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New Competition: Foreign Direct Investment and
Industrial Development in China
Since the late 1970s, China has transformed itself from a centrally planned
economy into an emerging market economy. During this process, new
forces of competition have been injected into Chinese industries through
imports, market entries and various institutional arrangements. Inward
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become a crucial channel through
which a new competitive force is introduced from abroad. By exploring both
the new, as well as the ‘old’, forces of competition and the new competitive
situations emerging in Chinese industries, this study assesses the institutional
and economic characteristics of the Chinese model of development and
provides a particular interpretation of the much heralded – but less
understood – ‘Chinese miracle’. 
The primary aim of this study is to examine inward FDI as an industrial
phenomenon – how the introduction of a new competitive force through FDI
inflows influences the development of industries. It offers an interdisci-
plinary effort to advance the understanding of the FDI impact on industrial
development in emerging markets. Based on a multidimensional, dynamic
and comparative approach to analysing industrial advancement, this study
investigates in particular the development of two Chinese industries –
the automotive industry and the electronics and ICT sector. It illustrates the
critical role of the policy environment in determining the effects of inward
FDI. The policy environment at the industry level is largely defined by both
entry restrictions and trade barriers. This study suggests that, under certain
circumstances, multinational corporations and domestic firms might
collaborate to dominate a market, for instance by establishing international
joint ventures. This reinforces the problems of market dominance, regulatory
capture and welfare losses. This study also seeks to help policy makers
understand the evolution of industries and to provide a fact base for decision
making at both industry and national level. It advocates a more sophisticated
and competition-friendly framework of public policy, which requires both
the introduction of new institutions and the upgrading of existing policy
instruments. This framework is vital to ensure the contestability of markets,
to reap the benefits of FDI, to tackle the negative effects of FDI and to
promote long-term sustainable industrial development.
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This study began with a preliminary research proposal made in 1999. Then the central 
research question was: what are the competitive/structural effects of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Chinese industries and what are the implications of these effects for 
public policy? Developments in recent years reinforced the importance of this type of 
research for the future economic advancement of China. The drafting of a Ph.D. thesis 
according to this research proposal formally began in early 2002. A conceptual framework 
has been gradually polished to incorporate the central notion of ‘industrial development’ 
by which I try to cover several interrelated dimensions of the development process of an 
industry. However, the focus has remained on the impact of FDI on competition and 
market structure in manufacturing industries.  
Although the research project was conceived as an investigation of the overall impact of 
FDI on industrial development, this study is decidedly about the competitive effects 
through which FDI influences industrial development in an emerging market economy. 
This explains the title of the book. The meaning of ‘new competition’ is manifold: first, 
new forces of competition have been injected into Chinese industries through imports, 
market entries and various institutional arrangements during China’s reform period. 
Consequently, new competitive situations emerged in Chinese industries. Inward FDI has 
become a crucial channel through which a new competitive force was introduced from 
abroad. Secondly, this study aims at a new understanding of competition in China’s reform 
era. By exploring both the new, as well as the ‘old’, forces of competition and the new 
competitive situations emerging in Chinese industries, this new understanding presents a 
particular interpretation of the much heralded – but less understood – ‘Chinese miracle’. In 
this sense, this study is an industrial-level extension of the theoretical argument that 
competition contributed significantly to China’s economic development in the reform 
period, as emphasised by several Chinese economists. Thirdly, based on concrete empirical 
evidence, this study provides new policy recommendations to the Chinese government 
advocating a more sophisticated and competition-friendly framework of public policy, 
which requires both the introduction of new institutions and the upgrading of existing 
policy instruments and benefits both the welfare of Chinese consumers and the 
competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. This framework is vital, I believe, to ensure the 
contestability of markets, to reap the benefits of FDI, to tackle the negative effects of FDI 
and to promote long-term sustainable industrial development. 
As suggested by Perkins (2002), what is so exiting about studying the Chinese economy 
is that one is dealing with really big issues. In the United States, for instance, a large 
number of economists are analyzing with great sophistication how to make (perhaps) 
already efficient markets slightly more efficient. In China, a much smaller number of 
well-trained economists are studying the far more complex problems of what kind of 
institutions the country should have and how to create them and make them work well. 
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Although China can learn from the institutions in developed countries, it cannot simply 
copy them. For now, as further argued by Perkins, economists need to address the truly big 
issues of structural change in developing countries in general and in China in particular. 
The third big issue proposed by Perkins, namely the ‘optimal’ industrial organisation for 
China, is closely related to the theme of this study.  
Inward FDI has imposed a significant impact on the industrial organisation in China, 
which has become one of the most popular investment destinations in the world. China has 
sucked in US$ 500 billion in FDI inflows. It has already become the largest recipient of 
FDI in the world since 2002. Actively attracting FDI inflows becomes an integral element 
of the Chinese model of economic development. Aggregately, inward FDI has introduced a 
crucial competitive force into the Chinese economy and contributed to the development of 
China’s private sector. At the industry level, however, the exact effects of inward FDI and 
MNC presence on market competition and industrial development remain unclear. By 
addressing this gap, the study presents an empirical work associated with the validity of a 
policy framework established to maximise the benefits of FDI for industrial development 
while mitigating the costs. The establishment of such a policy framework requires the 
support of sound policy-oriented research. Analytical works such as this can help to 
explicate the relevance of competition-friendly government policies and therefore 
contribute to develop such an appropriate legal and administrative framework in China. 
Not surprisingly, given the rapid pace of change, most of the available accounts of the 
Chinese industries failed to adequately reflect the dynamics in the Chinese economy. One 
crucial feature of this study is therefore a deep up-to-date microeconomic analysis at the 
industry level. 
Aims 
The primary aim of this study is to examine inward FDI as an industrial phenomenon – 
how the introduction of a new competitive force through FDI inflows influences the 
development of industries. This study contains three general streams of argumentation. 
First, this study suggests that, under certain circumstances, Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) and domestic firms might collaborate to dominate a market, for instance by 
establishing international joint ventures, which reinforces the problems of market 
dominance, regulatory capture and welfare losses. These circumstances are largely 
characterised by restrictive government policies in addition to the strong presence of a 
state-owned sector. With regard to the potential anticompetitive effects of inward FDI, the 
traditional wisdom is that FDI may increase market concentration and lead to dominant 
positions of MNCs after entry by suppressing or crowding out domestic firms. The 
firm-specific advantages that the MNCs have may raise barrier to entry for local firms or 
make competition too strong for existing local firms and thus crowd them out, thereby 
increasing concentration and restricting competition. The findings of the case study on 
China’s passenger car industry (Chapter 6) challenge this proposition by pointing out the 
possibility of collaboration between MNCs and local firms. Based on a multidimensional 
and dynamic framework of analysing industrial development, this study examines the costs 
and causes of the lack of competition in the ‘protected’ industries in emerging market 
economies. The results suggest that the costs may be significant in most aspects of 
industrial development and consumers have to pay most of the prices. 
Secondly, this study seeks to illustrate the critical role of policy environment in 
determining the effects of inward FDI. It has been widely acknowledged that competitive 
conditions in industries may to a large extent determine the impact of FDI on economic 
development. However, evidence lacks at the industry level to support this argument. 
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Furthermore, how government policies influence the FDI impact on industrial 
development remains largely unclear, particularly for developing countries and emerging 
market economies where government regulation still prevails. Traditionally trade policy 
has been the central concern. However, the simple dichotomy in development economics 
of ‘import substitution’ versus ‘export promotion’ does not provide convincing 
explanations. By examining the nature of competition in Chinese industries, this study 
supports the argument that, in developing countries, anticompetitive restrictions still come 
from paternalistic government interventions in general and restrictions on market entry in 
particular. The automotive and electronics & ICT industries in China (Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7) provide two contrasting cases and present two basic models of industrial 
development and associated industrial policies: a more open and competitive model and a 
more closed and protectionist model. The two models can be generally classified according 
to the degrees of both entry restrictions and trade barriers. The two models show distinctly 
different performance. An a posteriori conclusion is that the lower the entry and trade 
barriers, the more competitive the market will be and the more positive the impact of FDI 
on industrial development. However, it remains debatable whether the performance 
differences between the two contrasting cases were caused by government policies or by 
other factors, such as industrial characteristics, initial conditions and different global 
configurations. 
In addition to theory building, this study also seeks to help policy makers understand 
the evolution of industries and to provide a fact base for decision making at both the 
industrial and national level. The effectiveness of industrial policy is generally supported 
by the ‘multiple case’ case study on China’s electronics and ICT industry in general and 
the telecom equipment industry in specific (Chapter 7). The risks and uncertainties 
associated with the formulation and implementation of industrial policies are also 
highlighted by the case of China’s passenger car industry (Chapter 6). In the context of an 
emerging market economy, as demonstrated by the Chinese case, the risks of industrial 
policy may stem from various sources: first, unnecessary regulation may be imposed in the 
name of industrial policy; second, therefore, any type of competition mechanisms may be 
seriously hindered by these regulatory policies; third, selective support towards a limited 
number of firms may lead to reverse selection and the sustainability of inefficient firms; 
fourth, the focus on the development of in particular large enterprises may lead to 
regulatory capture that in turn results in the neglect or under-presentation of consumer 
interests, hence causing welfare losses for the society as a whole; fifth, the positive effects 
of inward FDI and private entry may be hampered or even reversed by specific regulatory 
measures. Competition policy may have an important role to play in tackling these 
problems, both in building public support for procompetitive government policy through 
competition advocacy and in promoting a competitive market environment by countering 
private restrictions on competition. Therefore, competition policy is proposed as a 
necessary part of a policy framework to ensure that inward FDI, in combination with other 
forces, can play a positive role in promoting industrial development.  
Thirdly, this study dedicates to advancing the understanding of the FDI impact on 
competition and industrial development in emerging markets. There are a number of 
possible approaches one could take to such a project. One approach would be to begin with 
certain predetermined theories and then to use China to test these theories. China is an 
important test case for general theories and such an approach has obvious advantages. 
However, relying in the context of a very large transition economy on predetermined 
theories drawn from the experience of very different economies is dangerous. This would 
probably imply improper deductive reasoning. Furthermore, existing theories on the 
 vi 
relationship between FDI and industrial development is generally static and cannot really 
explain nor map the dynamic process though which FDI influence industrial development 
in emerging markets. The approach adopted by this study is somewhat different. It does not 
expressly start with the objective of testing China against any predetermined theory. Rather, 
this study addresses a number of theoretical gaps, develops a more dynamic theory on the 
basis of an eclectic use of theories (in Part II), and then tests a number of Chinese 
industries against this dynamic theory (in Part III).  
This study (Section 4.3) seeks to extend the traditional static approach to the 
relationship between FDI and industrial concentration to include the dynamics by 
introducing a crucial question: namely, how market share achievements of foreign firms 
are determined in emerging markets over time? Although the traditional static analysis 
highlights the core of the structural problem that FDI could pose on domestic industries, 
markets, particularly those in developing countries, are constantly undergoing change. The 
FDI impact on competition is dynamic in nature and should therefore be studied 
longitudinally. However, there is very little empirical work on this issue, due in part to the 
lack of a conceptual design and succinct testable hypotheses. An inquiry on the sources of 
market dominance in China’s passenger car industry (Chapter 6) suggests that the foreign 
market share achievements of MNCs can be modelled in terms of firm level strategic 
variables and institutional characteristics. This study (Section 4.4) tries to extend the 
dynamic approach as well. It examines the relationship between FDI intensity of industries 
and Research and Development (R&D) expenditure of firms, which can be considered as a 
practical starting point for testing R&D spillover effects from FDI. There have rarely been 
studies that consider the spillover effects from inward FDI on R&D activities of domestic 
firms. The FDI spillover literature is mainly focusing on the relation between FDI in a host 
country and the productivity of host-country industries. In this stream of research, the 
determinants of productivity are the central concern and technological progress is usually 
measured as total factor productivity. This study provides an alternative approach by 
examining directly the FDI impact on R&D behaviour of firms and applies it to China’s 
electronics and ICT industry (Chapter 7).  
The ownership advantage of MNCs has been one of the cornerstones of the economic 
theory of FDI. However, competitive advantages of MNCs that stem from their entry 
strategies for foreign markets rather than from their ownership of proprietary assets are 
generally overlooked in the international business literature (Section 4.3 provides a more 
expansive view). In the traditional view, in addition, domestic firms only have inherent 
advantages associated with operating in their own environment. However, it should be 
recognised that competitive advantages of MNC affiliates may be eroded and domestic 
firms may develop their ownership advantages in the forms of proprietary assets as well. 
The process during which this takes place has not been conceptualised to capture the 
essence of this evolutionary path of industrial development. To overcome the gap, this 
study (Section 4.4) develops a model of industrial development in which the overall 
structure of an industry evolves up a ladder, which reflects in general the enhancement of 
the competitiveness of domestic firms. The processes of the endogenous industrial 
development without inward FDI and the exogenous industrial development with the 
‘catalysis’ of inward FDI are compared. The model may facilitate the investigation of the 
interrelationships among MNCs, domestic firms and government policies. The functions of 
various policy instruments (as components of an integrated policy framework) at different 
stages of industrial development are illustrated in this model. The result of the ‘multiple 
case’ case study on China’s electronics and ICT industry in general and the telecom 
equipment industry in particular (Chapter 7) presents a replication with which this model 
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can be considered robust and worthy of continued investigation and interpretation. 
Methodology 
To address both theoretical gaps and methodological problems faced by the research 
project, this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach. The problem with the traditional 
approaches is that they do not reveal in detail the nature of the dynamic process of 
industrial development. More importantly, the role and the nature of government policies 
and firm strategies remain largely overlooked. To overcome these problems, the study tries 
to establish a combination of two normally distinct disciplines: economics and business 
administration. Insights and inspiration have been drawn from a wide spectrum of 
disciplinaries such as industrial organisation, development economics, strategic 
management and international business. With regard to industrial dynamics, the strategies 
and practices of business firms should not be neglected when we examine the role played 
by the new competitive force from abroad for industrial development. Facing the intricacy 
of firm-level analysis and the missing links between the micro- and macro-level evidence, 
this study adopt a ‘big business’ approach following, for instance, Ruigrok and Van Tulder 
(1995). A research strategy is adopted thereafter to focus on large enterprises, both 
domestic and from abroad, rather than on small and medium-sized firms.  
Contextualisation offers an opportunity for the further development of international 
business theory. The inherent characteristics of the ‘Chinese context’ provide insights for 
such development (Child and Tse, 2001). A deeper and more comprehensive understanding 
of the economic development process of China in the reform years provides a general 
ground for our specific study on FDI, competition and industrial development in China. 
Only by starting from a full picture at the macro level appropriate in-depth analyses at 
lower levels can be selected and conducted in order to get convincing evidence and 
provide valuable policy recommendations. That is why this study dedicates a long 
introductory part (Part I) to identify the inherent characteristics of the Chinese model of 
economic development, to set a research agenda to investigate the impact of FDI on 
competition and industrial development, and to address basic research strategies and 
methodological concerns. It is important for China researchers to situate their studies in the 
specific Chinese context. I do hope the introductory chapter (Chapter 1) can be useful for 
other economic and business studies on China and save time for other authors. A basic 
understanding of the Chinese model of economic development, based on comparative 
studies between China and countries with some similarity can always be considered as an 
‘infrastructure’ for China studies. 
The underlying premises of this study are that industrial development is multi-faceted, 
that inward FDI can influence industrial development through various channels, and that 
competition is one of the major channels through which FDI influences industrial 
development. Focusing on only one aspect of the process of industrial development may 
result in misleading conclusions and simplistic policy recommendations. Considering 
multiple dimensions of industrial development, the circumspect case study approach is 
particularly valuable because it is possible to combine qualitative and quantitative analysis 
in both an insightful and a comprehensive way. As this study focuses on the competition 
mechanism through which inward FDI impacts on industrial development, the relationship 
between FDI and competition is the central concern of this study. The models exploring a 
relation between FDI and competition have typically involved a cross-sectional equation 
with a measure of FDI as one of the determinants of concentration. This standard 
cross-sectional analysis aims to verify the association of FDI with market concentration. 
However, several critical problems exist with this approach. First, a cross-sectional study is 
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usually based on the standard industrial classification, which ignores the problem of 
‘relevant market’. Secondly, the cross-sectional studies use market concentration as a 
measure of competition and neglect the contestability of the markets and other crucial 
aspects that are associated with the nature of market competition. Thirdly, the 
cross-sectional approach cannot clearly define the causality or the direction of influence 
between the two variables. The case study approach can avoid these problems. Therefore a 
‘two-case’ case study approach is adopted, supplemented by an overall assessment of the 
impact of FDI on China’s industrial sector (Chapter 5). Eisenhardt (1989) emphasised the 
role of case studies in building theory and proposed a tactic to search cross-case patterns 
by selecting pairs of cases. The comparative ‘two-case’ empirical framework is integrally 
complemented with single- and multiple- case studies. The comparative case study 
concerns the general research question of this study while the within-case analyses tackle 
the detailed ones – for instance, what are the determines of market dominance of firms and 
what influence the R&D expenditure of them. The analysis of within-case data is mainly 
quantitative, utilising both cross-sectional and panel data econometrics to test hypotheses 
concerning the research question(s). Because the two case studies covers almost the entire 
history of a particular industry with FDI presence and utilising panel data econometrics, 
the methodology can be considered as a longitudinal case study at the industry level. The 
within-case data analysis is generally at the firm level. 
Limitations 
By focusing on several specific industries in one economy, this study risks criticism for the 
causal inference. This problem of generalisability first comes from the level-two inference, 
which describes the process of generalising from case study findings to theory (see Yin, 
2003). The problem of generalisability faced by the within-case econometric study also 
comes from the level-one inference – the statistical sampling-based generalisability, which 
describes the process of generalising from a sample to population characteristics. Although 
a consistent pattern seems to emerge from a preliminary review of a large number of 
Chinese manufacturing industries, the performance consequence of government policies in 
other industries rather than these two relatively extreme cases is less clear-cut. It is, 
therefore, important to leave room for in-depth case studies on other industries, particular 
those that have a longer history of MNC presence. The theory emerging from both the 
comparative case study and the within-case analysis is testable. The validity of the theory 
needs replication and extension. If a dataset of a sample of a large amount of appropriately 
defined industries becomes available, econometric investigations could be conducted to 
explore the interrelationship between policy environment (degree of entry restrictions and 
trade barriers), degree of competition, inward FDI (degree of foreign presence) and 
industrial performance, thus testing the validity of the theory. This is one of the subsequent 
future studies planned by the SCOPE research team at the Rotterdam School of 
Management (Department of Business-Society Management). The SCOPE expert centre 
was established in 1997 under the overall supervision of Prof. Rob van Tulder. Parts of the 
SCOPE database have been constructed in close collaboration with the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 
China provides a rather unique context due to its extremely large market size, its 
distinctive features of economic transition, its geopolitical importance and its 
unprecedented model of economic development. Therefore it is debatable whether the 
conclusions of this study are applicable to other developing countries. Further studies 
might examine industries in different developing countries and with different degrees of 
industrial dynamics. An international comparative approach is a sound strategy. 
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Comparison between relatively comparable countries such as the so-called BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) seems the most practical. A recent comparative studies 
conducted by Mckinsey Global Institute (2003) on five industries in four major developing 
economies (Brazil, Mexico, China and India) is a notable effort. Repeating the ‘core 
companies’ research (conducted by the SCOPE research team) – and thereby making a 
distinction between foreign and domestic firms – for those countries seems a promising 
research venue. In case that these national studies can be complemented with an 
assessment of competitive situations at a global level in the relevant industries, a 
macro-micro link can not only be analytically established nationally, but also 
internationally. Consequently, the search for appropriate institutions at the national level 
needs complementary research after appropriate bilateral and multilateral institutional 
arrangements. In case that the Chinese (and Eastern Asian) example holds for other 
developing countries and transition economies, the multilateral trading system (WTO) 
needs to be supplemented by a multilateral agreement on competition. Whether this will be 
ever established remains highly uncertain, because all countries represent unique 
combinations of the institutions of trade, competition, industrial and technology policies. 
The search should not so much be after optimal institutions, but after appropriate 
institutions. In the case of China the latter seems to imply a particular combination of 
various policy instruments designed and implemented with sufficient considerations of 
both the particular Chinese context and the changing international environment. 
Researchers can hardly keep track of political and economic change. This provides an 
immense limitation to supporting relevant institution building at both national and 
international levels. 
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ince the beginning of its process of reform and openness in the late 1970s, China 
has transformed itself from a centrally planned economy into an emerging market 
economy. At the same time the Chinese economy achieved almost a 10 percent 
average annual growth rate. During the 1978-2000 period, China’s per capita GDP more 
than quintupled and the living standard of Chinese people on average improved 
significantly – although serious inequalities still persist between parts of the population. 
Processes of economic change are always multidimensional. When industrialisation meets 
transition and internationalisation in China’s reform era, however, it provides a particularly 
complicated environment for business operations and government policy-making. It, 
therefore, also provides a special context for economic and business studies. This 
introductory part aims at a comprehensive understanding of the specific context of the 
Chinese economy in the reform era. By identifying the inherent characteristics of the 
Chinese model of economic development, this part sets a research agenda to investigate the 
impact of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on competition and industrial 
development in China and to examine the policy implications of this impact. Basic 
research strategy and methodological concerns are presented in this part and the societal 
relevance of this study is highlighted. 
China’s prominent economic performance since 1978 could be partly attributed to the 
adoption of the development strategies previously successfully implemented by other 
countries, in particular Japan and the newly industrialised economies in East Asia. China 
not only shares some common (cultural, political and economic) features with its East 
Asian neighbours, but has also actively learned from the development experience of them. 
On the other hand, as a transition economy, China began its rapid economic growth at a 
very different starting point from that of its East Asian neighbours. China faced the 
unprecedented challenge of transforming a centrally planned economy into a market 
economy. The Chinese model of economic development is a hybrid form of strategies 
advocated by different streams of development thinking. China represents the ‘openness 
driven’ growth model pioneered by some East Asian economies, but to some extent goes 
even further. The Chinese model has been increasingly characterised by the collaboration 
between developmental state and Multinational Corporations (MNCs). China’s FDI 
policies have been proactive, both at the central level and at the levels of province and city, 
thus facilitating a large amount of inward FDI, which presents a significantly different 
pattern from Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, China followed the government-led 
development model of Japan and South Korea, in which industrial policy played a central 
role.  
Competition plays a vital role in economic growth and structural transformation in 
China’s reform period. To some extent, the process of transition is a process of introducing 
S 
  
competition – both domestic and international – into the economic system. The promotion 
and maintenance of competition were based on the function of relevant transitional 
institutions. While competition policy is widely recognised as a basic policy instrument to 
safeguard competition and is acknowledged as a necessary institution to support the market, 
a clearly defined formal competition policy is still lacking in China. After twenty years of 
rapid economic transition, China can be considered to have ample opportunities to 
continue its high growth performance in the coming years. Whether this growth potential 
can be realised largely depends on whether the institutional reform is able to keep pace 
with economic development. Although free trade and market entry have acted as a 
substitute for competition policy, there are critical concerns for the future of the Chinese 
economy: to what extent has the previous introduction of competition in the Chinese 
economy delivered positive effects; to what extent should competition be further 
maintained and promoted and can this be done by transitional institutions without a clearly 
defined formal competition policy, as has previously been the case?  
Actively attracting FDI inflows is an integral element of the Chinese model of 
economic development. Aggregately, inward FDI has introduced a new competitive force 
into the Chinese economy and contributed to the development of China’s private sector. At 
the industry level, however, the exact effects of inward FDI and particularly the presence 
of MNCs on market competition and industrial development remain unclear. What has 
been the role played by the new competitive force from abroad for industrial development? 
What has been the impact of FDI through the mechanism of competition rather than others 
such as spillovers and linkage? What are the policy implications of the FDI impact on 
competition and industrial development? FDI may deliver considerable benefits to 
industrial development. However, the potential costs should not be neglected. Furthermore, 
FDI cannot by itself promote long-term industrial development, which is largely dependent 
upon the well-functioning domestic markets. The traditional wisdom based on the 
experience of developing countries is that FDI can increase the contestability of domestic 
market at entry, but may also increase market concentration and lead to dominant positions 
as well as anticompetitive practices of MNCs after entry mainly by suppressing domestic 
firms. Does this hold true in the specific economic and industrial context in Chinese 
industries, which is characterised by the strong presence of a state sector and the 
prevalence of government intervention? The primary aim of this study is to examine FDI 
as an industrial phenomenon – how the introduction of a new competitive force through 
FDI inflows influences the development of Chinese industries. This study further seeks to 
illustrate the role of policy environment in determining the FDI effects on industrial 
development.  
 1 The Context 
 
 
 
 
his introductory chapter presents a multi-dimensional analysis aimed at a deeper and 
more comprehensive understanding of the economic development process in China 
during the reform period. China’s track record is compared to those of other transition 
economies and developing countries in order to come to an assessment of the uniqueness 
of the ‘Chinese model’ of economic development and to explain its relevance to the current 
theory and policy debate. This provides a general ground for our specific study on inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), competition and industrial development in China. 
Concurrent processes of transition, internationalisation and industrialisation took place 
over a relatively short period, providing a rather unique context to explore. As Toyne and 
Nigh (1998) suggested, contextualisation offers an opportunity for the further development 
of international business theory. The inherent characteristics of the ‘Chinese context’ 
provide insights for such development (Child and Tse, 2001). It is important for 
researchers to situate their economic studies in this particular context. What needs to be 
done, therefore, is to identify the inherent characteristics of the dynamic context of China 
in the reform era. Identifying the characteristics of the Chinese model of economic 
development is especially crucial to research projects on China in general and for this 
study in particular. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 presents a general assessment of the 
economic performance of China during the reform period. This section also provides a 
basic framework to analyse economic development process in China – which is 
characterised by the coexistence and co-evolution of processes of transition, 
internationalisation and industrialisation. Based upon this analytical framework, the next 
three sections examine the processes of transition, internationalisation and industrialisation 
respectively. A comparative approach is adopted to identify the inherent characteristics of 
the Chinese context. In Section 1.2, China is compared with other transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with regard to the process and 
performance of economic transition. In Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 the processes of 
internationalisation and industrialisation of China is compared with those of other 
developing countries, in particular some East Asian economies (the ‘East Asian Miracle’ 
as put forward by the World Bank). In the last section of this chapter, Section 1.5, 
concluding remarks are made addressing the question whether the Chinese model of 
economic development is unique or China is merely a follower of the best practices. The 
defining elements of the Chinese model are identified. 
1.1 The Economic Performance of China in the Reform Era: A Miracle in the 
Making? 
1978 saw a watershed in the history of the People’s Republic of China, dividing two 
T 
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continuous but distinguished phases: Mao’s China and after. With strong ideological and 
totalitarian characteristics, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
transformed a traditional China into a state-centred socialist nation in which the Party State 
dominated all sections of the society. An agricultural economy was moulded into a 
Soviet-style central-planning economic system. In 1978, an epochal Party congress – The 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress – shifted the emphasis from the ideological ‘Class 
Struggle’ to a more pragmatic notion of ‘Economic Construction’. Mao’s era ended, 
leaving an underdeveloped China with an absolutist ideology as the outset of the reform. In 
the reform era, China transformed itself from a centrally planned economy to an emerging 
market economy and at the same time achieved the highest economic growth rate in the 
world. With an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 9.52 percent 
between 1980 and 2000, China ranked highest in all the countries and territories in the 
world (see Table 1-1).  
Table 1-1 Top 10 in GDP growth, 1980-2000 
Rank Country Annual GDP growth rate (percent) Notes 
1 Equatorial Guinea* 14.84 86-00 
2 China 9.52  
3 Maldives* 8.92 85-00 
4 Aruba* 8.00 88-94 
5 Oman* 7.94 80-95 
6 Singapore 7.67  
7 Botswana 7.65  
8 South Korea 6.98  
9 Bhutan* 6.94 81-00 
10 Malaysia 6.64  
           Source: World Bank. 
Note: * No complete data from 1980 to 2000; the actual years considered is 
indicated in the notes. 
Meanwhile, China to some extent avoided a macroeconomic problem that is normally 
attached to periods of rapid growth – high inflation. South Korea, for instance, achieved a 
high economic growth rate during the 1960s and 1970s at the cost of high inflation – 
wholesale price increased 18 percent annually from 1972 to 1979 and 12 percent annually 
between 1962 and 1971.1 Figure 1-1 illustrates the average of annual GDP growth rates 
and inflation rates of countries and territories for the 1980-2000 period.2 It provides a 
clear view of the – literally – ‘outstanding’ macroeconomic performance of the Chinese 
economy during the reform period. 
 
                                                        
1 According to Stern et al. (1995). 
2 Totally includes 144 countries and territories. The countries and territories with the averaged inflation rate 
beyond 90 percent are not included. 
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Figure 1-1 Average annual GDP growth rate and inflation rate, 1980-2000 
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            Source: World Bank. 
Despite the rapid economic growth, China still remains a developing country with GDP 
per capita of 824 US$ in 2000 measured in official exchange rate and of 3976 US$ 
measured in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The same numbers in 1980 were 168 
US$ and 464 US$ respectively.3 Based upon both measures of GDP, the growth of GDP 
per capita of China ranked first in all countries and territories (see Table 1-2). In the 
beginning years of the new millennium, China was able to sustain its fast pace of economic 
growth. GDP per capita increased to 1090 US$ in 2003.4 If measured in terms of PPP, 
GDP per capita was approaching US$ 5000. With respect to the demographic scale of 
China – with a population of over 1.2 billion – these growth rates of GDP per capita can 
indeed be considered exceptional.5 Although it can be considered as a ‘Chinese Miracle’ 
of economic growth, China’s economic expansion in recent decades still does not yet 
                                                        
3 GDP per capita data is according to the World Bank. 
4 According to the NBSC. 
5 The accuracy and reliability of China’s GDP statistics have been questioned. Rawski (2001), for instance, 
suggested that the figure on China’s GDP growth since 1998 was doubtful. This pessimistic view, which drew 
wide attention from the media in recent years, was mainly based on the argument that there was inconsistency 
between GDP growth rates and variables such as energy consumption and freight transportation. It was argued 
that a ‘great wind of falsification and embellishment’ resulted in distortion of data and a statistical bubble. 
However, as argued by Rawski (2001), China’s pre-1998 growth figures ‘were in the ballpark, although it may 
have been a large ballpark’. Other scholars, such as Holz (2002), suggested that China’s statistical system, while 
far from perfect, was systematically improving and that the official GDP growth rate was reasonably reliable. 
Some scholars pointed out that Chinese statistics underestimated by a wide margin due to the fact that most of the 
low-ball estimates ignored the service sector. In 2003, the newly emerged discrepancy between GDP growth rates 
and energy consumption led to a new round of scepticism but in the other direction – the manipulated GDP 
growth figure lower than the actual level. 
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match that of post-war Japan6 and South Korea. 
Table 1-2 Top 10 in GDP per capita growth, 1980-2000 
PPP (current international $) Current US$ 
Rank Country 1980 2000 Growth (percent) Rank Country 1980 2000
Growth 
(percent) 
1 China 464 3,976 756.90 1 China 168 824 391.59 
2 South Korea 3,037 17,380 472.28 2 South Korea 3,910 13,062 234.05 
3 Ireland 5,841 29,866 411.32 3 St. Kitts and Nevis 2,555 6,830 167.32 
4 St. Kitts and Nevis 2,447 12,510 411.24 4 Singapore 11,048 28,230 155.51 
5 Luxembourg 10,964 50,061 356.59 5 Ireland 10,894 27,741 154.63 
6 Thailand 1,476 6,402 333.74 6 Thailand 1,117 2,805 151.09 
7 Malta 4,067 17,273 324.71 7 Mauritius 1,802 4,429 145.77 
8 Grenada 1,809 7,580 319.02 8 Botswana 1,678 3,951 135.41 
9 Mauritius 2,403 10,017 316.85 9 Bhutan 232 532 129.72 
10 Antigua and Barbuda 2,612 10,541 303.56 10 Luxembourg 24,832 56,372 127.01 
Source: World Bank. 
China and India – the two most populous countries in the world – contained 38 percent 
of the world’s population in 2000. The economies of both countries performed well, but 
China has been doing better on most accounts of economic development (see Table 1-3 for 
examples). In 1980, the per capita GDP of China was 27 percent lower than that of India. 
Twenty years later, the per capita GDP of China is 79 percent higher than that of India. 
China’s superior economic growth and increasing openness (see Section 1.3) has made it 
far more significant to the world economy than India. At the end of 2003, China eclipsed 
Japan on a monthly basis to become the world’s third largest trader, while India was 
around 30th.7 Another comparison between China and Russia also illustrates the high 
performance of China’s economic growth. Both countries entered a transition process from 
a planed to a market economy in a comparable time frame, but China achieved sustained 
economic growth, while Russia suffered a major economic collapse. In total GDP terms, in 
1990 China was 27 percent smaller than Russia but ten years later China was 189 percent 
bigger than Russia (see Table 1-3). Even the life expectancy – which started at comparable 
levels – in the two countries diverged considerably. 
                                                        
6 See Wolf, ‘The long march to prosperity: why China can maintain its explosive rate of growth for another two 
decades’, Financial Times, December 9, 2003. In the period 1950-1973, Japan’s manufacturing production rose 
about 13 percent annually and GDP at 10 percent a year. In the same period, Japan’s share in world exports of 
manufacture rose by 10 percentage points. 
7 India was the world’s 30th largest merchandise exporter in 2001 (see Wolf and Luce, ‘India’s slowing growth: 
why a hobbled economy cannot meet the country’s needs’, Financial Times April 4, 2003). 
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Table 1-3 Development performance 1980-2000: China, India and Russia 
Country China India Russia 
Year 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
GDP (US$ billion) * 163.6 397.6 1,041.2 156.7 275.2 467.3 439.5 543.7 359.6 
GDP, PPP  420.7 1,474.4 4,724.2 528.7 1,361.4 2,772.7 / 1,186.6 983.9 
GDP per capita (US$) * 166.7 350.3 824.8 228.0 323.9 459.9 3,161.5 3,666.1 2,470.8 
GDP per capita, PPP 430.0 1,300.0 3,740.0 770.0 1,600.0 2,730.0 / 8,000.0 6,760.0 
Illiteracy rate 32.9 21.7 14.8 59.0 50.7 42.8 1.2 0.8 0.4 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 66.8 68.9 70.3 54.2 59.1 62.8 67.1 68.9 65.3 
Population (millions) 981.2 1,135.2 1,262.5 687.3 849.5 1,015.9 139.0 148.3 145.6 
Source: World Bank. 
Note: * Constant 1995 US$. 
How and to what extent do economists understand this ‘Miracle’? What can we learn 
from this? There are two main streams of explanations for the ‘Chinese Miracle’. One 
stream explains the miracle with the conventional wisdom in economics. It contends that 
China’s good economic performance since 1978 is caused by the same factors behind other 
successful development stories, in particular the rapid growth of the East Asian economies. 
In this view, China has learned from other countries. The other stream emphasises China’s 
economic exceptionalism. It claims that China’s success is the result of an experimentation 
that fostered the emergence of new institutional forms and development strategies that 
have promoted growth. In this view, other countries could possibly learn from the ‘lessons 
from China’.  
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have found that economic growth is 
determined by a broad spectrum of factors.8 Harrod made the first major contribution to 
aggregate growth theory. The Harrod-Domar analysis leads to concentration on savings 
and investment as the determinants of economic growth. These aggregate growth models 
were extended in the 1950s and 1960s with Solow playing a leading role. In the 
neoclassical framework pioneered by Solow (1956), the rate of economic growth is 
determined by the rate of accumulation of capital and labour and by exogenous 
technological progress. 9  The standard growth accounting approach uses regression 
analysis to isolate and quantify contributions to economic growth. This approach has been 
widely applied in the literature to decompose the growth rate of aggregate output into 
contributions from the growth of capital and labour inputs and technological progress and 
other factors. Following this approach, researchers explored the sources of China’s 
economic growth, which have become the subject of an ongoing debate focusing on 
whether China’s growth during the reform period is driven principally by factor 
accumulation or by Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. Many researchers argued that 
the productivity growth has played a significant positive role (Chow, 1993; Borensztein 
and Ostry, 1996; Hu and Khan, 1997; Wang and Yao, 2002). On the other side, Krugman 
(1994b) argued that, as other East Asian economies, China depended heavily on a massive 
                                                        
8 The vast literature on growth theory generally falls into three groups: the early post-Keynesian growth models 
(the Harrod-Domar model and its variants), the neoclassical models (the Solow model and its variants), and the 
more recent endogenous (new) growth models (Romer-Lucas type models). 
9 Beginning with Solow, the dominant paradigm in the development economics for several decades has been one 
of inter-country convergence. This fundamental model in neoclassical tradition has led to an explosion of 
literature, largely empirical, on the subject. By the law of diminishing returns to inputs, poor countries in which 
capital is scarce should exhibit higher rates of return to capital. Consequently, assuming that savings and fertility 
rates are the same across countries, per capita incomes in poor countries should grow faster, and eventually living 
standards in all countries converge. 
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increase in input with only small improvement in productivity. Young (2000) claimed that 
the productivity performance of China’s non-agricultural sector during the reform period 
was moderate and the productivity growth only accounted for an insignificant proportion 
of economic growth. Other studies on industrial TFP presented evidence of substantial 
TFP growth during the reform period (Chen et al., 1988; Jefferson et al., 1996). Based 
upon the endogenous growth theory, an economy-wide study conducted by Wu (2000) 
suggested that China’s economic growth in the 1980s was principally due to efficiency 
improvement and growth in inputs, while technological progress became a major factor in 
the 1990s. 
The growth accounting analyses provide only a simple decomposition of output growth 
into its sources, without explaining through what mechanism these changes took place. It 
is important to go beyond growth accounting, which is incapable to be a practical guide to 
policies, to provide convincing explanations for China’s rapid economic growth. From the 
perspective of both the traditional development economics and recent developments in 
endogenous growth theory, the basic steady state properties of the Solow model are 
unsatisfactory. This approach generates a particular set of attitudes towards economic 
policy by stressing the role of factors, such as savings and population growth, which might 
actually be symptoms rather than causes of under-development. They direct policy 
concerns in superficial and often wrong directions, missing deeper sources of the problem 
(Mookherjee and Ray, 1999). A series of major structural changes have had a profound 
impact on the Chinese economy in the reform era. Among them, two aspects of structural 
changes have provided major impetus for China’s rapid development since 1978: the 
reform and openness, or denominated differently, transition and internationalisation. 
Through these two structural changes, the Chinese economy has evolved from a centrally 
planned to a market-oriented economy and from a closed to an open economy. At the same 
time, China experienced a rapid process of industrialisation. When industrialisation meets 
transition and internationalisation, it becomes rather complicated to identify the sources of 
economic growth. Nevertheless, it seems that China has utilised these potential sources of 
economic growth particularly well and achieved relatively successful economic 
development.  
The processes of transition, internationalisation and industrialisation deepened 
simultaneously in a relatively short period of time. The three processes interacted with 
each other and experienced a process of co-evolution. The coexistence/co-evolution of 
transition, internationalisation and industrialisation presents the basic ingredient for the 
uniqueness of the Chinese context. It has specific implications for business operations and 
government policy-making. As a transition economy, China shares some similarities with 
other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Former Soviet Union 
(FSU), but it has had a different transition process and performance. On the other hand, 
with a rapid process of internationalisation and industrialisation, China looks more like its 
East Asian neighbours, following a similar model of economic development, but with 
strong characteristics associated with China’s particular economic structure and policy 
orientation. It seems that China’s occupies a rather unique position as a development 
model. Figure 1-2 illustrates a basic framework for understanding the Chinese context and 
seeks to position the Chinese development model vis-à-vis other economies, particularly 
transition economies and East Asian countries. The next sections will elaborate these 
preliminary arguments, in order to further assess the uniqueness of the Chinese context and 
development model. 
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Figure 1-2 Transition, internationalisation and industrialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The complex and dynamic nature of this mixture of transition, internationalisation and 
industrialisation provides a unique context for relevant economics and business research. 
The understanding of this context requires deep insights into the process of economic 
change in over 20 years, looking from manifold perspectives. The understanding of the 
interaction/co-evolution of transition, internationalisation and industrialisation provides an 
additional analytical challenge due to their mutual interaction and impact. The experience 
of some other transition economies demonstrates that without carefully planning and 
proper strategy implementation, the transition process could lead to economic and social 
disaster, severely jeopardising the potential positive effects of economic 
internationalisation. Careful methodological considerations are crucial to face the 
challenges. First, an inter-disciplinary approach is needed. Many ideas can be borrowed 
from international economics, industrial organisation and new institutional economics. 
Secondly, to avoid the typical problem of getting general conclusions from a specific case 
study, comparative studies between China and countries with some similarity are required. 
The analytical and detailed study of a particular country or a group of countries is a 
practical way to learn about the nature of economic development and the processes of it. 
Compared with a cross-country regression, this approach is more time-consuming but 
yields deeper insights (Stern, 1989). The problem is that a few examples may be 
misleading when drawing general conclusions. Thus, in the next three sections, China’s 
track record will be compared to two particular groups of countries that China can be 
considered to belong to – the transition economies and the East Asian countries. 
1.2 China’s Economic Transition: A Comparison 
The 20th century witnessed two great economic and social experiments: the socialist 
experiment that began, in its more extreme form, in the former Soviet Union in 1917; and 
the experiment moving back from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The 
latter, the economic transition, has been suggested as one of the most important 
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experiments in economics ever occurred – a massive and relatively sudden change in the 
rules of the game in economies.10 The principle feature of the transition process is 
institutional change. Institutions are the rules of the game in the society and they affect 
economic performance by determining the cost of transacting and producing (North, 1990). 
The institutional defects of central planning stem from the lack of incentives 11 , 
competition 12 , price mechanism 13 , hard budget constraints 14  and decentralised 
decision-making. 15  These institutional defects could seriously affect economic 
performance and were among the key determinants of the failure of the socialist 
experiment.16 The defining characteristic of the ‘transition economies’ has been their 
decision to abandon central planning as the principle mechanism of resource allocation and 
to move to market-oriented economies with private ownership of the means of production. 
The countries referred as ‘transition economies’ comprise 31 countries in Europe and Asia 
(see Table 1-4). Transition economies can be classified into four groups: 1) EU accession 
countries17, 2) other Eastern European countries, 3) FSU countries (not including Baltic 
countries that are included in the first group), 4) East Asian transitional countries. The first 
three groups totally include 27 transition economies in (Central and) Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union (EEFSU). 
                                                        
10 See Stiglitz, ‘Whither reform? Ten years of the transition’, World Bank, Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, 1999. 
11 According to Hayek (1948), the practical feasibility of socialism is not only a purely technical issues; it was a 
political-economic problem tied to the nature of the motivations and incentives of individuals and organisations. 
See Chapter 1 of Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a survey of incentives in economic thoughts.  
12 Central planning eliminates rivalry among economic agents – rivalry that is a dynamic form of competition 
distinct from the static notion of competition in the neoclassical economics (Lavoie, 1985).  
13 The price mechanism includes: 1) a demand –and-supply driven system of prices determination, 2) price 
responsiveness of firms. Both are lack in the centrally planned economy. The phenomenon of the price system 
has been the focus of the economic study since the classical economists such as Smith, Ricardo and Mill.  
14 A term coined by Kornai (1986b) when investigating the nature of the planned economy. The term was widely 
used in the analysis of economic systems. See Dewatripont et al. (1996), Maskin (1996) and Qian (1998) for 
surveys. In Kornai’s view, the budgetary constraints facing the socialist firms are ‘soft’ because the firms’ survival 
and growth are not dependent upon its financial performance. 
15 Hayek’s works on the socialist economy provides the early sources with which to address the problems of 
centralisation and decentralisation. The issue of centralisation and decentralisation has traditionally coincided to a 
large extent with the analysis of the relation between central planning and the market. However, there are other 
approached to the effects of differing degrees of decision distribution in the economy (Dallago and Mittone, 
1996). According to Demsetz (1982a), the problem central to the interests of the classical economists was the 
nature and consequences of decentralisation. Demsetz argued, furthermore, that the perfect competition model 
could be seen as a tool for understanding both the price system and decentralisation. 
16 See Nee and Stark (1989) for a discussion of the economic institutions of centrally planned economies. 
17 Since May 1, 2004, these 10 countries have become formal members of the European Union. 
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Table 1-4 Transition economies 
Transition economy/group 
Year 
transition 
began 
Real output 
ratio 
1999/1989 
Average 
inflation 
1989–99 
1999 Average 
transition 
indicator 
PPP GDP 
per capita 
1999 
EU accession countries 1990 0.87 34.9 3.3 9,062 
Bulgaria 1991 0.67 68.4 2.9 4,812 
Czech Republic 1991 0.94 7.8 3.4 13,408 
Hungary 1990 0.99 19.7 3.7 11,273 
Poland 1990 1.28 49.2 3.5 8,832 
Romania 1991 0.74 76.1 2.8 5,798 
Slovak Republic 1991 1.01 14.3 3.3 10,255 
Slovenia 1990 1.05 12.9 3.3 15,685 
Estonia 1992 0.78 24.3 3.5 7,909 
Latvia 1992 0.56 35.1 3.1 5,893 
Lithuania 1992 0.70 41.0 3.1 6,750 
Other South Eastern 
European countries 1990 0.77 3,331.8 2.5 3,651 
Albania 1991 0.93 33.4 2.5 2,897 
Bosnia and Herzegovina / 0.93 13,118.0 1.8 1,014 
Croatia 1990 0.80 100.0 3.0 6,793 
Macedonia, FYR 1990 0.59 75.6 2.8 3,903 
Former Soviet Union 
countries* 1992 0.53 149.1 2.3 3,337 
Armenia 1992 0.48 106.5 2.7 2,469 
Azerbaijan 1992 0.47 233.2 2.2 2,404 
Belarus 1992 0.81 162.4 1.5 6,485 
Georgia 1992 0.31 17.9 2.5 3,950 
Kazakhstan 1992 0.61 77.3 2.7 4,351 
Kyrgyz Republic 1992 0.61 22.3 2.8 2,419 
Moldova 1992 0.31 16.5 2.8 1,847 
Mongolia 1990 0.93 46.5 2.8 1,573 
Russia 1992 0.55 88.0 2.5 6,815 
Tajikistan 1992 0.29 688.5 2.0 1,045 
Turkmenistan 1992 0.61 4.9 1.4 4,589 
Ukraine 1992 0.35 169.4 2.4 3,276 
Uzbekistan 1992 0.97 304.5 2.1 2,157 
East Asian countries 1986 1.78 17.1 2.1 2,042 
Cambodia 1990 1.62 6.3 2.5 1,261 
China 1978 2.52 8.1 2.1 3,709 
Lao P.D.R. 1986 1.85 28.6 1.8 1,385 
Vietnam 1986 1.97 25.4 1.9 1,815 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Note: 1) Data for country groups are simple averages of group member data. 2) * Not including Baltic countries. 
In the four groups of transition economies, four East Asian countries, including 
Cambodia, China, Lao and Vietnam, outperformed other groups on output growth and 
macroeconomic stability (in terms of inflation rate). Within this group, China is 
particularly prominent. Compared to all other transition economies, China presents a 
unique case in both the process and the performance of economic transition. In its 
two-decade economic transition, China has been undergoing highly dynamic and profound 
institutional changes. These changes unleashed the fundamental forces of incentives, 
competition, price mechanism, hard budget constraints and decentralised decision-making. 
But the path of transition China took was unusual and many institutional forms were not 
the same as the conventional best-practice institutions from the perspective of the 
mainstream economic theories (Qian, 2000b). 
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1.2.1 The Process of China’s Economic Transition 
Both China and EEFSU countries experienced a two-stage process moving from a 
centrally planned system to the direction of a market system (Qian, 2000a). The first stage 
was characterised by partial reforms aiming at supplementing the central planning with the 
market. In EEFSU countries, reforms started as early as 1952 in Yugoslav, 1968 in 
Hungary, 1980 in Poland and 1985 in the former Soviet Union.18 The reforms aimed at the 
‘correct’ combination of market and central planning, which the reformers believed to be 
the most efficient governance structure for socialist economies (Stark and Nee, 1989). 
However, partial reforms both perpetuated problems of the pre-reform economy and 
created new distortions and imbalance (Stark and Nee, 1989). Consequently, the reforms 
before 1990 generally ended up in failure (Kornai, 1986a, 1992). This failure led Kornai 
(1992) to conclude that ‘in spite of generating a whole series of favourable changes, reform 
is doomed to fail’ and ‘the system is incapable of stepping away from its own shadow.’ 
This failure eventually spurred a political revolution followed by a more radical transition 
to a market system. The ‘big bang’ approach of transition in many EEFSU countries after 
1990 can be considered as a response to earlier unsuccessful economic reforms. The 
Chinese experience seems to change the claim that partial reform is doomed to fail. In 
China, reform was initiated in the late 1970s. China differed from the EEFSU transition 
economies in that its first stage reform in the 1980s was relatively successful. The first 
phase transition eliminated shortages, generated high economic growth and improved 
people’s living standards on average. However, the partial reform did result in serious 
problems such as the corruption and severe inflation. These problems contributed 
substantially to the political and social instability in the late 1980s. After the suppression 
of political upheaval in June 1989, the momentum of reform was counterbalanced by the 
ideological retrogress and the deterioration of outside environment due to international 
sanction. After three years of stagnation, China resumed its ‘Great Leap’ towards a market 
economy in 1992. The new stage of reform afterwards was equivalent to the transition in 
EEFSU countries in the 1990s. In contrast to the big-bang approach widely adopted the 
EEFSU transition economies, China’s market-oriented reform in this stage represented an 
alternative pattern, usually portrayed as a gradual and experimental process. Unlike the 
first phase of reform, which ended in uproar and violence, the economic transition in the 
1990s evolved relatively fluently without a political revolution and serious social disorder.  
The process of China’s transition to market economy can be portrayed as a gradual and 
experimental process, or in Deng Xiaoping’s phrase: ‘crossing the river by groping for 
stones’. This process can be viewed as an evolutionary process in three phases. The first 
phase spanned fourteen years between 1978 and 1991; the second phase began in 1992; 
and the third phase began in 2002. Despite the continuity, the division between phases is 
apparent. Deng’s ‘Southern Visitation’ in early 1992 and the significant ideological 
breakthrough occurred afterwards marked the turning point between the first and second 
phase. China’s entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) presents a watershed 
between the second and third phase. This three-phase model is illustrated in Figure 1-3.  
                                                        
18 The Yugoslav self-management model and the Hungarian ‘new economic mechanism’ provided examples for 
the theoretical concept of market socialism, in which the means of production are publicly or collectively owned, 
and the allocation of resources follows the rules of the market. 
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Figure 1-3 Process of China’s economic transition 
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In the first stage, the basic institutional framework of central planning remained intact 
and the goal of reform was still not a market economy. Starting with agricultural reforms, 
market-oriented measures were then extended to cities and the industrial sector in 1984. 
Economic reform was carried out incrementally to improve incentives, to promote 
competition, to liberate prices, to harden budget constraints, to decentralise 
decision-making and to expand the scope of market-based (rather than centrally planned) 
allocation for resources. In this phase of economic transition, the Chinese government 
implemented a price reform, adopting a so-called ‘dual-track’ approach (see Subsection 
2.1.1 for details), which demonstrated how markets could grow out of plans (Byrd, 1991; 
Naughton, 1995). This phase of economic transition achieved significant economic success 
despite the serious problems in later years. The significance of this early success can be 
well understood when compared with the reforms in EEFSU countries before 1990, the 
failure of which spurred a political revolution. From a perspective of political economics, 
the economic achievement in the first phase of transition weakened the resistance towards 
further reforms and built up the confidence and commitment of reformers. In fact, reform 
did not stop even during the 1989-1991 period when the conservatives gained the upper 
hands.  
The second stage of economic transition began with Deng’s ‘Southern Visitation’ in the 
spring of 1992 to neutralise central resistance and mobilise local support for further and 
more radical reforms. In the Party congress of November 1993, Deng’s ideological 
breakthrough to abolish the planning system and establish a modern market system was 
formally endorsed. Creating a ‘socialist market economy’ in which market mechanism 
would play the primary role in resource allocation was set as the goal of the reform. Since 
then, China carried out several radical reforms in line with the November 1993 decision. 
Major reforms included the unification of exchange rates, current account convertibility, 
the reform of tax and fiscal systems, the reorganisation of financial regulatory system, the 
adoption of Western accounting rules and the establishment of a social security system. 
China also started to privatise collectively owned and small and medium-sized 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and to lay off excess state employees (see Subsection 
2.1.3 for details). This phase of economic transition is comparable to that in the CEE 
countries after 1990 and in the FSU countries after 1992, although the political and 
economic context leading to such reforms was different. In all the EEFSU countries, 
economic transition began after political democratisation, while China began 
comprehensive transition toward a market economy without such a political reform.  
The third stage commenced with China’s WTO entry in December 2001. As a 
particularly crucial external factor, China’s accession to the WTO provided an important 
and timely impetus for China’s transition to a market economy and made the prospect of 
China’s economic transition clearer. The WTO membership provided China with the rule 
of law within a multilateral framework. In order to fit into this framework and benefit from 
it, China is strongly stimulated to expedite its transition to a full-fledged market system. 
China’s accession to the WTO provides strong external impulses for further domestic 
reforms and is bound to change the domestic political balance in favour of further and 
faster reforms. 2002 also became the first year of the government by the ‘fourth 
generation’ of Chinese leaders. In the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth Congress in October 
2003, a series of reforms were planned, many of them with a long-term horizon. Their 
aims are to complete China’s transition to a market economy and to achieve 
comprehensive, balanced and sustainable growth in such a manner that improves the 
quality of life for 1.3 billion Chinese people. According to the plan, thorough reforms in 
different areas will be implemented at various speeds over the next decade. 
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1.2.2 A Comparative Assessment of Transition Performance 
Ten years after the beginning of the transition in EEFSU since the early 1990s19, a 
profound divide lies between two groups of countries as to the performance of economic 
transition. One group of transition economies comprises the 10 new members of the 
European Union, i.e. the Central and East European countries (including the Baltic 
countries). Within this group, structural transformation is still fragmentary, but 
macro-economic stabilisation has been achieved and growth resumed. The other group 
mainly consists of the countries of the FSU and the former Yugoslavia. In these countries, 
transition has been counteracted by the heavy legacies of communist system and by the 
pernicious effects of political instability. Within this group, market institutions do not 
function well, stabilisation is not yet completed and the prospects for growth remain quite 
uncertain.20 
Despite the discrepancy in the performance of transition between these two groups of 
countries, virtually all transition economies in EEFSU suffered from a more or less severe 
‘transformational recession’ (Kornai, 1993), or ‘transitional recession’ (Kolodko, 2000). 
The collapse of output in the early years of transition was exceeding even the worst 
expectations.21 In 1998, one in five people in the region survived on less than a standard 
poverty line of US$ 2.15 a day. A decade ago, fewer than one in 25 people lived in such 
absolute poverty. Although absolute income deprivation at this level is virtually 
non-existent in many CEE countries, it is a very common phenomenon in the FSU 
countries. Inequality, which has barely increased in the CEE countries since the beginning 
of transition, has increased so much in some FSU countries such as Armenia, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Russia that they have become the most unequal countries in the world (cf. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, 2002). 
There are different explanations of the ‘transitional recession’ and many of them 
attribute this to the lack of proper market institutions. This led to a rethink of the so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’, a term coined by John Williamson (1990, 1993, 1997) to 
describe the set of policy proposals to address Latin America’s debt crises in the 1980s.22 
The ‘Washington Consensus’ is generally seen as the expression of the neoclassical 
mainstream school, either in the form of original Williamson’s agenda for structural 
adjustment or in its stronger version advocated by the IMF and other international 
institutions. The negative outlook of the transition process in the EEFSU countries, which 
followed the policy advice based on the ‘Washington Consensus’, severely challenged the 
wisdom of this ‘consensus’.23 The challenge even came from an ‘insider’ as far as 
                                                        
19 There have been many conferences, special issues in journals, as well as books, reports, and articles in 
newspapers on the topic ‘ten years of transition’. Perhaps the most comprehensive surveys are those by the EBRD 
(1999) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 2000). 
20 Some countries in the second group, such as Russia, did witness high economic growth since the late 1990s. 
The Russian economy quickly restored stability after the 1998 financial crisis, productivity increased rapidly, and 
GDP has been growing by 7 percent a year. However, this sound economic performance has frequently been 
linked to the rise of oil prices, making it largely a consequence of exogenous factors. 
21 See Lavigne (1999) for references and a comment of the discussion. 
22 John Williamson proposed a list of ingredients for a recipe for structural adjustment and development in Latin 
America. According to Williamson the recipe was ‘generally applicable’ elsewhere, and universally agreed upon 
in Washington (i.e. by senior members of the US administration and Congress, the Federal Reserve, the 
international financial institutions, and the think-tanks). This policy advice has been applied mainly through the 
IMF and the World Bank to the transition economies. 
23 See Gore (2000) for a detailed discussion on the rise and fall of the Washington Consensus as a paradigm for 
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international financial organisations are concerned – Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief 
economist at the World Bank, who voiced fiercer critics against the policy proposed by the 
IMF.24 In contrast to most other transition economies that suffered painful transition costs, 
China attained a uniquely high and sustained positive performance during its economic 
transition. There is also argument that the transitional economies of Asia as a whole 
(except Mongolia) outperform their counterparts in EEFSU (see Rana, 1995, for example). 
Figure 1-4 illustrates a simple performance measurement framework for transition 
economies.25 
Figure 1-4 Economic performance of transition economies, 1989-1999 
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                 Source: EBRD and IMF. 
The key economic objectives of transition are to raise economic efficiency and promote 
growth. Despite the similarity of ultimate objectives and basic elements of changes 
required, countries’ actual transition experience differed substantially, with respect to both 
policies implemented and results achieved. The reasons for the differences include the 
country’s initial condition, the external environment and the specific strategy and process 
pursued during the transition. The differences of initial conditions, processes and outcome 
of economic transition between China and the EEFSU countries are generalised in Table 
1-5. This also presents a summary of two main models of economic transition – the 
gradualist approach adopted by China and other East Asian transition economies versus the 
                                                                                                                                            
development. 
24 See Stiglitz, ‘The insider: what I learned at the world economic crisis’, The New Republic, April 17, 2000. 
25 Countries listed in Table 1-5, excluding the economies that have average annual inflation rates over 180 
percent. 
China 
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big-bang (shock therapy) approach adopted by the EEFSU countries. 
Table 1-5 Economic transition: differences between EEFSU countries and China 
Item EEFSU countries China 
Path  
Big-bang approach 
Democratisation → Economic 
Liberalisation → Privatisation 
Gradualist approach 
– Without multiparty democratic reform 
– Liberalisation proceeded gradually 
– Privatisation delayed 
Development level High level of industrialisation Low level of industrialisation 
Planning system 
Centralised planning system with a 
large number of commodities subject to 
the central government’s plan 
allocation 
Planning after administrative 
decentralisation with a relatively small 
number of commodities subject to the 
central government’s plan allocation 
Initial 
condition 
Industrial structure 
– Concentrated industrial system 
– Few small enterprises 
 
– More than half of the industrial output 
came from enterprises controlled by local 
governments (in 1978) 
– Importance of local state-owned small 
firms (mostly in agriculture-related 
industries) 
First stage 
 
Started in as early as 1968 in Hungary, 
1980 in Poland and 1985 in the former 
Soviet Union  
 
– Started in 1978 
– Incremental reform introducing dramatic 
changes outside the central planning 
– Market created by a ‘dual-track’ price 
reform  
– The rapid rise of a non-state sector 
– Gradualist SOE reform aiming at 
providing autonomy and incentives 
Process 
Second stage 
Started in 1990 
(for different countries, see Table 1-4) 
– Started in 1992 
– Establishment the goal for a market 
system 
– A series institutional reform launched to 
build up a modern market system 
– Privatisation of SOEs introduced 
Economic 
development 
– Painful transitional recession 
– Poor economic performance with 
high inflation rate and sharply 
decreased industrial output 
– Living standard on average 
significantly decreased. 
– Total industrial output grew at an annual 
rate of 14.65 percent between 1978 and 
1999 compared to an average GDP growth 
rate of 9.64 percent  
– Living standard on average significantly 
improved. 
Market system 
– Market system established by a 
radical approach 
– Formal institutions built up quickly 
but informal institutions neglected 
– Market system establishes by a 
gradualist approach 
– Market-supporting institutions built up 
sequentially 
Outcome 
Firm ownership 
From totally state owned to totally 
private owned 
A diversified ownership structure emerged 
and the state sector accounted for less than 
30 percent of industrial output. 
The shock therapies promoted by the adherents of the neoliberalism26 became severely 
questioned by researchers, who based their arguments on the evaluation of transition 
performance. The negligence of institutional arrangements was claimed as a grave 
miscalculation of the ‘mainstream’ approach. 27  On the other hand, the nature of 
                                                        
26 Neoliberalism refers to the application of the principles of neoclassical economics to economic development 
and other aspects of economic affairs (Gilpin, 2001). 
27 See Kolodko (1998) ‘Economic neoliberalism became almost irrelevant... ’, Transition Newsletter, June 1998. 
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institutional change has not been carefully explored and little attention was paid to 
promoting the organisation capabilities of enterprises except for the simple solution of 
privatisation.28  There is misunderstanding not only of the foundations of a market 
economy but also of the basics of an institutional reform process.29 Although there is still 
no general accepted policy stance after the fading of the ‘Washington Consensus’, 
comprehensive considerations of institutions and institutional change have become widely 
acknowledged. For instance, the assessment of the transition process conducted by the 
EBRD30 shows a growing concern with the theme of institution building. Some recent 
World Bank reports, such as the World Development Reports 2002, are pertaining to the 
important role of institutions in supporting markets, addressing what makes institutions 
work and how to build market-supporting institutions. 
1.2.3 Lessons from Economic Transition: Strategies Matter 
The starting point of economic transition is a centrally planned economic system with 
substantial inefficiency due to allocative distortions and poor incentives (Qian, 2000b). 
Consequently, the successful transition from centrally planned to market-oriented economy 
could, almost by definition, provide a substantial source of efficiency improvement. But, 
as the failure of Eastern European reform before 1989 attested, topping this potential is not 
easy. The different outcome of economic transition demonstrates that the transition process 
itself is not only a possible source of production increase and economic growth but also 
can bear high social and economic costs, including lost output, rising unemployment, 
rising poverty, increasing income disparities, deteriorating social cohesion and crime. Both 
initial conditions and transition strategies are important in explaining the difference in 
transition performance. In the process of transition, an appropriate strategy is vital to 
maximise the benefits and to minimise the costs.  
The composition of the necessary institutions poses the first strategic consideration of 
transition. Some major elements of the economic transition have been identified, including 
macroeconomic stabilisation, price and market liberalisation, restructuring and privatising 
state enterprises and redefining the role of the state. But they have clearly been far from 
sufficient. Facing severe challenges to its legitimacy, the ‘mainstream’ school attempted to 
argue that it had never neglected institution building: ‘the need for legal reform, the 
creation of a central bank and effective fiscal system, and other aspects of modern 
government, were widely recognised from the start of the transition process’ (Fisher and 
Sahay, 2000: 20). The problem is that the necessary composition of institutions, including 
formal and informal ones, had not been fully identified. Pre-existing informal institutions 
and their linkages and interdependency with nascent institutions were largely overlooked, 
therefore leading to unexpected ‘side effects’. The reason for such unintended outcome of 
economic transition has possibly been the absence of ‘fits’ between the designed plan and 
the existing institutional environments that reflected a unique historical trajectory of 
institutional development (Aoki, 2001). The Chinese experience indicates that political 
                                                        
28 For instance, the Russian privatisation program operated under the general presumption that the existing 
enterprises were the appropriate economic units to become independent private firms, and the privatisation was 
built around enterprises mainly for convenience and to move privatisation along quickly (Joskow et al., 1994) 
29 See Stiglitz, ‘Whither reform? Ten years of the transition’, World Bank, Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, 1999. 
30 See the annually published array of ‘transition indicators’ in the annual Transition Report. 
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reform towards a multiparty democracy is not necessary for economic transition, while a 
relatively stable political situation is helpful to the implementation of economic transition. 
The correct sequencing of reforms is thus a very important concern.31 In the transition 
process, removing one distortion may be counter-productive in the presence of another 
distortion. The Chinese experience shows that it is crucial to design the transition process 
so that concurrent reforms mutually reinforce each other and consequential synergies can 
generate an impetus propelling reforms as well as growth. 
The second important strategic consideration of transition lies in the speed of reform. 
There have been two approaches for attaining a market-oriented economy: the big-bang (or 
shock therapy) approach and the gradualist approach.32 The big-bang approach advocated 
the need to destroy all remnants of the pre-existing planning system and to replace it with a 
system based upon a market allocation of resources as rapidly as possible. The gradualist 
approach advocated replacing the old system with a new one step by step, in a piecemeal 
manner and in a relatively long time span. The gradualist approach also advocated an 
experimentalist approach of institution building. The experience of the EEFSU transition 
economies shows that the social and economic costs of the big-bang approach, usually 
occurring in conjunction with political reforms, have been extremely high, at least in the 
short run. This approach has been associated with greater economic and political instability. 
On the other hand, adopting the gradualist approach, China and other East Asian transition 
economies were committed to the attainment of market based resource allocation while 
generally maintaining the stability of society and macro economy. The gradual pace of 
Chinese transition was partly due to time-consuming process of experimentation to 
discover the institutions that were deemed optimal for China. In Eastern Europe, Hungary 
also allowed a relatively gradual approach of transition (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). It 
is interesting to note that in particular Hungary has been among the best performers in the 
EEFSU transition economies and it also managed to attract a large part of total FDI in East 
Europe in the first half of the 1990s. 
How can the advantage of the gradualist approach be explained? From a political 
economic perspective, a reform with few winners and many losers is politically difficult to 
implement (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Wei (1997) defined the gradualist approach to 
reform as a sequential implementation of minimum bangs (terminology from Williamson, 
1991), which is a simultaneous implementation of a minimum set of reforms that can be 
implemented independent of other reforms without failures. Based on a model pioneered 
by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Wei demonstrated that political difficulties might be 
related partly to the speed with which a reform is implemented. When the outcomes of 
reform are uncertain to individuals, a gradualist or sequential approach splits the resistance 
force and can thus increase the program’s chance of surviving attack by special interest 
groups. China’s experience illustrates that reforms can possibly be implemented without 
creating many or big losers. The more successful reforms seem to be those that are 
carefully designed to benefit the majority of the society, in an appropriate, not necessarily 
optimal, sequencing, and in a gradual manner.  
The third strategic consideration is related to the second one but with different 
implications: should the reform be incremental or radical? The Chinese style of economic 
                                                        
31 For important works on the subject, see Edwards (1990) and McKinnon (1991). For summary of components 
of transition and proposed sequencing, see Fischer and Gelb (1991). 
32 For a summary of the proponents of the big-bang approach and those who favour the gradualist approach, see 
Dewatripont and Roland (1995). 
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transition was typically an incremental reform, which means allowing some pre-existing 
inefficient sectors to exist and meanwhile introducing new and efficient sectors. In the 
reform aiming at market creation, the Chinese dual-track approach gradually substituted 
the plan with the market as the basic mechanism of price determination and implemented 
efficient Pareto-improving (Lau et al., 2000). In the reform aiming at enterprise 
development, China’s incremental reform achieved most success outside rather than inside 
the state sector (see Subsection 2.1.2 for details). The incremental approach provided an 
approach of avoiding creating many and/or big losers and keeping economic and social 
stability. The existence of inefficient sectors reduced political resistance, lowered risk and 
provided effective compensatory mechanisms at least in the short term. 
1.3 The Internationalisation of the Chinese Economy 
One of the central tenets of international economics is that economic openness can 
improve welfare and economic performance.33 Most perceived benefits of economic 
openness lie in trade and FDI. The benefits of international trade have long been discussed, 
with Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage as fundamental underpinning. Since the 
1980s, researchers have increasingly recognised the roles of intra-industry trade, increasing 
returns to scale and imperfect competition on the one hand and uncertainty and insurance 
on the other (e.g. Harris and Case, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985, 1989; Krugman, 
1986). By allowing for the benefits of increasing returns and the additional welfare gains 
by reducing the dead weight losses created by domestic monopolies, trade can produce 
more gains than could have been expected from the traditional models focusing on 
allocative efficiency. However, by allowing for unequal trade, transfer pricing and tax 
competition, the balance can easily become less positive and even negative – in particular 
for developing countries. There is also increasing agreement on the benefits that a country 
may seek to reap from inward FDI. As external direct investment from foreign countries, 
inward FDI could boost the total funds available for investment in the host economy. In 
addition, FDI might be a vehicle of the transfer of technology and managerial know-how, 
the one that could provides host countries a package of valuable tangible and intangible 
assets. However, despite the fact that ‘the benefits of openness are oversold routinely in the 
policy-relevant literature and in the publications of the World Bank and the IMF’ (Rodrik, 
1999: 25), the principle relationship between economic openness and growth is still a 
highly debated topic in the development literature. 
1.3.1 The Increasing Openness of the Chinese Economy: A Measurement Framework 
China experienced a rapidly increasing economic openness during the reform period. 
Several aspects of this process are illustrated in Figure 1-5, which depicts the volume of 
imports, exports, FDI inflows and foreign currency reserve from 1978 to 2003. China has 
emerged as the fourth largest trading nation, with a total trade volume of US$ 851 billion 
in 2003. China has also become one of the most popular investment destinations in the 
world. Since 2002, it has become the largest recipient of FDI in the world. China has 
                                                        
33 For surveys of the classic static arguments and several dynamic arguments for free trade see e.g. Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) or Grossman and Helpman (1991). For empirical studies on the effect of openness on economic 
performance see e.g. Sachs and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1993). 
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attracted FDI inflows of over US$ 500 billion. Since 1994, China has consecutively run 
surpluses in both current and capital accounts, which led to a surge of foreign currency 
reserve, the amount of which reached US$ 448 billion34 at the end of 2003 – the second 
largest in the world only behind Japan.  
Figure 1-5 Increasing openness of the Chinese economy during the reform period 
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   Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). 
According to the WTO, China has become the fourth largest merchandise exporter of 
the world, only behind the United States, Germany and Japan. Merchandise exports 
contributed significantly to China’s economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Yu, 1998). 
China rapidly strengthened its export competitiveness35 in global markets: the share of 
China’s exports in the total volume of the world increased from one percent in 1985 to 
over six percent in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2002). The structure of China’s exports also 
substantially changed: in 1985, exports of primary products and resource-based 
manufactures represented 49 percent of all exports; in 2000 their percentage receded to 12 
percent and that of non-resource-based manufactures jumped to 87 percent. The percentage 
of high-technology products in China’s exports jumped from 3 percent in 1985 to 22 
percent in 2000. However, the level and trend of export pattern during the reform period 
can be explained by relative comparative advantages and the effect of exchange rate was 
                                                        
34 The amount of foreign currency reserve as to the end of 2003 was announced to be US$ 403 billion by Chinese 
government. However, this figure would be US$ 448 billion if taking account of the amount of US$ 45 billion 
that was injected into the state-owned banking sector. 
35 Export competitiveness has many aspects, the most obvious implying higher exports, but it also means 
diversifying the export basket, sustaining higher rate of export growth, and upgrading the high-value-added 
content of export activity. 
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significant in the 1990s (Yue and Hua, 2002). Behind the export boom in the 1990s was 
the role of inward FDI.36 In 1988, foreign affiliates accounted for less than 9 percent of 
exports; in 2003, their percentage jumped up to 54.8 percent. Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) played a leading role in the particularly remarkable export dynamism in 
high-technology industries. The percentage of exports by foreign affiliates in 
high-technology industries rose from 59 percent in 1996 to 81 percent in 2000. Throughout 
much of the 1990s, China accounted for almost half of FDI inflows to developing 
countries and was the second largest recipient of FDI inflows in the world, after the United 
States. It was generally anticipated that the WTO entry would further increase China’s FDI 
inflows. Indeed, in the first year after its WTO entry, China surpassed the United States to 
become the world’s biggest recipient of FDI with over US$ 52 billion in FDI inflows in 
2002. FDI inflows to China further increased to US$ 55 billion in 2003.37 
Most studies on economic openness draw attention to trade policies. Theoretical growth 
literature has given more attention to the relationship between trade policies and growth 
rather than to the relationship between trade volumes and growth (Yanikkaya, 2003). 
Researchers have used a number of factors such as trade flows, trade restrictions, or price 
distortions to measures trade openness. Sachs and Warner (1995), for instance, provided a 
widely used indicator, based on the classification of the trade regime of a country. However, 
there is still no agreement on the best measure of openness on a cross-country basis.38 In 
order to provide an internationally comparative yardstick of the openness of the Chinese 
economy, we developed a simplified method39 to measure inward and outward economic 
openness on a cross-country basis. To have a more comprehensive understanding, we 
measured economic openness with respect to both trade and FDI. The method is applied to 
the largest 50 economies in the world (in terms of GDP) in 2001, to illustrate the 
comparative degree of economic openness (Table 1-6). A preliminary assessment of the 
level of economic openness of most East Asian economies, a number of transition 
economies with relatively large economic size, and other large-scale developing and 
developed economies could be made on the basis of this openness index. This assessment 
generally supports the positioning of the East Asia countries and the EEFSU transition 
economies in the scheme of Figure 1-2. 
                                                        
36 See Zhang and Song (2000), Zhang and Felmingham (2001) and Liu et al. (2001) for discussions. 
37 Data in this paragraph is according to UNCTAD (2002). 
38 See e.g. Krishna (1992), Pritchett (1996), Rodrigues and Rodrik (1999) and Yanikkaya (2003) for the 
discussions of different measurement approaches. 
39 The averages of the four relevant indexes (FDI outflows, exports, FDI inflows, imports) of the largest 50 
economies in the world in terms of GDP of the 2000 are used as benchmarks. 
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Table 1-6 Degrees of openness of the largest 50 economies in 2001 
No. Economy Imports* 
FDI 
inflows* 
Openness 
index 
(Inward) 
Exports* 
FDI 
outflows* 
Openness 
index 
(Outward) 
Openness 
index 
(Overall) 
1 United States** 14.95 1.43 0.35 11.24 1.03 0.29 0.32 
2 Japan 9.81 0.15 0.14 10.44 0.93 0.27 0.20 
3 Germany 33.07 1.84 0.61 34.97 2.28 0.77 0.69 
4 United Kingdom 29.28 4.35 0.85 27.12 4.78 1.08 0.97 
5 France 26.35 4.21 0.80 27.91 7.10 1.46 1.13 
6 China 23.41 4.04 0.75 25.83 0.59 0.39 0.57 
7 Italy 26.67 1.37 0.48 28.27 1.97 0.64 0.56 
8 Canada 38.64 4.15 0.94 43.81 5.28 1.35 1.15 
9 Mexico 29.97 4.10 0.83 27.61 0.14 0.34 0.58 
10 Spain 31.40 4.81 0.93 29.92 5.69 1.26 1.10 
11 Brazil 14.40 4.47 0.69 13.36 -0.45 0.08 0.38 
12 India 15.43 0.71 0.27 13.65 0.16 0.18 0.23 
13 South Korea 40.56 0.84 0.59 42.91 0.57 0.58 0.59 
14 Netherlands 59.73 13.48 2.27 65.06 12.76 2.80 2.53 
15 Australia** 22.75 1.09 0.40 22.85 2.99 0.74 0.57 
16 Russia 24.15 0.80 0.38 36.81 0.82 0.55 0.47 
17 Argentina 10.16 1.19 0.26 11.42 -0.07 0.12 0.19 
18 Switzerland 41.13 3.59 0.91 45.47 7.00 1.65 1.28 
19 Belgium 81.09 38.41 5.37 84.42 43.83 8.03 6.70 
20 Sweden 40.56 5.61 1.13 46.45 3.14 1.04 1.09 
21 Austria 52.58 3.12 1.00 52.21 1.66 0.86 0.93 
22 Saudi Arabia 24.45 0.01 0.30 41.94 -0.02 0.47 0.39 
23 Poland 33.01 3.24 0.77 29.12 -0.05 0.32 0.55 
24 Norway** 30.45 1.24 0.51 46.61 -0.44 0.46 0.49 
25 Hong Kong 138.58 14.69 3.36 143.90 7.01 2.77 3.07 
26 Denmark 39.18 7.11 1.29 45.59 8.03 1.81 1.55 
27 Turkey 31.04 2.21 0.63 33.69 0.34 0.44 0.53 
28 Indonesia 32.58 -2.26 0.14 41.08 0.09 0.48 0.31 
29 Venezuela 17.56 2.76 0.53 22.66 0.12 0.28 0.40 
30 Finland 31.58 3.09 0.74 40.38 6.92 1.58 1.16 
31 Greece** 32.93 1.36 0.56 24.98 0.52 0.37 0.46 
32 Thailand 60.20 3.32 1.11 66.26 0.14 0.78 0.95 
33 Iran 21.49 0.04 0.27 28.09 2.47 0.72 0.49 
34 South Africa 25.29 5.99 0.99 27.81 -2.81 -0.14 0.43 
35 Portugal 41.24 5.37 1.11 31.63 6.89 1.47 1.29 
36 Israel** 46.94 3.25 0.94 39.99 0.74 0.58 0.76 
37 Ireland 80.49 15.18 2.71 95.39 5.68 2.00 2.36 
38 Egypt 22.67 0.52 0.33 17.58 0.01 0.20 0.27 
39 Malaysia 97.96 0.63 1.26 116.34 0.30 1.38 1.32 
40 Singapore 151.84 12.78 3.31 173.56 11.15 3.78 3.54 
41 Colombia 19.04 3.06 0.58 19.40 0.02 0.22 0.40 
42 Philippines 47.43 1.37 0.73 49.27 -0.22 0.53 0.63 
43 Puerto Rico 100.44 0.00 1.22 80.76 0.00 0.92 1.07 
44 Chile 32.66 6.74 1.17 34.68 2.16 0.74 0.95 
45 Pakistan 19.35 0.66 0.31 18.01 0.05 0.21 0.26 
46 Czech Rep. 73.79 9.93 2.03 71.05 0.29 0.86 1.44 
47 Algeria 21.40 2.19 0.51 37.18 0.02 0.43 0.47 
48 Peru 17.28 2.13 0.45 15.82 0.18 0.21 0.33 
49 Hungary 62.61 4.70 1.30 60.47 0.65 0.79 1.05 
50 New Zealand** 35.08 3.98 0.88 36.74 2.37 0.80 0.84 
 Average 41.09 4.38 1.00 43.83 3.10 1.00 1.00 
Source: World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Note: 1) * Share of GDP. 2) ** Data for 2000. 
The degrees of economic openness of the largest 15 economies (in terms of exports and 
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FDI inflows) in 2001 are illustrated in Figure 1-6. In the same figure, the dynamics of the 
openness of the Chinese economy is also depicted, demonstrating the fast growing 
openness of the Chinese economy from 1980 to 2003. Since 1995, the relative significance 
of inward FDI decreased despite the fact that the total volume of FDI inflows increased 
from US$ 37.5 billion in 1995 to US$ 53.5 billion in 2003. The ratio of exports to GDP 
increased steadily for more than 20 years and climbed to 32.5 percent in 2003. 
Figure 1-6 Degrees of openness of the largest 15 economies* in 2001 and the Chinese path of openness 
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     Source: World Bank and MOFTEC. 
     Note: * Not including the Netherlands (exports = 65.1% of GDP; FDI inflows = 13.5% of GDP). 
1.3.2 China’s Economic Internationalisation: Another Chapter to the ‘East Asian 
Miracle’ (Hi) story? 
China could be considered as another example of the ‘East Asian Miracle’ as termed by 
the World Bank (1993). 40  Although interrupted by the 1997 financial crisis, the 
development performance of East Asian economies is certainly remarkable. Most of this 
alleged ‘miracle’ is carried by the growth performance of seven economies in the region – 
South Korea, Taiwan41, Singapore, Hong Kong42, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia (Table 
1-7). Nine East Asian countries (Japan43 and China included) have been among the 12 
                                                        
40 A World Bank team published, in 1993, the influential research report – The East Asian Miracle, Economic 
Growth and Public Policy, which stimulated an ongoing debate about the causes of the ‘miracle’. 
41 Abbreviation for ‘Taiwan, Province of China’ 
42 Abbreviation for ‘Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of P.R. China’ 
43 Japan long ago joined the ranks of developed countries. Its economic success in the post-war era prior to the 
1990s is without peer: its GDP per capita raised from 276 US$ in 1950 to more than 23000 US$ in 1990. 
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fastest-growing economies in the world for thirty years since 1960. GDP per capita in all 
the East Asian countries taken together has been rising more than twice as fast as in 
developed countries. However, there is high diversity in natural resources, population, 
culture, economic development level, and government policy orientation among the East 
Asian countries, ranging from small city-states such as Hong Kong and Singapore to large 
resource-rich countries such as Indonesia. Thus, it is impossible to speak of a single ‘East 
Asian model’ of economic development. 
Table 1-7 Growth performance of the East Asian economies 
Economy GDP per capita 1995, US$ (PPP) 
GDP growth 
1961-69 
GDP growth 
1970-79 
GDP growth 
1980-89 
GDP growth 
1990-96 
Hong Kong 23,900 9.9 9.2 7.5 5.0 
Singapore 22,600 9.6 9.4 7.2 8.3 
Taiwan 13,200 / 10.2 8.1 6.3 
South Korea 11,900 8.3 9.3 8.0 7.7 
Malaysia 10,400 6.6 8.0 5.7 8.8 
Thailand 8,000 7.8 7.3 7.2 8.6 
Indonesia 3,800 3.7 7.8 5.7 7.2 
China 3,100 3.0 7.5 9.3 10.1 
Source: IMF and World Bank. 
Few economists predicted the ‘East Asian Miracle’ and there is still no widely accepted 
theoretical explanation for it. As Nelson (1998) argued, the extremely uneven performance 
among nations that were very poor as of 1960 remains a nagging (theoretical) puzzle. In 
1955, South Korea and Taiwan were as poor as Zaire and Sudan. No one, at that time, 
could imagine that they would become the world’s most successful developing economies. 
Now the four ‘Asian Tigers’ – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – are 
typical Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), some of which have GDP per capita even 
higher than some developed countries. Following similar development path, some 
Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Thailand present other examples of the 
‘East Asian Miracle’.  
The rapid economic growth of East Asian countries was due to both factor 
accumulation and technological progress. According to the World Bank (1993), most of 
East Asia’s rapid growth is due to superior accumulation of physical and human capital, 
and countries in East Asia were better able than most other countries at allocating physical 
and human resources to high-yielding investment projects. World Bank (1993) and Kawai 
(1994) have also provided empirical evidence of rapid TFP growth in East Asian 
economies. Following the approach of growth accounting, however, Young (1994, 1995), 
Kim and Lau (1994) and Krugman (1994b) suggested that the increases in TFP played a 
surprisingly small role in the economic growth of the East Asian countries. In several 
countries, sharp increases in physical and human capital as well as in labour-force 
participation accounted for almost the entire rise in output. Table 1-8 shows the factors 
driving the growth of East Asian economies, according to Kim and Lau (1994). Clearly, 
growth of the East Asian economies can be explained mostly by factor accumulation.  
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Table 1-8 Growth accounting of the East Asian economies 
Economy Period Capital Labour Technological progress 
China 1954-1990 92 9 -1 
Hong Kong 1966-1990 56 16 28 
Indonesia 1970-1990 116 11 -27 
Japan 1957-1990 63 5 32 
Malaysia 1970-1990 71 19 10 
Singapore 1964-1990 59 21 20 
South Korea 1964-1990 36 13 1 
Taiwan 1953-1990 89 9 2 
Thailand 1966-1990 72 13 15 
   Source: Kim and Lau (1994). 
Studies of the East Asian Miracle have gone beyond growth accounting and have tried 
to give underlying reasons for the dramatic rise in factor inputs. Factors such as stable 
macro economy, high saving and investment rate, high-quality human capital, high-degree 
economic openness, industrial policy, well promoted education and some demographic, 
political and cultural issues have been identified. Research interests have been primarily 
directed at the roles played by government policies and economic openness. Among the 
variety of policy explanations, two positions have emerged. Adherents of the neoliberalism 
stressed East Asia’s success in getting the fundamentals right, pursuing market-conforming 
policies and minimising price distortions. The critics of this approach emphasised a key 
role played by the government particularly in determining resource allocation to specific 
industries. In terms of economic openness, the export-led growth strategy of the East Asian 
economies was widely identified by scholars as a reason for their success. For instance, the 
World Bank (1993) argued that focus on foreign markets promoted economic efficiency by 
keeping domestic prices closely in line with international prices and also accelerated 
introduction of foreign technologies, thus facilitating increased productivity. 
Although economic openness – in particular export orientation – was widely identified 
as one of the common features of the East Asian countries, there are substantial differences 
between different economies with respect to the degrees and dynamics of economic 
openness (see Table 1-9). As city-states and free harbours, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
extremely high degree of economic openness, from both inward and outward perspectives. 
As medium-sized open economies, Thailand and Malaysia have been characterised by 
particularly high openness to both international trade and inward FDI. With relatively 
larger economic scale, South Korea and Taiwan have had high level of exports but 
relatively low levels of inward FDI. Contrary to the common preconception, Japan is one 
of the most closed economies in terms of the relative level of economic openness, 
especially in inward FDI. The size of domestic market has effects on the level of economic 
openness: the smaller an economy is, the opener it tends to be. Correcting for this scale 
effect, China has already become a more open economy than many other East Asian 
economies. Although China is still not as open as Thailand and Malaysia, for a large 
continental economy, foreign trade and inward FDI have already accounted for a 
substantial proportion of China’s GDP. With regard to inward FDI, China has shown high 
ratios since the early 1990s, following Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, but leading 
Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan.  
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Table 1-9 Economic openness of the East Asian economies 
Economy Percent of GDP 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
China Exports  / / 1.81 4.21 7.61 9.99 17.53 23.99 25.89 
 FDI inflows / / / / / 0.54 0.98 5.12 3.56 
Hong Kong Exports  84.41 70.12 94.58 84.60 89.85 109.04 134.27 149.45 150.10 
 FDI inflows / / / / / / / / 38.09 
Indonesia Exports  15.04 5.53 13.45 24.01 34.18 22.89 25.33 26.31 42.35 
 FDI inflows / / 0.86 1.48 0.23 0.35 0.96 2.15 -2.99 
Japan Exports  10.55 10.35 10.65 12.61 13.49 14.17 10.38 9.09 10.76 
 FDI inflows / / / / 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.17 
Malaysia Exports  50.60 41.83 41.41 43.02 56.69 54.09 74.54 94.09 124.80 
 FDI inflows / / 2.20 3.54 3.75 2.19 5.30 4.70 4.21 
Singapore Exports  / / / / / / 184.05 178.25 178.79 
 FDI inflows / / / 5.15 10.55 5.92 15.20 10.58 5.83 
South Korea Exports  3.19 8.40 13.78 27.23 32.74 32.89 29.09 30.20 44.79 
 FDI inflows / / / / 0.01 0.25 0.31 0.36 2.01 
Thailand Exports  15.68 16.45 14.99 18.36 24.11 23.21 34.13 41.84 67.07 
 FDI inflows / / 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.42 2.86 1.23 2.79 
Source: World Bank. 
Openness to foreign trade and inward FDI has a significant impact on the path of 
China’s economic development. China represents the ‘openness driven’ growth model 
pioneered by some East Asian economies such as South Korea and Taiwan, but to some 
extent goes even further. Some East Asian economies are the most cited precedents having 
successfully employed the strategy to attract FDI in the export sector but, at the same time, 
have in place import substitution polices for the reasons such as income distribution or 
industrial development (Harris and Schmitt, 2001). Although import substitution policies 
still exist in a number of industries, China’s economy is increasingly open to imports and 
closely integrated into the world economy, much more so than Japan and South Korea 
were at a similar stage of their economic development. Although the bilateral trade surplus 
with the United States is swelling, China has deficits with many other important trade 
partners such as Germany, Japan and South Korea. In recent years, China’s imports are 
rising faster than its exports and its overall international trade is moving towards balance. 
According to the WTO, China has become the third largest merchandise importer of the 
world, only behind the United States and Germany. On the other hand, China’s FDI 
policies have been proactive, both at the central level and at the levels of provincial and 
cities, thus facilitating a large amount of FDI inflows, which presents a significantly 
different pattern from Japan and South Korea. 
The debate centres on the role of states versus markets in the East Asian economies. 
The debate (mainly on the experience of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) arises not only 
because proactive government policy was widely employed but also because it was 
consciously used for the purpose of stimulating economic growth. What were the basic 
government policies responsible for East Asian growth? What was the role of government 
policy in stimulating growth? Several authors (Amsden, 1989; Waden, 1990; Johnson, 
1982, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999) have explored the nature of East Asian developmental 
state and especially the role of governments in industrialisation. They asserted that East 
Asian governments have played a central role in the development of their economies and 
that widespread use of industrial policies has been a crucial factor behind the phenomenal 
economic growth. These interpretations of the East Asian Miracle led to the emergence of 
the theory of developmental state, which challenged the neoliberalist paradigm of 
development theories.  
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1.4 Industrialisation, Chinese Style 
Traditionally, the concept of industrialisation refers to the proportion of the national 
income derived from the industrial sector in general goes up. Associated with the 
increasing share of industrial output, the proportion of the working population engaged in 
the industrial sector also increases.44 This traditional concept of industrialisation captures 
the fundamental feature of the structural change in capitalist economy since the English 
industrial revolution – the increasing significance of the industrial sector in the economy. 
However, as the service sector gained a significant proportion at the expense of the 
industrial sector in most developed economies in the 20th Century, the traditional focus on 
the manufacturing activities and the industrial sector was not sufficient for understanding 
the overall structural change in an economy. Therefore, we use the concept of 
industrialisation to refer the structural change that is characterised by the growing 
proportion of the output (and value-added) of the non-agricultural sector (including both 
industrial and service sectors) vis-à-vis the whole economy.  
1.4.1 The Process of China’s Industrialisation 
Industrialisation is generally considered to be a necessary part and impetus of economic 
development. China experienced a rapid industrialisation process during its reform period 
and this process accelerated in recent years. The value-added of the agricultural sector in 
the whole economy decreased from 28.1 percent in 1978 to 9.5 percent in the first half of 
2003. The post-reform industrialisation process is a continuation of the pre-reform one 
(Figure 1-7), but with different characteristics. Since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, great efforts have been made to carry out an industrialisation 
process. The efforts were initially largely based upon the central planning model of the 
former Soviet Union. Since the 1960s, there were some modifications of the planning 
system. Prior to the 1980s, the government’s industrialisation efforts were focused on the 
establishment of a heavy industrial base as well as the formation of a comprehensive range 
of modern industries. During the reform period, the industrial structure was greatly 
upgraded as more modern manufacturing and service sectors quickly developed. While in 
other countries around the world, the industrial sector decreased substantially in 
importance compared to the service sector, China’s industrial sector sustained its position 
in the economy in the reform era – the percentage of value-added of the industrial sector 
has even increased two percent in 22 years since 1978.45  
                                                        
44 See Berend and Ranki (1982) and Bagchi (1987) for the discussions of the traditional concept of 
industrialisation. 
45 The agricultural sector includes agriculture, forestry, and fishing; the industrial sector includes mining, 
manufacturing, and utilities (production and supply of electricity, gas and water); the services sector includes all 
other industries and sectors that are not included in the agricultural and industrial sectors. In 1985, Chinese 
government first formulated the classification of these three sectors. In 2002, with the new revision of the 
standard industrial classification, the division among these three sectors was slightly changed. 
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Figure 1-7 Sectoral composition of GDP in China, 1950-2003 
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          Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 
          Note: * First half of 2003. 
Industry, especially the manufacturing sector, has been one of the driving forces of 
China’s rapid economic growth. The annual growth rate of total industrial output, which 
averaged 14.65 percent between 1978 and 1999, had a high correlation with the annual 
GDP growth rate, which averaged 9.64 percent during the same period (Figure 1-8). The 
manufacturing value-added per capita increased from RMB¥ 444.5 in 1989 to RMB¥ 
1,747.5 in 1999 – the average annual growth rate of manufacturing value-added from 1989 
to 1999 was 13.2 percent. Through efforts of over five decades, the Chinese manufacturing 
sector can produce virtually a whole range of industrial products and China has become the 
world’s largest producer of a large number of products (see Section 5.1 for details). China 
is now the world’s fourth largest industrial producer behind the United States, Japan and 
Germany. After 2000, a new round of accelerated industrial development began due to the 
rapid growth of China’s heavy and chemical industries. The percentage of value-added of 
the industrial sector in the Chinese economy amounted to 51.8 percent in 2002. This figure 
increased sharply to 57.5 percent in the first half of 2003 thanks to the accelerating 
development of some specific industries, which illustrates the very dynamic and still rather 
volatile nature of the Chinese economy and China’s industrialisation path.46 
                                                        
46 The industries of mechanics, automotive, steel and electronics contributed 48 percent to total industrial 
development from January to August 2003. They took 38 percent of the total sales of the industrial sector. The 
dramatic structural change possibly reflected the overheating of the Chinese economy, at least of the specific 
sectors which included the four manufacturing industries mentioned above and the downstream industries such as 
real estate development. 
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Figure 1-8 Growth rates of industrial output and GDP, 1978-1999 
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        Source: NBSC. 
But the service rather than the industrial sector has provided the main impetus for 
industrialisation during the reform period. The percentage of value-added of the service 
sector increased steadily from 23.7 percent in 1978 to 33.4 percent in 2000 and remained 
relatively stable afterwards. Nevertheless, the share of the service sector in China is still 
significantly lower than that in developed countries and even developing countries on 
average. The low share of this sector in the Chinese economy is a legacy of the planned 
economy and also reflects China’s increasingly clear positioning as a manufacturing 
powerhouse in the world economy. In the era of planned economy, many services provided 
by the market in most market economies were coordinated in the boundary of firms and 
were incorporated in the industrial output. Many services provided as private goods in a 
market economy were provided by the government as public goods, such as free housing, 
free education, free medicine, and so on. The transition process has created markets for 
these formerly public-provided services, although these processes of marketisation are still 
far from over. The extremely low share of the service sector in the economy is also a result 
of the dualistic structure47 of the Chinese economy – a legacy of Mao’s China. The rapid 
                                                        
47 By ‘dualistic structure’ we basically mean the coexistence of a modern industrial sector and a large rural sector, 
as well as the gaps and barriers between these two largely separated parts of the economy. In growth theory, 
Lewis (1954) pioneered the studies of the ‘dualistic structure’ of developing economies. Solow model and some 
of its extensions remained within the framework of a one-sector model, neglecting the coexistence of capitalist 
and non-capitalist sectors, usually a most striking feature of underdevelopment. The two-sector, or dualistic, 
development theory models introduced by Lewis, unlike the static Solow model, have transitional dynamics that 
are different from neoclassical approach. Lewis pioneered the view of development as a transformation from 
traditional forms of production and economic organisation to an advanced capitalist economy. With the 
introduction of a labour surplus and an elastic labour supply, Lewis took an important step away from the 
neoclassical model. 
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industrialisation process in the period of planned economy is partly based on the sacrifice 
of the Chinese peasants. The Household Registration System (HRS) and food rationing 
prevented the mobility of people from poor rural areas to relatively richer urban areas. The 
HRS remained during the reform period but has been modified to permit more flexibility in 
the reallocation of labour between rural and urban areas. This change in HRS as well as the 
abolition of food rationing in the early 1990s facilitated rural workers to work temporarily 
in cities, which contributed substantially to the large flow of migrant labour from rural to 
urban areas. Although China experienced a fast process of industrialisation and 
urbanisation in the reform era and the agricultural sector held less than 10 percent of the 
GDP in 2003, still over 700 million people lived in the rural area, which led to the 
underdevelopment of the service sector on the one hand and the underestimate of 
value-added from this sector on the other. 
1.4.2 Characteristics of the Chinese Industrialisation: Comparing with the East Asian 
Economies 
East Asian economies experienced dramatic changes in industrial structure during the 
period of their rapid economic growth. South Korea and Taiwan followed Japan in the 
process of industrial transformation from light industries to heavy and chemical industries 
and further to some high-technology sectors. In Singapore and Hong Kong, foreign trade 
and financial services developed to such a level that transformed the city-states into global 
commercial and financial centres. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia started the 
industrialisation process with selected industries and benefited from increasing inward FDI, 
especially that from Japan and the East Asian NIEs. 
In the late 1980s, the newly emerged theory of the developmental state emphasised that 
governments played a central role in the economic development of East Asian economies. 
Industrial policy has been asserted the central factor behind the rapid industrialisation of 
East Asian economies. Some important interpretations of the role of industrial policy on 
industrialisation include Amsden’s (1989) book on South Korea, Wade’s (1990) book on 
Taiwan, as well as Johnson’s books on Japan (1982, 1995).48 These authors argued that the 
governments of the three economies devised an array of incentives that encouraged private 
investment in strategic industries. Price mechanism and non-price means were utilised to 
encourage private firms to take actions that the government considered to promote rapid 
industrialisation. These governments identified critical economic areas for development 
and directed resource allocation towards selected industries. These governments also tried 
to subject the selected sectors to international competition that forced them to become 
more efficient. The industrial policies encouraged the development of industries and 
altered the structure of the economy that would not have taken place merely depending on 
firm response to market signals.  
Factors associated with rapid industrialisation in other East Asian economies, such as 
high saving and investment rates, high-quality human capital and industrial policy, are also 
applicable to China.49 Like in Japan and South Korea, industrialisation in China during the 
                                                        
48 Nevertheless, some scholars argued that the economic success does not itself constituted proof of the efficacy 
of such policy (Vestal, 1993), and the successes that were achieved were often matched by failures, and that the 
costs were not insignificant (Stern et al., 1995). 
49 China has one of the world’s highest saving rates at over 40 percent. As a percentage of GDP, investment has 
grown to 45 percent in recent years. Fixed asset investment has been the principle driver of China’s economic 
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reform period was greatly influenced by industrial policy. In the 1980s, the priority was the 
development of light industries in order to change the structure of dominant heavy 
industries and weak light industries and the overwhelming shortage of consumer goods in 
the markets.50 As a result of these early efforts, the percentage of light industry in total 
industry rose from 44 percent in 1979 to 52 percent in 1984. In the early 1990s, the 
problem of shortages in the consumer goods was generally solved and the industrial 
structure was healthier than that of the 1980s in terms of the heavy-light industry ratio. The 
industrial policy pursued in Japan and South Korea’s years of rapid development can be 
considered as valued-orientated, which aimed to direct resource allocation towards 
industries with higher growth potential and more value-added (thus the more potential 
contribution to economic growth). Different from this scheme, China’s industrial policy 
prior to the early 1990s can be considered as shortage-orientated. The industrial policy 
aimed to direct resource allocation towards industries with low production capacity thus 
with difficulties to meet the market demand. As markets were not fully created and firms 
were not good at reacting to market signals, industrial policy in China acted in part as a 
complementary to the market mechanism for resource allocation.  
In 1989, the State Council issues the ‘Decision on the Gist of Current Industrial Policy’, 
the first explicit general guideline for a national industrial policy. In 1994, the State 
Council issued the ‘Outline of State Industrial Policy in the 1990s’, providing the basic 
institutional framework for China’s industrial policy. In the 1990s, China’s industrial 
policy has become more value-orientated to support some specific strategic industries. 
Several ‘pillar industries’ characterised by sophisticated technology and high value-added 
production, such as machinery, electronics, petrochemical, automotive and construction, 
have been identified and consequently supported by specific policy measures. The support 
of the development of high-tech industries has been increasingly emphasised by China’s 
industrial policy. The industrial policy for the electronics and Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) sector (first consumer electronics, then computer and 
telecommunications, later on software and integrated circuit) and the related broad national 
strategy of ‘promoting industrialisation by informatisation’ provide a typical example (see 
Subsection 7.1.2 for details). In addition to the pillar-industry argument, Chinese industrial 
policy has kept emphasising the importance of agriculture, basic industries and 
infrastructures. China’s trade policy reinforced the role played by industrial policy. Based 
on a study on the determinants of tariff rates for 95 industries in 1996, Chen and Feng 
(2000) found that the trade policy pursued by China was principally defined by the 
industrial policy that favoured high-technology industries and the concerns of social 
stability. On the other hand, polices towards inward FDI have become increasingly 
industry selective. The role played by the Chinese government in industrialisation came 
not only from the central government but also from local state agencies. Based on a 
decentralised governance structure, the arrangements of authority sharing and a system of 
fiscal decentralisation have brought strong incentives to local governments to promote 
economic development at the local level. As local governments actively involved in the 
process of local economic development, especially of the growth of the manufacturing 
sector, which was considered to be the main source of tax income and local employments, 
they spontaneously played a significant role in industrialisation in their localities (Qi, 1992; 
                                                                                                                                            
growth. 
50 In Kornai’s view, the problem of shortage is the central, unavoidable feature of the planned economies. It is 
rooted in the problem of soft budgetary constraints in the socialist economies.  
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Zheng, 1994; Montinola et al., 1995). 
During the reform period, China’s industrialisation process was largely driven by the 
new economic forces introduced by economic transition, internationalisation and a 
decentralised government structure. The newly entered non-state-owned enterprises have 
played a vital role in the rapid structural change in the Chinese economy. While an 
increasing number of foreign firms built or transferred their production capacity into China, 
industrial clusters popped up in some FDI-attracting hotspots in coastal provinces of China. 
Some industries, such as that of low-end products like textiles and toys, led this process of 
considerable capacity migrations, followed by other industries of high-technology products. 
As this process accelerated in recent years, the effects of China’s industrialisation went 
beyond its territory. China has been alleged to become an increasingly powerful global 
deflationary force as low price consumer goods made in China flush into international 
markets. Ironically, China was also alleged to be a global inflationary force as the strong 
demand for natural resources and primary products from China exploded in recent years. 
As the manufacturing strength and export competitiveness built up, China was 
considered to become the ‘workshop of the world’, as highlighted by its rapid economic 
growth and extremely high share of the industrial and manufacturing sector in the 
economy. Behind China’s strengthened competitiveness was a combination of capital and 
technology from foreign firms and domestic labour forces from the world’s largest pool of 
manufacturing labour. Extremely cheap labours fed the country’s export-oriented 
industries, fuelling low-cost production for the manufacturing sector and exports. This 
provides a comparable process to what took place in the East Asian countries, but with 
times of scale. The more major difference has been that, in these tiger economies, wage 
inflation followed rapid economic growth as labour resource became stretched eventually. 
In China, however, the supply of low-priced labour seems almost inexhaustible, making it 
possible to sustain this growth pattern for a considerable while in the future. 
One of the specific characteristics of China’s industrialisation during the reform period, 
therefore, lies in the labour side and the dualistic nature of its economic structure. There 
are still a huge amount of redundant labour in the rural areas, earning on average just 
RMB¥ 2476 per year compared with the RMB¥ 7703 of people living in cities.51 The gap 
between rural and urban areas poses a severe problem to China due to a severely skewed 
economic growth process. Yet it also confers a bonanza for factory bosses in China: as 
most migrant workers head to factories around China’s coastal cities, a seemingly endless 
supply of low-priced labour52 allows companies not only to control costs, but even to cut 
them dramatically. By contrast, post-war Japanese and South Korean economic 
development has been characterised as rapid growth with relatively equitable distribution 
of income (Whang, 1989). 
                                                        
51 Data for 2002. According to the NBSC. 
52 In 2004, severe shortage of migrant workers in a number of locations such as Guangdong was reported. 
Whether this signalise a structural change remains a question and need further observation. 
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1.5 The Chinese Model of Economic Development: Follower or Forerunner? 
The process of economic change is dynamic, evolutionary and multidimensional. With 
respect to the different paths, various speeds and characteristic features of the multi-faceted 
economic change, the development process of every country can be considered unique. 
Nevertheless, some countries do present models of economic development, which provide 
some best practices (development strategies and institutional forms) for latecomers to 
follow. The Chinese model of economic development does not challenge the conventional 
wisdom on what are the best practices, but it does provide some lessons on how to 
effectively implement these best-practice strategies and institutions. In other words, China 
has been not only a follower of best practices but also a forerunner in some innovative 
approaches to implementing them with ‘new combinations’ – to use Schumpeter’s phrase. 
Table 1-10 summarises the comparative studies between China, EESFU transition 
economies and East Asian economies (focusing on Japan and South Korea) in the previous 
three sections, in order to facilitate the further discussion of the uniqueness of the Chinese 
model of economic development. 
Table 1-10 A summary of the preceding comparative studies 
Economy Transition Internationalisation Industrialisation 
China 
Gradualist approach 
– Without multiparty democracy 
– Gradual liberalisation 
– Privatisation delayed 
– Export promotion 
– FDI promotion 
 
Before reform Centrally planned 
After reform 
– High saving and investment rate 
– Government-led (Industrial policy) 
– The role of local governments 
– The role of foreign MNCs 
– Supporting large-sized SOEs 
EEFSU 
Big-bang approach 
– Multiparty democracy 
– Liberalisation 
– Privatisation 
– FDI promotion 
 
 
 
– Centrally planned 
 
 
 
East Asia 
 
 
– Export promotion 
 
 
 
– High saving and investment rate 
– Government-led 
(Industrial policy) 
– Supporting domestic firms 
China’s good economic performance since 1978 could be partly attributed to the 
adoption of the development strategies previously successfully implemented by other 
countries, in particular Japan and the East Asian NIEs (cf. Perkins, 2001; Pereira, 2003). In 
this view, China has learned from other countries. The ‘flying geese’ model (Akamatsu, 
1962) holds that lower-wage countries follow leader countries up the value-added chain 
and technology ladder. It also reflects a pattern of learning from neighbours. For instance, 
decisions on which industries to favour and the related policy flexibility are crucial to the 
effectiveness of industrial policies. The successes or failures of other countries’ policy 
practices and their paths of technological progress provide valuable lessons for the 
latecomers. Based upon a common feature of the coexistence of a proactive government 
and a market economy, both China and the East Asian NIEs have had a public drive for 
industrialisation, high rates of saving and investment, and (various forms of) openness to 
the world economy. China not only shares these common fundamentals with its East Asian 
neighbours, but has also learned from the development experience of them. China’ 
experience has provided additional evidence that backward economies can make rapid 
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progress by imitating the leaders. 
On the other hand, as a transition economy, China began its rapid economic growth at a 
very different starting point from that of its East Asian neighbours. China faced the 
unprecedented challenge of transforming a centrally planned economy into a market 
economy. In addition to the standard sources of economic growth adequately explored by 
the East Asian countries, China also faced some special sources because of the allocative 
distortions in its previous economic system and consequently the room of efficiency 
improvement. However, how would it be possible to set a development strategy to explore 
the growth potential and to achieve sustainable economic growth during a process of 
transition? No experience could be referred to and the sole choice has been ‘learning by 
doing’. China seems to have gleaned from its own experience in the process of transition. 
In the studies of the economic development of latecomers such as Germany in the 19th 
century, Gerschenkron (1962) argued that latecomers need to make special arrangements 
to compensate for their backwardness and they may find ways to do so. In the dynamic 
process of transition, internationalisation and industrialisation in China’s reform period, 
did new development strategies and institutional forms that can promote economic growth 
emerge? How could the Chinese experience be incorporated into the development debate? 
Could other countries possibly learn from the ‘lessons from China’?  
1.5.1 The Best Practices Remixed: China’s Development Strategy 
Economic development remains an urgent global need. The past several decades show 
striking and growing differences between countries in their ability to develop. Although 
many developing countries have achieved impressive economic growth, some countries 
have become more marginalised and there are still over a billion people in the world living 
in poverty. Economic inequalities within countries remain large and there is little sign of 
convergence in incomes across counties (UNCTAD, 1997b). Long-term economic 
development should be the central policy objective of the governments of developing 
countries. However, there are intense disagreements among economists and public officials 
over the best way to achieve this goal and competing paradigms have emerged, leading in 
turn to very different policy recommendations. The disagreements are mainly about the 
role of the state in economic development and the optimal degree of economic openness. 
Taking both aspects into account, a simplified summary of the models of economic 
systems and the strategies for economic development is depicted in Figure 1-9. The 
positioning of China and some relevant economies as to their economic systems or 
development strategies are illustrated in this figure, which thus can demonstrate the 
intellectual sources of the Chinese model of economic development and to fit China into 
the ongoing development debates. 
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Shock Therapy 
Figure 1-9 Models of economic systems and development strategies: typical examples in East Asia 
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One of the basic disagreements over the best way to achieve the goal of economic 
development regards the role of the state. The relation between the market and the state is 
one of the basic ones in economies and economics. A principal theme of Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations is that government regulation, let along central planning, is not 
necessary to make an economic system function in an orderly manner. The economy could 
be effectively coordinated by the ‘invisible hand’ of a system of prices.53 A major task of 
economists since the publication of Wealth of Nations, argued by Demsetz (1988), has 
been to formalise this proposition. The Great Depression crashed the belief that the market 
is perfect by definition and made it more rational to coordinate industrial production by the 
forms of planning. The most extreme position was taken by Lenin, who argued that the 
economic system in Russia would be run as one big factory.54 This idea precipitated the 
two great economic experiments in the 20th century – the socialist experiment and the 
experiment of economic transition. 
After the establishment of the Soviet model of centrally planned economy, fundamental 
                                                        
53 Smith, by the way, did see a role for governments in creating the preconditions for effectively operating 
markets and was not completely against state influence in other areas as well. Smith envisaged the tasks of 
government as highly limited and beneficent only in three areas: national defence, the administration of justice, 
and in certain large-scale infrastructure investment projects that private industry would no or could not pursue. 
54 It is the effort to find the equilibrium between using the market mechanism and existence of management in 
this big factory that lead Coase introducing the concept of transaction cost into economics (Coase, 1992). Coase 
developed economic understanding by breaking the hypothesis of the non-existence of transaction cost. Another 
breakthrough took place at the same time by breaking the hypothesis of free competition and introducing concept 
of monopoly. 
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differences lied between two basic models of economic regimes (or overall economic 
institutional arrangements) – the market economy and the planed economy. First, in terms 
of resource allocation, market economies rely on decentralised decision-making and the 
basic mechanisms of market – price and competition, while planned economies rely on 
central planning. Secondly, in terms of property ownership and incentives, market 
economies are based upon a system of private ownership, while planned economies rely on 
public ownership of the means of production. With respect to the market-state relationship, 
the model of centrally planned economy, which served for many years as the clear polar 
alternative to the variety of market economies, goes to one extreme – government plays a 
dominant role in the economy both as the sole owner and as the core decision-marker. 
There are varieties of institutional arrangements and economic performance within the 
planned economies; however, the generally miserable economic performance of them led 
many observers to appreciate the superiority of the market economy. In one sense market 
capitalism has emerged the victor in a war of competing economic ideologies that has been 
waged for much of the 20th century. 
Significant varieties have also existed among market economies. With national systems 
of market economy differ from one another in many aspects, differences in the following 
two areas are worthy of particular attention: 1) the role of the state in the economy, 2) the 
system of corporate governance and private business practice. According to Gilpin (2001), 
three dominant economies provide three archetypes: the American (or ‘Anglo-Saxon’) 
system of market-centred capitalism, the Germany (or Western European) system of 
‘social market’ capitalism, and the Japanese system of state-led developmental capitalism. 
With regard to the role of the state in the economy, there are some generally accepted basic 
functions of the state, including the production of pubic goods, the redistributive activities 
and macroeconomic stabilisation. Despite this common belief, however, matured market 
economies diversify from the generally laissez-faire, non-interventionist stance of the 
United States to the Japanese state’s crucial role in economic development. Western 
European states play a more significant role in the economy than the United States, but are 
less interventionist than Japan. With regards to the system of corporate governance and 
business practices, American, Western European and Japanese firms organise their 
economic activities (such as financing and production) in varying ways. 
The American, Germany and Japanese model of market economies were claimed 
superior at one time or another as one model outperformed others during a specific period 
of time. The Japanese model of state-led development obtained specific attentions in the 
1980s thanks to Japan’s success in terms of growth and international trade. Interests in the 
Japanese model were reinforced by the rapid industrialisation of the NIEs in East Asia. In 
the 1980s much of the literature concerned with East Asia’s high levels of economic 
growth focused on the reliance on market fundamentals and limited government 
intervention. It was argued that the success of these economies was due to their reliance on 
the market, the openness of their economies and the export-led strategies. In the late 1980s, 
the theory of developmental state arose, presenting a different interpretation of the ‘East 
Asian Miracle’ and a revisionist critique to the neoliberalism.55 According to this stream 
of theory, the rapid economic growth of Japan and the East Asian NIEs (particularly South 
Korea and Taiwan) was due to their adoption of the state-led development model in which 
                                                        
55 See Core (2000) for a detailed discussion of the ‘orthodox’ school and the ‘heterodox’ school of development 
thinking. See Amsden (1994) and Gilpin (2001) for the accusation of the World Bank interpretation of the ‘East 
Asian Miracle’.  
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the state played a key role in guiding economic development. This interpretation 
emphasised the state orchestrated oligopolistic competition and the government 
intervention so as to ‘get the price wrong’ (Amsden, 1989), presenting an opposition to the 
neoliberalist approach. 
The development of South Korea has strong parallels to that of Japan, including the 
dominance of the powerful role of the government, the giant conglomerates, the intimate 
government-bank-industry relationships, the rapid import and implementation of foreign 
technology and the export-orientation of growth (Kennett, 2001). Nevertheless, with 
different initial conditions56, processes and strategies of industrialisation, South Korea and 
other East Asian economies were not merely followers of the Japanese model, but 
presented alternative models of development characterised by the combination of 
government-led development (an even stronger version than Japan’s) and a high degree of 
economic openness. 
The impact of economic openness on economic growth has been one of the topical 
issues of the traditional development economics for a long time. The role of trade policy 
(in particular import substitution versus export promotion strategies) has been the focus of 
considerable academic efforts. The 1950s saw a great emphasis on import substitution as a 
means to industrialisation and growth, which was strongly influenced by Singer and 
Prebisch (Singer, 1950), who argued that the terms of trade facing developing countries for 
their traditional exports were deteriorating and suggested it was necessary both to 
industrialise and to control the increasingly expensive imports. Import substitution was 
particularly influential in Latin America. This argument led to the literature on 
North-South modelling, which variously included the possibility of differences across 
countries in endowments, market structure and technology.57 Since the 1960s, some 
questions about the recommendation for import substitution were brought forward and 
investigated carefully. In response to these investigations and to the experience of both the 
more planned and less trade-oriented countries on the one hand and the less planed and 
more trade-oriented countries on the other, view started to change (Stern, 1989). By the 
mid-1980s, export promotion on growth had become a dominant theme, suggesting that 
there was strong positive relationship between outward orientation and economic growth 
(World Bank, 1988). With the theoretical development, there has been considerable 
progress in trade policy reform in most developing countries, turning from an import 
substitution strategy to an outward oriented approach. 
Since the mid-1980s, most developing countries also undertook substantial revisions in 
their FDI polices, with a view towards incorporating inward FDI into their development 
strategies (UNCTAD, 1999). Until well into the 1980s, most developing countries had 
maintained widespread restrictions on FDI and the literature on MNC’s role in 
development processes revealed controversial conclusion. The change reflected the 
changing attitudes of developing country governments towards MNCs. Prior to the 
mid-1980s, the general attitudes reflected considerable suspicion and MNCs encountered 
hostility and resentment in host countries (see e.g. Caves, 1982). Many developing country 
governments treated MNCs as part of ‘development problem’ rather than a solution. The 
                                                        
56 Japan began industrialisation in the late 19th and the early 20th Century. After the Second World War, Japanese 
imperialism had left a legacy of physical infrastructure, an educated population, and effective institutions that 
favoured economic development (Gilpin, 2001). South Korea, on the other hand, still had a largely agrarian 
economic with 65 percent of the workforce in agriculture in 1961 (Kennett, 2001). 
57 See McIntosh (1986) for a survey. 
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successful development experience of some developing economies that heavily attracted 
FDI inflows provided example of the positive roles of MNCs. After decades of scepticism, 
there was a shared belief that MNCs can be an important element in a country’s 
development strategy (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996). Governments began to recognise that 
MNCs could provide a package of external resources that can contribute to development. 
MNCs are similar to large local firms but have much to offer in terms of their proprietary 
assets, or ownership advantages. The mobile assets of MNCs consist of capital, technology, 
managerial know-how and market access. Through process of investment and refinancing, 
MNCs bring in these mobile assets to developing countries. MNCs have increasing been 
recognised as one of the principal vehicles for the international transfer of technology and 
managerial know-how. 
The debt crisis of the early 1980s58 signalled the failure of the development strategy 
based on import substitution and government intervention, which most developing 
countries in Latin America, South Asia and Africa had pursed since the Second World War. 
This traditional strategy of development emphasised import-substituting industrialisation 
and assigned a relatively dominant role of the state in the economy. Although the state in 
this model was not as dominant as that in the centrally planned economy, the economy was 
largely controlled by the state and was to some extent centrally planned. The traditional 
development economics, which was predominant before the 1970s, provided rationale for 
this ‘planned’ (or government controlled) development model. Development economists 
assumed that there were fundamental differences between developing and developed 
economies and argued that neoclassical economics were inapplicable to developing 
countries because of their special conditions. Furthermore, a number of market failures 
were prevented from economic development without interventionist state and international 
assistance. 
Up to the mid-1980s, most Latin American economies had very restrictive trade 
regimes, very intrusive and large government sectors, and severe macroeconomic 
imbalances (high inflation and large current account deficits) (Corbo, 2000). In these 
countries, the debt crisis set the stage for the introduction of widespread reforms that 
dramatically changed the traditional development strategy. The neoclassical belief in the 
free market prevailed in academia and the doctrine of Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) became dominant in international institutions such as IMF and World Bank.59 
Neoclassical economists suggested that the principle source of underdevelopment was 
government intervention that hampered market mechanisms, distorted incentives and 
actually worked against economic development. They argued that macroeconomic 
stability, competitive markets, economic openness and ‘market-friendly’ polices 60 
constitute the fundamentals for economic development. The liberalisation of FDI policy 
was also part of the conditionality in the SAP and was promoted by the IMF and the World 
Bank.  
Both the success of the East Asian economies and the failures of many other developing 
                                                        
58 The debt crisis surfaced in Mexico in 1982 and spread rapidly throughout the developing world, especially in 
Latin America. 
59 A debtor country applying for financial assistance from the IMF or the World Bank had to commit itself to the 
SAP, the packages of reforms characterised by macroeconomic balance, export-led growth, reduction of the state 
involvement in the economy and liberalising economic activities. The SAP was initiated by the US Secretary of 
the Treasury James Baker in 1985 as a respond to the reassessment of the debt crisis in the early 1980s and the 
East Asian success in the 1960s and 1970s. 
60 The ‘market-friendly’ strategy of development was put forward by World Bank (1991). 
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countries, especially those suffering from the debt crisis in the 1980s, were attributed to the 
involvement of states in economies. This controversy can be explained if we distinguish 
the different roles played by the states in these two categories of developing countries. In 
the East Asian economies, governments played a guiding role in economic development, 
mainly by the means of carefully devised incentives. The governments identified specific 
industries, which are perceived to be critical for economic development, and directed 
resource allocation towards selected industries. The policy instruments used by these 
governments have been principally based on the function of the market mechanism. The 
governments did not own and operate manufacturing and service enterprises, nor did they 
directly intervene and tightly regulate the commodity markets. Contrary to this state-led 
model, the state-controlled model in many other developing countries prior to the 1980s 
posed direct government controls over economic activities. The government owned and 
operated not only public utilities and infrastructures but also, in many countries, 
manufacturing and service enterprises. The states also intervened in many markets of 
commodities. Financial intermediates were either publicly owned or tightly regulated. 
Controls on foreign trade and FDI were extensive and the economies were inward oriented. 
The East Asian models were generally characterised by well-functioning markets, an 
open economy, proactive industrial policy, and close ties among government, banks and 
industry. The intimate government-bank-industry relationships facilitated channelling bank 
capital into promising industries and thus promoted rapid industrialisation. This system of 
‘alliance capitalism’ (Wade, 1990) worked efficiently for decades until the breakout of the 
financial crisis in 1997.61 This crisis brought the question about the sustainability of the 
East Asian model of development to the front. Under the condition of the government 
control of financial markets and the capital account, this model worked efficiently and with 
sustainability. However, as the domestic and international financial context changed 
dramatically in the 1990s, the vulnerability of the financial approach of the East Asian 
model became apparent. On the one hand, capital account convertibility and the increasing 
reliance on short-term foreign portfolio investment exposed the domestic financial markets 
to the pernicious behaviour of the international financial markets. On the other hand, the 
intimate government-bank-industry relationships and inadequate financial regulation 
encouraged questionable overinvestment and irrational lending and made banks vulnerable 
to a shock that would cause firms to default on bank loans. 
The Chinese economic system status quo can be considered as a hybrid of the American 
system of market-centred capitalism, the Japanese system of state-led developmental 
capitalism and the legacy of the centrally planned economy. The low significance of 
government spending (particularly redistributive spending) and the large gap between the 
rich and the poor highlight the departure of the Chinese model from the Western European 
system of ‘social market’ capitalism. The common features shared by China and the East 
Asian NIEs are not only geographical, but also in the similarities of a number of structural 
characteristics. State facilitation of economic growth was conceived as a government 
strategy in both East Asian countries after the Second World War62 and China during the 
reform period. Like the East Asian authoritarian capitalist states before their democratic 
                                                        
61 The crisis started in Thailand and then spread to South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. The Philippines, Hong 
Kong and Singapore were affected but to a lesser degree. By 2000, the stricken nations had rapidly recovered 
from the crisis. 
62 State facilitation of economic growth was conceived as an anti-Communist strategy in East Asian countries as 
allies of the United States after the Second World War (Rustow, 1960).  
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transformation, China has a single-party political system and a strong government. The 
other common feature of China and the East Asian NIEs includes the industrial and 
financial approaches to promoting industrialisation and their commitment to economic 
openness. The economic system of China is still far from a matured model and will 
possibly undergo dramatic changes in the future. The ongoing processes of transition, 
internationalisation and industrialisation will continue to shape China’s economic system 
and accordingly define the future of the Chinese economy. The Chinese government and 
the development strategy adopted by it will play a key role in this process. 
In terms of development strategy, the Chinese model up to now is a hybrid form of 
strategies advocated by various streams of development theory. China had followed an 
economic development model patterned on the centrally planned economic system for 
almost three decades. In the process of economic transition, China gradually abandoned 
central planning and moved toward a market economy in which markets played the central 
role in resource allocation – this generally reflected the neoclassical emphasis on the 
central role of the market. With respect to the political system, the Chinese model shares 
some similarities with the East Asian NIEs.63 In addition, some components of the East 
Asian strategy for economic development are applicable to explain China’s economic 
growth. Foremost among these elements was the economic openness that is widely 
accepted as a strategy for economic development, highlighted by the policies of export 
promotion and FDI attraction. China also followed the government-led development model 
of Japan and South Korea, in which proactive industrial policy and intimate 
government-bank-industry relationships played vital roles. In an overall environment of 
economic transition in which the legacy of the planned economy still exist, the industrial 
and financial approaches of Japan and South Korea was very appealing to the former 
planners who were still in power. On the other hand, state ownership, the weak corporate 
governance and a decentralised government structure facilitated the intimate relationship 
between the state-owned banks and enterprises.  
The rethink of the East Asian financial crisis and the recognition of the cumulating 
problems in its own financial system led China to pursue further economic and financial 
reforms to build up market-supporting institutions largely based upon the US system of 
market-centred capitalism, which clearly demonstrated a revision of the previously most 
influential Japanese and South Korean model. In terms of bank-industry relationship, 
Chinese commercial banks are not allowed to own the equities of industrial firms, as in the 
US system. The differences between the Chinese development model and that of Japan and 
South Korea also lie in three other aspects. First, the decentralised central-local 
relationships and the proactive roles played by the localities in China are apparently 
different from the Japanese and South Korean models. China’s decentralised model 
provides another example with how regional development could occur in a continental 
sized market economy; and the combination of the developmental state and the 
developmental localism becomes one of defining features of China’s development model. 
Second, the increasing reliance on inward FDI for technological progress, export markets 
and economic development also signed a departure from the Japanese and South Korean 
model, which has a systematic exclusion of foreign capital. But it showed similarities with 
the FDI-led development model adopted by some other East Asian countries with 
                                                        
63 As argued by Chow (1997), South Korea, Taiwan (until late 1980s) and Singapore practiced a single-party 
political system. Although Japan had a multiparty system, the country was ruled by the Liberty Democratic Party 
from 1958 to 1994. 
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relatively small economies such as Malaysia.64 The Chinese model can be generally 
characterised by the collaboration between developmental state and MNCs. Third, the 
rapidly changing industrial organisation structure and the diversity of firm ownership 
demonstrate another main difference from that of Japan and South Korea. Much of the 
debate on this issue has been over whether the Japanese keiretsu model or the South 
Korean chaebol model is appropriate for China.65 Japan’s recent troubles and South 
Korea’s involvement in the East Asian financial crisis have given pause to many advocates 
of these models (Perkins, 2002). Japanese keiretsus, South Korean chaebols and Chinese 
large-scale SOEs are all supported by some forms of government policy. However, the 
fundamental discrepancy between keiretsus/chaebols and Chinese SOEs is that the former 
are private owned conglomerate, while the latter are generally public owned despite some 
recent efforts for ownership diversification of SOEs (see Subsection 2.1.3 for a detailed 
discussion). Thus the nature of corporate governance and the related agency problems in 
China are different from that in Japan and South Korea. 
1.5.2 Lessons from China: Institutional Issues in Reforms 
China’s experience highlights the increasingly recognised principle that ‘institutions 
matter’ for understanding the diverse economic performance of different countries. On the 
surface the economic changes took place in China during the reform period may be 
thought of as purely market phenomena. However, if we seek to understand the causes and 
consequences of the phenomena at a deeper level, we are compelled to take institutional 
aspects into account. 
Institutions can be considered as the humanly devised constrains that structure human 
interaction (North, 1990). Institutions can be formal rules and informal constrains. Formal 
rules include political and judicial rules, economic rules, and contracts. Informal constrains 
cannot be as precisely defined as formal rules. They include conventions, norms of 
behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct. After new formal institutions are introduced, 
tension may be created since indigenous, informal rules are inert and difficult to change. 
As a result nascent institutions may be neither enforceable nor functional. The experience 
of Chinese transition suggests that it is important to consider the interactions between 
various institutions, not only formal rules but also informal constrains, so that institutions 
that are newly introduced or pre-existing mutually reinforce each other. The resulting 
synergies can help to maintain the stability of society and macro economy and to generate 
a driving force propelling reforms and growth.  
With respect to the origins and enforcement of institutions, another stream of theory 
considered institutions as an equilibrium of a game. Different from the rule-of-the-game 
                                                        
64 Except for Japan and South Korea, most East Asian economies have relatively high level of inward FDI. Some 
economies, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are more notable. None Asian examples of FDI-led growth 
include some developing countries in Latin America (such as Brazil and Mexico), some CEE transition 
economies (such as Czech Republic and Hungary), and some developed countries (such as Ireland). 
65 The development of large industrial group was associated with the SOE reform in China. In 1991, 55 
large-sized SOEs were identified for the experiment of establishing large industrial groups. In 1997, the number 
of these experimental groups increased to 118. For the discussions of the development of large-sized SOEs, see 
Nolan (1995, 1996), Lo (1997), NBSC and the State Council Development Research Centre (1999, in Chinese), 
Lo (1999), Nolan and Wang (1999), Smyth (2000) and Sutherland (2003). For a discussion of the analogy 
between the Chinese promotion of large industrial groups and the Japans and South Korean model, see Sutherland 
(2003). 
The context  43 
 
approach which tends to subscribe to the view that rule-making is susceptible to conscious 
design by legislators, public officials and economists, the institution-as-an-equilibrium 
approach subscribes to the view of an institution as a ‘spontaneous order’ 66  or a 
self-organising system. The former approach takes the rules of the game as exogenous, 
while the latter approach considers the rules of the game as endogenously generated and 
thus self-enforcing through the strategic interactions of agents, including the enforcer.67 
The precondition for the emergence of a new institution is that agents’ action-choice rules 
become mutually consistent and convergent believes among agents being induced (Aoki, 
2001). The reason why governments so often fail to implement policies which economists 
consider to be efficiency enhancing lies in the impact of the political constraints on reform 
plans (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992) and the uncertainty regarding the distribution of 
gains and losses from reforms (Fernadez and Rodrik, 1991). The Chinese experience 
illustrates that institutional reforms could be designed in a manner with more certainty to 
benefit the majority of the society, without creating many and/or big losers. The potential 
benefits for agents from the proposed reforms made the interaction between agents (also 
the enforcer) more favourable for the emergence of a new institution and made the newly 
introduced ‘rules of the game’ more enforceable. 
The equilibrium view of institutions does not imply that institutions are rigidly frozen; 
they do change. China’s experience of economic transition provides lessons for policy 
reforms, with specific relevance to the transition from centrally planned to market-oriented 
economy. The Chinese experience demonstrates that reforms can be implemented fluently 
in an appropriate, not necessarily optimal, sequencing, and in a gradual, evolutionary and 
experimental manner. How could a ‘revolution’ take place in an evolutionary manner? The 
Chinese experience illustrates that a relatively stable political and macroeconomic situation 
is helpful to the implementation of reforms. The Chinese experience supports the argument 
that a single-party political system is consistent with a market economy (Chow, 1997). 
Economic transition is a program of policy reforms aiming at fundamentally changing 
the overall institutional arrangements of an economy from centrally planned to 
market-oriented. The complex linkages, interactions and complementarities between 
different institutions lead to the multiplicity and robustness of the overall institutional 
arrangements of an economy. How to implement a transition from one overall equilibrium 
to another, given this multiplicity and robustness? The challenge of reform facing 
transition economies is not so much about knowing where to end up, but about searching 
for a feasible path toward the end point. China’s economic transition can be viewed as a 
path-dependent evolutionary process in a piecemeal manner, which fits Popper’s notion of 
‘piecemeal social engineering’ (Qian, 2000a). 
Another main lesson from the Chinese experience is that considerable growth is 
possible with ‘sensible’ but not necessarily optimal institutions (Qian, 2000b). As Shleifer 
and Triesman (1999) argued, China’s transition shows not about what is desirable, but 
about what is feasible. It is important to distinguish the concepts of the conventional, 
best-practice institutions from the alternative, feasible ‘transitional institutions’. The 
transitional institutions reflected what could be done practically rather than what should be 
done in an ideal world. In the process of China’s economic transition, some institutional 
arrangements were not a straightforward copy of best-practice institutions of matured 
market economies, but elaborately designed and implemented transitional institutions. On 
                                                        
66 See Hayek (1973). 
67 See Aoki (2001) for a detailed discussion of the institution-as-an-equilibrium approach. 
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the one hand, the transitional institutions fulfilled the basic institutional objectives, 
unleashing the fundamental forces of incentives, competition, price mechanism, hard 
budget constraints and decentralised decision-making. On the other hand, with regard to 
specific initial conditions, the rigidity of pre-existing institutions and the inertia of agents, 
the transitional institutions made reforms practically enforceable and politically acceptable. 
However, ‘transitional institutions’ were usually based on ‘particularistic contracting’ that 
were unsustainable and might have serious ‘side effects’. For example, the dual-track price 
reform between 1984 and 1991, the ‘contract responsibility system’ in SOE reform 
between 1984 and 1988, and the ‘fiscal contracting system’ in government reform between 
1982 and 1993 all realised particular objectives of reform but also produced unexpected 
‘side effects’. Thus all of these transitional institutions implemented in the first phase of 
transition were superseded by the best-practice institutional arrangements in the second 
phase of transition (see Section 2.2 for a detailed discussion). 
Back to a fundamental question raised by this chapter: is China’s economic success the 
result of its discovery of new institutional forms or the result of the convergence of its 
economic institutions to those of matured market economies? In the process of China’s 
economic transition, some new institutional forms did emerge. However, these innovative 
forms of institutional arrangements were mainly transitional institutions that aimed to fulfil 
the same basic institutional objectives as introduced by the conventional, best-practice 
institutions. The transitional institutions can be more effective than the best-practice 
institutions for a particular period of time, especially in the beginning period of a reform 
when facing constraints from specific initial conditions, pre-existing institutions, or 
political resistance. The transitional institutions were generally taking the form of 
‘particularistic contracting’. Therefore, compared with the best-practice institutions, the 
transitional institutions have unexpected side effects and are unsustainable due to the 
information asymmetry in contract negotiation and opportunism in contract 
implementation. Thus, for China, transitional institutions, under certain condition of 
institutional constraints, represented a feasible direction for institutional evolution towards 
the best practices. For other countries, the logic rather than the contents of the transitional 
institutional arrangements in China’s reform period provides some general implications for 
institution building. 
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hrough twenty-some years of transition, the Chinese economy has been transformed 
from an economic system without competition to a system in which competition plays 
an essential role. To some extent, the process of transition is a process of introducing 
competition into the economic system. The introduction and promotion of competition 
have played a crucial role in market creation, enterprise development and institutional 
innovation. The introduction and promotion of competition during the reform period were 
based upon the function of relevant transitional institutions. While competition policy is 
widely recognised as a basic policy instrument to protect and promote competition and as a 
necessary institution to support market, a formal competition policy was not included in 
the list of necessary institutions to be built up in the 1990s. Although the process of 
competition policy legislation expedited after China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in recent years, a clearly defined formal competition policy is still 
lacking in China. In the reform era, free trade and market entry have acted as a substitute 
for competition policy. Particularly, inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has 
introduced an important competitive force into Chinese industries. However, the impact of 
inward FDI on market competition and industrial development remains largely unclear. 
After the WTO entry, probably more FDI will flow into China and Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) will play an increasingly important role in the economy. Therefore 
the research on the FDI impact on competition and industrial development and the policy 
implications of this impact become especially urgent. 
Almost double-digit annual economic growth for more than 20 years as well as the 
complex structural transformation that took place simultaneously presents in many respects 
a ‘miracle’. The first section of this chapter, Section 2.1, extends the macro level analysis 
of the Chinese context in Chapter 1 to the lower levels of analysis in order to come to a 
preliminary assessment of the recondite force of competition behind this ‘miracle’ of 
economic growth and structural transformation. In this section, the role of the introduced 
competition in market creation, enterprise development, regional economic growth and 
institutional innovation is assessed based on a review of the relevant literature. This 
account highlights the importance of competition for the Chinese model of economic 
development. Section 2.2 then addresses the challenges faced to sustain this model. This 
section discusses the role of market-supporting institutions in general and competition 
policy in particular for the sustainability of China’s economic growth. To learn from the 
experience of other countries, this section also examines why and how competition 
policies were introduced by other developing economies, particularly the East Asian 
Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union 
(EEFSU) transition economies which are the focus of the comparative studies in Chapter 1. 
The last section, Section 2.3, explores the relationship between FDI and the Chinese model 
of economic development and the general implications of this relationship for government 
policy. The analysis of the development effect of FDI is directed towards the industry level 
T 
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in this section and a research agenda is set to investigate the impact of FDI on competition 
and the development of Chinese industries and to examine the policy implications of this 
impact. 
2.1 Competition and the Chinese Model of Economic Development 
The benefits of a market economy – greater efficiency and innovation in product markets – 
depend upon the function of the fundamental forces of incentives, competition, price 
mechanism, hard budget constraints and decentralised decision-making. Competition is 
one of these ‘fingers’ of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, without each of which the 
market will not function well. The benefits of a market economy also depend on the 
operation of enterprises, the most basic units of organised production. Economic growth, 
far from relying solely upon the ‘invisible hand’ of market, has been firmly rooted in the 
development of enterprises, the ‘visible hand’ (term borrowed from Chandler, 1977) of 
resource allocation. Markets facilitate the transaction between firms and also provide a 
stage for firms to compete with each other. Competition has long been recognised as a 
major force bringing about economic development. In the 18th century Adam Smith 
pointed out that China’s lack of competition with the outside world limited its growth and 
development prospects and allowed the persistence of the divide between the rich and the 
poor. The subsequent history of China seems to have illustrated Smith’s prescience.  
Competition arises whenever two or more parties strive for something that not all can 
obtain at the same time (Stigler, 1987). Competition can take place among individuals, 
organisations and jurisdictions, in both market places and political arenas. This study 
focuses on the competition among firms taking place in industries and markets.1 To what 
extent has the previous introduction of competition in the Chinese economy delivered 
positive effects? A better understanding of the role of competition in shaping China’s 
economic growth and structural transformation can provide a firmer foundation on which 
to make economic policies in China. The role of competition in transition and the 
importance of establishing a system of competitive markets have long been acknowledged 
by Chinese economists.2 During the reform period, many institutional changes aimed to 
inject competition into the economy. Competition was introduced into the economy at the 
macro level between plan and market tracks during the process of price reform, which 
created most product markets, and at the micro level between firms, which compete with 
each other in newly created markets. China’s economic transition can essentially be 
                                                        
1 The narrow concepts of ‘market competition’ and ‘industrial competition’ were proposed by Stigler (1957). The 
term ‘market competition’ (competition in product markets) refers to the competition within a product market 
without the entry and exit of firms. The term ‘industrial competition’ is applied when there is free mobility of 
resource across industries, i.e. the free entry and exit of firms. 
2 Jinglian Wu has been an advocate of the establishment of a competitive market system since the 1980s. In 1990 
when the direction of reform was under heated debate, Wu was adherently stress the importance of market and 
competition (see Wu and Liu, 1991, in Chinese). To some extent, this study is an extension and interpretation of 
Wu’s argument at the industry level and in the FDI filed. Justin Yifu Lin has been another influential advocate of 
competition, especially in the area of SOE reform. He stressed that competition rather than ownership was more 
effective to solve the agency problem for SOEs (see Lin et al., 1997, in Chinese). The debate between Justin Yifu 
Lin and Weiying Zhang on the relative importance between ownership and competition in SOE reform reflected 
the one of the main theoretical debates on SOE reform and enterprise development in the 1990s (see Zhao, 1999, 
for a discussion). The role of competition on privatisation has also been recognised by Weiying Zhang (see Li et 
al., 2000) 
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characterised as an incremental and experimental process, which allowed the pre-existing 
inefficient sectors to exist, while at the same time introduced the new efficient sectors. The 
rivalry between pre-existing and newly entered sectors provided the basic mechanism for 
the logic of incremental and experimental reform. As this approach of reforms reduced 
resistance and lowered risk, the rule of ‘survival of the fittest’ guaranteed the prevalence of 
the efficient sectors, usually the newly entered ones. Resource reallocation from 
pre-existing to new sectors took place in a gradual manner, not only ensuring the 
improvement of welfare and efficiency, but also providing an effective compensatory and 
stabilising mechanism. This process contributed to the economic growth and structural 
transformation through shifting resources toward more efficient sectors by the basic 
mechanism of competition, which ensured the ‘survival of the fittest’, freed up resources 
and promoted efficiency. 
2.1.1 Competition and Market Creation 
In the first phase of the economic transition in the 1980s, the basic institutional framework 
of central planning remained largely intact. Meanwhile new competitive forces were 
injected into the economy through transitional institutions. Competitive product markets 
were created by curtailing central planning and moving towards market-based prices. The 
dual-track price reform was based upon the logic of continual enforcement of the central 
planning while simultaneously liberalising markets. Under the plan track, economic agents 
were assigned rights to and obligations for fixed quantities of goods at fixed planned prices 
as specified in the pre-existing plan. Meanwhile, a market track was introduced under 
which economic agents participated in the market with free market prices, provided that 
they fulfil their obligation under the plan. Based upon the logic of dual-track reform, prices 
were liberalised at the margin while infra-marginal plan prices and quotas were maintained 
for some time before being phased out. Because the planned quota was frozen, the market 
was able to grow out of the plan (Naughton, 1995). By 1993, dual-prices in the market had 
almost ended for most industrial products. In retail, the plan track accounted for only 5 
percent while in agricultural procurement accounted for approximately 10 percent. In the 
second phase of the economic transition in the 1990s, the scope of government pricing 
further narrowed down. According to the pricing catalogue issued by the State Council, the 
prices determined by the government decreased from 141 categories of commodities in 
1992 to 13 categories in 2001. Government pricing accounted 2.7 percent in all consumer 
goods.3  
Factor markets were created in the reform process and the prices of labour, capital and 
land were increasingly determined by markets. Prior to the reform, the overwhelming 
majority of the labour force was either engaged in rural communes or employed by urban 
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). The government determined the allocation of labour. 
Wage change and labour mobility were tightly controlled. During the reform period, 
China’s labour force experienced fundamental transformation and rural non-farm labours 
and urban employment in the non-state sector have growth rapidly. By the end of the 1990s, 
about one third of the rural labour force had been in the non-agricultural sector and about 
three fifth of the urban labour force had been outside the state sector (Fleisher and Yang, 
2003). Crossing the rural and urban labour markets, 77 million rural migrant labours 
                                                        
3 According to Beijing Normal University (2003, in Chinese). 
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worked temporarily in cities in 2000 (Cai, 2003). The emergent labour market created by 
relevant reform measures played a key role in this large-scale reallocation of labour. In the 
reform era, a financial market with a separated structure of banking, securities and 
insurance has been created. The consequent establishment of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1992, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) in 1998 and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003 created a 
separated regulatory structure accordingly. Although the urban land in China is 
state-owned, a land market emerged as a land-renting system built according to the Hong 
Kong model has been introduced into Chinese cities since 1986. For industrial land usage, 
land renting was applied to Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) as early as in 1979. 
As product and factor markets were being created, the boundary between the market 
and the state was redrawn. Sequential structural reforms of the government redefined the 
role of the government in the economy and substantially reduced government intervention 
in the economy. In the first phase of transition, despite an early reform in 1982, the basic 
government structure had been kept intact from the era of planned economy until the late 
1980s. Most SOEs continued directly under the authority of governmental supervisory 
agencies, such as the industrial ministries at the central level and the sectoral bureaus at the 
provincial level. The government reform implemented in 1988 first claimed to transfer the 
economic role of government from direct to indirect administration and emphasised to 
strengthen macroeconomic management as well as to reduce microeconomic regulation. 
The National State-owned Assets Administration Bureau (NSAAB) was established, 
implementing the function of state-owned asset administration. In the beginning of the 
second phase of transition, the 1993 government reform was implemented in the 
background of the reorganisation of market economy as the goal of reform. It aimed to 
adjust the role and framework of the government to fit the market economy. In the 1998 
reform, the government abandoned the function of SOE management to further adapt to 
the market economy and the scope of industrial management further decreased. Through 
these rounds of reforms, the government bureaucracy was largely streamlined and the 
structure based upon the Soviet-style industrial management ideas was transferred to a 
system focusing on macroeconomic management, which is largely consistent with other 
market economies. In a gradual manner, most industrial ministries were abolished or 
replaced by much smaller bureaus, which were then incorporated into the State Economic 
and Trade Commission (SETC). Nine out these ten bureaus were further transformed into 
one-government industrial associations (except for that of the tobacco industry). However, 
government regulation remained in many industries – some were associated with 
complicated system of administrative screening on investment projects and some were 
pursued in the name of industrial policy. 
In 2003, at the beginning of third phase of transition, a new round of government 
reform was implemented to make the necessary adjustments to fit the government structure 
for the new situation after the WTO accession. The SETC and the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) were merged into the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC) to work in line with the unification of the domestic and international 
commerce. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
was established to execute the state ownership rights. The State Development Planning 
Commission (SDPC)4  was transformed into the National Development and Reform 
                                                        
4 The SDPC was transformed from the State Planning Commission (SPC) in 1998. In the era of planned economy, 
the SPC was responsible for central planning and was the central agency in the government system. 
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Commission (NDRC), incorporating the functions of the State Council Office for 
Restructuring Economic System5 and part of the functions of the SETC. 
In the early years of economic transition, although markets were created, the legacy of 
the planned economy remained and government regulation existed in most industries. As 
reform deepened, China’s trade, investment and industrial policies were undergoing 
gradual revision. Increasingly, government regulation on market entry loosened and 
restrictions on competition in many industries were moved away in a gradual manner. This 
process first took place in the newly liberalised markets of consumer goods and then 
extended to the industries of production materials, driving the process of market creation. 
After 20 years’ gradual liberalisation, the direct government control has retreated from 
most industrial sectors, except for a number of industries with military and strategic 
concerns. Within the service sector, entry barriers to financial services and 
telecommunications are still high. No non-state-owned firm has ever entered basic 
telecommunications. Although there has been a gradual process of foreign entry in 
insurance market since 1992 and in securities market since 1995, the openness of these 
markets is still preliminary and experimental. Non-state entry in the banking sector is rare 
with one exception of the establishment of Minsheng Bank in 1995 and some specific 
cases of private or foreign minority investment in small and medium-sized commercial 
banks.6 Compared to the generally closed and highly regulated financial services, the 
retailing sector was opened earlier and the entry barriers have been largely reduced for 
major cities since the late 1990s. 
2.1.2 Competition and Enterprise Development: Ownership Diversification 
As markets were created and entry barriers were reduced, enterprises developed. While 
rapid entry of new private sector has been a feature of virtually all transition economies, 
enterprise development in Chinese transition is a variant of this more general process. The 
Chinese case demonstrates that the key feature of the process of enterprise development 
was market entry, rather than privatisation per se: market entry created competition and 
drove market development, leading to a decline in state controls and monopolies 
(Naughton, 1994). In the reform of the firm sector, no direct privatisation materialised in 
China until the mid-1990s. The most profound structural change came from the entry and 
expansion of a non-state sector. New market entries injected new competitive forces into 
markets. The new entrants competed successfully in markets and captured increasing 
market share from the previously dominant SOEs. With the rapid growth of industrial 
outputs, sizable shifts occurred in the ownership structure from the prevalence of SOEs to 
a more diversified pattern (Figure 2-1). In the late 1990s, the state sector, which includes 
either state-owned or state-holding companies, accounted for less than 30 percent of 
industrial output.7 The percentage of wholly state-owned firms decreased to about 20 
                                                        
5 The State Council Office for Restructuring Economic System was reduced from the State Commission for 
Restructuring Economic System in 1998, which had been responsible for the policies and strategies of the 
market-oriented reform since the early 1980s. 
6 For instance, some private owned firms have invested in the city commercial banks (controlled by local 
governments) in Guiyang, Yinchuan, Wenzhou, and Beijing, among others. HSBC, International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and some other international financial institutions have invested in the city commercial banks 
in Shanghai, Nanjing and Xi ’an since 2001. IFC also invested in Minsheng Bank in 2003. In August 2004, HSBC 
invested US$ 1.747 billion to become the second largest shareholder of the Bank of Communication. 
7 The state sector includes wholly owned SOEs and state-holding companies within FIEs and joint-stock 
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percent.  
Figure 2-1 Total industrial output 1980-1999: ownership composition 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). 
Note: 1) The amount of the total industrial output is of the price of each current year. 2) The data for 
1991-1994 has been modified by the NBSC, according to the Third Industrial Census in 1995. Thus 
it is slightly different from the corresponding data in the almanacs of previous years. 3) Since 1998, 
the scope of industrial statistics has been changed from including all firms to the ‘above-scale firms’ 
(including all SOEs and non-state-owned firms with an annual turnover above RMB¥ 5 million). In 
order to make it comparable with previous years, the NBSC modified the data for 1998 and after. 4) 
Before 1996, the data for the state sector published by the NBSC is of all SOEs. After 1996, the data 
for the state sector is of the SOEs and the firms with state control. So there is overlapping in the data 
for different ownership categories. To make it comparable with previous years, the author modified 
the data, removing the overlapping part and changing the data for the state sector to purely state 
owned firms. 5) ‘Other ownership’ includes FIEs, joint-stock companies and firms of other 
categories of ownership. 
The non-state sector has already become the bulk of the economy: the value-added of 
the non-state sector already accounted for 62.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 2001.8 The rapid growing of the non-state sector was driven by the expansion of 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)9, Private-owned Enterprises (POEs) and FIEs. 
The ‘unexpected’ development of TVEs marked the landscape of industrial growth in the 
1980s. The rapid rise of FIEs, POEs and joint-stock companies (or ‘companies limited by 
shares’) was the impetus for the ownership structural change accelerated in the 1990s 
(Figure 2-2). Although the absolute level of SOE output increased steadily, competition 
from the non-state sector led to the rapid shrinking of the state owned sector in the relative 
term. Consequently, resources were increasingly allocated to the non-state-owned sector. 
                                                                                                                                            
companies (Conversions of SOEs are a vital source of joint-stock companies and international joint ventures). 
8 According to the NBSC. 
9 TVEs were identified as collective owned enterprises (COEs). COEs also includes community (local 
government) owned enterprises in cities. 
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From 1992 to 2001, the percentage of the non-state sector in total fixed asset investment 
increased from 32.0 to 52.7 percent. In the same period, the percentage of the non-state 
sector in total city employment increased from 39.0 to 68.1 percent.10 
Figure 2-2 Shares of various ownership categories in total industrial output, 1980-1999 
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          Source: NBSC. 
Figure 2-2 shows that the rapid expansion of TVEs, combined with the growth of POEs 
especially in the second half of the 1980s, led to the sharp shrinking of the share of SOEs 
in total industrial output in the 1980s. Early in 1979, the Commune and Bridge Enterprises 
(renamed TVEs later in 1984 as the commune regime abolished) were allowed to enter the 
industries that were not related to agriculture. In 1984, previous restrictions against TVE 
entry and expansion were further abrogated. Afterwards, TVEs achieved impressive 
growth: total rural industrial output increased more than five times between 1983 and 1988, 
much faster than any other category of firms. Thus it is not possible to understand the 
industrial reform in China without appropriately taking account of TVEs (Weitzman and 
Xu, 1994). On the one hand, the decentralised government structure, as addressed in 
Section 1.5, provided the basic institutional foundation for the birth of TVEs. On the other 
hand, the success of TVEs was largely due to a set of external conditions to which TVEs 
were an effective adaptation (Naughton, 1994). TVEs were classified by the Chinese 
government as collectively owned and were more easily able to survive the anti-private 
property ideology than private firms in the early years of reform. The vaguely defined 
ownership was thus an advantage of the internal institutional form of TVEs (Weitzman and 
Xu, 1994). Despite the great diversity in the organisation and management of TVEs, an 
important feature of them was the community (town or village) government control of 
firms (Che and Qian, 1998a). Through the institutional arrangements of TVEs, community 
                                                        
10 According to the NBSC. 
52  Chapter Two 
 
residents created forms of income sharing that might be optimal in the absence of an 
independent legal system (Nee, 1992). The local (community) government played a critical 
role in protecting TVEs in the environment lacking property right protection (Chang and 
Wang, 1994; Li, 1996). In a business environment without a well-developed capital market 
and with strong lending discrimination against POEs, TVEs could overcome the obstacle 
to obtain capital based upon the help from local (community) governments (Che and Qian, 
1998b). 
Like TVEs in the 1980s, FIEs became the leading force of industrial growth in the 
1990s. Back in the late 1970s, foreign investors were allowed to establish FIEs, which 
need at least 25 percent foreign ownership. FIEs enjoyed special tax status compared with 
domestic firms. As foreign firms invested in China and engaged in local production, a new 
competitive force has been injected into domestic markets from abroad. Growing imports 
reinforced this process. The percentage of FIEs in total industrial output increased from 1.9 
percent in 1990 to 15.9 percent in 1999. This rapid growth of FIEs reflected the 
contribution of FDI to China’s industrial development in the 1990s. In recent years, FIEs 
continued to grow steadily: the percentage of FIEs in industrial value-added of the 
so-called ‘above-scale firms’ (including all SOEs and non-state-owned firms with an 
annual turnover above RMB¥ 5 million) increased from 19.1 percent in 1998 to 27.2 
percent in 2003. Contrarily, the share of Collective-owned Enterprises (COEs), consisting 
of mainly TVEs, decreased sharply during the same period due to the large-scale TVE 
privatisation took place since the late 1990s. This large-scale privatisation of TVEs was a 
continuation of TVE privatisation in the mid-1990s in some provinces, such as Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang, and was encouraged by the ideological breakthrough at the 15th Party Congress 
in 1997, which recognised private firms as ‘important component of the economy’. In fact, 
many TVEs were de facto POEs with a ‘red hat’ to protect them in the ideological 
environment perceived by the entrepreneurs to be uncertain. POEs experienced rapid 
expansion in the 1990s (see Figure 2-2). This was principally due to the ideological 
breakthroughs achieved since 1992, which provided increasingly friendly institutional 
environment for POEs. This POE development in the second phase of economic transition 
was a continuation of POE expansion in the first phase of transition, especially after the 
reform expanded to cities and private firms employing more than eight persons became 
formally legalised in 1984. Table 2-1shows the ownership structural change of industrial 
value-added in recent years. 
Table 2-1 Ownership structure of the industrial value-added of above-scale firms, 1998-2003 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total industrial value-added (RMB¥ billion) 3,354.1 3,535.7 3,957.0 4,260.7 4,593.5 5,361.2 
Industrial value-added of above-scale firms (RMB¥ billion) 2,004.6 2,030.7 2,368.5 2,695.0 3,148.2 4,104.5 
FIEs (percent) 19.1 20.7 22.5 24.6 25.7 27.2 
COEs (percent) 24.9 17.0 13.9 11.7 8.8 6.8 
Joint-stock companies (percent) 6.7 14.7 20.9 30.0 36.8 41.1 
State-owned and state-holding (percent) 56.7 57.1 59.2 56.4 52.8 47.3 
Source: NBSC. 
A striking feature of the ownership structural change in industrial output since the late 
1990s was the rise of the joint-stock companies, which were usually listed in domestic or 
international stock markets. The rapid growth of joint-stock companies was mainly the 
result of a new round of SOE reform, which aimed to fulfil specific objectives through 
stock-market listings of qualified SOEs. These objectives included transforming SOEs into 
‘modern enterprises’, establishing sound corporate governance accordingly, diversifying 
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the ownership structure of SOEs, and expanding the scale of direct financing for SOEs, 
which were relying too much on the State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) for loans. 
In the 1990s, Chinese stock market grew rapidly, but mainly to fulfil the policy function of 
supporting SOE reform (Table 2-2). Although the listed companies in China have 
diversified ownership structure, the state is usually the largest shareholder because most 
joint-stock companies were transformed from former SOEs and the institutions of the 
Chinese stock market were designed to ensure the control of the listed companied by the 
state.11 The institutional arrangements of China’s stock market facilitated SOE reform but 
largely distorted the resource allocation function of the stock market in terms of directing 
capital flow to more efficient firms.12 Furthermore, some specific transitional institutional 
arrangements, such as the untradablity of state-owned equity13 and the separation of the 
A-share and B-share market14, posed critical institutional deficits, which severely harmed 
the efficiency and future development of China’s capital market. The path dependency of 
institutional change determines that these problems are not easily solved without causing 
severe consequences, highlighting the ‘side effects’ of transitional institutions. 
Table 2-2 Number of listed companies in Chinese stock markets 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange National total Year 
Newly listed Total Newly listed Total Newly listed Total 
1990 7 7 / / 7 7 
1991 25 32 6 6 31 38 
1992 22 54 18 24 40 78 
1993 72 126 52 76 124 202 
1994 68 194 42 118 110 312 
1995 15 209 9 127 24 336 
1996 103 312 100 227 203 539 
1997 85 397 121 348 206 745 
1998 53 450 53 401 106 851 
1999 45 495 52 453 97 948 
2000 88 583 49 502 137 1,085 
2001 78 661 1 503 79 1,164 
2002 70 731 1 504 71 1,235 
2003 49 780 1 505 50 1,285 
   Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
                                                        
11 Most firms listed in Chinese stock exchanges were transformed from SOEs, with rare exception for some 
specific cases of other ownership. However, POEs entered the stock market mainly by the means of acquisition. 
The CSRC have authority over international stock-market listings as well.  
12 The situation has been partly changed since 2000 and especially after the 16th Party Congress in 2002 as more 
POEs were allowed to be listed. FIEs were also permitted to acquire listed companies and to be listed in the 
Chinese stock market. 
13 The stocks of listed companies are categorised into three types according to their holders – State-owned Shares, 
(State-owned and Non-State-owned) Legal Person Shares, and Public Shares. The State-owned shares and 
State-owned Legal Person Shares are untradable on the market. 
14 A-share market is the mainly part of China’s stock market. A-share market is only open to domestic investors 
and the trading was in RMB. B-share market is a market established to attract foreign investment under the 
condition of capital account inconvertibility. B-share market was initially only open to foreign investors, and the 
trading was in foreign currencies (US$ in Shanghai Stock Exchange and HK$ in Shenzhen Stock Exchange). In 
2001, the B-share markets were opened to domestic investors. There were totally 111 B-share listed companies in 
China’s stock market until the end of 2003. Some companies are dual-listed in both A-share market and B-share 
market, which lead to serious price discrepancy. 
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2.1.3 Competition and Enterprise Development: SOE Reform 
The enterprise development during the reform period has not only been achieved outside 
but also inside the state sector. The SOE reform has been one of the central concerns of 
China’s economic transition since the beginning of reform. The early means of SOE 
reform mainly include the ‘economic responsibility system’ in 1981 and 1982, the ‘tax 
substitute profit’ program from 1983 to 1986, and the ‘contract responsibility system’ from 
1987 to 1992. These reforms aimed to provide SOE management certain degree of 
autonomy, to introduce managerial incentives to maximise profits and to establish a 
contractual relationship between SOEs and their governmental supervisory agencies. 
Facing unexpected ‘side effects’ of the transitional institutions for SOE reform and 
deteriorating financial performance of SOEs, the Chinese government abandoned the 
transactional contracting and turned to the ‘best practice’. In 1993, the decision was made 
by the Chinese government to establish the so-called ‘modern enterprises institution’. 
Afterwards, a series of experiments focusing on ‘corporatisation’ were launched to 
transform SOEs into ‘modern enterprises’.15 SOEs were organisationally restructured into 
limited liability corporations according to the newly passed Company Law. They were 
required to form boards of directors, to hold shareholder meetings and to establish boards 
of supervisors.16 The bodies executing the state ownership rights in SOEs were converted 
from the sectoral supervisory government agencies or enterprises groups into share holding 
corporations. The state assets under the control of share holding corporations were partially 
restructured into joint-stock companies, which were put into the frontier of the experiment 
of establishing ‘modern enterprises institution’ and were listed in stock markets and 
subjected to the supervision of the private shareholders. However, most listed companies 
had majority state ownership and were under the control of state-owned share holding 
corporations, which largely remained a homogeneous behavioural pattern as their 
predecessors. 
The performance of the state-owned industrial sector prior to the mid-1990s provided 
controversial evidence of the effectiveness of the SOE reform. On the one hand, the state 
sector enjoyed sustained Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth during the reform period, 
comparing with the productivity stagnation before reform.17 TFP growth in the state sector 
was somewhat higher than two percent during the 1980s and it might hall to less than two 
percent in the early 1990s (Jefferson et al., 1999). On the other hand, the profitability of 
the state sector declined despite the growth of FTP, especially in the 1990s (Figure 2-3). 
An explanation of the paradox of rising productivity and falling profitability is that the 
SOE productivity, while growing, appears to be lagging behind that of the non-state sector 
(Jefferson et al., 1999). For instance, TFP by the collective sector, increased at an 
estimated annual average rate of 3.4 percent between 1980 and 1992, approximately 40 
percent higher than the productivity growth of the state sector (Jefferson, 1999). 
                                                        
15 In 1994, 100 SOEs were identified for the experiment of establishing ‘modern enterprises institution’. The 
scope of this experiment increased to 2343 SOEs in 1996 and to 2700 SOEs in 2000. 
16 According to a survey conducted by the NBSC in 2000, which covered 2473 in the total 2700 SOEs 
undergoing ‘modern enterprises institution’ experiment, 81.5 percent had finished corporatisation, 82.2 percent 
had established shareholder meetings, 95.1 percent had formed borders of directors, and 84.5 percent had 
established borders of supervisors. 
17 See Jefferson et al. (1999) for an overview of a range of studies of TFP in Chinese industry. 
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Figure 2-3 Profitability of the state-owned industrial sector, 1980-1996 
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   Source: NBSC. 
The ‘competition eroding profits’ hypothesis provides convincing explanation for the 
phenomenon of falling SOE profitability. According to this hypothesis, the growing 
competition in industries caused by the entry of the non-state sector (particularly TVEs) 
since the 1980s has eroded the state’s monopoly, causing profit rates to decline in the state 
sector (Naughton, 1992, 1995). Before the late 1980s, however, the decline of profit rates 
was not accompanied by a decrease of the total amount of profits (see Figure 2-3). 
Contrarily, firm level evidence demonstrated that the intensification of competition and the 
increase in managerial autonomy significantly improved the managerial incentives and 
contributed to the TFP growth (Li, 1997). Jefferson and Rawski (1994) argued that profit 
concerns and competition led to significant improvement in SOEs. According to Li (1999), 
SOE productivity had significant correlations with the degree of competition and openness 
in the region where SOEs were located. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, due to tight 
economic policy and weak economic environment, competition in industries further 
intensified, leading to the rapid deterioration of the financial performance of SOEs. Even 
as macro economy improved after 1992, total losses of the state sector continued to 
increase. In addition, large-scale entry of FIEs, especially MNCs, in the 1990s subjected 
SOEs to increased competitive pressures from outside. Consequently, the falling 
profitability of SOEs in the 1990s became very serious in the mid-1990s as profits declined 
sharply and losses continued to climb. In 1996, the total losses exceeded profits for the 
first time, highlighting the weak condition of the state-owned industrial sector as a whole.  
With the intensification of competition, the weakness of SOEs compared with other 
ownership categories became apparent. The weakness of the state sector was partly due to 
the specific costs that SOEs had to bear. According to Qian (1996), SOEs carry two 
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categories of particular costs: the political cost (or bureaucratic cost)18, which is caused by 
the political control from the government with non-economic objectives, and the agency 
cost, which is caused by the separation of ownership and control, a common feature of 
large modern corporation. The agency problem for SOEs is more complex than that for 
large corporations in market economies, as pointed out by Kornai (1992), because the 
government as principal has various non-economic objectives. Before the mid-1990s, 
without a social-welfare network, Chinese SOEs had to bear a heavy burden of retirement 
pension and other social-welfare costs and they had to employ redundant workers in order 
to fulfil the task of promoting employment and maintaining social stability.19 These policy 
burdens, which were inherited from the era of planned economy, imposed substantial costs 
for SOEs and put them in a disadvantaged position in the competition with 
non-state-owned firms. Additionally, as the government offered various incentives (such as 
tax holidays)20 to attract FDI, it provided an uneven playground for competition between 
SOEs (and other ownership categories of domestic firms) and FIEs. Lin and Tan (1999) 
argued that the root of the SOE problem is the separation of ownership and control and the 
soft budget constraints arising from the state-imposed burdens. Due to the problem of 
information asymmetry, it is very hard for the government to distinguish between the 
losses caused by policy burdens and the operational losses. Thu the state in practice has to 
be fully responsible for the poor performance of SOEs and, consequently, the budget 
constraint of SOEs become soft. This interpretation explained why the agency problems 
were not eliminated or mitigated by the intensification of competition in China’s state 
sector, as normally the case in a market economy. 
The deteriorating financial performance of SOEs in the mid-1990s posed serious threats 
to the economy, putting a drag on government income and economic growth and 
undermining the already weak, state-dominated banking sector. As a response to this crisis, 
a radical and fundamental shift was made in the strategy of SOE reform in 1996 and the 
policy of ‘grasp the large and let go the small’ was formulated. This policy had two folds 
of implications: first, strengthening the position of large-sized SOEs by abolishing policy 
burdens imposed on them and by providing supportive policy measures; secondly, 
revitalising the small and medium-sized SOEs by various measures of privatisation. To 
eliminate the policy burdens, a preliminary social welfare network was established in cities 
and abundant workers were laid off. SOEs shed 28.7 million workers between 1997 and 
2000, approximately 40 percent of the state sector’s workforce in 1997.21 Meanwhile, 
most small-sized SOEs were privatised, which was referred to as a ‘quiet revolution from 
below’ (Cao et al., 1999: 105). In 1996, 300 large-sized SOEs, which accounted for 47.4 
percent of total industrial sales and 68.8 percent of total tax and profits, were identified as 
‘National Key Enterprises’ (NKEs) subjected to the ‘grasp the large’ policy. In 1997, 
further 212 large-sized SOEs were identified as NKEs and the scope of ‘grasp the large’ 
was generally fixed to these 512 NKEs since then. After this identification of the ‘national 
team’ of industrial development, a package of policy measures was implemented to support 
the prestigious NKEs. These policy measures included: 1) favourable treatment of bank 
lending and direct financing, 2) large-scale debt restructuring and massive debt-equity 
                                                        
18 See Kornai (1980, 1992) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
19 See Lin et al. (1998a, Chinese version in 1997) and Lin et al. (1998b) for detailed discussions of various policy 
burdens. 
20 See Fu (2000) for a discussion. 
21 According to the NBSC. 
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swaps, 3) government-arranged mergers and restructuring, 4) more autonomy on 
international trade and foreign affairs, 5) preferential innovation policy measures, 6) 
specific training program for the top managers, and so on. Associated with the ‘grasp the 
large and let go the small’ policy, a program of ‘strategic restructuring of the state-owned 
economy’22 was implemented: some key industries were identified and a number of large 
industrial groups in these industries were established based upon government supported 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and restructurings. The support to NKEs, as well as the 
previous efforts to establish large industrial groups since the early 1990s, has clarified the 
policy to construct large enterprises on the basis of large-sized SOEs. This highlighted the 
similarity between the Chinese model and the Japanese and South Korean model of 
economic development in terms of the industrial organisation structure. 
Concurrent with the efforts at corporatisation and worker layoffs, the supportive policy 
measures, especially large-scale debt restructuring and massive debt-equity swaps, directly 
affected the financial performance of SOEs.23 In 2000, a turnaround was observed and 
substantial improvement of SOE profitability seemed evident despite the increasingly 
worsening of SOE financial performance in 1997 and 1998. The victory of a three-year 
reform program to revert the financial crisis of SOEs was declared. In 2000, state-sector 
profits reached RMB¥ 239.2 billion, albeit the still high level of losses at RMB¥ 62.4 
billion. Although the organisational restructuring and worker layoffs did increase efficiency, 
admitted by the SETC, preferential policy measures accounted for the bulk of the state 
sector’s improvement of financial performance. In recent years, the profitability of the 
state sector kept improving and the total profits increased to RMB¥ 378.4 billion in 2003. 
The contribution of the state sector to GDP has remained at a relatively stable level since 
the late 1990s (see Table 2-1).  
Associated with the process of SOE reform has been the transformation of the regime of 
state-owned asset management. In 1988, the ad hoc government agency implementing the 
function of state-owned asset administration, the NSAAB was established. In 1998, the 
NSAAB was incorporated into the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In 2002, the 16th Party’s 
Congress put forward the principle that the central government and local governments 
respectively executes the state ownership rights for the SOEs. In 2003, the SASAC was 
established to execute the state ownership rights at the central level. 189 large-sized SOEs 
were identified as ‘Central Enterprises’, which are under direct supervision of the SASAC. 
Meanwhile, a series of measures and policies for the control of large-sized SOEs, 
previously dispersed in various government agencies, have been concentrated to the 
SASAC. For instance, the right of the appointment and removals of the top managers has 
been transferred from the Party and administrative system into the SASAC and some open 
and market-oriented process of recruitment has been adopted to appoint high level 
managers of some ‘Central Enterprises’. 
2.1.4 Competition, Local Economic Growth and Institutional Innovation 
Local economic growth is an important facet of China’s economic development. According 
to a recent World Bank report, if China’s individual provinces were considered as separate 
                                                        
22 See Wu (1998, in Chinese) for a detailed discussion. 
23 Except for several case studies that provided positive remarks (Huang and Wei, 1999, in Chinese; Zhao, 1999, 
in Chinese), the information about the financial performance of small-sized SOEs after privatisation is not 
available. So it is still not possible to assess the overall effect of the ‘let go the small’ policy. 
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nations, all twenty of the fastest growing nations in the world would have been Chinese for 
much of the past two decades. A number of scholars have recognised the primary role 
played by the local governments in China’s economic development. This phenomenon of 
economic federalism has been termed as ‘developmental localism’ by Zheng (1994), ‘local 
corporatism’ by Qi (1992) and ‘market-preserving federalism’ by Montinola et al. (1995).  
The function of the state and its relationship with the market and with firms, which has 
been discussed in Subsection 2.1.1, is one aspect of the issue of decentralisation. Another 
crucial aspect is the organisational form of the state itself (Dallago and Mittone, 1996). 
Accompanying with the redefinition of the boundary between the state and the market 
during the reform period, a decentralised governance structure was formed as the central 
government distributed some authorities to local governments at province and lower levels 
such as county, town and village levels. The autonomy given to local governments has 
decentralised decision-making and helped local economic growth. As argued by Qian and 
Weingast (1997), this decentralisation in China is a successful governance structure that 
increases governmental efficiency and preserves market incentives. The decentralisation 
could find its root in the era of planned economy. After the establishment of a Soviet model 
of central planning, China experienced two waves of administrative decentralisation in 
1958 and 1970. As noted by Granick (1990), the peculiarities of China’s planned economy 
could not be attributed solely economic underdevelopment and the decentralisation within 
China’s state sector presented a clear departure from the standard model of former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. During the reform period, the central government increasingly 
shared the authority of economic administration with the local governments, which were 
assigned to be in charge of the economic development in their jurisdictions. A system of 
fiscal decentralisation was implemented to divide the revenues and expenditures between 
central and local governments. The system of fiscal decentralisation was implemented 
through the institutional arrangements of the ‘fiscal contracting system’ before 1993. In 
1994 a separated central and local taxation system was established to substitute the 
transitional institution of the fiscal contracting system. The arrangements of authority 
sharing and a system of fiscal decentralisation provided local governments strong 
incentives to promote economic development at the local level. Local governments, 
therefore, intensively engaged in the development of local firms, the attraction of the 
foreign firms and the promotion of sales of these firms in domestic and international 
markets. The partnership between local governments and firms leads to authority sharing 
in practice (Zhang, 2004). 
Decentralisation led to rivalry between localities. Jurisdictional rivalry among local 
governments can increase efficiency through sorting and matching (Tiebout, 1956). It is 
also a necessary condition to create growing markets in the transition economies (Jin et al., 
1999). Inter-regional rivalry has provided an impetus for infrastructural improvement and 
institutional innovation at the local level and thereby contributed to local economic growth. 
In order to improve the performance of local firms, to attract foreign investment and to 
solve economic problems existing in their jurisdictions, local governments seek to improve 
the infrastructure and institutional environments at the local level. According to the World 
Bank (2002), rivalry among jurisdictions highlights successful institutions and promotes 
demand for them. Because of differences in local conditions, differences that range from 
development level to geography, one size doe not fit all in institutional building at the local 
level. However, some successful measures pioneered by specific local governments were 
applicable to other areas faced the same problems. These institutional arrangements could 
be simulated by others and spread among localities. Central government might notice the 
effectiveness of specific institutional innovation from local governments and would 
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possibly stimulate the expansion of these institutions. Experiment has been a key for 
institutional reform, often at the local level. Sometimes the experiment was designed by 
the central government and specific localities were chosen to implement. Sometimes, the 
institutional innovation were initiated by local governments and later recognised by the 
central government. The central government was important in validating a successful 
experiment and thus in accelerating its spread around the country. For instance, most 
measures for SOE reform implemented in the 1980s nationwide were first innovated by 
local governments. The radical policy of ‘grasp the large and let go the small’ was also 
initiated by the local governments for small and medium-sized SOEs at the local level24 
and later acknowledged and promoted by the central government on a national basis. 
According to Zhang and Li (1998, in Chinese) and Zhao (1999), inter-regional rivalry 
contributed significantly to the institutional innovation in SOE reform. Li et al. (2000) 
demonstrated theoretically how inter-regional competition in product market stimulates the 
privatisation of SOEs and COEs. 
Inter-regional rivalry led to rapid economic growth of a large number of provinces but 
created a growing disparity in economic performance among regions, especially between 
the costal and interior provinces. Inter-regional rivalry also led to regional protectionism 
and deteriorated the problem of market fragmentation, which provided serious challenges 
for China’s long-term economic development. The disparity between the costal and interior 
regions emerged and strongly expanded during the reform period. This disparity was due in 
part to the gradual regional expansion of economic reform and openness, which has been 
one of the most major features of China’s gradualist and experimental approach of 
economic transition. The reform and openness of the Chinese economy was initiated in the 
southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
near Hong Kong, Marco and Taiwan were established to be both the frontline and the 
experimental fields for economic transition. The reform and openness expanded to 14 
costal cities, Hainan Island and specific costal areas sequentially in the 1980s. In the 1990s, 
the economic openness further expanded to almost the entire country gradually (see 
Démurger et al., 2002, for a chronology of the regional expansion of reform and openness). 
The pioneering costal cities and regions in economic openness obtained the first-mover 
opportunities to absorb foreign capital, technology and managerial know-how earlier than 
their interior counterparts. This preferential policy treatment from the central government 
has provided them advantages over the inland. The geographic advantage of the costal area 
broadened the gap. Although substantial disparity in regional incomes is a common 
phenomenon in geographically large country, the disparity between costal and interior 
areas in China has become a severe problem. Public concern for regional income disparity 
in China has been increasing significantly since the early 1990s. The ambitious 
‘Development the West’ strategy promoted by the central government has been the 
strongest effort to develop the Central and Western region and solve the serious problem of 
regional disparity. The origin and consequences of China’s regional inequality has been 
widely studied in recent years.25 Despite manifold approaches adopted by various studies, 
the central message is that the preferential policy treatment towards the coastal provinces 
                                                        
24 According to Pan (1997, in Chinese), Chongqing was among the first to implement the policy of ‘grasp the 
large and let go the small’. Zhao (1999) argued that Shandong Province was an earlier and more typical example. 
25 See Lyons (1991), Tsui (1991), Lee (1994), Chen and Fleisher (1996), Jian et al. (1996), Tsui (1996), Fleisher 
and Chen (1997), Raiser (1998), Wu (1999), Song et al. (2000), Démurger (2001), Zhang (2001), Zhang et al. 
(2001), Bao et al. (2002), Cai et al. (2002), Démurger et al. (2002) and Jones et al. (2003). 
60  Chapter Two 
 
and SEZs was largely responsible for rising regional disparities (Démurger et al., 2002).  
2.2 Sustaining the Chinese Model: Roles of Market-supporting Institutions 
Through 25 years of market-oriented transition, China has undisputedly created major 
opportunities to sustain its rapid economic development and to continue its high growth 
performance. However, several severe challenges also lie ahead. Whether the potential of 
long-term economic development can be realised depends in particular on the question 
whether the institutional reform is able to keep pace with economic development. Markets 
will not function well in general (and specifically for developing countries that face a 
larger and more complex set of social and economic problems) without supporting 
institutions, which include relevant rules, mechanisms and organisations. Under certain 
conditions, market-supporting institutions can help transmit information, reduce 
transaction costs and enforce property rights and contracts, facilitating the division of 
labour and market transactions. The fundamental forces of incentives, competition, price 
mechanism, hard budget constraints and decentralised decision-making are also embodied 
in market-supporting institutions. This section specifies the challenges ahead to sustain the 
Chinese model, addresses in general the need to build market-supporting institutions to 
face the challenges, and investigates in particular the need for building a formal 
competition policy. 
2.2.1 Challenges Ahead 
Through twenty-some years of transition, the Chinese economy has been transformed into 
a market-based economy. The society has also been undergone fundamental changes and a 
more assertive civil society has grown up and played an increasingly important role in the 
economy and the polity, despite the fact that the pace and scope of political reform in 
China’s reform period has not been as impressive as the change in other areas. China 
maintains a single-party political system, in which the Party is assigned a leading role 
based on the premise that it knows best what is in the interests of the people.26 The stick to 
‘economic construction’ as the central objective of the Party since the late 1970s has 
provided the basis of this premise. Furthermore, the East Asian experience demonstrates 
the compatibility of a single-party political system and a market economy (see Section 1.5). 
However, high risks remain unless the leading role of the Party and of the ruling elite, 
particularly senior Party leaders can be reconciled with the supremacy of the law and a 
system in which law limits Party power. Advocates of a more liberal political system and 
neoclassical economists alike have argued that sustainable economic development requires 
‘rule of law’ and in particular enforceable property rights.27 
Despite the theoretical debate on the compatibility of single-party socialism and rule of 
law, China’s commitment to a law-based order has deepened during the reform period.28 
                                                        
26 Contrary to the stance of the advocates of radical democratisation, neoauthoritarian scholars argued that China 
was still not ready to make a radical move toward democracy. Instead these scholars called for a period of 
neoauthoritarian rule during which the economy could be rapidly developed to provide the foundation for 
democratic reform. 
27 See e.g. Pistor and Wellons (1999) and North (1981, 1999). 
28 See Keith (1994) and Peerenboom (2002) for discussions. 
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Based on a study of the Chinese experience, Peerenboom (2002) argued that single-party 
socialism in which the Party plays a leading role is in theory compatible with rule of law, 
albeit not a Liberal Democratic version of rule of law. Twenty-five years of reform has 
resulted in the (re) establishment of a legal system and a proliferation of new laws. The 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has endorsed the establishment of a socialist rule-of-law 
state in which the Party and the government must act in accordance with law. This new 
stance was explicitly incorporated via amendments into the Constitution in 1999. In 
addition, a new amendment of the Constitution in 2004 recognised for the first time the 
legal protection of the private property rights. Despite opposition from within the Party, the 
reform period has witnessed a growing separation of the Party and the state. The retreat of 
the Party has resulted in the transfer of power from the Party both to the government and to 
the society. Furthermore, just as there has been a retreat of the Party, so has there been a 
retreat of the state (see Subsection 2.1.1). An effective administrative law regime that 
imposes meaningful limits on the behaviour of the government and ruling elites is essential 
to the rule of law. Many new laws, such as the Price Law and the Budge Law, have been 
introduced aiming at controlling the economic activities of the government. Party members 
and government officials are required to comply with the law and in practice their 
behaviour is increasingly constrained by law.  
However, it is widely acknowledged both at home and abroad that China has 
encountered herculean problems in realising rule of law. Dealing with the remaining 
legislative gaps still poses a major challenge. Further reforms, such as the establishment of 
a more authoritative judiciary and the creation of a more independent anticorruption 
system, require approval from the Party, which will balance the needs to strengthen the 
legal system and realise rule of law, on the one hand, and the prevention of the demise of 
the Party and instability of the society on the other. Even though the Party is still a 
dominant force within the Chinese polity, it is not monolithic. As argued by Peerenboom 
(2002), the increasing diversities within the CCP, the pressing need to sustain economic 
growth and attract FDI, the growing discontent over corruption, a more robust civil society, 
the rise of the non-state sector, and accordingly the rising domestic demands for rule of law 
make the future of rule of law in China dependent on more than the preferences of senior 
Party leaders. Although it is not likely that the market-orientation economic transition will 
be reverted, the danger of the persistence of the neoauthoritarian rule and the absence of 
rule of law highlights the possibility of the crony capitalism in China. Constitutionalism 
and rule of law have been strongly advocated by Jinglian Wu and Xiaokai Yang, among 
other Chinese economists, to avert the prevalence of the crony capitalism, especially since 
the East Asian financial crisis. 
Whether China remains socialist is a question. Has the People’s Republic of China been 
changed into the ‘People’s Republic of Capital’? Compared with the social democratic 
states in Europe, the ratios of government income and expenditure to GDP are extremely 
low in China. In terms of tax system and industrial relation, the Chinese economy is more 
capitalistic, with some specific features of the early phase of the development of the 
capitalism. High levels of economic growth are considered to be both an economic and a 
political necessity. Regarding the equity versus efficiency trade-off that is core to judging 
the orientation of an economic system (cf. Van Tulder and Van der Zwart, forthcoming), the 
Chinese government has clearly adopted a stance that gives priority to efficiency. To 
sustain the rapid pace of growth, the equity has been sacrificed and the benefits of 
economic growth are distributed in such a manner that social stability cannot be guarantied. 
Certain classes within the society, such as the peasants purely engaged in the rural sector 
and the workers who have been laid off, did not benefit much from the reform and were 
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increasingly marginalised. The scale of necessary transfer payment has been still too small. 
Although a more humanistic viewpoint of development has been advocated by the new 
generation of Party leaders and concrete policy measures have been implemented, to solve 
the problems accumulated in almost twenty years in the short term is not easy.  
Income inequality increased dramatically during the reform period. Due to the dualistic 
structure of the Chinese economy, most studies on income inequality examined this issue 
within the rural and urban sectors separately or between these two sectors.29 Considering 
the country as a whole, World Bank (1997a) estimated that Gini coefficient increased from 
0.29 in 1981 to 0.39 in 1995. According to other studies (e.g. Khan and Riskin, 1998) the 
Gini coefficient increased was already 0.45 in 1995. Most of the income inequality came 
from the disparities between the rural and urban sectors. The rural-urban income disparity 
was largely due to the legacy of the planned economy, in which the interests of the 
peasants were sacrificed to support the development of heavy industries. The ratio of urban 
to rural income was 2.36 in 1978 and decreased to 2.14 in 1985 due to the rapid growth of 
agriculture in the early years of reform. Since the mid-1980s, this ratio has been kept 
increasing and reached 2.79 in 1995. The ratio experienced a sharp decease in 1995 and 
1996 in which the prices of agriculture products were greatly lifted by the government. 
According to a recent report of the China Academy of Social Science (2004, in Chinese), 
the ratio of urban to rural income was 3.1 in 2002, the second highest in the world only 
behind Zimbabwe. When taking the free medication and unemployment insurance in the 
cities into account, China has become the country with the highest rural-urban income 
disparity in the world. This high rural-urban income disparity is posing serious threat to the 
social stability and long-term economic growth of China. The rapid increase of rural-urban 
income disparity was largely due to the extremely rapid growth of income of the urban rich 
(China Academy of Social Science, 2004, in Chinese) and the stagnation of rural income 
growth. The income growth of rural households has been much slower than that of urban 
households in recent years due directly to the following reasons: 1) the relatively slow 
growth of agriculture, 2) the price decrease of agricultural products, 3) the increasing tax 
and other burdens on peasants, 4) the greater restrictions on temporary employment in 
cities due to large-scale layoff of urban workers. Fundamentally, the Household 
Registration System (HRS) and other restrictions on rural-urban migration, the less 
accessibility of education in rural areas, and the urban-biased government policy have 
adversely affected rural income growth.30 
China’s sustained economic growth in the reform era was largely based on the condition 
of a relatively stable social and political environment. Whether this stability can be 
maintained also depends on the ability of the government to solve the problems of 
increasing inequality and widening gaps between rich and poor. According to the World 
Bank (2001), this problem is relatively simple: markets are central to improving the lives 
of poor people and institutions play an important role in how markets affect people’s 
standards of living and help protect their rights. The Chinese government already has a 
considerable commitment to the market-oriented reform and this has not yet resulted in an 
effective solution to the severe inequality problem. Whether neoclassical economists are 
right in stating that these problems are only ‘transitory’ is difficult to judge. What seems 
relatively safe to assume, however, is that institutions without discrimination and aiming at 
providing equal opportunities to all the people are increasingly important. Policy reforms 
                                                        
29 See Zhao et al. (1999, in Chinese) and Li (2002, in Chinese) for surveys.  
30 See Yang (1999) and Johnson (2000) for discussions. 
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and institutional arrangements should allow benefits to the rich as well as the poor. The 
Chinese government needs to be more aware of the dual effects of specific reform 
measures in affecting both efficiency and equality.  
Another major challenge: environmental problems jeopardise the sustainability of 
long-term economic development. China’s achievement of rapid economic growth and 
industrialisation has given rise to the problems of environment pollution, ecological 
destruction and amounting carbon dioxide emission. These problems in the environmental 
area are due in part to weak regulation and the uncontrolled desire for rapid economic 
growth (the so-called ‘GDP worship’). TVEs, which were the engine of China’s industrial 
development before the mid-1990s, were difficult to monitor and regulate and contributed 
significantly to the acute pollution problems and ecological destruction. From the late 
1990s, the intensifying environmental problems have been put under control, but the 
ecological destruction remains a serious problem to date. The resource constraint and 
energy security are critical issues for China’s future economic development. As demand is 
soaring, water and electricity shortages in some areas are exacerbating. Owing to the 
stagnation of production and a rapid increase of demand, China has become a net importer 
of oil since 1993. As demand for energy surged and China’s oil consumption toped Japan’s 
in the recent year, resource constraint on economic growth and the issue of energy security 
became prominent.  
Despite the impressive achievements in the process of economic transition, China still 
has a long way to go on its progression towards ‘the other side of the river’ – a full-fledged 
and developed market economy. First, to some extent the markets remain localised and 
segmented. 31  Many product markets are segmented as local governments use their 
regulatory and other discretionary powers to favour the purchase of products made within 
their jurisdiction. Factor markets such as capital market and labour market has been 
created and developed rapidly during the reform period. But significant institutional 
deficits still exist in these factor markets. The seemingly unsolvable problem of the stock 
market provides an example (see Subsection 2.1.2). Since food rationing was abolished 
and HRS was modified, more flexibility has been permitted in the reallocation of labour 
between rural and urban areas. However, the rural and urban labour markets remain largely 
segmented. As HRS remained, discrimination against migrant labours in terms of 
education and medication still existed in cities. Secondly, a level playground for firms is 
still lacking. The uneven playground is reflected by discriminative treatment to different 
categories of ownership regarding market entry, taxation, financing, and so on. Various 
incentives provided by the central and local governments to attract inward FDI have put 
FIEs in a preferential position in competition with domestic enterprises. The supportive 
policies towards SOEs, especially the NKEs, have provided them competitive advantages 
over others. Unlike in other countries where the financial system usually discriminates 
against firms on the basis of their size, the lending discrimination in China is on the basis 
of the ownership of firms. Using city-level data over 1989-1991, Wei and Wang (1997) 
found evidence that China’s bank loans favour SOEs. They argued that the lending bias 
diminished the effectiveness of other measures designed to promote the non-state sector. In 
addition to restricted access to bank credits, POEs lacked property right protection and 
were no equally treated in terms of market entry. Although facing this unfair business 
environment and uneven playground, other ownerships grew rapidly during the reform 
period. TVEs led the process in the 1980s and POEs followed in the 1990s. 
                                                        
31 See World Bank (1994) and Xu (2002) for discussions. 
64  Chapter Two 
 
Despite the recent achievements, SOE reform is still far from a success after 25 years of 
adjustment and experimentation. Before the banking sector reform in the mid-1990s, the 
intimate relationship with the government and SOEs led SOCBs have no accountability for 
inappropriate lending decision. There is no managerial incentive or pressure to improve the 
quality of lending decision, but the political propensity to support SOEs and to develop 
local economies. One main mechanism through which loss-making SOEs can keep away 
from going bankrupt was the generous lending made by the state-owned banking sector 
that are not expected to be paid back in full and on time (Wei and Wang, 1997). As a result, 
the SOCBs are weighted down by Non-performance Loans (NPLs). According to the 
official data published by the People’ Bank of China, China’s central bank, the NPL ratio 
of all domestic financial institutions was 19.8 percent at the end of 2002 and the NPL ratio 
for the four main SOCBs was 26.1 percent. This ratio has decreased rapidly compared with 
the 1990s due to systematic measures to reduce NPLs, such as capital injection and debt 
stripping.32 To further reduce NPL ratios and increase the capital adequacy of SOCBs, 
more radical measures were adopted: US$ 45 billion from the foreign currency reserves 
was injected to two SOCBs in 2003, and further capital injection and international 
stock-market listing of four SOCBs was scheduled. However, the NPLs built up by the 
SOCBs and the related risks in the financial system are still a threat to the macroeconomic 
stability for China.  
2.2.2 Building Market-supporting Institutions 
To some extent, whether the potential of long-term economic development for China can 
be realised depends on whether the institutional reform is able to keep pace with economic 
development. Markets play a central role in allocating resources and distributing income in 
all but the centrally planned economies. A commitment to building a market economy is 
the central concern for most developing economies at the moment. As a (potentially) 
efficient way of resource allocation, markets can be the key to long-term economic 
advancement. According to international organisations such as the World Bank, 
participating in the (global) market is crucial to economic growth and poverty reduction 
(World Bank, 2002). However, this statement – in particular the Dollar/Kraay study that 
was supposed to provide the supporting evidence – has been severely criticised. In fact, 
many developing countries that opened their markets for international trade did not benefit 
from their policy. It is too easy to state that problems or challenges faced by countries such 
as China are mainly attributed to weak markets or the absence of market-supporting 
institutions. There are both internal and external dimensions to this problem, which is not 
easy to solve. Furthermore, the relevance and appropriateness of institutions (whether 
market-supporting or not) depend on the timing of their implementation in relation to the 
development level of a country and to the development strategy adopted. Thus question 
remains for China – while market mechanisms seems relatively weak and specific 
market-supporting institutions are still absent, to what extent markets should be further 
developed without a more balanced view towards the equity versus efficiency trade-off? 
In the process of economic transition, China abandoned the central planning model and 
indeed moved toward a market economy in which markets played a more central role in 
                                                        
32 In 1998, RMB ¥ 270 billion Special Treasury Bond was issued for capital injection to SOCBs. In 1999, four 
asset management companies were established to accept the NPLs amounted RMB ¥ 1400 billion from four 
SOCBs respectively.  
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resource allocation. China’s rapid economic growth and structural transformation 
coincided with a relatively controlled process of growing liberalisation and a general 
reduction in the role of the state in economic activities. The function of the government has 
been largely confined to managing the macro economy, building infrastructure and 
providing sound environment for economic development.33 The government does not any 
more decide upon the prices of most commodities, nor does it directly intervene in the 
production decisions of most firms. A government structure fit for the function of 
economic management in the context of a market economy has been preliminarily 
established. This structure has three main components: the fiscal and taxation system, the 
financial system and the strategic planning system. In addition to the generally accepted 
economic functions of the state, such as the production of pubic goods, the redistributive 
activities and macroeconomic stabilisation, the Chinese government also played a leading 
role in guiding the process of transition and economic development.  
The Chinese model of economic development has become increasingly based upon the 
central function of markets (albeit with still considerable steering of the government). The 
transition from central planned to market-oriented economy has provided a major source of 
economic growth for China. Although there is no credible alternative to pursing this 
market-based model, as suggested by Woetzel (2003), the sustainability of the Chinese 
model will under question in two aspects. First, in case too much reliance is put on the 
functioning of markets, this model lacks support from the ‘social capital’ and intermediary 
institutions, the importance of which for the proper functioning of societies and markets is 
elaborated elsewhere (cf. Van Tulder and Van der Zwart, forthcoming). Secondly, ‘market 
imperfections’ arise in many instances and even extremely market-oriented models cannot 
function well in case that the market itself cannot function in a reliable manner. Markets 
will not perform well without supporting institutions (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1999; World Bank, 2002).34 Institutions affect economic performance, 
for instance, by determining the cost of transaction and production. Markets work if they 
have rules, enforcement mechanism and organisation to support market transactions. As an 
effective way of resource allocation, market needs support from institutions. The 
fundamental forces of incentives, competition, price mechanism, hard budget constraints 
and decentralised decision-making are embodied in market-supporting institutions. As the 
rules of the game, the market-supporting institutions give people opportunity and 
incentives to engage in the fruitful game of market. States and communities can build 
necessary institutions to support the function of market mechanism and the development of 
markets (see Table 2-3 for examples of market-supporting institutions).  
Table 2-3 Examples of market-supporting institutions 
Public Private 
z Judicial systems 
z Competition laws 
z Bank supervisory authorities 
z Disclosure requirement on companies 
z Formal land titles and laws governing inheritance 
z Chambers of commerce 
z Credit registries 
z Money lenders 
z Reciprocity among business partners 
z Land inheritance norms 
   Source: World Bank (2002). 
                                                        
33 See the ‘Decision on issues concerning the establishment of a socialist market economic system’ issued by the 
3rd Plenum of the 14th Congress in 1993. 
34 A central lesson in transition is that markets will not function well without supporting institutions, a state that 
carries through its basic responsibilities and a healthy civil society (EBRD, 1999). 
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The building of market-supporting institutions in China’s first phase of transition was 
principally based on transitional arrangements. The transitional institutions were usually 
based on ‘particularistic contracting’ that were relatively unsustainable and might have 
serious ‘side effects’ (see Subsection 1.5.2). The balance of benefits and costs of the 
‘transitional institutions’ typically inclined towards the negative side as the ‘side effects’ 
accumulated. Thus a transformation from transitional to best-practice institutions became 
not only easier to implement as agents became familiar with the general principle of the 
new ‘rule of the game’, but also urgent to implement as the accumulated ‘side effects’ 
being increasingly acknowledged. Several typical examples of transitional institutions that 
have been mentioned earlier are illustrated in Table 2-4, including the dual-track price 
reform (discussed in Subsection 2.1.1), the ‘contract responsibility system’ (discussed in 
Subsection 2.1.3) and the ‘fiscal contracting system’ (discussed in Subsection 2.1.4).  
Table 2-4 Examples of transitional institutions 
Transitional 
institution 
(Period) 
Basic institutional 
objectives Benefits Costs 
Optimal 
institution 
(Period) 
Dual-track price 
reform 
(1984-1991) 
Market creation:  
Making market play the 
central role in price 
determination and 
resource allocation 
 
Pareto improving; 
without arousing 
political resistance 
Creating opportunities 
for rent-seeking and 
corruption 
Price Liberalisation 
(1992-) 
Contract 
responsibility system 
(1984-1988) 
SOE reform: 
Decentralising 
decision-making for SOEs 
and promoting incentive 
for managers 
Flexibility; 
Experience can be 
borrowed from the 
similar reform in 
agriculture 
Opportunism and moral 
hazard; Informational 
asymmetry between 
SOEs and government in 
negotiation  
Privatisation of small 
and medium-sized 
SOEs; establishment 
of modern corporate 
governance 
(1993-) 
Fiscal contracting 
system 
(1982-1993) 
 
Fiscal decentralisation:  
Decentralising 
decision-making for 
government and 
promoting incentive for 
local state agencies 
Flexibility; 
consistent with the 
experimentations of 
reforms in specific 
areas 
Annual negotiation; 
Local protectionism and 
market fragmentation; 
Fiscal weakness of the 
central government 
Separated central and 
local taxation system 
based on value-added 
tax 
(1994-) 
The transitional institutions realised specific objectives of reform but also produced 
serious – and often unexpected – ‘side effects’. In the second phase of economic transition, 
most of these transitional institutions were transformed into new institutional arrangements. 
Although the dual-track price reform was proved as efficient Pareto-improving by the 
general equilibrium analysis (Lau et al., 2000), this approach had serious negative effects. 
The large gap between the prices in the plan and market track created opportunities for rent 
seeking and led to widespread corruption, which contributed significantly to the economic 
and political unrest in the late 1980s. The contract responsibility system that was 
implemented in the 1980s for SOE reform was terminated due to the widespread 
opportunist behaviour of top managers of SOEs in their tenure of contracting. Another 
serious problem of the contract responsibility system was the informational asymmetry 
between SOEs and government in negotiation for the terms of contract. Although certain 
degree of autonomy and managerial incentives was introduced into SOEs by establishing a 
contractual relationship between SOEs and their governmental supervisory agencies, the 
fundamental agency problem could not be solved and sometimes even worsened. Based on 
the same logic of ‘particularistic contracting’, the fiscal contracting system faced similar 
problems. The division of economic interests between the central and local governments 
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was largely based on a process of negotiation and bargaining. The provinces with strong 
bargaining power usually received preferential fiscal treatment, which in turn contributed 
significantly to their economic development and increasingly led to regional inequalities. 
2.2.3 Competition Policy: From ‘Transitional’ to ‘Optimal’ Institution? 
Well-functioning markets, both domestic and foreign, are vital to China’s future economic 
development. This requires in principle many things from the government. Central to the 
tasks is the ability to furnishing the requisite institutions to support the appropriate 
functioning of markets. Competition policy is one of the key components of 
market-supporting institutions. The nature of competition in a specific industry is 
influenced by a wide rang of factors, including firm rivalries and government policies. 
There are many potential restrictions to competition. Governments introduce competition 
policies to tackle private restrictions to market competition and to promote economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare. Competition policy is a particular policy instrument 
safeguarding competition, although a number of other policy measures may also have their 
impacts on competitive situations. The term competition policy refers to the competition 
law and the policy process based on it, which aims to ensure that the competitive process is 
not impeded. The term competition law generally refers to legislation, judicial decisions 
and regulations, which are generally designed to maintain or protect competition and to 
control abuses of market dominance by firms. In addition to competition policy, a broad set 
of policy instruments influencing competition includes privatisation, deregulation, trade 
policy, foreign investment policy, industrial policy and subsidies. Thus countries may have 
been able to maintain a considerable degree of competition in product markets despite the 
absence of a de jure competition policy.  
The introduction of new forces of competition has been crucial to the functioning of the 
Chinese model of economic development (see Section 2.1). In the first phase of China’s 
economic transition, the emergence and promotion of competition was based upon the 
regulatory reforms and transitional institutional arrangements. The transitional institution 
for competition promotion was not constrained to one particular institution as the examples 
in Table 2-4. Various institutional changes in economic transition helped introduce new 
forces of competition into the economy. By forcing firms to participate in the newly 
created competitive markets, competition was injected into the economy. Competition in 
industries was promoted by removing entry barriers in markets. Economic openness also 
constituted an effective channel for injecting competition. Competition can be introduced 
by opening up the economy to international competition, particularly for tradable sectors. 
Inward FDI and international trade injected competition from abroad into markets. 
Increasing openness to international trade (see Table 2-5 for the changes of average tariff 
rate since 1992) exerted competitive pressures on domestic firms. Openness to 
international trade also urged the government to reform those domestic institutions that 
undermine the ability of firms to respond to competitive pressures from abroad. 
International trade reform itself can be viewed as institutional reform, as argued by Rodrik 
(2000). 
Table 2-5 Tariff rate of China, 1992-2004 
Year 1992 1993 1995 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004
Average tariff rate (percent) 43.2 36.4 23.0 17.0 15.3 12.0 11.0 10.4
   Source: MOFTEC (MOC). 
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Meanwhile, regulatory reform has been implemented and competition has been 
introduced into the ‘natural monopolistic industries’ such as telecommunications, 
electricity, gas, postal services and railroad.35 The problems of these industries in China 
were particularly serious because of the ‘administrative monopoly’, which were caused by 
the combination of the monopolistic enterprises and the government and led to the 
collusion between the monopolistic interests and administrative power (Feng, 2003, in 
Chinese). In the early 1980s, the price regulation on telecommunications was relaxed, 
significantly increasing the profitability of the telecommunications sector and accordingly 
its investment capability. In 1985, the adoption of the ‘collecting money for electricity’ 
policy partly opened the electricity market. In 1987, the entry regulation of the civil 
aviation market was loosened and local governments were allowed to establish airline 
companies. The new round reform in the 1990s focused on changing the monopolistic 
market structure and introducing competition into the network industries. Some network 
industries such as telecommunications, electricity and civil aviation have realised the 
separation between the enterprises and the government. The sectors of railroad and postal 
services (except for the services of express and fast delivery) remained largely intact. 
Competitive market structure has been primarily established in some sectors, among which 
the progress of telecommunications industry may be the most prominent. Thorough the 
entry of new competitors and the breakup of the monopolist, competition has been 
introduced into the telecommunications market, first in mobile telecommunications and 
data services and then expanded to the fixed lines.36 
The importance of the legislative protection of competition has been acknowledged 
since the beginning of China’s reform. In 1980, the State Council enacted the ‘Provisional 
Regulation on Implementing and Protecting Socialist Competition’, which emphasised for 
the first time the necessity to fight monopoly, especially the ‘administrative monopoly’. In 
the beginning of the second phase of China’s economic transition, as suggested in 
Subsection 1.2.1, the establishment of a modern market system has been formally 
recognised as the goal of reform and a series of formal institutions are established 
accordingly. The Law to Counter-Unfair Competition was enacted in 1993. The 
introduction of this law can be considered the first step toward establishing a competition 
policy. This law, which aims to ‘encourage and protect fair competition, stop acts of unfair 
competition and defend the lawful rights and interests of firms and consumers’, probates a 
number of business practices, among which some are typical targets of a competition law 
such as predatory pricing and bid rigging. The State Administration for Industry and 
                                                        
35 As in other countries as well, these industries was deem to be ‘natural monopolistic industries’ because the 
absence of competition was motivated by the existence of large fixed costs in the network, whose duplication was 
neither privately nor socially desirable. However, incentive regulation and competition have been or are being 
introduced worldwide in these network industries (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). 
36 In 1994, China Unicom and Jitong Communication were established. It was the first time competitive force 
beside the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication was introduced. In 1998, China Telecom was established to 
separate telecommunications operation from administration. The administrative system of post and 
communication was separated: China State Post Bureau has been established; the administration of 
telecommunications was incorporated into the newly formed Ministry of Information Industry. In 1999, the 
mobile telecommunications, satellite communication and paging service were stripped from China Telecom. With 
the establishment of China Mobile and the rapid growth of China Unicom, a duopolistic market structure was 
preliminarily formed in the mobile telecommunications sector. In 1999, China Netcom was established. In 2000, 
China Railcom was established. In 2001, China Satcom was established. In 2002, China Telecom was separated 
into two parts geographically, and the north part (10 provinces) was incorporated into China Netcom. Jitong 
Communication was also incorporated into China Netcom. 
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Commerce (SAIC) is responsible for the implementation of the Law to Counter-Unfair 
Competition. For 10 years since the enactment of this law, agencies at different levels of 
the SAIC have investigated 195,000 cases, with RMB¥ 15.03 billion involved. RMB¥ 2.19 
billion has been fined accordingly.37 Other competition related laws include the Law of the 
Protecting Consumers’ Rights and Interests enacted in 1994 and the Price Law enacted in 
1998. The former, implemented by the SAIC, aims to protest consumer interests and the 
latter, implemented by the NDRC (the former SDPC), aims in part to curb price war and 
predatory pricing. 
While competition policy is widely recognised as a basic policy instrument to safeguard 
competition and as a necessary institution to support markets, a formal and clearly defined 
competition policy was not included in the list of necessary institutions to be built up in the 
1990s. The process of drafting of antitrust law38 began in 1994 right after the introduction 
of the Law to Counter-Unfair Competition, but the final draft of this law has been 
procrastinated for several years.39 Thus the core of China’s de jure competition policy, an 
antitrust law, is still absent.40 The present regime of de facto competition policy mainly 
includes the Law to Counter-Unfair Competition, the Law of the Protecting Consumers’ 
Rights, the Price Law, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulations, as well as regulations 
against unfair competition acts in specific industries (such as civil aviation). In addition, a 
preliminary system of merger control has been established in China. The legal framework 
of this system is embodied in a number of regulations on merger and acquisition targeting 
at different ownership categories of firms, promulgated and implemented by various 
government agencies (see Subsection 5.2.5 for a detailed discussion). Although the scope 
of China’s present competition regime is broad, a large part of the three widely accepted 
principal areas of modern competition law – agreements among firms, the abuse of 
dominant positions and combination or mergers among firms – are still not covered by the 
present competition policy regime. An independent competition policy agency is also 
lacking in China. The government agencies involved principally include the SAIC, the 
MOFTEC and the SETC (as noted earlier, the MOFTEC and the SETC has been 
consolidated into the MOC since 2003). Therefore the promotion and protection of 
competition in China remain relying on transitional institutional arrangements. 
Recent developments 41  demonstrate that the attitude of the Chinese government 
towards the issue of competition policy has changed as a new legislation plan is 
implemented in order to adapt for the new situation following China’s WTO entry. The 
rules of WTO give China no choice but to accelerate its transition to a full-fledged market 
system by incorporating international accepted best-practice institutions, among which 
competition policy is an important component. Accession to the WTO has accelerated the 
                                                        
37 According to the SAIC. 
38 The law is named ‘Antimonopoly Law’. 
39 A drafting group of the Antitrust Law was established in May 1994. The Antitrust Law was included in the 
legislation planning in the Eighth and Ninth People’s Congress continually. A daft version of China’s antitrust law 
has been dispersed in 2002. But antitrust law was not included in the China legislation plan in 2003. 
40 The Annex table A.22. in World Investment Report 1997 takes China as one of the countries and territories with 
competition laws. The year in which the competition law was first adopted is also indicated as 1993. In fact, it is 
refer to The Law to Counter-Unfair Competition, which was adopted on December 1, 1993.  
41 For example, Lu Fuyuan, the former Mister of Commerce, said in March 2003 that the Antitrust Law is being 
prepared for enactment. A draft version of Antimonopoly Law has been circulated at the end of 2003. In May 
2004, a survey-based report prepared by the SAIC has pointed out some industries that have raised antitrust 
concerns. 
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gradual convergence of domestic and international institutions, an essential requirement for 
further international economic integration. The institutional convergence implies that the 
rules governing the interaction between economic agents in both domestic and 
international economic arenas will increasingly reflect homogeneous principles and norms.  
Was the competition mechanism of markets on the basis of transitional institutions in 
China’s reform period functioning in an efficient manner? How to evaluate of the 
effectiveness of the de facto competition maintenance mechanism in the first two phases of 
China’s economic transition? There are three main approaches to measuring competition. 
The first approach is to analyse market structure; the second approach is to look at the 
consequences of market structure; the third approach is to look directly at the behaviour of 
firms. The aggregate measures of Chinese industry regarding firm profitability reflected 
the intensified competition before the mid-1990s, highlighting the relative effectiveness of 
de facto competition maintenance mechanism. Naughton (1992) argued that the ability of 
the non-state sector to bid away supernormal profits within the state sector has reduced 
profitability not only within the state sector but also within the non-state sector, where the 
opportunities to exploit monopoly profits have diminished. The paradox of rising 
productivity and falling profitability, discussed in the Subsection 2.1.3, was an 
industry-wide phenomenon in China, not a condition limited to the state sector (Jefferson 
et al. 1999).42 Although profit performance varied across different ownership categories, 
profitability declined for all ownership in the 1988-1996 period (Table 2-6). 
Although the transitional institution for competition promotion and maintenance can act 
as a substitute for competition policy, at present a critical concern on the future of the 
Chinese economy is: to what extent has the previous introduction of market competition in 
Chinese industries delivered positive effects (especially after the mid-1990s when a large 
amount of FDI flushed in), to what extent should competition be further maintained and 
promoted, and can this be done by transitional institutions without a clearly defined formal 
competition policy, as has previously been the case? In case that the degree of market 
competition is sound and there is an effective de facto competition maintenance 
mechanism, is it necessary to replace or supplement it with a competition policy? If the 
competition mechanism of markets is malfunctioning and there is no effective de facto 
competition maintenance mechanism, is a competition policy effective enough to change 
the situation, or there should be other policy consideration? All these questions have no 
uniform answer for different industries during different period of time. To evaluate the 
necessity of competition policy, the aggregate measurement, such as that in Table 2-6, is 
insufficient; the reliable approach is to examine the degree of competition in industries, 
and in the other words, to evaluate of the effectiveness of the de facto competition 
maintenance mechanism in various industries.  
                                                        
42 Productivity increased in the COEs, for instance, but profit rate declined too (Jefferson et al. 1992, 1994). 
Problem definition  71 
 
Table 2-6 Profitability (percent) in the Chinese industry, selected years 
Ownership Category 1988 1992 1995 1996 
(Profit + tax) / total industrial output 
SOEs 17.8 11.4 11.1 10.0 
COEs 10.7 7.6 6.6 5.9 
   TVEs 10.1 7.9 / / 
Others 13.2 9.5 / / 
   FIEs / / 8.8 7.7 
   Joint-stock companies / / 13.4 11.5 
Total 15.7 10.1 9.2 8.2 
(Profit + tax) / total assets 
SOEs 20.6 9.2 6.6 6.5 
COEs 19.8 9.8 8.1 8.1 
   TVEs 18.8 11.8 / / 
Others 24.7 10.7 / / 
   FIEs / / 8.3 8.4 
   Joint-stock companies / / 9.5 9.2 
Total 20.5 9.5 8.3 7.1 
Profit / total industrial output 
SOEs 3.3 3.1 2.6 1.5 
COEs 2.3 3.5 2.4 2.3 
   TVEs 2.4 4.2 / / 
Others 2.5 6.2 / / 
   FIEs / / 4.6 3.9 
   Joint-stock companies / / 7.4 5.9 
Total 2.9 3.5 3.0 2.4 
Profit / total assets 
SOEs 3.8 2.5 1.9 1.0 
COEs 4.1 4.5 3.2 3.1 
   TVEs 4.5 6.3 / / 
Others 4.7 7.0 / / 
   FIEs / / 5.1 4.3 
   Joint-stock companies / / 6.3 4.7 
Total 3.9 3.3 2.7 2.1 
   Source: Jefferson and Singh (1999). 
2.2.4 Introducing Competition Policy: The Experience of Developing Countries 
Does China need a formal competition policy and what kind of competition policy does 
China need? Although the answer lies in the empirical studies of Chinese industries, as was 
stressed in the last section, experience of other developing economies can already provide 
valuable lessons. A large number of countries have introduced national competition laws. 
Currently, over 90 countries worldwide have competition law, including almost all 
developed countries. There are still a large number of developing countries do not have 
competition laws and policies. For these countries, the question is whether or not the 
introduction of competition policy is worth it? Is it necessary that developing countries 
adopt competition policies that have been adopted by developed countries? It is important 
for each country to consider the necessity of competition policy in the light of its own 
economic, legal and cultural environment, as well as its own model of economic 
development. One size does not fit all in considering institutional design. It is also 
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important to take a pragmatic approach to building a competition policy, focusing on what 
can be done practically rather than on what should be done in an ideal world. 43 
Developing countries can learn from the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions in the 
developed economies, but they cannot simply copy them. This subsection further 
elaborates these issues by describing the proliferation of competition policies in general 
and addressing the experience of East Asian economies and EEFSU transition economies 
in particular. These two groups of countries are also the comparative basis for Chapter 1. 
Proliferation of competition policies 
The modern history of competition policy took shape during the later decades of the 19th 
century. The Sherman Act of 1890 in the United States was the first substantial antitrust 
measure of modern times. The act was passed in response to the growth in corporate trusts, 
which led to a substantial increase in concentration in many US industries. The principal 
areas of modern competition policy include agreements among firms, the abuse of 
dominant positions and combination or mergers among firms. Competition advocacy is 
another important function for all antitrust authorities, particularly for developing countries. 
Since the late 19th Centaury, competition policy has been introduced in a large number of 
countries. By the end of 1996, over 70 countries worldwide had introduced competition 
laws (UNCTAD, 1997a). The number has hitherto increased to over 90.44 Figure 2-4 
illustrates the proliferation of formal competition policy institutions for countries and 
territories over time.45 Governments have introduced competition laws and established 
competition authorities to enforce them, because of domestic antitrust concerns, in 
response to economic crises, or due to international pressures (World Bank, 2002). Most 
developed countries introduced competition law before 1980, especially in the 1950s. 
Except for some pioneers, most developing countries adopted competition policies after 
1990. Almost all developed countries have competition legislations, but there are still a 
large number of developing countries that still have not introduced competition policies. 
                                                        
43 See World Bank (2002) for a discussion of building effective institutions. 
44 See the ‘Directory of competition authorities’ prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat, 2002. 
45 According to UNCTAD and OECD.  
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Figure 2-4 Proliferation of competition polices 
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Canada and the United States were the first two countries to introduce competition law, 
in 1889 and 1890 respectively. Sweden introduced an antimonopoly law in 1925 because 
of concerns about cartels. Most other countries that have introduced competition law 
before 1950 were Anglo-Saxon, including Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. Many European countries introduced competition policy in the 1950s. Antitrust 
became institutionalised in Western Europe as governments moved to reduce trade 
restrictions and integrate their economies. Differing from the antitrust tradition of the 
United States, argued by Wells (2002), most European countries had tolerated and even 
encouraged cartels. According to Wells, pressure from Washington helped prevent a 
resurgence of cartel in Europe after the Second World War. The United States devoted 
considerable resources to building a liberal economic order, which Washington believed 
was necessary to preserving not only prosperity but also peace after the war. Antitrust was 
a cornerstone of this policy and the United States sought to impose antitrust policy on other 
nations, especially Western European countries and Japan (Wells, 2002). The occupation of 
Germany and Japan initiated an ambitious social science experiment: the reconstruction of 
these economies that were largely devastated. The occupation allowed Americans to 
implement programs of deconcentration and decartelisation in Japan and Germany, which 
had highly concentrated and cartelised economies. Meanwhile, the United States 
succeeded in imposing on Western Germany and Japan antitrust policies roughly modelled 
after its own regime.46 
A large number of developing countries have also introduced competition laws. The 
introduction of competition laws in developing countries reflects the changing context of 
the national and global economy. In the 1970s, support for free markets reached its nadir in 
developing countries, as governments embraced the policy suggestions based on the 
traditional development economics (see Section 1.5). Cartels, most notably the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), were established to raise the 
commodity prices to a ‘just’ level. Since debt crisis in the 1980s, economic liberalisation 
policies have been introduced with the aim of promoting efficiency and increasing 
competition. The reform program was implemented through external pressure from 
international financial institutions and often entailed enacting and enforcing strong 
competition policy.47 Trade liberalisation and privatisation were central components of the 
reform. For developing countries, the earlier protectionist policies have left a legacy of 
weak and underdeveloped competition frameworks. Government policy instruments are 
needed to safeguard and promote the competitive process, especially in a context of rapid 
institutional change and economic openness. Regulation, sometimes embodied a 
component of competition policy, was often developed after privatisation (Wise, 2000a).  
At the end of the 1980s only a handful of developing countries had effective 
competition legislation (Gray, 1991). Where rules and guidelines for competition existed, 
they were poorly implemented compared with competition policies of developed countries. 
In the 1990s, the pace of adoption increased rapidly as former centrally planned economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe introduced comprehensive programs of deregulation, 
                                                        
46 The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and the Decartelisation and Deconcentration Law of Germany were both 
enacted in 1947. They are significantly amended by later legislation, moving away from their US origins to 
consider more local conditions, particularly through a higher degree of tolerance for some types of cartel 
activities (World Bank, 2002). In Japan, the Fair Trade Commission was created in 1947, modelled on the 
American Federal Trade Commission. In 1957, the parliament legislation of Western Germany strictly limited, 
although not entirely abolished cartels, which was not as strong as the 1947 degrees.  
47 See Sell (1998) for a discussion. 
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privatisation and competition policy. A number of developing countries also introduced 
competition policy in the 1990s. Since 1990, more than 35 developing countries and 
transition economies have introduced competition law.  
Experience of the East Asian NIEs 
The four ‘Asian Tigers’ – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – are the core 
of the so-called ‘East Asian Miracle’. In these four ‘dragons’, South Korea and Taiwan, 
have introduced competition policy, but Singapore and Hong Kong still do not have 
competition legislation. As city-states, Singapore and Hong Kong provide a rather unique 
environment, the political and economic idiosyncrasies of which make international 
comparisons difficult, if not impossible. South Korea deserves the most attention because 
it introduced competition legislation earlier and improved it in a gradual manner. The 
South Korean competition policy provides a typical example for the competition policy 
introduced and improved in a context of state-led rapid economic development. The 
special role the competition policy played for chaebol reform and policy consultancy can 
also be used by China as a reference. Nevertheless it seems reasonable for developing 
countries to question the relevance of competition policy to their development given the 
success of economies such as Hong Kong and Singapore, even and South Korea. In fact, 
competition policy played a negligible role in the era of rapid economic development in 
South Korea. 
South Korea is one of the pioneers in developing countries introducing competition 
policies.48 In South Korea, competition policy played a small role in the era of state-led 
development of the 1960s and 1970s. In this period the government assigned top priority to 
industrial and trade policies in order to maximise investment and international market 
share. South Korea’s competition policy regime developed as its economic policy has 
shifted from government controls toward reliance on markets since the early 1980s (OECD, 
1996). Since the policy shift took place in the early 1980s, chaebol, the primary vehicle for 
investment and development, has emerged as a primary subject of competition policy. The 
chaebols are historical legacies of the early period of government-led rapid economic 
growth. In South Korea’s development program, the chaebol structures offered some 
advantages, but, as South Korea’s market environment opened more in the 1980s, 
weaknesses in this economic organisation became evident (Wise, 2000b). Chaebol, the 
effective solution for rapid industrial development and catch-up in the era of state-led 
growth has posed serious problems in the new economic environment. 
The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), the current antimonopoly law 
of South Korea, was adopted in December 1980, essentially replacing the Price 
Stabilisation Act enacted in 1974 aiming at controlling prices and assuring fair trade 
practices. The stated purpose of MRFTA is to encourage fair and free competition by 
prohibiting abuses of dominant positions, preventing excessive concentration of economic 
power and regulating improper concerted activities and unfair business practices, thereby 
stimulating creative business activities, protecting consumers and promoting the balanced 
development of the national economy. The MRFTA marked a significant departure from 
the traditional model of government-led development to a market economy and created a 
comprehensive set of new rules for the market economy – free and fair competition. 
Responsibility for the implementation of this new law was assigned to a new agency, the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), within the powerful Economic Planning Board. 
                                                        
48 See e.g. OECD (1996) and Lee (1998, 2002). 
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The MRFTA forbids dominant firms in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets from abusing 
their market dominating positions. 49  The KFTC exerted considerable administrative 
efforts to identify these monopolistic or oligopolistic firms, but was only able to correct a 
very small proportion of these cases. In 1999, the MRFTA was amended to abolish this 
prior designation of dominant firms. The KFTC prohibits firms and cartels from engaging 
in collective activities that would restrict competition substantially. By 2000, 329 such 
prohibited collective activities had been remedied.50 As to merger review, the 1999 
amendment also abolished the ambiguous exemptions (either industrial rationalisation or 
strengthening the international competitiveness of an industry) and set up the efficiencies 
and failing-firm defence. The KFTC also administers rules pertaining to unfair contract 
practices and advertising, as important complements to competition policy. The KFTC also 
plays a unique role in the area of competition advocacy. Other government agencies are 
required to consult with the KFTC in case that they are going to introduce, amend or enact 
any laws, degrees, or administrative measures that may restrain competition. From 1981 to 
2000, government agencies consulted with the KFTC on 3,789 separate proposed 
legislation or alterations, of which the KFTC corrected 685.  
The institution of competition policy has progressed gradually since the 1980s. In 1988, 
competition policy enforcement intensified and the Task Force for Economic Autonomy 
and Competition was established to review existing regulations and recommend changes. 
In 1990, the Committee for Administrative Deregulation was set up, which was succeeded 
in 1993 by the Deregulation Committee. Issues addressed included rules about plant 
establishment, construction, land use, customs clearance, foreign investment, environment, 
and distribution. Sectors studied included transport, distribution, construction, finance, 
stock brokerage and insurance, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, food and beverages, 
alcoholic beverages, fisheries, energy, and services such as advertising and 
telecommunications (Lee, 1998). In 1990, decision-making power of competition law 
related matters had been shifted from the Minister of the Economic Planning Board to the 
KFTC Chair, thus giving the KFTC independence in its enforcement decisions. In 1994, as 
a result of the re-organisation of government, the KFTC emerged as a separate and 
independent agency.  
Following the 1997 financial crisis and the measures imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), competition policy was considered key to regulatory reform for 
South Korea. The government has used competition policy tools to restructure chaebols as 
well (Wise, 2000b). There is continuing concern about problems raised by the chaebols, 
problems which are not limited to conventional competition issues but which also include 
concerns about capital structures and corporate governance. The MRFTA, for example, 
prohibits direct cross-investment between subsidiaries of the same chaebol and restricts 
affiliate cross debt guarantees between subsidiaries belonging to any of the 30 largest 
chaebols. Under the 1998 amendment, MRFTA prohibits affiliate payment guarantees for 
all new borrowings to the 30 largest chaebols. The 1999 amendment of the MRFTA 
permits the existence of holding companies with certain restrictions51, as a means to induce 
                                                        
49 Market dominating firms refer to either any single firms that has a market share of more than 50 percent or the 
three largest firms in a given market that have a combined market share of more than 75 percent. See Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Law No. 3320 of 1980. 
50 See Lee (2002). 
51 ‘Financial’ holding companies cannot possess non-financial subsidiaries and ‘general’ holding companies 
cannot possess subsidiaries doing financial business. 
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chaebols to reorganise themselves and to separate financial capital from industrial capital. 
Advocacy to achieve procompetitive reform has been comparatively successful. Recent 
reforms eliminated most remaining exemptions from the competition law and some 
potentially anticompetitive special privileges remain, many of them benefiting small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
The introduction of competition policy in Taiwan was later than in South Korea. A ‘Fair 
Trade Law’ was promulgated in 1991 and became effective in 1992. The target of this 
competition law is restrictive business practices and unfair trade practices. The Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) was established in January 1992. The FTC is the central authority in 
charge of competition policy and the implementation of the Fair Trade Law. It is 
responsible for drafting fair trade policy, laws and regulations, and for investigating and 
handling various acts impeding competition, such as monopolies, mergers, concerted 
actions, and other restrictions on competition or unfair competitive practices by enterprises. 
When matters provided for under the Fair Trade Law concern the authority of other 
ministries and commissions, the FTC handles them in consultation with those bodies. The 
FTC is also charged with directing and supervising the enforcement of the Fair Trade Law 
by the authorities at the municipality and county (or city) level. 
Hong Kong and Singapore are among the most open economies in the world (see 
Subsection 1.3.2). Although they are widely regarded as a free and competitive economy, 
there are actually no competition policies in Hong Kong and Singapore. In 1992, the 
Consumer Council of Hong Kong began to study a number of industries where there was a 
lack of competition. The Council later published a summary report, which recommended 
the enactment of competition laws and the adoption of comprehensive competition policies 
in Hong Kong. But the government did not accept the Council’s recommendations. The 
government argued that the needs, requirements and characteristics of individual sectors 
varied, so a sector-specific approach to safeguarding competition was more practicable. In 
case that the government finds that effective competition does not prevail in certain 
industries, or a dominant firm abuses its market dominance, it will take actions to promote 
competition. This sector-specific approach was adopted by Lam (2000) to analyse the 
problem of market dominance in Hong Kong’s gas industry. The author concluded that the 
gas industry in Hong Kong is dominated by HKCG, which gained unreasonable profits 
depending on its dominance position. It is argued that, instead of imposing extensive 
government regulation on the company, a better way to discipline the firm is to introduce 
natural gas and a common carrier system to Hong Kong. Like in Hong Kong, there is 
generally no legislation or regulation that governs anticompetitive practices in Singapore. 
Starting with the telecommunications and power industries, Singapore has been adopting a 
sector-specific approach to ensuring efficient competition in liberalised markets. The 
Singapore government was reported to be studying the need for special legislation to 
ensure commercial fair play and a competition law will be enacted by 2005. 
Without competition policy, Hong Kong and Singapore have realised high economic 
growth performance over decades. This indicates that in extremely open economies, 
international trade can introduce fierce competition into domestic markets and possibly act 
as an effective substitute for competition policy. But the experience of post-war Japan 
could also be treated as a demonstration of the irrelevance of competition policy for rapid 
economic growth even in a large and relatively closed economy. Japan’s anti-monopoly 
law has been in place since the end of the Second World War. For most of the post-war era, 
however, the principal goal of Japan’s economic policy has been economic growth and free 
competition has sometimes been seen as inconsistent with that goal (Iyori and Uesugi, 
1994). Competition policy was assigned to a separate agency, independent of the 
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government but politically not strong enough to promote its policies effectively (Wise, 
1999). In the 1990s, Japan’s attitude toward competition policy enforcement has changed 
mainly due to pressure from the United States. 52  The enforcement activities were 
increased and exceptions from the competition policy were removed. Despite the recent 
renaissance of competition policy in Japan, the decades of rapid growth of the post-war 
Japanese economy generally witnessed the absence of an effective competition policy. The 
Japanese, as well as the South Korean, experience has questioned the relevance of 
competition policy for economic growth. Rather, the necessity of a proactive industrial 
policy has been highlighted. 
Experience of transition economies 
The number of countries and territories with competition laws increased sharply after 1989 
as the former centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe introduced 
comprehensive reform programs including competition policy. Starting from an initial 
condition where industries were extremely concentrated in line with the model of centrally 
planned economy, most transition economies pursued policies to reduce concentration 
through facilitation of entry and restructuring of state-owned industries. Privatisation 
played a central role in most EEFSU transition economies. Based on the experience of the 
privatisation of other developing countries, given the initial levels of concentration, there 
was a keen awareness of the risk that privatisation might easily transform public 
monopolies into private ones and might increase the risk of abuses of market dominance. 
Most policy advisors therefore strongly supported the implementation of antitrust 
mechanisms in transition countries (Pittman, 1992; Willig, 1992; Estrin and Cave, 1993; 
Mastalir, 1993; Saunders, 1993). In some transition economies, competition authorities 
were given the mandate to scrutinise privatisation decisions ex ante in order to ensure that 
newly privatised entities would not have excessive market power (Djankov and Hoekman, 
1998a). Competition authorities had the mandate to impose demonopolisation prior to 
privatisation. In Russia, however, private monopolies were created in a hasty privatisation 
program and had already been expected in 1994 to give rise to high social and political 
costs (Joskow et al., 1994) – which has been the case witnessing the considerable negative 
effects imposed on the Russian economy by the so-called ‘oligarchs’ linked to these private 
monopolies. 
The economic transition of Central and Eastern Europe has been different from that in 
China (see Section 1.2). The former was pre-designed and took place in a short period 
while the latter materialised in a gradualist and experimental manner in a relatively longer 
period. The competition legislation was introduced as a part of the comprehensive 
programs of market-oriented reform package in the EEFSU transition economies. In the 
EEFSU transition economies, according to the World Bank (2002), the 10 EU accession 
countries (see Table 1-4) began enacting competition laws under some forms of pressure 
from the European Commission. However, the supporting legal framework for competition 
policy in these countries was absent and there was differing understanding of the reach of 
competition laws. The countries had to amend the laws to make explicit the matters that 
their advisors taken for granted (World Bank, 2002). The experience of these countries 
provides China an example for competition legislation and its enforcement in a context of 
                                                        
52 In trade dispute with the United States, it was claimed that the lax enforcement of competition policy gave 
Japanese firms unfair advantages against imports. The response from Japan was a number of explicit 
commitments to increase the resources and visibility of competition policy implementation (Wise, 1999). 
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economic transition process. 
For the transition economies, competition policy institutions evolved in the process of 
transition from central planning to a market economy. Competition policy was part of a 
larger context of pro-market decisions about privatisation and market openness. The 
competition laws introduced by the EESFU transition economies, including the 1990 
Hungarian and Polish laws, the 1991 Russian law and the 1991 law of the Czech and 
Slovak Federated Republic, more closely resemble the competition law of the European 
Community than that of the United States.53 The Russian law, for instance, is concerned 
primarily with the abuse of market dominance, not with cartelisation and exclusionary 
practices (Joskow et al., 1994). It is recognised that a broader view of competition policies 
is needed to analyse competition for the special context of transition economies. Import, 
domestic entry, break-up of conglomerates and the imposition of hard budget constraints 
on SOEs are important aspects (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998b). It is proved that 
competition is enhanced through the effect of policies other than antitrust enforcement, 
although the antitrust office may well play a role as well.54  
It is hard to assess quantitatively what the impact of the functioning of competition 
authorities has been in the EEFSU transition economies. An empirical study of competition 
policy in the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) by 
Fingleton et al. (1996) concluded that most enforcement cases were directed towards the 
abuse of market dominance. Many of these cases concerned the allegation of unfair trade 
practices and were basically contract enforcement problems. Only a small percentage of 
cases were found to concern hard-core collusive practices, such as bid rigging, price-fixing 
and market allocation. The study also concluded that remedies for serious violations of the 
law were not sufficient to ensure that firms have a strong enough incentive to abide by the 
law. A study on the activities of the Bulgaria competition authority conducted by Hoekman 
and Djankov (2000) has found similarly that a small percentage of cases concerned the 
hard-core anticompetitive practices.  
In Central and Eastern European transition economies, competition policy institutions 
have played an important role in creating the conditions for a healthy market economy and 
the competition issues that appear in the markets are comparable to those in other 
developed countries (Wise, 2000c). For most EEFSU transition economies, after the 
market economy was generally launched, the resources and priorities of competition policy 
have concentrated more on monitoring horizontal restraints and anticompetitive mergers 
and on the competition problems of regulation. Some countries are moving to introduce 
competition into formerly regulated or monopolised infrastructure sectors and services. 
The experience of EEFSU transition economies seems to illustrate that a well-designed 
multidimensional competition policy can have significant effects in fostering and 
maintaining competitive markets. It is argued that an open trade regime, complemented by 
wide-ranging privatisation, free entry into industrial sectors and the imposition of hard 
budget constraints on remaining SOEs, has led to a market structure similar to that found 
in a developed country (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998a). Whether this is the case, is open 
for debate and for more detailed study on the effectiveness of competition policies in these 
countries, which is not the object of this study. 
                                                        
53 Pittman (1992) provides a general evaluation of key provisions of these laws. 
54 The studies in this area include: Djankov and Hoekman (1998b) and Konings (1998) on the impact of import 
competition in transition economies; Newberry and Kattuman (1992) and Feinberg and Meurs (1994) on the 
importance of domestic entry; and Schaffer (1998) on the effect of hardened budget constraints. 
80  Chapter Two 
 
2.3 FDI, Competition and Government Policy: Implications for the Chinese 
Model of Economic Development  
Macro economic advancement is based on the development of individual industries. 
Industrial development could be broadly defined as the increase of domestic production 
capacity, the progress of both static and dynamic efficiency, and the enhancement of 
international competitiveness of industries. To what extent has the previous (controlled) 
introduction of competition in Chinese industries delivered positive effects to industrial 
development and to what extent should competition be further maintained and promoted? 
The answer to this question varies among industries. And manifold approaches can be 
adopted to address this concern. In a dynamic context characterised by the coexistence and 
co-evolution of the process of transition, internationalisation and industrialisation, the 
complexity in industries highlights the importance of choice between different approaches 
in industry studies. In China, different industries have various degrees of openness and 
entry barriers and consequently different competitive forces have been engaged in 
competition within the industries. Section 2.1 addresses the question about who compete in 
Chinese industries and under what condition. Categorised by the ownership characteristic, 
SOEs, FIEs and POEs are the main actors on the arena of business competition in Chinese 
industries. The hybrid ownership forms of listed companies and the COEs can be treated as 
independent forces or can simply be categorised into these three main types. Different 
categories of enterprises face an uneven playground, which has a strong impact on 
competitive situations in Chinese industries in which different ownership categories of 
firms compete with each other.  
In the industries that have not been opened to inward FDI, competition is between 
domestic enterprises and industrial development is largely indigenous. In the industries 
that have been opened up to foreign entries, new competitive forces from abroad have been 
introduced and competitive situations in these industries are accordingly more complex 
than the ‘closed’ industries. The number of ‘purely closed’ industries has kept decreasing 
during the reform period. Most industries in the manufacturing sector have been opened to 
the foreign investors and FIEs have taken a significant share of total industrial output and 
value-added (see Subsection 2.1.2). To examine the effects delivered by the introduction of 
the new competitive force from outside China through inward FDI, this study focuses on 
manufacturing industries that have been opened to foreign entries. These ‘open’ industries 
now cover most manufacturing industries in China. The impact of inward FDI on market 
competition and the development of these industries remain largely unclear. After China’s 
WTO entry, probably more FDI will flow into China and MNCs will play an increasingly 
important role in the economy. Should this require specific attention from competition 
policy towards FIEs? In addition, mergers and acquisitions are bound to be more important 
as an entry mode of FDI into China. Therefore merger related competition policy 
instrument is also likely to be called for. In short, the research on the FDI impact on 
competition and industrial development and the policy implications of this impact becomes 
especially urgent. 
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2.3.1 The New Context for FDI: Global Trends 
The factors that propel economic development have not changed over time, but the global 
context for development has changed dramatically over the past decades. These changes 
affect not only the role of FDI in host countries, but also government policy on FDI. Now, 
most developing countries consider FDI as an impetus for development. The changed 
attitudes reflect their efforts to promote economic development and to improve their 
national competitiveness, or competitive advantage of nations.55 The magnitude of FDI 
flows continued to set records through the last decade, before falling back in 2001 and 
2002. The total value of worldwide FDI inflows reached a record US$ 1,300 billion in 
2000, from just over US$ 200 billion in 1993. In 1980, total FDI stock represented the 
equivalent of only 5 percent of world GDP; by the end of the 1990s, this percentage had 
more than tripled to 17 percent (UNCTAD, 2001). However, the majority of world 
investment is largely concentrated in developed countries, which remain the prime 
destination of FDI. Over 80 percent of FDI inflows and over 90 percent of FDI outflows 
were located in developed countries (OECD, 2002a). The relative weights of different 
entry modes of FDI have shifted in recent years, as cross-border M&As substantially 
gaining importance. In the 1980-99 period, the value of cross-border M&As increased each 
year, by an average of 42 percent, to a level of US$ 1.15 trillion in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2000a; 
UNCTAD, 2001). 
The growth of FDI was largely due to reduced investment impediments and improved 
investment environments. Commitments have been undertaken by developed countries to 
provide national treatment for foreign invested firms, to avoid discordant requirements on 
them and to improve the investment environment. Developing countries have also 
increasingly viewed FDI as a source of economic development. They have liberalised the 
entry of inward FDI, pursued policies to stimulate foreign investment, and gradually 
extended this process to the traditionally closed industries. Previous ownership and 
operation requirements imposed on FDI have also been considerably reduced and it is now 
common to allow foreign firms to transfer their profits abroad freely as well as to repatriate 
the capital invested.56 The gradual abandonment of many FDI restrictions has been 
complemented by the adoption of standards of non-discrimination, national treatment and 
most-favoured-nation treatment for inward FDI.  
Several factors induced greater changes in attitudes of developing countries towards 
FDI. First, facing the accelerating pace of technological change and the rising costs of 
innovation, developing countries had to rely on FDI to obtain new technologies. Second, 
facing the emergence of international production systems under the control of MNCs, 
developing countries had to invite MNCs in order to participate in these systems. 
Associated with these two factors, the third aspect is the role of MNCs in the promotion of 
national trade competitiveness. From the mid-1980s, significant changes have taken place 
in world trade. The most basic structural trend in trade patterns lies in fundamental change 
                                                        
55 In a context of increased internationalisation – many inappropriately refer to this process as ‘globalisation’ (see 
Van Tulder et al., 2001, Van den Berghe, 2003, for a critique), competitiveness is ‘ability of economies to sustain 
income growth in an open setting’ (Lall, 2000). Some neoliberalist economists (e.g. Krugman, 1994a), however, 
questioned whether national competitiveness is a legitimate policy concern for governments, and argued that 
firms compete with each other, not countries. 
56 See UNCTAD (1994, 1995, 1996a, 1997a, and 1998) for details. 
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in the total trade composition.57 According to UNCTAD (2002), the trade value of 
manufactured products grew four times faster than that of primary products. At the same 
time, the share of parts and components in total trade was raising. Primary products and 
resource-based manufactures have steadily lost shares over the past several decades. This 
meant that the countries that specialised in these products might find it hard to sustain high 
export growth. Within manufactured products, growth was driven by technology-intensive 
exports (Lall, 1998). Exports grew faster the more advanced the level of technology and 
the less the reliance on natural resources. High-technology products were the most 
dynamic export category. MNCs played the dominant role in high-technology exports; 
their participation provided opportunities for developing countries to enter into this most 
dynamic area of export growth.  
The falling impediments to international trade and investment flows since the 
mid-1980s dramatically changed the context in which MNCs operated. In addition to these 
trends of policy liberalisation, two other forces combined to form this new context: 1) the 
decreasing transaction cost to ease the international flow of goods, services and 
information, caused by advances in transport and telecommunication technology; 2) the 
stronger competition among MNCs in a growing range of industries. In this fast changing 
context, MNCs’ proprietary assets, or ownership advantages, changed accordingly. This 
new context has not only invigorated global markets through arm’s-length transactions but 
also given rise to elaborate corporate systems of organising the production process 
(UNCTAD, 2002). The rising complexity of this new context meant that rapid innovation 
and deployment of new technologies became more important for MNCs. They had to react 
by changing the ways to organise and manage their activities, the relations with suppliers, 
buyers and competitors, and the processes of technological change and innovation (Lall, 
2000).  
As a result, international production systems have emerged with which MNCs locate 
different parts of production processes across the globe, to take advantage of fine 
differences of costs, resources, logistics and markets (UNCTAD, 1993a). Compared to 
earlier organisational structures of MNC operations, the characteristics of international 
production systems are the intensity of integration on regional or global scale and the 
emphasis on the efficiency of the system as a whole (Kaplinsky, 2000). The rise of 
international production systems reflected the response of MNCs to dramatic changes in 
the international economic environment and their search for enhanced competitive 
advantage through an optimal configuration of where they produce and how they 
coordinate their production activities (UNCTAD, 2002). Evolving as MNCs respond to 
economic and technological forces, international production systems became of growing 
importance in shaping trade pattern, industrial structure and competitiveness of a national 
economy. With the theoretical development of international production systems, there has 
been a new discussion on the positive and negative effects of MNC presence on 
development in developing countries.  
To acquire a portfolio of assets that contribute to maximise the competitive advantage 
of them, MNCs are increasingly shifting their mobile assets across the globe to find the 
best match with the immobile assets of different locations. The most important motivations 
underlying MNCs’ location decision include resource-seeking, market-seeking, 
                                                        
57 The basic classification of merchandise exports distinguishes between primary products and manufactures, 
with the latter further divided into four groups: resource-based, low-technology, medium-technology and 
high-technology products (for detailed description of each categories, see UNCTAD, 2002) 
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efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking (OECD, 2002a). To get access to abundant 
or low-priced production factors in specific country is a major motive of FDI. Targeted 
production factors include natural resources and human resources. FDI that seeks to 
benefit from low-priced labour often occurs as MNCs respond to rising wage pressures at 
home by shifting labour-intensive production processes to developing countries. Access to 
host-country markets for processed goods is another important motive for investing in the 
manufacturing sectors of host countries. Sometimes MNCs seek to promote efficiency via 
FDI into host countries. This motivation increasingly goes beyond the simple reallocation 
of labour-intensive production. MNCs undertake FDI with the purpose of acquiring 
‘strategic assets’ which might give them a competitive edge. According to UNCTAD 
(2002), three sorts of drivers acting simultaneously on the location decision of MNCs in 
international production systems. First, cost differentials remain a fundamental factor and 
are crucial to achieve systemic efficiency across the entire international production systems. 
Secondly, asset-seeking is another factor that leads MNCs to utilise skills and knowledge 
in a more systematic way on the global scale. Thirdly, clustering has become a key factor 
on MNCs’ location decision-making. Increasingly, clustering becomes a global process 
reflecting the consensus by MNCs of the value of co-location with suppliers, competitors 
and service providers.  
The opening up of markets gives MNCs a broader range of choice for their international 
expansion. It also makes them more selective in their choices of potential investment sites, 
which means the rivalry for attracting FDI among developing countries become harsher. 
Attracting MNCs’ mobile assets requires host countries to improve the quality of their 
immobile assets. The ability to provide attractive immobile assets becomes a critical part 
of FDI attraction strategy for developing countries. According to the eclectic (O-L-I) 
paradigm, for a firm to choose FDI rather than exports as a mode of international 
expansion, there must be some location advantages in the foreign country. Location 
advantages may come in various forms: firms aiming at reducing costs may be attracted by 
the low prices of labour, land and other factors; firms wishing to expand their international 
market share may be attracted by a large home market; firms trying to get access to natural 
resources or strategic assets may be attracted by the availability of such resources or assets, 
and so on.  
There is a vast literature on the location determinants of FDI. Multi-factor studies58 
emphasise some combinations of economic, social, geographical, political and cultural 
factors as determinants of FDI. UNCTAD (1998) categorised the location determinants of 
FDI into three main groups: economic determinants, the host country policy framework for 
FDI, and business facilitation. Lee and Houde (2000) generalised the six main location 
advantages: 1) market size and growth prospects, 2) natural and human resource 
endowments, 3) physical, financial and technological infrastructure, 4) openness to 
international trade and access to international markets, 5) the regulatory and policy 
framework, and 6) policy coherence. Some other determinants include the political and 
social stability, cultural distance and institutional distance (relatively to MNCs from 
different origins), geographic location and industrial relations. 
Manifold factors play different roles in attracting FDI. Natural and human resource 
endowments determine the factor cost advantages and are important to attract the resource- 
and efficiency-seeking FDI. Differences in infrastructure, such as transportation and 
                                                        
58 Major studies include Kobrin (1976), Root and Ahmed (1978), Schneider and Frey (1985), Koechlin (1992), 
Rolfe et al. (1993) and Grosse and Trevino (1996). 
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telecommunications, influence FDI location decisions of MNC not only amongst countries 
but also across regions within a country. A high degree of economic openness lowers the 
transaction cost of MNCs and attracts export-oriented FDI. The environment of a host 
country’s government policy is of great importance. It influences the cost and the risk of 
doing business in a foreign environment. Political stability and industrial relations 
influencing the overall business environment are central concerns of MNCs in terms of the 
risk control of foreign investment. FDI is likely to flow to those areas with good 
accessibility and consequently lower transportation costs to facilitate logistics and to 
control costs. Countries or regions of a country with this geographical advantage will be 
more attractive to MNCs. As clustering becomes a more important factor influencing 
MNCs’ location decision-making, the geographic advantage of specific regions becomes 
automatically reinforced. 
Some determinants such as location, market size and factor endowments are 
natural-endowed and others, such as policy environment and infrastructure, are 
self-created. Some determinants such as government policies are relatively easy to change, 
while others such as location are unchangeable. In the long run, most factors are changing 
in an evolutionary manner and changeable by incisive government action. Cheap labour, 
for example, is not a sustainable advantage because increasing incomes will erode the edge 
it provides, which has been demonstrated by the experience of the East Asian NIEs. The 
public sector can play a decisive role in creating and strengthening a country’s location 
advantages through supplying public goods and services, which include improving 
infrastructure, enhancing the education system and improving economic policies.59 In a 
non-discriminative and national treatment policy setting, these public sector activities may 
increase the profitability of an investment project, not only of foreign companies but also 
of domestic firms. However, developing countries’ shifts towards FDI liberalisation may 
have been carried out too far to not only remove all restraints to FDI flows but also to give 
super-national treatment to MNCs. A widely used instrument to attract FDI is the tax 
policy. Offering various incentives to attract FDI may be a rational policy in case that 
inward FDI generates positive growth effect, but it does provide an uneven playground for 
competition between domestic and foreign firms and accordingly distort the competition 
mechanism of markets. In addition, there is fear that the outcome of tax competition 
among countries will evolve into a ‘race to the bottom’ where the developing governments 
gain very little from FDI. International investment agreements are probably required in 
order to reduce such problems (Oman, 2000).  
As the context of FDI changes rapidly, the determinants have increasingly shifted from 
natural endowments of resources, such as low-priced land and labour, to acquired 
endowments of resources, such as the availability of intermediate goods and skilled labour 
(OECD, 2002a). The availability of strategic assets such as innovative assets and sourcing 
facilities has become another important determinant in the location decisions of MNCs. 
High-level local technological capabilities are an important factor for attracting FDI in 
high value-added activities. In the new context for FDI, the most attractive location 
advantages for export-oriented MNCs are now world-class infrastructure, skilled and 
productive labour, and an agglomeration of efficient suppliers, competitors, support 
institutions and services (Puga and Venables, 1999). As MNCs increasingly consider 
efficiency and competitiveness in their location decision, the areas that can attract a large 
amount of inward FDI are usually those that allow MNCs to set up facilities to promote 
                                                        
59 See Dunning and Narula (1996) for a thorough discussion. 
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efficiency and win the global competition. This means that the host country has to provide 
competitive immobile assets – infrastructure, services, supply networks and institutions – 
to complement the mobile assets of MNCs (Narula and Dunning, 1999). Low priced labour 
still remains a source of competitive advantage, but its importance is diminishing (Lall, 
2000).  
2.3.2 FDI and the Chinese Model of Economic Development 
Economic internationalisation provides both opportunities and challenges to developing 
countries. Without active participation in the international economy, some developing 
countries face the risk of increasing marginalisation. On the other hand, as flows of goods, 
services, capital, technology and information between countries are increasing at 
unprecedented pace, developing countries face new opportunities for development. Inward 
FDI is an important vehicle for international resource flows to developing countries. FDI is 
important because it provide a package of tangible and intangible assets, which is crucial 
to economic advancement for developing countries. However, FDI is not the only source 
of capital and other resources, such as technology and human resources, for economic 
development. Countries may rely on their own resources and capabilities to develop. 
Several countries did build impressive competitive capabilities by restricting the market 
entry of MNCs. Many others have restricted foreign entry without being able to promote 
competitive domestic enterprises. Despite potential negative effects, inward FDI may be an 
efficient way for developing countries to enhance their technological capabilities and 
human resources (see Section 4.1 for a detailed discussion). Facing various constraints to 
develop and to take advantage of necessary resources for development, developing 
countries increasingly embrace a strategy for economic development that incorporates 
inward FDI as an important component.  
China is one of the most popular investment destinations in the world (see Table 2-7 for 
FDI inflows between 1979 and 2003). FDI inflows increased rapidly in the first half of the 
1990s when the Chinese government significantly liberalised its FDI regime, which 
consists of the encouragement, guidance and administration of FDI projects.60 The regions 
open to FDI expanded significantly: major cities along the Yangtze River and most capital 
cities of interior provinces were opened up and numerous development zones were 
established. The Chinese government also decentralised the approval authority from the 
central government to local governments. In addition to the liberalisation of FDI regime, 
some scholars attributed the surge of FDI inflows to the improvements in the overall legal 
environment (Lardy, 1994; Fu, 2000). Because the incentives provided by the central 
government and the local governments to attract FDI, it is rational to conclude that China 
attracts a large amount of FDI because the government treats foreign firms better than 
domestic firms. Based on another line of reasoning that emphasised the factors that make 
domestic firms weaker rather than the factors that make foreign firms stronger, Huang 
(2003) argued that prominent institutional deficits of the Chinese economy explain the 
                                                        
60 China’s FDI regime includes a wide range of laws and regulations in the areas of legal enterprise forms, 
screening, administration for industry and commerce, investment direction (industrial and regional guidance), 
high-technology and export promotion, taxation, foreign currency management, intellectual property rights, 
financial market regulation, industrial relation, environment protection, land usage, accounting, foreign trade, and 
so on (see Subsection 5.1.3 for the policy on industrial guidance). The laws were enacted by the People’s 
Congress and the regulations were promulgated by different government agencies.  
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pattern of FDI in China. The institutional deficits suggested by Huang are the policy 
favours SOEs at the expense of POEs, insecurity of private ownership and economic 
fragmentation. 
Table 2-7 FDI inflows in China, 1979-2003 
Year Number of projects Contractual amount (US$ billion) 
Realised amount 
(US$ billion) 
Share of total investment 
(percent) 
1979-1982 920 5.0 1.8 / 
1983 638 1.9 0.9 0.9 
1984 2,166 2.9 1.4 1.6 
1985 3,073 6.3 2.0 1.9 
1986 1,498 3.3 2.2 2.1 
1987 2,233 3.7 2.3 2.3 
1988 5,945 5.3 3.2 2.5 
1989 5,779 5.6 3.4 2.9 
1990 7,273 6.6 3.5 3.7 
1991 12,978 12.0 4.4 4.2 
1992 48,764 58.1 11.0 7.5 
1993 83,437 111.4 27.5 12.1 
1994 47,549 82.7 33.8 17.1 
1995 37,011 91.3 37.5 15.7 
1996 24,556 73.3 41.7 15.1 
1997 21,001 51.0 45.3 14.8 
1998 19,799 52.1 45.5 13.2 
1999 16,918 41.2 40.3 11.2 
2000 22,347 62.4 40.7 10.3 
2001 26,140 69.2 46.9 10.5 
2002 34,171 82.8 52.7 10.1 
2003 41,081 115.2 53.5 8.0* 
Total 465,277 943.2 501.5 / 
Source: MOFTEC (MOC) FDI Statistics. 
Note: * Calculated by the author; exchange rate of the end of 2003 was used.  
There have been generally three modes of entry: 1) Equity Joint Venture (EJV), 2) 
Contractual Joint Venture (CJV), and 3) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOE).61 
Another legal form of FIEs is Foreign Invested Joint-Stock Companies (FIJSCs). FIJSCs 
can be established according to the Company Law and a specific regulation.62 The equity 
and contractual joint venture has been the main choice of entry modes, accounting for 65.7 
percent of projects and 59.1 percent of contractual amount until 2002.63 In terms of 
realised amount, EJVs and CJVs have taken 61.0 percent and WFOEs have taken 37.0 
percent. The industrial sector has been the main target of inward FDI: 75.4 percent of 
                                                        
61 Three different laws have been enacted to provide provisions for the three forms of FIEs respectively.  
62 The ‘Interim Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of Foreign Invested Joint-Stock 
Companies’ promulgated in 1995 by the MOFTEC. According to the Company Law of China, there are two 
forms of companies – Limited-liability Company and Joint-stock Company (a company owned by parts who have 
bought share in it). The EJV, CJV and WFOE usually belong to the first category; while the FIJSC belongs to the 
second. 
63 The contractual amount of FDI refers to the value of foreign investment specified in the investment contracts 
signed in a specific year. The amount of realised amount of FDI refers to the actually invested foreign capital in a 
specific year. Since 2004, the scope of China’s FDI statistics has been revised – the contractual amount of FDI 
refers the foreign part of registered capital of a FIE, and the realised amount of FDI refers to the injected foreign 
capital specified by the capital certificate report. 
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projects and 66.1 percent of the contractual amount of FDI focused on manufacturing as of 
2002. In the all FDI projects, the large-scale projects with contractual amount above US$ 
10 million has accounted for 2.9 percent of all projects but 51.4 percent of all contractual 
amount. The geographic distribution of FDI is concentrated to the costal areas: until 2002, 
86.1 percent of FDI has flowed to the Eastern provinces. Until the end of 2002, 45 percent 
of total FDI inflows had been from Hong Kong, with realised FDI amounted US$ 204.9 
billion. Other FDI sources within the top 10 include: the United States (8.9 percent), Japan 
(8.1 percent), Taiwan (7.4 percent), Virgin Islands (5.4 percent), Singapore (4.8 percent), 
South Korea (3.4 percent), the United Kingdom (2.4 percent), Germany (1.8 percent) and 
France (1.2 percent).64 The significance of Hong Kong as a source region of FDI inflows 
has stimulated the speculation of ‘Round-trip FDI’, referring to the domestic capital that 
first flowed out of China then flowed back in order to take advantage of the FDI 
incentives.65  
In fact, much of China’s FDI inflows have been from the ethnically Chinese economies: 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Singapore. Investment from these four sources had 
accounted for 59.0 percent of total FDI inflows until 2002. According to Wei (1995), the 
investors from the ethnically Chinese economies possess cultural advantages when 
investing in China. In a poor legal system, cultural and ethnic proximity helps reduce the 
high transaction costs of doing business. This cultural perspective has provided the most 
convincing explanation for the composition of FDI sources. Host countries with larger 
market size, faster economic growth and a higher level of income will be more attractive 
for the market-seeking FDI. The empirical studies on the determinants of FDI in China 
have indicated that market size (measured by GDP) and income level (measured by GDP 
per capita) has a positive effect on FDI inflows (Wei, 1995, 2000; Dees, 1998; Wei and Liu, 
2001), which reflected the market-seeking motives of foreign investors. The low labour 
costs, relatively large volume of exports and the depreciation of the Chinese currency have 
been argued to be important determinants (Dees, 1998; Wei and Liu, 2001). It is also found 
that FDI inflows are positively and significantly influenced, for instance, by geographic 
proximity (Wei, 1995, 2000), by adult literacy rate (Wei, 1995), by linguistic ties (Wei, 
2000) and by borrowing costs (Wei and Liu, 2001). An investment project involves a 
long-term exposure to the economic, political and social context in the host country and 
MNCs therefore look for a stable business environment to ensure that the smooth and safe 
running of their business. Political and social stability forms the general background of a 
host country’s FDI policy. Countries with a record of economic, political and social 
stability are likely to be attractive to foreign investment (Lipsey, 1999). Empirical studies 
have indicated that FDI inflows are negatively related to corruption and regulatory burden 
(Wei, 2000), country risk and cultural differences (Wei and Liu, 2001).66 
It is relatively obvious to conclude that inward FDI has been a driving force behind 
China’s economic success (cf. Lardy, 1996; World Bank, 1997b). The contribution that 
FDI has made to the Chinese economy during the period since 1980 and especially since 
1992 has been considerable. But the exact effect is less easy to assess. The contribution of 
                                                        
64 The data in this paragraph is according to MOFTEC. 
65 See World Bank (1996), Huang (1998, 2003) and Tseng and Zebregs (2002) for the discussions of this issue. 
World Bank estimated ‘round-trip FDI’ at around 25 percent of total FDI inflows in 1992. Tseng and Zebregs 
(2002) estimated that ‘round-trip FDI’ in 1996 accounted for 7 percent of total FDI inflow.  
66 See Wei (2003) for a detailed discussion for the determinants of FDI in China, including a review of the studies 
at the regional level (for example, Chen, 1996; Wei et al., 1999; Cheng and Kwan, 2000). 
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FDI to capital formation was constantly over 10 percent between 1993 and 2002 despite a 
decreasing trend since 1994 (see Table 2-7). The role of FIEs in the economy, in terms of 
the contribution to total industrial output and value-added, has been increasingly 
significant (see Figure 2-2 and Table 2-1). FIEs in China have also been instrumental in 
increasing China’s trade openness, particularly since the late 1990s as FDI inflows have 
shifted toward capital- and technology-intensive export sectors. The share of FIEs in the 
value of total imports and exports increased rapidly and FIEs accounted for 55 percent of 
the total value in 2003 (Figure 2-5).  
Figure 2-5 Total amount of China’s imports and exports, 1986-2003 
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   Source: MOFTEC. 
Inward FDI has played an important role in the economic growth of many localities as 
well. Clustering accelerated this process and contributed greatly to local development, 
especially in the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta regions. Suzhou, a city in 
Jiangsu Province, and Dongguan, a city in Guangdong Province, are typical examples. 
Dongguan for instance has become one of the largest light-manufacturing bases in the 
world and the largest computer peripheral production base and sourcing centre. 
Dongguan’s output of computer magnetic heads, motherboards, monitors, power supplies, 
scanners, disk drives and micro-motors ranks first in the world. Following rapid industrial 
clustering, which accelerated in recent years, 90 percent of electronic accessories can be 
purchased in the Pearl River Delta; for computers, 95 percent accessories are available 
locally. FDI inflows totalled US$ 11.27 billion by the end of 2001 and FIEs, numbering 
3,610 in 2002, accounted for over 80 percent of the city’s total industrial output. These are 
also over 10,000 local enterprises undertaking outward processing for FIEs. FDI in 
Dongguan has been mainly from Taiwan and Hong Kong, but now over 30 of the Fortune 
500 companies have invested in Dongguan as well. After growing at an annual rate of 20 
percent in the last 20 years, Dongguan is now China’s third largest exporting city, after 
Shenzhen and Shanghai. Its economy is export-oriented, with 85 percent of its industrial 
output relating to exports. In 2001, the amount of exports was US$19 billion, 270 percent 
of the city’s GDP. 
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Considerable qualitative evidence on the positive effects of FDI on the Chinese 
economy has been suggested (e.g. Kueh, 1992; Lardy, 1995; Huang, 1998; Henley et al., 
1999). Most statistical evidence has been reported by cross-regional studies that simply 
treat FDI as an exogenous variable. Wei (1994) found that FDI is positively correlated with 
cross-city differences in growth rates in China. Similar conclusions have been reported by 
other studies, such as Chen et al. (1995), Sun (1998), Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000), Sun 
and Parikh (2001), Wei and Liu (2001), Zhang (2001) and Zhang and Felmingham (2002). 
FDI may cause rapid economic growth or be attracted by it. With regard to the causal 
direction, Shan et al. (1999) and Zhang (1999) found a mutual-causal relationship between 
FDI and economic growth. Taking explicitly the problem of mutual-causality into account, 
Berthélemy and Démurger (2000) confirmed that FDI played a vital role in China’s 
economic growth. But several studies have identified variations over time for the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth by conducting analysis for sub-periods. 
Zhang (2001) suggested that the impact of FDI on economic growth increased over the 
periods of 1984-88, 1989-93 and 1994-98. Dayal-Gulati and Husain (2000) indicated that 
the FDI effect on economic growth was stronger in the 1993-97 period than in the 1983-87 
period and FDI did not play a significant role during the 1988-1992 period. One prominent 
view of the various studies remains that FDI has had significant effects on China’s 
economic growth. Cross-regional studies on the relationship between FDI and economic 
growth, as well as the literature on regional disparities discussed in Subsection 2.1.4, also 
gave a strong indication that costal regions have benefited more from FDI than the rest of 
the country. 
The literature on the FDI effect on China’s economic growth has limitations. First, the 
utilisation of the aggregate data can only capture the net impact of FDI and some negative 
effects cannot be identified by the aggregate approach (Wei, 2003). Second, the 
mechanisms through which FDI promoted economic growth have not been identified with 
precision. Although some studies (e.g. Chen et al. 1995; Dayal-Gulati and Husain, 2000) 
have addressed mechanisms such as technology transfer, there is a lack of precision (Wei, 
2003).67 The widely adopted approach of cross-regional studies has prevented scholars to 
fill the gaps. FDI is, fundamentally, a microeconomic rather than a macroeconomic 
phenomenon. However, the existing accounts of China’s inward FDI has been mainly at 
the macro level. A limited number of empirical studies paid specific attention to 
understanding the role of FDI on the development of Chinese industries.68 Zhang and 
Taylor (2001) investigated the technology transfer through FDI in China’s automotive 
industry. The productivity spillovers from FDI in Chinese industries have been studied by 
a number of studies, e.g. Fan and Warr (2000)’s study on China’s low- and 
medium-technology industries, Liu et al. (2001) and Wei and Liu (2001)’s studies on 
China’s electronics industry. Some more recent studies examined FDI spillovers in Chinese 
industries (Hu, 2001; Hu and Jefferson, 2002; Buckley et al., 2002; Liu and Wang, 2003; 
Cheung and Lin, 2004). UNCTAD (2002) claimed that China has been one of the principle 
                                                        
67 Studies particularly focused on technology transfer associated with FDI include: Lan (1996), Sun (1996), 
Young and Lan (1997), Fan and Warr (2000), Bennett et al. (2001), Liu et al. (2001), Zhang and Taylor (2001), 
Wei and Liu (2001) and Thompson (2002). Sun (1996) addressed FDI and the linkage effects in China. Lan (1996) 
and Young and Lan (1997) were based on a case study of the city of Dalian. Bennett et al. (2001) was based on 
the study of the strategies of 20 EU firms operating in China. Thompson (2002) studied 84 garment firms from 
Hong Kong.  
68 Some notable studies in the Chinese academia include Jiang (2002, in Chinese), Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese) 
and Peking University (2004, in Chinese). 
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beneficiaries of MNC participation in high technology production and export. Despite the 
good performance at the aggregate level, however, it has been acknowledged that some 
Chinese industries have been characterised by low international competitiveness and 
innovative incapability even with significant MNC presence. A recent comparative studies 
conducted by Mckinsey Global Institute (2003) on five industries in four major developing 
economies (Brazil, Mexico, China and India) has provided in-depth accounts of the impact 
of FDI on industrial development in the industries of automotive and consumer electronics 
in China. General conclusion was reached that both the incentives used to attract FDI and 
the restrictions placed on it are largely ineffective and frequently counterproductive. 
Due to the lack of industry-level evidence, the existing accounts cannot adequately 
explain how FDI contributes to economic growth through promoting the development of 
different industries and through the growth of enterprises in these industries. As a new 
competitive force in the economy, have FIEs helped or hampered China’s industrial 
development? What have been the benefits and costs of Chinese approach of attracting and 
managing FDI materialised in different industries? What are their policy implications for 
industrial development? As an important source of economic growth, inward FDI has 
become an integral part of the Chinese model of economic development. The sustainability 
of this model is highlighted by many factors: the increasingly improvement of China’s 
investment climate, the rapidly growing size of the Chinese market, and the seemingly 
endless supply of cheap labour as noted in Subsection 1.4.2. In addition, the Asian 
financial crisis also demonstrated that FDI was more stable than other forms of capital 
inflows. The necessity to examine the degree of competition in industries, illustrated in 
Section 2.2.3, the importance of FDI to the Chinese model of economic development, and 
the gaps remaining in the literature on China’s FDI have made a case for the need for a 
new approach to FDI study at the industry- and firm-level. 
2.3.3 FDI, Competition and Industrial Development: What Are the Implications for 
Government Policies? 
Actively attracting FDI inflows has become an integral element of the Chinese model of 
economic development. Generally speaking, inward FDI has introduced a competitive 
force into the Chinese economy and contributed to the expansion of a private sector in 
China. At the industry level, however, the exact impacts of inward FDI and MNC presence 
on market competition and industrial development remain largely unclear. What has been 
the role played by the new competitive force from abroad through FDI for industrial 
development? What has been the impact of FDI materialised on the basis of the 
mechanism of market competition rather than through the channels such as spillovers and 
linkage? What are the policy implications of the FDI impact on competition and industrial 
development? FDI may deliver considerable benefits to industrial development. However, 
the potential costs should not be neglected. With regard to the potential anticompetitive 
effect of inward FDI, the traditional wisdom is that FDI may increase market concentration 
and lead to dominant positions of MNCs after entry by suppressing or crowding out 
domestic firms. The firm-specific advantages of MNCs may raise barriers to entry for local 
firms or make competition too strong for existing local firms and thus crowd them out, 
therefore increasing concentration and restricting competition. Does this hold true in the 
specific economic and industrial context of Chinese industries?  
The primary aim of this study is to examine FDI as an industrial phenomenon – how 
FDI inflows and therefore the introduction of a new competitive force into Chinese 
industries have influenced the development of them. What has been the role of government 
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policies in determining the FDI impact on industrial development? How to improve the 
current policy framework to make inward FDI play a more positive role in promoting 
industrial development? FDI cannot by itself promote long-term industrial development, 
which is largely dependent upon the well-functioning domestic markets. The benefits of 
FDI liberalisation to particular industries will rely not only on the inflow of foreign capital 
and associated resources but also on the restructuring of domestic industries and 
accordingly the effective reallocation of resources, which is crucially dependent upon a 
well-functioning market in which the competition mechanism plays a vital role.  
FDI might increase competition of domestic markets but could also lead to abuses of 
market dominance and anticompetitive practices of MNCs. Governments in some 
developing countries are sometimes so anxious to attract FDI that they agree to offer 
MNCs various kinds of arrangements that grant market dominance with legal protection 
against competition, in exchange for capital injection and technology transfer. In China, a 
strategy named ‘market for technology’ has been adopted, requiring foreign firms to transfer 
technology in return for market access. Whether this strategy has been successful depends in 
part on the balance between the positive impact brought by FDI through its structural as 
well as dynamic effects and the associated costs of the positive impact: to what extent not 
only market access but also market dominance have been ‘given’ to MNCs in the expense 
of domestic firms and with the tolerance of MNCs’ anticompetitive practices. For 
developing countries with a high degree of economic openness and a large amount of FDI 
inflows, the interrelationship among FDI, competition and industrial development as well 
as its policy implications would be prominent. For China, which has already been the 
largest recipient of FDI, this concern is of particular importance. The contribution that FDI 
has made to the Chinese economy during the reform period, as discussed earlier, has been 
considerable. However, empirical studies that can provide a full picture and a balanced 
view have not been presented yet.  
Since 2002, China has surpassed the United States to become the largest recipient of 
FDI in the world. After China’s WTO entry, there is a time schedule for further opening up 
of the protected and restricted sectors to foreign investors. Predictably, more inward FDI 
will flow into China and MNCs will play an increasingly important role in the economy. 
Should this require specific attention from competition policy towards FIEs? In addition, 
foreign M&As will be more important an entry mode of FDI into China and a merger 
control system is also being called for. China’s FDI inflows have consisted of mainly 
greenfield investment and the scale of the foreign M&As has been limited and still not 
included in the FDI statistics of MOFTEC (MOC since 2003). The limitation of M&As as 
a mode of market entry in China was generally in line with in other developing countries. 
Trends in the entry mode of FDI in developing countries differ considerably from those in 
developed countries, where greenfield investment continues to dominate. However, driven 
by privatisation, M&As have become an increasingly important entry mode in developing 
countries as well in recent years. Two-thirds of FDI inflows to developing countries are 
greenfield investment, although there are important regional differences: the percentage of 
FDI that took the form of M&A in Latin America increased from 18 percent in the 1987-89 
period to 54 percent in the 1998-2000 period; in Asia, this percentage increased from 8 to 
20 percent for the same period (UNCATD, 2001). In recent years, attracting FDI in the 
mode of foreign M&As has become an important policy concern of the Chinese 
government. Thus the study on the relation of foreign M&As and government policy 
becomes especially urgent.  
Does a unique Chinese model of economic development that has been largely 
characterised by the collaboration between a developmental state and MNCs need unique 
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institutional arrangements to sustain? What will be the role of a regime of competition 
policy in establishing an appropriate set of market-supporting institutions? How to build up 
an appropriate policy framework to maximise the benefits of FDI for industrial 
development while mitigating the costs? To answer these questions for China, empirical 
studies on the FDI impact on competition and industrial development in Chinese industries 
is crucial. Establishing an appropriate policy framework requires the support of sound 
policy-oriented research. Analytical works on the benefits and costs of FDI at the industry 
level can help to explain the relevance of government policies and to develop a suitable 
legal and administrative framework.  
The central research question of this study thus concerns the effects of FDI on 
competition and industrial development in China. The unit of analysis is at the industry 
level. The complexity of the central research question requires a research strategy that 
combines the analysis of both industry- and firm-level data, on the one hand, with in-depth 
case studies of specific industries, on the other. According to Geroski and Mata (2001), 
four different approaches can be used to study what takes place in industries. The first is 
the case study of a specific sector. This traditional approach remains valued because it is 
possible to combine qualitative and quantitative data in an insightful way in a case study. 
The weakness of the case study approach is that case studies cannot easily generalise in a 
widely accepted convincing manner. The second approach is the cross-section econometric 
study, which expands thinking from the minutia of particular cases to the broad features 
that many industries share in common. The weakness of this approach is that there are 
many important features of markets and industries that are very difficult to measure and, 
therefore, control for. The third approach is the to panel data econometric study, through 
which not only can important unobservable variables be controlled for using fixed effects 
in a panel, but the times series dimension of such data enables one to take account of 
market dynamics. The fourth approach is the longitudinal case study, which covers almost 
the entire history of a particular industry. They are alternative to panel data study because 
they contain a long times series, giving one enough data to make solid inferences about 
market dynamics and removing the worry that particular panels may reflect the features of 
the specific period over which they are constructed. The methodology adopted to study 
what took place in Chinese industries in this study is a structural combination of the above 
approaches. The hypothesis-testing econometric research is used for analysing within-case 
data within a general framework of a ‘two-case’ case study approach and subordinate 
single- and multiple-case studies. 
The underlying premise of this study is that industrial development is multi-faceted and 
that inward FDI can influence industrial development through manifold channels among 
which competition is central. Focusing on only one aspect of the process of industrial 
development may result in misleading conclusions and policy recommendations. As we 
consider multiple dimensions of industrial development, including the progress of the scale, 
efficiency and competitiveness of industries, the case study approach is particularly 
valuable because it is possible to combine qualitative and quantitative analysis in both an 
insightful and a comprehensive way. Because we focus on the competition mechanism 
though which FDI influences industrial development, the relationship between FDI and 
competition is the central concern of this study. The models examining the relation 
between FDI and competition have typically involved a cross-sectional equation with a 
measure of FDI as one of the determinants of concentration. The deficits of this standard 
approach further highlight the advantages of case studies (see Subsection 4.2.1 for a 
detailed discussion). A central proposition of this study is that patterns of government 
policy, which can be simply categorised as procompetitive and anticompetitive, could lead 
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to different degrees of competition in markets thereby largely determine the FDI impact on 
industrial development. Therefore a ‘two-case’ case study approach is adopted, 
supplemented by an overall assessment of the impact of FDI on China’s industrial sector. 
Eisenhardt (1989) emphasised the role of case studies in building theory and proposed a 
tactic to search cross-case patterns by selecting pairs of cases and then to list the 
similarities and differences between each pair. Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss (1987) 
have detailed their comparative case study approach for developing grounded theory. As 
suggested by Cameron and Quinn (1988), creative insights often arise from the 
juxtaposition of contradictory or paradoxical evidence. A method of ‘structured and 
focused comparison’ was emphasised by George and Mckeown (1985). King et al. (1994) 
addressed standards for valid inference. The ‘two-case’ case study approach presents an 
insightful comparison and, therefore, facilitates causal inference and theory building. The 
analysis of within-case data is mainly quantitative, utilising both cross-sectional and panel 
data econometrics to test hypotheses concerning the research question(s). With the two 
cases, manifold aspects of the development of two industries are compared and the causal 
relationship between government policy patterns and the FDI impact on industrial 
development is generalised. Covering almost the entire history of a particular industry with 
FDI presence and utilising panel data econometrics, the methodology can be considered as 
a longitudinal case study at the industry level. The within-case data analysis is generally at 
the firm level and both cross-sectional and panel data econometrics is adopted. 
This study seeks to advance the understanding of the FDI impact on competition and 
industrial development in emerging markets. There are a number of possible approaches 
one could take to such a project. One approach would be to begin with certain 
predetermined theories and then use China to test these theories. China is indeed an 
important test case for general theories and such an approach has obvious advantages. 
However, certain costs associated with this approach. First, relying in the context of a very 
large transition economy on predetermined theories drawn from the experience of very 
different economies is dangerous. Secondly, existing theories pertaining to the relationship 
between FDI and industrial development is generally static and cannot really explain nor 
map the dynamic process though which FDI influence industrial development in emerging 
markets. The approach adopted by this study is somewhat different. We do not expressly 
start with the objective of testing China against any predetermined theory. Rather, we 
address a number of theoretical gaps and develop a more dynamic theory on the basis of an 
eclectic use of theories in Part II, and then test a number of Chinese industries against this 
dynamic theory in Part III. In part IV, general conclusions are drawn and policy 
recommendations are provided. 
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his theoretical part is dedicated to reviewing the literature on the relationship 
between inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), competition and industrial 
development. It further seeks to fill existing theoretical gaps and to provide both a 
conceptual framework and a methodological case for the empirical scrutiny in Part III. As 
argued by Yin (2003), theory development prior to the collection of any data is an essential 
step in doing case study. The research design also should benefit from the development of 
such a theoretical framework. To provide a foundation for theoretical inquiry into the 
relationship between competition and industrial advancement, this part begins with a more 
general discussion on the relationship between competition and economic development at 
the macro level. The notion of competition differs widely among different schools of 
economics. Furthermore, the ways in which competition is perceived to work and 
contribute to development differ widely among economists, public officials and business 
people. Competition is multidimensional and may have desirable or undesirable effects on 
economic development – often depending on the circumstance under which it evolves. In 
the short run, as emphasised by the neoclassical economics, competition is necessary to 
ensure that allocative and X-efficiency is achieved and consumer welfare is maximised. 
Moreover these basic functions of competition are rather static and they need to be 
complemented by some dynamic functions: despite ongoing theoretical debates, 
competition is generally considered to be an impetus behind the technological progress and 
thus long-term economic growth. But it is difficult to assess these effects in a developing 
country where market imperfections are manifold. 
Competition policy is supposed to be the central institution that maintains and protects 
competition. One commonly expressed objective of competition policy is the prevention of 
the abuse of market dominance thereby to protect consumers and to promote efficiency. 
However, countries may have been able to maintain considerable degree of market 
competition despite the absence of a de jure competition policy. Developing countries 
should first make clear whether the rationale of competition policy, usually clarified by 
economists from and for developed countries, also holds true for developing countries? For 
policy reform and institutional change, however, rationale does not necessarily mean 
necessity. Is there truly a need for a de jure competition policy in developing countries? In 
case that effective de facto competition maintenance mechanisms are in place, is there a 
need to replace or supplement them with a formal competition policy? For different 
developing countries at different development levels and facing different development 
problems, there seems to be no uniform answers to these questions. The necessity of 
competition policy for developing countries is contingent upon particular issues, among 
which the effect of inward FDI is a crucial one.  
The economic effects of inward FDI on developing countries can run from the 
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microeconomic level to the aggregative level. A large body of literature has been directed 
to stressing the benefits of FDI for developing countries, mainly in terms of its positive 
effect at the macro level. The effects of FDI on the performance of industries, however, 
raise critical questions since economic development is based upon the development of a 
large variety of industries. The impact of FDI on the structure of industries raises the first 
concern. Another theme arises in connection with the technological progress in industries 
and the innovation conducted by firms. FDI can not only transfer new technology to 
domestic industries but also help build capability and promote activities that generate new 
technology in host countries. It remains to be explored whether and in what way the 
complicated interactions among foreign firms, domestic firms and government policies can 
be beneficially integrated into the dynamic process of industrial development. 
FDI provides developing countries with a mixture of positive and negative effects. 
Effective FDI policy is therefore a demanding task for the governments of developing 
countries. The challenge lies in taking measures to maximise one and minimise the other. 
There remains substantial need for government policies, but less and less in the traditional 
version of widespread intervention and strict protection. A passive laissez faire approach 
seems equally insufficient due to the existence of market failures in general and those 
related to inward FDI in particular. Competition could be a central mechanism through 
which FDI can promote the development of industries. It is hard to imagine that the 
benefits of FDI on industrial development can be achieved without a well-functioning 
competitive market. But inward FDI could possibly lead to market dominance and the 
abuse of it as well, thus creating additional market failures. Therefore, addressing the 
interface between competition policy and inward FDI is part of the policy challenge facing 
a developing country. 
 3 Competition and Economic 
Development: Theoretical and Policy 
Concerns for Developing Countries  
 
 
 
 
ompetition is multidimensional and can have desirable effects on economic 
development. The theoretical rationale of competition policy basically originates from 
the economic analysis of monopoly. Economists always argued that competitive market 
structure would increase consumer choice and welfare, while monopoly tends to lead to the 
opposite. There is market failure where competition mechanism cannot function well as a 
result of the actions of individual firms or groups of firms acting together. As a 
consequence, competition policy is necessary to maintain or restore competition and 
accordingly ensure that economic efficiency1  is rewarded and consumer welfare is 
maximised. Does this rationale of competition policy, usually clarified by economists in 
developed countries according to the economic circumstance in developed countries, hold 
true for developing countries? There is still no systematic research available to 
demonstrate the rationale of competition policy for developing countries, or for countries 
at different levels of development. For developing countries, a central objective is the 
promotion of long-term economic growth. From the standpoint of economic development, 
to what extent is the essential focus of competition policy on allocative efficiency and 
consumer welfare consistent with the goal of development? In case of inconsistencies, 
does it mean that competition policy is not necessary for developing countries, or that 
developing countries need their own kind of competition policy, or that competition policy 
should be implemented differently in developing countries?  
This chapter reviews the existing literature and investigates the theoretical 
interrelationship between competition, competition policy and economic development. 
Different notions of competition are used in different schools of economic thoughts. 
Section 3.1 addresses these competing concepts of competition. The causal relationship 
between competition policy and development is generally based upon the relation between 
competition policy and competition, which is addressed in the second section, and the 
linkage between competition and development, which is examined in the third section. 
Section 3.2 analyses the objectives, instruments and implementation modes of competition 
policy, investigating why and how competition policy can maintain and protect 
competition. Section 3.3 examines the relationship between competition and development 
from manifold perspectives and on the basis of various schools of economic theory. By so 
doing, this section investigates the rationale of competition policy for developing countries. 
For policy reform and institutional change, ‘rationale’ does not necessarily mean 
‘necessity’. What theoretical analysis provides is rationale, while the necessity lies in real 
                                                        
1 Two types of efficiency are generally distinguished: allocative efficiency and dynamic (or technical) efficiency. 
See also Section 3.1 for a discussion of X-efficiency. 
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needs. Section 3.4 then evaluates the necessity of competition policy for developing 
countries, focusing particularly on a number of practical issues – with appropriate 
reference to the theoretical concerns related to these practical issues. 
3.1 Competing Concepts of Competition: From Smith to Neo-Schumpeterians 
Competition is so important in economic theory that it is difficult to imagine economics as 
a social discipline without it (Demsetz, 1982a). However, the notion of competition differs 
widely among different schools of economics. The history of economics has provided 
fundamentally different views on the meaning of competition. The classical economic 
literature emphasised price determination through the notion of competition as replacing 
ethically and politically oriented price administration as the focus of economic analysis 
(McNulty, 1967). Competition acts as a force that would, in the long run, eliminate excess 
profits and unsatisfied demand. The ability of rivals to seek out and compete away 
supernormal profits was believed to be the basic reason for the pervasiveness of 
competition (Stigler, 1987). According to Adam Smith, competition is the prerequisite that 
shelters freedom of decision and action of self-interested individuals from leading to 
anarchy or chaos but rather to economically optimal, socially fair and desirable market 
results. 
As a central notion of the classical economics, the concept of competition is loosely 
drawn and is generally depicted as a process of rivalry. According to Smith, competition 
takes place among buyers or sellers in one market or industry, or takes place across 
markets or industries. On the one hand, the competition within a market or an industry 
brings market prices to their ‘natural’ level. Smith explained why a reduced supply of a 
good led to a higher price: the ‘competition [which] will immediately begin’ among buyers 
would bid up the price. Similarly, when the supply is excessive, the price would sink more, 
the greater ‘the competition of the sellers’.2 Here competition was very much interpreted 
as a race among buyers or sellers; the greater the number of each, naturally, the greater the 
vigour of the race. On the other hand, the competition among industries for the use of the 
same resources equalises returns across various uses of resources. On the basis of this 
notion of competition, Smith developed one of the central themes on resource allocation in 
the market economy – each owner of a productive resource will seek to employ it where it 
will yield the largest return; as a result, under competition each resource will be so 
distributed that it yields the same rate of return in every use. 
For almost a century after the publication of the Wealth of Nations in 1776, the 
prevailing treatment of competition followed the tradition of Smith. The lack of a precise 
definition of competition in the classical economics was partly because monopoly was 
highly exceptional at the time (Stigler, 1987). This situation changed in the late 19th 
century as large-scale enterprises rapidly grew up. Meanwhile, the expanding usage of 
mathematics gave birth to the formal and abstract theory of economics by Walra, Marshall 
and Pareto. Therefore more precise specification of the nature of competition needed to be 
formulised. Neoclassical economics took the concept of competition into a different 
direction. The development of the concept of ‘perfect competition’ was initiated by 
Augustin Cournot in 1838 in his Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth and 
continued through the works of Edgeworth (1881), Clark (1914) and Knight (1921, 1946). 
                                                        
2 Smith (1776), 1976: 73-74. 
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The formulation of the model of perfect competition was completed in the work of Knight 
(1921, 1946) and this concept increasingly became the standard model of economic theory 
thereafter. The perfect competition model is useful for evaluating the outcome of 
competition in a special case defined by its assumptions– homogeneous good, perfect 
information, price taking, no transaction costs, no externalities, perfect divisibility of 
output, and free entry and exit. Because of these strong assumptions, perfect competition 
can never be encountered in the real world. However, the perfect competition model 
provides a benchmark for analytical purposes and presents an ideal abstract against which 
to compare other theoretical models or actual markets. The development of the concept of 
competition has acquired a growing role as the criterion by which to judge the efficiency of 
actual markets (Stigler, 1987). The desirable properties of a perfectly competitive market 
fundamentally explain why economists in general are so in favour of ‘competition’.  
The neoclassical approach emphasises the equilibrium analysis of the market. In 
neoclassical economics, the concept of competition is built around the notion of a 
convergence of prices towards equilibrium of supply and demand and is formally 
presented in the idea of perfect competition. It focuses on the effects of competition rather 
than the underlying behavioural process that characterises competition. The neoclassical 
interpretation of competition as leading the economic system to equilibrium is 
fundamentally different from classical economic thoughts. The classical economists related 
the concept of competition to competitive behaviour, while the neoclassical view shows no 
interest in analysing competition itself but is more concerned with the outcome of it. In 
fact, the perfect competition model provides the primary analytical tool for understanding 
the role of price system in a decentralised economy (Demsetz, 1989). On the one hand, the 
perfect competition model focuses on understanding the functioning of decentralised 
market structure, in which there is no participant whose buy or sell decision are a 
significant fraction of the market. Thus it was argued by Demsetz (1989) that the perfect 
competition model is better named the perfect decentralisation model. On the other hand, 
as suggested by Demsetz (1982a), the perfect competition model could be seen as a tool 
for understanding the price system, but not for understanding competition. Thus it presents 
a natural evolution from the central interests of the classical economists on the price 
system. 
The comparative-static nature of neoclassical economics determines that it views 
competition as a state rather than a process as envisaged by classical economists, whilst 
price became a parameter rather than a variable. Under neoclassical economics, the 
concepts of competition and the market have become merged. As Hayek (1948) 
emphasised, the neoclassical concept of perfect competition describes an equilibrium 
situation buy says nothing about the competitive process which lead to that equilibrium. It 
actually robs the firm of all business activities that might reasonably be associated with the 
verb ‘to compete’. Thus, as Hayek argued, perfect competition in fact meant the absence of 
competitive activities. Following the neoclassical approach, the economic analysis of 
competition has long been focusing on price competition, with the market being viewed as 
the mechanism for resource reallocation and with prices acting as a signalling system.  
A number of schools of economic thoughts have expressed fundamentally differing 
concepts of competition. More subtle issues associated with competition are raised for 
instance by the Austrian approach, which emphasises on actual market activities and 
processes. The essence of Austrian economics is its emphasis on the ongoing economic 
process as opposed to the equilibrium analysis of neoclassical economics (McNulty, 1987). 
The Austrian school views competition as a mechanism of virtuous selection in line with 
the Darwinian notion of natural selection: competitive pressures continually eliminate the 
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weak and inefficient, allowing the fittest to survive and prosper. Hayek attributes a 
different feature to competition than did neoclassical theory: namely its incapability to 
discover better ways to use economic resources by allowing more competent and efficient 
behaviour to prevail (Egidi, 1996). The Austrian school views competition as a dynamic 
process in which entrepreneurs seek new profit opportunities in a world of constant change. 
In contrast to static neoclassical theory, firms are interested in change over the relatively 
long run and profits earned by successful entrepreneurs are not viewed as inefficiencies but 
as signals of response to changing market conditions. This approach is rooted in an 
alternative understanding of the nature of the firm – the behavioural theory of the firm 
other than the simple notion that treats firm as a production function in neoclassical 
economics. The Austrian school emphasises firms’ learning capabilities and adaptive 
activities and the interactions between these activities (Metcalfe, 2000). This entails a shift 
from perceiving competition in terms of a state of equilibrium, characterised by different 
ideal patterns of market structure, towards conceptualising competition as a process of 
change, premised on the existence of the differential behaviour.  
Schumpeter extended the Austrian School’s concept of competition, even though 
couched in terms very similar to the Austrians’. The entrepreneur, a neglected figure in 
classical and neoclassical economics, is the central figure in the Schumpeterian analytical 
framework. According to Schumpeter, the entrepreneur plays a role of disequilibrating by 
innovating – by introducing new products, new technologies, new markets, new sources of 
raw materials, and so on. By emphasising innovative behaviour as individualistic, ‘heroic’ 
actions, Shumpeter argued that competition is primarily a process of the creation and 
diffusion of new knowledge within the economic system under conditions of rivalry; a 
process which has important reallocative effects and presumes conditions of market failure 
(Egidi, 1996). In contrast to Hayek’s view that competition is a process of virtuous 
selection, Schumpert’s competition is a process of extensive search for innovations. This 
perspectives views competition less in terms of price but in terms a dynamic process of 
various types of innovation – not exclusively technological innovations but also 
organisational and institutional innovations. The distinction between Ricardian short-term 
allocative efficiency and Schumpeterian long-term dynamic efficiency 3  is therefore 
highlighted by the neo-Schumpeterians (Yoshitomo, 1991). Contrary to the neoclassical 
equilibrium concept of competition, Schumpeterian competition is a process of ‘creative 
destruction’ based on search, innovation and imitation. At the centre of Schumpeter’s 
concept of competition is the innovative search within enterprises. For competing firms, 
successful innovative searches not only reduce costs and keep quality and performance 
standards ahead, but also force other firms to adjust rapidly so as to catch up with the 
innovation cycle. Schumpeterian competition is concerned with the process of adaptive 
learning and the creation of novelty. It is by this change in approach that attention is 
switched to the strategic, cognitive and organisational aspects of firms, which explain why 
they behave differently (Arthur and Lane, 1993). 
Schumpeter and neo-Schumpeterians argued that it is not price competition but the 
specific search for new innovative solutions shaping the economy. This type of 
competition leads to cost and quality advantages and shapes the competitive position of 
enterprises. Because Schumpeter did not focus on the innovation process, but on the effects 
of innovations, the neo-Schumpeterians attempt to fill the ‘black box’ left by Schumpeter 
to consider the process of innovation. Any innovative search activity cannot be separated 
                                                        
3 Nelson and Winter (1982) first defined the innovation process in terms of dynamic efficiency. 
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from the environment of innovation. According to Schumpeter’s analysis, not only 
innovative search process but also appropriate environmental conditions for this search 
matter. Recent analysis of economic development under evolutionary assumptions focuses 
on the close relationship between innovation search and environment for innovations. 
Evolutionary approaches are still less developed but show clear differences with the 
equilibrium approach to competition (Metcalfe, 1998). The fundamental difference lies in 
the displacement of equilibrium as the central conceptual framework. The evolutionary 
approach is concerning why technological competition is the driving force behind 
structural change and economic development.4 The evolutionary approach has been used 
to explain how competitive advantages, as opposed to comparative advantages, explain 
successful development. These evolutionary approaches are more consistent with the 
economic reality in which competition relates to not only prices and costs but also to a 
wider set of technological, strategic and organisational aspects of firms, and economic 
welfare increases in response to not only price reductions but also to improvement in 
quality and product variety (Jorde and Teece, 1992). 
3.2 Competition Policy: Objectives, Instruments and Implementation 
Competition can be promoted or protected by introducing or reinforcing relevant domestic 
institutions, among which competition policy is arguably the central element. As argued in 
Section 2.1, competition is a critical ‘finger’ of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. It has 
long been acknowledged as a major force bringing about economic development. However, 
it is recognised that freely functioning markets may ‘fail’ because of the anticompetitive 
practices of individual firms or groups of firms acting together and that, as a result, some 
correcting force is necessary to ensure that the benefits of competition are adequately 
achieved. The market failure that competition policy seeks to rectify is the situation where 
competition appears to be faltering as the result of the direct actions of a firm or a group of 
firms.  
3.2.1 Objectives of Competition Policy 
While many objectives have been ascribed to competition policy in various jurisdictions 
over the past hundred years, certain major themes stand out. The most common of the 
objectives cited is the maintenance and promotion of the process of free competition, or 
the protection or promotion of ‘effective competition’. Effective competition is a market 
condition that exists when two or more firms, acting independently, contend for their 
business in a manner that ensures that the consumers will be offered the lowest price 
alternative or best technical design meeting its minimum needs. The concept of effective 
competition is not just concerned with the prices and costs – it relates also to the 
considerations of a broad range of factors such as the quality of products/services, the 
range of products/services that are available, efficiency, as well as incentives for 
innovation. One of the features of a market where there is effective competition is that no 
one firm would be able to change prices independently of the other firms. A firm cannot 
have a dominant position in a market at the same time as the market is considered to be 
effectively competitive. 
                                                        
4 See Nelson and winter (1982) for a detailed discussion. 
Competition and economic development  101 
 
The maintenance and promotion of free competition are seen as synonymous with 
preventing or countering unreasonable restraints on competition. The primary objective of 
the maintenance and promotion of effective competition was to counter private restrictions 
on competition. However, in some specific countries, the role of competition policy has 
expanded significantly to include lessening the adverse effects of government intervention 
in the market. Linked to the promotion of competition, improving access and opening 
markets by reducing barriers to entry through deregulation, privatisation, tariff reduction, 
or removal of quotas and licenses are also specified as objectives of competition policy in 
some countries. Competition authorities do not have a direct mandate over commercial, 
regulatory and privatisation policies but can wield influence favouring market-determined 
solutions. In some countries, competition authorities can analyse whether regulatory 
measures from the public sector will negatively affect competition and strive to have any 
measures that unreasonably limit competition amended or abolished. 
Other commonly expressed objectives of competition policy are the prevention of 
abuses of market dominance5, the protection of consumers and the achievement of 
economic efficiency, which includes both allocative and dynamic efficiency through 
reduced production costs and technological change and innovation. Market dominance is 
the ability of a firm or group of firms to persistently hold the price above long-run average 
costs without thereby losing so many sales that the price level is unsustainable (Utton, 
2003). The creation, exploitation and maintenance of market dominance are the main 
concern of antitrust laws and competition policies. Compared with the theoretical concept 
of monopoly in economics, the effects of which has been discussed in Section 3.1, market 
dominance is a more practical concept used in antitrust analysis. Great emphasis has 
thereby been put on the sources of market dominance. Hay and Vickers (1987) mentioned 
five factors that can lead to the acquisition of market dominance. Three of them, collusion, 
predatory practice and Merger and Acquisition (M&A) are directly amendable to control 
through competition policy. The others are government grant (in the form of licenses, 
patents, quotas and tariffs) and corporate advantages and efforts, the so-called ‘skill, 
foresight and industry’.6 Government grants and trade policy issues are the subject of 
policy controls but usually settled in a different arena rather than competition policy. 
Recognising the strategic interdependence of their decisions may lead firms in markets 
with a limited number of competitors to collude, allowing them to keep prices up and 
market shares stable. The European Commission has considered this as ‘joint dominance’.7 
The essence of market dominance is the ability to control the market in such a way that 
prices can persistently be raised above costs, leading to excessive profits; where this occurs 
the market will not allocate resource efficiently.8 The task of competition policy can be 
viewed as an attempt to remove the sources of that market failure or to prevent its 
emergence. The welfare losses from market dominance that competition policy tries to 
rectify are likely to be substantial, while this does not mean that all competition policy 
actions are correct and effective. The neo-Chicago School claimed that dominant firms 
                                                        
5 The term ‘market dominance’ and ‘market power’ can be used interchangeably.  
6 Judge Learned Hand used the phrase ‘skill, foresight and industry’ in a famous US antirust case in the 1940s: 
the United States vs. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa). 
7 The concept of joint dominance matches closely the concept of coordinated effects. It has been disputed for a 
long period of time whether the European Commission could have extended the concept of dominance to deal 
with a situation in which dominance was jointly held by two (or more) firms. The first case where the 
Commission used joint dominance was in Nestle/Perrier, in the French mineral water industry. 
8 See Utton (2003) for a detailed discussion. 
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arise because of economies of scale and some superiority (such as management and 
innovation) which gives them supremacy in the competition. The dominance reflects 
efficient causes, which justify whatever the monopoly effects may impose. The speed with 
which unregulated markets are self-correcting in the face of market dominance is a very 
important issue that is directly related to the necessity of competition policy and has been 
at the centre of antitrust discussions. Are sources of market dominance likely to be 
ephemeral or persistent? In the former case, the inefficiencies are quickly eroded by the 
forces of market competition and it may be better to withhold direct policy intervention. In 
the latter case, knowledge of the source of market dominance should act as a guide to the 
effective antitrust remedy. This is as what Easterbrook (1984) pointed out: the central 
purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run.  
The central practical problem lies in the interpretation and measurement of market 
dominance. Assessing market dominance qualitatively is a difficult procedure, requiring 
sophisticated information and complicated analysis. Given the importance of potential 
competition, as well as actual competition, and differences about what is needed to ensure 
competition based on industry characteristics, ideally a qualitative approach to determining 
dominance is appropriate (World Bank, 2002). In the early years of US antitrust, however, 
many important cases took essentially the simple position that the larger the market share 
the greater the market power. The empirical analysis of market structure as a screening 
device for possible antitrust action was largely based on static measures such as 
concentration ratios. More recently there has been much greater concern for the dynamics 
of market structure (see Subsection 4.3 for a detailed discussion).  
Since the mid-1970s, the interests of consumers in lower prices and improved products 
became the central concern of competition policy in the United States.9 The US approach 
argued that ultimately the consumer interest should be paramount in competition policy 
and this can be best achieved by pursuing greater efficiency. Competition policy should 
not intervene as long as consumer interests are well served by efficient firms despite their 
size. However, competition policy should act in the case that large firms abuse their market 
dominance to exclude competitors in unreasonable manners. On the basis of the prevention 
of the abuse of market dominance, the promotion of economic efficiency and improvement 
of consumer welfare has been widely recognised as central aims of competition policy. 
Thus the objectives of competition policy reflect different perspectives towards one core 
belief, ensuring the effective functioning of competition mechanism to gain economic 
efficiency so to protect the consumer by the means of preventing unreasonable restraints 
on competition imposed by private firms (and also possibly from the adverse effects of 
government intervention).  
If the objective of competition policy is seen primarily in terms of maintenance and 
promotion of the competitive process as simply put in the beginning of the subsection, this 
may also be interpreted as ensuring the continued presence of existing firms who want the 
freedom to act in a competitive manner, even though it may damage the consumer interests. 
                                                        
9 Beginning in the mid-1970s, the US antitrust authority embarked upon a Chicago School revolution as Robert 
Bork, along with other antitrust scholars from Chicago University, became federal appellate judges. Over the next 
two decades, one doctrinal area after another in US antitrust was transformed; among them one key issue was to 
harmonise the new economic focus on efficiency and entry with the pre-existing legal rules that relied on 
concentration (Baker, 2002). Since the rise of the Chicago School, the presumption of harm from the increased 
concentration has declined dramatically. Accordingly, the 1982 Merger Guidelines departed from the 1968 
Guidelines by emphasising the analysis of a transaction’s competitive effects rather than merely on market 
concentration. 
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By placing a greater emphasis on the competitive process rather than economic efficiency 
and consumer interests, competition authorities may give undue emphasis to the protection 
of competitors rather than to competition. Since the mid-1970s, a broad consensus has 
developed in the United States regarding the goal of US antitrust policy: to foster 
competitive markets and to control the abuse of market dominance, not to protect smaller 
firms from tough competition by larger ones. However, unless the competition authorities 
keep efficiency and consumer interest firmly in mind, they may serve the interests of 
weaker competitors, especially under the condition where a market is dominated by an 
efficient firm and complaint comes from smaller rivals. 
In response to sociopolitical concerns various objectives of competition policy other 
than the promotion of economic efficiency and improvement of consumer welfare have 
been identified. These include integrating markets, protecting small businesses, preserving 
the free enterprise system and promoting economic development. In addition, it has been 
argued that competition policy must recognise the effects that the business practices such 
as M&As may have on employment and regional development. All these economic 
concerns are far beyond the traditional focus of competition policy on allocative efficiency. 
Furthermore, some non-economic objectives, such as maintaining equity, fairness and 
honesty, have been ascribed to competition policy. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
(1999), for instance, listed the objectives of competition policy, which include: 1) the 
promotion of equity and fairness, 2) the promotion of opportunities for small and 
medium-sized business, 3) market integration, 4) the promotion of technological 
development, local production and employment, and 5) the protection of economic and 
political pluralism. 
With regard to the objectives of competition, a spectrum of views has been expressed. 
The two ends of the spectrum can be described in terms of economic and non-economic 
objectives. At one end is the view that the sole purpose of competition policy is to 
maximise economic efficiency. In this view, there is no room for sociopolitical criteria 
such as fairness and equity in the implementation of competition policy. The opposite view 
is that competition policy is based on multiple values that are neither easily quantified nor 
summarised to a single economic objective. In this view, some sociopolitical criteria such 
as fairness and equity are incorporated into the objectives of competition policy. 
Associated objective are freedom of trade, freedom of choice and access to markets. A 
systematic summary of the objectives of competition policy is demonstrated in Table 3-1. 
While the changing emphasis on various objectives and the pressure to increase the 
number of goals has been notable, the focus of competition policy has been increasingly 
economic efficiency in the industrialised countries. 
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Table 3-1 Objectives of competition policy 
General Objectives 
Maintenance and promotion of competitive process 
Prevent business practices that restrain competition (in order to maintain competitive process) 
Improving access and opening markets (in order to promote competitive process) 
Examples: 
‘For over six decades, the mission of the Antitrust Division has been to promote and protect the competitive 
process – and the American economy – through the enforcement of the antitrust laws’ 
– Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
‘The Commission seeks to ensure that the nation's markets function competitively, and are vigorous, efficient, 
and free of undue restrictions.’ 
– Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the United States 
Economic Objectives 
Efficiency related economic objectives 
– Static: low prices (economic welfare) 
– Dynamic: technological change and innovation 
(long-run economic welfare) 
Economic Development 
Other economic objectives 
– Protecting small business 
– Maintaining employment 
– Market integration 
 
 
Effective competition 
Non-economic Objectives 
Equity 
Social welfare 
Fairness (fair competition) 
Freedom (of trade, choice and action) 
Pluralism (political as well as economic) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fair competition 
3.2.2 Targets and Instruments of Competition Policy 
The essential core of competition legislation is to counter private restrictions on 
competition. However, there is disagreement over what constitutes private restrains to 
competition. Three widely accepted principal targets of modern competition policy include: 
1) agreements among firms, 2) the abuse of a dominant position (monopolisation), and 3) 
mergers among firms. The first area covers the relationships and agreements between 
otherwise independent firms; the second area refers to the actions by a single firm; while 
the third area concerns structural combinations of independent firms. The second and first 
aspects concern the single-firm monopoly and joint action by a group of firms respectively, 
while the third aspect prevents the creation of a monopoly. Related policy instruments have 
been developed to curb the anticompetitive effects of these practices. The central concern 
of competition policy is related to all issues raised by market dominance, whether this 
comes from a single firm or a group of firms acting overtly or covertly together. The issues 
and targets involved in competition policy are complex. To make sense of the complexity, 
Table 3-2 categorises the major targets of competition policy, distinguishing horizontal 
from vertical issues. 
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Table 3-2 Major targets of competition policy 
Target of competition policy Horizontal Issue Vertical Issue 
Agreements among firms Horizontal agreements Vertical agreements 
Abuse of a dominant position 
Price discrimination 
Predatory pricing 
Strategic behaviour 
Vertical restraints 
– Resale price maintenance 
– Selective distribution systems 
– Tying arrangements 
– Exclusive dealing 
– Refusal to sell 
Mergers among firms Horizontal mergers Vertical mergers 
Agreements among competitors are implicit or explicit agreements that restrict 
competitors’ ability to act independently. The term of agreements encompasses a broad 
range of conduct, from joint ventures, joint advertising or marketing and trade association 
activities, to price-fixing, bid rigging and allocation of markets, sales and customers. There 
is a prominent distinction between horizontal agreement and vertical agreements. The 
former are the agreements among firms at the same level of the production chain; the latter 
are agreements among enterprises at different levels of production chain. Not all 
agreements between competitors hurt competition. Competition authorities distinguish 
between agreements that reduce competition on balance and those that promote 
competition on balance or are at least competitively neutral.  
Certain horizontal agreements to restrict the terms of trading (price, output, rebates, 
discounts, and so on) are anticompetitive. These agreements are intended to eliminate 
competition among firms and do not involve integration of operations, creation of a new 
product or method of distribution, or any other joint effort intended to further competition. 
Such agreements are overt restraints of trade, are often referred to as cartel agreements, or 
collusions. Examples are pricing-fixing, bid rigging, the allocation of territories or 
customers, and boycotts or refusals to deal in support of these practices. These agreements 
have no economic or social benefit and are unequivocally harmful. They have received the 
greatest degree of unanimity of treatment by the antitrust authorities. Most countries view 
cartel agreement as the most serious competition offences; in some countries cartel 
agreements are per se illegal and prosecuted as crimes. Most economists and practitioners 
of competition policy strongly condemn price-fixing and similar forms of cartel 
agreements, which are referred to as hard-core cartels. Vertical agreements can have 
desirable effects, uncertain effects or undesirable effects. The vertical agreements that are 
restrictive raise the antitrust concern. Regardless of the specific form taken by a vertical 
agreement, it is crucial to treat particular upstream and downstream firms as a single 
vertical structure. Vertical agreements are most likely to be harmful when at least one of 
the transacting parties is dominant in either the upstream or downstream market. However, 
even restrictive vertical agreements that involved dominant firms can result in efficiency 
gains. This requires caution in dealing with such cases so that efficient market 
developments are not impeded. 
Certain restrictive business practices, such as price discrimination, predatory pricing 
and vertical restraints, can be qualified as the abuse of a dominant position. Price 
discrimination is the sale of two or more similar goods at prices that are in different ratios 
to marginal cost (Stigler, 1968). A firm with a degree of market dominance may be able to 
discriminate on price. Although economic analysis gives an ambiguous view of the 
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possible effects of price discrimination10, competition policies in both the United States 
and the European Union have considerable scope for the examination and the possible 
control of price discrimination. A particular form of price discrimination is predatory 
pricing, which refers to a deliberate conduct, usually by a dominant firm, to cut prices to a 
very low level in the short run in order to drive competitors out of the market or deter a 
potential rival. Despite the ongoing debate on the effects of predatory pricing, the 
competition authorities in the United States and the European Union have spent a great 
deal of resources on the cases of predatory pricing. The issue of predatory pricing has been 
broadened to cover strategic behaviour, which involves other variables apart from price. 
The strategic behaviour by dominant firms aims to deter potential entrants rather than to 
destroy actual competitors. Although the research in strategic behaviour has influenced the 
US antitrust practice11, it has not been convincing that the pre-commitment of resources 
and the strategic behaviour of dominant firms have been sufficient to constitute 
monopolisation of an industry. Vertical restrictions occur when a firm at one stage of the 
line of value-added activity imposes restraints on the terms of trading by firms at another 
stage – vertical restrictions take place between firms in a vertical relationship, usually 
manufacturers and distributors. A complex variety of vertical restraints/agreements 
includes resale price maintenance, selective distribution systems, tying arrangements 
(tie-in sales), exclusive dealing and refusal to sell.  
Alleged abuses of a dominant position can also promote efficiency in which possible 
anticompetitive harm is weighted against possible efficiency benefits. Much of the 
economic analysis in this area is equivocal. The ambiguity and complexity of different 
cases suggests that a rule of reason rather than a general hostile stance in the 
implementation of competition policy in this area will produce more efficient results. In an 
investigation of an alleged abuse case, competition authority should explain how the 
alleged exclusionary practices might harm competition and explore possible efficiency 
benefits from the practice. 
Most M&As impose no threat to competition. However, some M&As would severely 
harm competition by significantly increasing the probability of abusing market dominance. 
These are the transactions that the competition authority seeks to identify and prevent. 
Mergers can be identified as horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. A horizontal merger 
involves the acquisition of or merger with an actual or possible competitor. A vertical 
merger involves the acquisition of or merger with a supplier of an input or a customer. A 
conglomerate merger refers to a merger between firms operating in different markets that 
                                                        
10 Theoretically there are three categories of price discrimination: the first degree refers to the case where the 
seller has complete knowledge of the reservation prices of customers; the first degree refers to the case where the 
seller has incomplete information of the reservation prices of customers; third degree price discrimination refers 
to the case where the seller can isolate customers either geographically or by end use. According to the 
conventional view, the first and second degrees of price discrimination should not be a target for antitrust action 
because, compared with the available alternatives, it actually improves economic welfare (Utton, 2003). However, 
a fundamental change in market structure may make possible more favourable alternative. Third degree 
discrimination may have rather ambiguous effects. Due to the potential welfare gains that can rise from al three 
types of price discrimination, on the one hand, and the distinction between persistent and systematic price 
discrimination, on the other, most economists take an agnostic or even positive view of the effects of price 
discrimination. 
11 The preemptive strategies include: 1) accelerating R&D expenditures in order to acquire ‘preemptive patents’ 
as argued by Gilbert (1981) and Gilbert and Newbery (1982); 2) brand proliferation and excessive advertising for 
incumbent firms to attempt to protect their position (Schmalensee, 1978; Hilke and Nelson, 1984). For more 
detailed discussions, see Porter (1980, 1985) and Salop (1981). 
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do not have a vertical relationship. When examining horizontal or vertical M&As, 
competition authorities seek to prevent the creation, preservation or enhancement of 
market dominance. The horizontal M&As between sizable firms operating in the same 
market are likely to have the most direct impact on market power. The vertical M&As 
between firms operating at different stages in the production process may also have 
consequences on market power. The effects of conglomerate M&As have been intensively 
disputed in the past but are now generally regarded as having little or no market-power 
impact (Utton, 2003). Competition authorities may be concerned about horizontal M&As 
when a firm combines with an existing competitor or a firm that is likely to enter the 
market in the near future under circumstances suggesting that competition in the market 
may be diminished. They may be concerned also about vertical M&As when such a merger 
makes it more difficult for competitors to enter the market, when, for example, the merger 
would cause the competitors to experience difficulty in gaining access to needed inputs or 
distribution channels. For competition authorities, the primal priority of merger control is 
to prevent firms that already dominate their markets from making anticompetitive 
acquisitions of or combinations with competitors and to inhibit M&As that create market 
dominance that did not exist before the merger.  
Compared with the per se approach to collusion, for competition authorities, the 
position with horizontal merger is much more ambiguous. The competition authorities will 
not intervene in case that a horizontal merger, while increasing the market share of the new 
entity, may have a negligible effect on market power. If a merger may simultaneously 
enhance market power and promote technical efficiency, the competition authorities have 
to decide whether the merger should be blocked, principally based on the trade-off between 
the probable increase in market power and the prospective efficiency improvement. Thus 
merger policy is more complex than other major areas of competition policy because its 
decision is based on projection rather than past events. 
Competition advocacy encompasses all activities of the competition authority that do 
not fall under the three main enforcement categories of competition policy. Competition 
advocacy has recently been accepted as an important function for all antitrust authorities. It 
complements law enforcement activities, assists in public education and helps to promote 
economic development. Competition advocacy refers to those activities conducted by the 
competition authority related to the promotion of a competitive environment for economic 
activities by means of non-enforcement mechanism, mainly through its relations with other 
government entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition 
(International Competition Network, 2002). These activities are targeted on other public 
authorities in charge of regulation or policy-making with the aim of curing anticompetitive 
effects of regulatory intervention and the society (the judicial system, other government 
entities, economic agents and the public at large) with the aim of raising public awareness 
of importance of competition.  
3.2.3 Implementation of Competition Policy 
Although a striking diversity of competition policy regimes exists around the world, a 
competition policy regime usually addresses four fundamental functions: 1) initiates 
proceedings; 2) undertakes investigations; 3) adjudicates contested competition 
proceedings; 4) judicial review of competition decisions. A competition policy regime 
consists of both substantial legal rules and an enforcement system. A competition law, 
which specifies legal rules and judicial process designed to maintain or protect competition 
and to control abuses of market dominance by firms, is the core of a competition policy 
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regime.  
Competition policy incorporates both legal and economic principles and both 
disciplines play complementary roles. In the very beginning of antitrust legislation, 
economists were largely bystanders as legal and political events coalesced to produce the 
first antitrust law (Stigler, 1982; McChesney, 1995). Gradually, economics has influenced 
the principle as well as the implementation of the antitrust law. Economic theory and 
concepts of industrial organisation have had continuous influence on competition law and 
guided the formation of competition policy, informing the debate about the relative merits 
of competition by indicating the costs of measures that suppress it. For competition 
authorities, economic tools can be used to assess the effects of various business practices, 
to analyse market structure and to predict the consequences of enforcement decisions. Now, 
economic analysis plays a vital role in determining what case the competition authorities 
actually pursue. Courts, on the other hand, have endorsed a central role for economics in 
rendering their own decision. Economics frames the central issues for investigation and, on 
the basis of data analysis and theory, structures the examination of various practices of 
firms or structural changes in industries (Kwoka and White, 1999). 
As to the debates on the interaction between law and economics in the area of 
competition policy enforcement, there is an inherent tension between the need for a clear 
set of legal rules to foster certainty in the application of competition policy and the need to 
consider specific situations. Precise legal rules cannot be formulated across all types of 
actual or potential anticompetitive situations. An outright prohibition or a per se approach 
may well be adopted against hard-core cartel agreements, while a rule-of-reason approach 
that evaluates facts on a case-by-case basis is likely to be more appropriate in certain types 
of some business practices such as abuses of a dominant position and M&As. In the latter 
case, competition agents balance the competitive benefits and costs of a particular 
agreement, seeking to determine whether the agreement is ‘unreasonable’ and therefore 
illegal. As suggested in Subsection 3.2.1, economic efficiency has become the central 
concern in most competition investigations. Under certain conditions, however, 
improvement in one type of efficiency may come at the expense of other types – by 
curbing market dominance to improve allocative efficiency, competition authorities for 
instance may hinder dynamic, or technical, efficiency. Thus the task of competition policy 
can be summarised as ‘the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing 
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gains or a net loss in consumer 
welfare’ (Bork, 1978). In such cases complex trade-offs are likely to be involved, posing 
difficult problems for the policy maker. Increasing attention has been devoted to dynamic 
efficiencies and, consequently, resulted in the tensions between settled concerns about 
price and cost and new concerns about promoting innovation and maintaining market 
access. 
Competition laws specify legal rules and judicial processes to fulfil the objectives of 
competition policy. Despite their similar general objects, a striking diversity of antitrust 
provisions exists around the world. The two dominant systems of competition policy, 
which have been transplanted to many developing countries, are the systems of the United 
States and of the European Union. The main laws that have defined US antitrust policy are 
Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Robinson-Patman Act, 
Celler-Kefauver Act and Antitrust Enforcement Improvement Act.12 The cornerstones of 
                                                        
12 The Sherman Act first provides antitrust provisions in the United States – Section 1 deals with collusion and 
Section 2 covers monopolisation, or market dominance. Section 2 gives a wide scope of possible abuses by a 
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EU competition policy are Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The treaty, which embodies 
the constitution and basic principles for the development of the European Union, contains 
these two articles that specifically tackle competition issues. Previously, Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty of Rome were concerned with competition policy. However, after the 
ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, these Articles were renumbered Article 81 and 82, 
respectively, in May 1999.13 The Rome Treaty contained no specific provisions on M&As. 
Mergers have traditionally been regulated by Article 82 and Regulation No. 4064/89, 
‘European Council Merger Regulation (ECMR), the Control of Concentration’, which 
covers mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. The ECMR was passed in 1990 and 
subsequently amended by Council Regulation 13/10/97, which has been in force since 
March 1998. This regulation stipulates that a ‘concentration’ with a Community dimension 
‘which creates or strengthens a dominant position as result of which effective competition 
in the common market or in a substantial part of it is significantly impeded’ is to be 
declared incompatible with the common market. The European Commission replaced the 
Regulation 4064/89 with a new regulation in May 2004. At present there remain 
remarkable differences between the US and EU competition laws with respect to the 
treatment of some issues in competition policy, such as predatory pricing and merger 
control. The major difference between US and EU antitrust enforcement is in the levels 
and nature of enforcement (Graham and Richardson, 1997). Generally speaking, American 
antitrust law has been influenced by a more penetrating use of economic theory, whereas 
the influence of economics on European competition law has remained relatively modest. 
Compared to American antitrust law, European competition law still is less consistent with 
an efficiency-based approach. 
In addition to differences in competition laws, differences in enforcement determine the 
ways in which countries treat competition. Because of diversified institutional 
arrangements to undertake the four fundamental functions of competition policy, various 
models of competition policy exist. In the organisation of administrative enforcement, for 
instance, the frameworks of competition policy can be classified bifurcated or integrated 
model. Under the bifurcated model, separate bodies are responsible for investigation and 
adjudication of cases. Under the integrated model, investigation and adjudication falls 
within the purview of one administrative body. The adjudication function can be 
undertaken by the court or by the government agency that investigate the antitrust cases. 
Thus the type of administrative apparatus that governs competition policy differs widely 
across countries. In the United States, the enforcement of competition policy is carried out 
either by the Antitrust Division within the US Department of Justice (DOJ) or by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It is also possible for private parties who have suffered 
                                                                                                                                            
dominant firm. As with Section 1, violation constitutes a criminal offence. The antitrust provisions were extended 
in 1914 by the enactment of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The main effect of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act was to establish the FTC. The Clayton Act specifies four specific kinds of 
restrictive practices: 1) price discrimination; 2) exclusive dealing and tying contracts; 3) acquisition of competing 
companies; and 4) interlocking directorates. Price discrimination was modified by the Robinson-Patman Act in 
1936. The Celler-Kefauver Act was passed in 1950 to amend Section 7 of the Clayton Act and thereby to cover 
certain asset acquisitions and acquisitions involving firms that were not direct competitors. 
13 Article 81 is aimed mainly at agreements between firms that have as their object or effect the ‘prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market’. Article 82 covers a number of practices that 
may constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the Community. These practices include: 1) the imposition 
of unfair prices and other trading practices; 2) the limitation of production, markets or technical development; 3) 
the application of dissimilar terms to similar conditions in order to place some trading parties at a competitive 
disadvantage; 4) the inclusion of supplementary terms which have no bearing on the main substance of a contract. 
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as a result of anticompetitive practices to bring prosecutions for violations of antitrust laws. 
The Antitrust Division’s traditional role was that of prosecutor rather than adjudication. 
Cases under the Sherman Act are brought by the Antitrust Division before a Federal 
District Court and an appeal against a decision may be brought to the Supreme Court. In 
contrast, the FTC is an independent body charged with providing economic analysis of 
various competition issues along with conducting formal investigations and prosecutions. 
It is an administrative agency with quasi-judicial powers which can conduct hearings into 
suspected violations of the law and its jurisdiction is purely civil. According to the Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, all ‘unfair methods of competition’ were illegal 
and it was up to the FTC to decide what exactly these were. In the European Union, 
competition policy is enforced by the European Commission. The Commission has the 
mandate to determine whether an agreement infringes Article 81. Different from the US 
system, the EU competition policy has developed a notification procedure – firms 
participating in an agreement which may infringe Article 81 could be considered for 
exemption and be exempt from fines by notifying the Commission about the provisions of 
the agreement.14 The commission also has the authority under Article 82 to investigate 
firms that may abuse their dominant positions. Firms found guilty of an offence under 
Article 81 and 82 can be heavily fined by the Commission. Since the promulgation of the 
ECMR in 1990, the Commission has had exclusive authority to investigate proposed large 
M&As above a threshold.15 All decisions by the Commission concerning collusion, abuses 
and mergers can be examined on appeal by the Court of First Instance and further by the 
Court of Justice Instance.  
The effectiveness of competition laws and competition authorities in protecting 
competition varies substantially around the world. Results of the survey conducted for the 
World Bank (2002) indicated that the higher the per capita income of the country, the more 
effective is the competition law. Also, the longer the competition authority has been in 
place, the more effective it tends to be. The average tenure of competition authorities in 
developed countries in the survey is 27 years, while that for developing countries is 10 
years. On average, competition authorities in developed countries are more effective than 
competition authorities in developing countries, according to the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (2000) index of effectiveness of competition law, which is based on surveys of 
top and middle management of firms in each country.16 But several other factors are 
crucial to the effectiveness of competition policy. First, competition agencies need to have 
sufficient legal enforcement powers so that the agency can make decisions on competition 
cases without referring the simpler ones to the courts. Secondly, competition agencies need 
the statutory authority to force firms to supply necessary information. Thirdly, the 
independence of the competition authority is necessary for competition policy enforcement. 
Fourthly, competition authorities need adequate budgets and staff to perform their 
functions. Finally, private enforcement is supplementary for public enforcement.  
                                                        
14 In 2000, the European Commission planned to end the notification system in order to free administrative 
resources. 
15 According to the ECMR, the large mergers involve firms with a combined worldwide turnover of at least € 5 
billion, as long as the total EU turnover of each firm is greater than € 250 million, and as long as no firm involved 
does more than two-thirds of its EU business in one member country. All other mergers will stay in the national 
jurisdiction of individual member countries. 
16 This index is based on the responses of 3,678 executives to the survey question on the degree to which 
‘competition laws prevent unfair competition in your country.’ 
Competition and economic development  111 
 
3.3 Competition and Development: Exploring the Rationale of Competition 
Policy for Developing Countries 
The ways in which and the extent to which competition is perceived to work and 
contribute to development differ widely among economists, public officials and business 
people. In dealing with development, we focus on the economic facet of it, though 
development encompasses other dimensions such as social, political and environmental. 
For developing countries, long-term economic development is the central concern when 
considering institution building or making economic policies. There is one central question 
in the study of economic development: why are some countries developed and others not? 
How living standards in the population are determined, how they changed over time and 
how government policy can be used in the influence of these processes. The study of the 
process of economic growth is central to the development economics. The relation between 
competition and economic growth highlights the theoretical rationale of competition policy 
for developing countries. For developing countries prepared to introduce competition 
policy, there is a common question: is competition policy a good instrument for economic 
development. To what extent is the focus of competition policy on allocative efficiency and 
consumer welfare consistent with the goal of development? Should competition be 
encouraged in developing countries? To address these questions, insights should be 
provided to a related question, namely, the relation between competition and development. 
Is competition a good thing per se to foster economic development?  
It has been recognised that under a wide variety of circumstances, competition has 
beneficial effects on economic performance and social welfare. There has been a sound 
theoretical basis to assume such positive impact, but there have also been ample theoretical 
arguments underpinning potentially negative effects (see Table 3-3 for an overview). For 
instance, Chamberlin’s ‘excess capacity theorem’ has provided theoretical support for the 
concept of ‘wasteful competition’. There have also been arguments on ‘excessive 
competition’, both in the old version of the late 19th century as well as in new versions 
documented in the recent theoretical industrial organisation literature. In addition, the 
theory of contestable markets has suggested that the actual effect of the (likely) absence of 
competition may be positive considering the role played by potential entry.17 Furthermore, 
competition may not lead to optimal results under the condition of natural monopoly and it 
is not competition policy but regulation that should be adopted under this circumstance.18 
Similarly, the evidence provided by empirical studies on the relationship between 
competition and economic performance has been far from conclusive. To shed lights on 
both the theoretical underpinning and the empirical evidence of the interrelationship 
among competition, competition policy and economic development, we address this issue 
from different perspectives in the following subsections. Both static and dynamic views of 
competition have been taken and the behavioural approach is addressed in Subsection 3.3.2. 
The empirical evidence of the effects of competition policy on competition and, therefore, 
on development has been rare. It is, methodologically, extremely hard to separate the 
impact of competition policy from other factors that influence the degree of market 
competition. In addition, an appropriate measure of the strength of competition policy is 
                                                        
17 Stiglitz (1994), however, criticised the theory of contestable market for its underscoring the importance of 
entry barriers that make the threat of potential entry incredible. In the same book, Stiglitz argued strongly in 
favour of competition policy as a policy instrument to reduce the welfare loss caused by the lack of competition. 
18 In ‘natural monopolistic industries’, the absence of competition is rationalised by the existence of large fixed 
costs in the network, whose duplication may be neither privately nor socially desirable. 
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still lacking. 
Table 3-3 Competition, competition policy and development: a summary of the interrelationship 
Relationship Theoretical underpinning:  Positive effect 
Theoretical underpinning:  
Negative effect 
Empirical evidence 
Competition 
– 
Development 
Static efficiency 
– Allocative efficiency 
– X-efficiency 
Dynamic efficiency 
Incentive mechanism argument 
Theory of contestable markets 
Excess capacity theorem 
– Wasteful competition 
Excessive competition theory 
Natural monopoly argument 
There has been a vast body of 
literature on the relationship 
between competition and a variety 
of indicators of economic 
development.  
The FDI-competition-development 
nexus remain largely uncovered 
due to the lack of the 
industry-level evidence. 
Competition 
policy 
– 
Competition 
The rationale of competition policy has been generally based on the 
theories underpinning the positive/negative effects of 
competition/monopoly. Whether competition policy leads to competition 
and therefore development, as assumed, is mainly a practically issue, which 
concerns the effectiveness of competition policy. 
There have been litter empirical 
studies due to the methodological 
constraints and the lack of an 
appropriate measure of the 
strength of competition policy. 
3.3.1 Competition and Economic Efficiency  
The association between competition and economic efficiency goes back as far as Adam 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ metaphor. In the dominant paradigm of neoclassic economics, 
economic efficiency is coherent with economic development. As a mechanism of virtue 
selection, competition encourages efficiency by allowing the most efficient firms to 
survive and grow at the expense of their inefficient counterparts. The exit of these efficient 
firms frees up resources, which can then be used by more efficient firms. Focusing on the 
basic condition of competition, Stigler (1987) argued that the central element of market 
competition is the freedom of traders to use their resources where they choose and to 
exchange them at a price they choose.  
In terms of firm behaviour, competition is multidimensional and can have desirable 
effects not only on Ricardian short-term allocative efficiency, but also on Schumpeterian 
long-term dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency refers to technological improvement 
that leads to increase in the efficiency and welfare of the economy. The effects of 
competition on growth and development are not only in the short run but also in the long 
run. In the short run, competition is necessary to ensure that allocative efficiency is 
achieved and consumer welfare is maximised. These basic functions of competition are 
static and they are complemented by some dynamic functions: competition is the driving 
force behind the technological progress and long-term economic growth. Thus 
well-functioning competition is crucial to long-term economic development. The dynamic 
efficiency is effectively promoted by a combination of cooperation and competition among 
firms. Dynamic efficiency has been related to the intensity of competition by two 
influential views. The first, generally referred to as the Schumpeterian hypothesis, argued 
that firms must make high level of profits and enjoy some monopoly power in order to 
invest the funds necessary for successful innovation (Kamien and Schwartz, 1971). The 
second view argued that competition leads to increased incentive for firm to gain a 
competitive advantage (see later subsections for a detailed discussion) – one way of doing 
this is to invest in research and development projects (Nickell, 1996). On the other hand, it 
is argued that Schumpeterian dynamic efficiency ‘cannot be obtained by totally ignoring 
Ricardian competitive advantages’ (Yoshitomi, 1991). Thus the existence of cooperation 
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between firms should not hamper competition – as the basic mechanism of market, 
competition is the precondition of short-term allocative efficiency as well as long-term 
economic growth.  
A distinction between monopoly and competitive market structure has long been 
recognised, stretching back as far as Aristotle. As the basic instrument of static, partial 
equilibrium analysis, the model of perfect competition highlights the ability of competition 
to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resource that is Pareto optimal under an extremely 
decentralised market structure – a ‘perfectly competitive’ market. The competitive 
equilibrium has desirable efficiency properties – perfect competition will lead to economic 
efficient in the traditional Pareto sense in which resources are so allocated that no one can 
be made better off without someone else being made worse off.19 The desirable properties 
are in part due to free entry and exit of firms. The role of entry and exit in assuring the 
equalisation of returns across markets is not logically limited to the case of extremely 
decentralised market structure, the case in which it is technological feasible for a market to 
host a very large number of firms. The theory of contestable markets developed by Baumol 
et al. (1982a) extends the neoclassical partial equilibrium theory of a long-run competitive 
equilibrium to the case of increasing returns to scale. This theory suggests that an industry 
consisting of one or a few firms may be efficient by emphasising the role played by 
potential entry. When firm are in a protected market, incentives to achieve minimum cost 
may be blunted and a considerable amount of slack may exist at all levels of the 
organisation. The term ‘X-inefficiency’ is used to describe this kind of internal 
disorganisation.20 If competitive pressures can be intensified, X-inefficiency will tend to 
disappear. 
To the neoclassical economists, a monopoly, which can be simply defined as ‘absence 
of competition’21, is the polar opposite to perfect competition. Monopolies have been 
under fierce attack since the classical economists. The neoclassical approach to monopoly 
involves the comparison of monopoly with perfect competition. The most influential study 
has been that of Harberger (1954) who provided the core of the economists’ case against 
monopoly – the price-cost divergence, as well as the resource misallocation and the 
resulting deadweight welfare loss.22 In the view of neoclassical economists, a monopolist 
in economic theory is the sole producer of a good or service for which there are no close 
substitutes. Some entry barriers also exist which prevents other firms from entering the 
market and competing with the incumbent. Under these circumstances the firm can choose 
the output and price that maximises profit. The monopolist’s pricing behaviour leads to 
allocative inefficiency.23 A simple diagram in Figure 3-1 depicts the costs of monopoly. 
We assume that costs remain constant over the entire output range. Given the market 
                                                        
19 For the general equilibrium analysis, competition is also a basic assumption for the efficient allocation of 
resources. The First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics claims that: 1) if there are enough markets, 2) if 
all consumers and producers behave competitively, and 3) if equilibrium exists, then the allocation of resources in 
that equilibrium will be Pareto optimal (Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1959). 
20 Leibenstein (1966) first introduced the term ‘X-efficiency’.  
21 Irving Fisher (1923) defined monopoly as ‘absence of competition’. 
22 In the same study, however, Harberger estimated that the welfare loss from the existence of monopoly in the 
United States was virtually non-existent – a merely 0.07 percent. Some economists have challenged Harberger’s 
estimates. Scherer, for instance, estimated that monopoly has imposed social costs equivalent to about 6 percent 
of the gross national product. 
23 However, the monopolist may be technologically efficient and in the long-run equilibrium the industry will 
also be efficient in this sense (Utton, 2003).  
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demand, then under competitive conditions the price is OPc and the output is OQc. 
Consumer surplus, PcBD, is maximised. In case that a monopolist controls the industry, 
price will be increased to OPm and output will be decreased to OQm as the firm equalises 
marginal cost with marginal revenue. It is clear that at output level OQm there is a 
difference CA between price and marginal cost. Under the monopolistic condition the area 
PcACPm becomes the monopoly profit and the consumer surplus shrinks to PmCD. In 
principle consumers would like to pay the monopolist a sum equal to the area PcACPm in 
exchange for an increase in output to OQc. The net welfare loss is the triangle ABC, the 
so-called ‘deadweight’ welfare loss. The diagram simply illustrates how output restriction 
leads to the price-cost divergence and the consequential resource misallocation. The 
redistribution of value PcACPm in favour of the monopolist is fundamentally caused by the 
monopolist’s ability to hold price above long-run average costs – the market dominance.  
Figure 3-1 Welfare losses from monopoly (market dominance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
In addition, the protection of the monopoly may lead to ‘X-inefficiency’.24 The 
stronger the protection for a monopoly, the weaker are its incentives for X-efficiency. The 
reduction of monopoly by removing entry barriers can have the effects of improving both 
allocative and X-efficiency (Utton, 2003). Furthermore, as argued by Stiglitz (1996), the 
welfare loss from reduced competition can be much larger than that Harberger (1954) 
suggested due to the rent-seeking behaviour by monopolists. The analysis of monopoly has 
provided the initial economic underpinning of competition policy. The putative need to 
address actions that reduce competition and result in monopoly is reflected in the first two 
sections of the pillar of US antitrust policy – the 1890 Sherman Act. Section 1 prohibits the 
‘restraints of trade’ (cartel agreements) and Section 2 proscribes ‘monopolisation’, a term 
describing actions by which a firm becomes a monopoly through ‘unfair’ competitive 
                                                        
24 In response, Leibenstein pointed out that Harberger based his estimates on aggregate measures, so that could 
not capture a great deal of inefficiency which he termed as ‘X-inefficiency’. 
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practices. 
The dichotomy between monopoly and competitive market structure is far too simple. 
There is a much wider spectrum of market structure in between. Against the theoretical 
standard of perfect competition, Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson renewed 
economists’ interest in imperfectly or monopolistically competitive process in the 1930s 
(Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933). The analysis of Cournot oligopoly has provided 
additional economic underpinning of competition policy. The Cournot oligopoly theory 
supports another pillar of US antitrust policy – the 1994 Clayton Act. Section 7 of this act 
prohibits mergers that ‘may tend to inhibit competition’. Historically, the models of 
imperfect competition emerged after the rise of the modern industrial enterprises around 
the turn of the 19th and the 20th Century (cf. Chandler, 1977). In the circumstance in 
which large firms dominate industries, the positive and normative implications of models 
of imperfect competition are of interest, as are the design of government policies such as 
competition and regulatory policies aimed at improving efficiency of markets. In contrast 
to the model of perfect competition, the models of imperfect competition are uncertain 
about whether the force of competition is entirely beneficial. The notion that competition 
can be wasteful was popularised by Edward Chamberlin. Under the condition of imperfect 
competition, firms face down-sloping demand curves or upward-sloping supply curves for 
some products. This is different from the perfect competition, in which firms face perfectly 
elastic demand and supply curves for all products. Chamberlin’s ‘excess capacity theorem’ 
has provided theoretical support for the ‘wasteful competition’. The theoretical argument 
of ‘excessive competition’ has presented additional challenge for the widespread belief that 
the more competition there is, the better the economy will function. Also known as 
destructive or cut-throat competition, excessive competition refers to situations when 
competition results in prices that cannot cover the costs of production, particularly fixed 
costs. Although insufficient competition is harmful to an economy, excessive competition 
may be ruinous. The literature on excessive entry has provided an additional dimension for 
the excessive competition argument. Recent studies in theoretical industrial organisation 
has demonstrated that there are cases where social welfare will be increased by 
strengthening, rather than weakening, the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of 
potential entry.25  
A number of studies have found a positive relationship between competition and 
productivity as well as between competition and the rate of productivity growth (Geroski, 
1990a; Porter, 1990; Baily and Gersbach, 1995; Nickell, 1996, 1997). Productivity growth, 
in turn, accounts for most of the income and growth differences across countries (Easterly 
and Levine, 2000). In developed countries, productivity growth is generally the result of 
technological advances. In developing countries, productivity growth has mostly been 
attained through technology spillovers from trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
licensing. Market competition increases productive efficiency by providing incentives for 
managers to cut costs, reduce slack, innovate, and improve institutional arrangements in 
production (Vickers, 1995; Nickell, 1996). In the presence of competition, firms adjust 
their operations to raise efficiency and less efficient firms exit the industry. The mechanism 
of entry and exit has been argued to be an important source of industry wide productivity 
growth (World Bank, 2002). In a study of South Korea between 1990 and 1998, plant exit 
and entry accounted for as much as 45 percent of manufacturing productivity growth 
during cyclical upturns and 65 percent during downturns (Hahn, 2000). Porter (1990) has 
                                                        
25 See Stiglitz (1981), Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) and Suzumura (1995). 
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observed that the sectors with strong domestic – even local – competition have produced 
the most successful companies in worldwide markets. None of these studies make a 
difference between foreign and domestic companies, which according to Dunning presents 
a vital flaw in their reasoning. We will come back to this issue in Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Determining Firm Behaviour: Competition as an Incentive Mechanism 
Some recent literature on the relationship between competition and development has 
emphasised the impact of competition on firm behaviour and, consequently, on economic 
development. In this view, an important role of competition is to act as a disciplining 
device, inducing the firm to behave in a better way. The separation of ownership and 
control is a common feature of the typical governance of modern enterprises. This 
separation leads to divergence between the owners of a firm, who would aim to maximise 
profits, and the managers that operate the firm, who may pursue distinct incentives. In 
addition to incentive divergence, information asymmetry often arises between the owners 
and the managers. Agency problems, such as the moral hazards and managerial slacks, 
may surface. When agency problems exist, profit maximisation needs not to be the most 
appropriate assumption for economic analysis. Instead, the behavioural assumptions that 
take account of those agency problems may be a more realistic and thus practical approach. 
Facing agency problems, firms have to take initiatives to develop best practices in 
corporate governance to cope with the internal agency problem and realise its business 
objectives. Competition can provide an effective external disciplining mechanism.  
Competition can act as an incentive mechanism to solve the agency problem; the impact 
of competition on development thus also depends on the degree to which agency problems 
exist in a country. Aghion et al. (1995) suggested that the impact of competition on 
economic development critically depends on the behaviour of firms. Rather than 
considering firm behaviour as exogenously given, Aghion et al. (1997) endogenised the 
behaviour by explicitly modelling the agency problem between the manager and the owner 
and demonstrated that, depending on the magnitude of this agency problem, firms behave 
in ways that are close to profit maximisation or adopt much more conservative behaviour. 
Controlling for the magnitude of agency problems, it was verified that competition plays 
an important and positive role as a disciplining device when agency problems are 
important. This could for instance apply to the problem of ‘corruption’ and ‘bad 
governance’. There is a significant relationship between corruption and development: the 
lower the development level of a country, the higher its corruption (cf. the Transparency 
International). The direction of causation is not yet established. But it is clear that effective 
competition is bound to reduce the possibilities of corruption, which always is related to 
market failure and collusion. 
The impact of competition on incentives and on the level of managerial effort has been 
studied recently. According to Rey (1998), competition may help align owners’ and 
managers’ objectives through a number of channels or mechanisms. Managers of modern 
enterprises have access to more information than the owners. In addition, they make the 
day-to-day business decisions that have direct effects on a company’s performance. The 
interest difference between owners and managers requests owners effectively supervise 
and evaluate the management team – oversee the managerial operation and to reward the 
managers according to their managerial efforts (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Competition 
makes the comparison and evaluation possible. Owners of a firm can compare the 
performance of their firm with that of its competitors and evaluate and reward managers 
accordingly. This idea of benchmarking has been formally analysed by Holmstrom (1982), 
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Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Mookherjee (1984), who pointed out that compensation 
schemes can provide sharper incentives when there are more competitors. An increase in 
the number of competitors enhances inferences of the managers’ abilities, which in turn 
induces investors to use high-powered incentive contracts that lead managers to provide 
more effort. 
Some literature focused on the impact of competition from entrepreneurial firms, as 
opposed to managerial firms. Hart (1983) argued that a higher competitive pressure, in the 
form of a higher proportion of entrepreneurial firms, has a positive impact on managerial 
behaviour when managers are not very responsive to monetary incentives. Scharfstein 
(1988) pointed out that competition might lead instead to more slack when managers are 
sufficiently responsive to monetary incentives as opposed to non-monetary incentives. 
Hermalin (1992) stressed the sensitivity of the analysis to the presence of income effects in 
managers’ preferences and the effectiveness of financial markets in pushing firms toward 
profit maximisation in the context of an economy-wide growth model. Schmidt (1997) 
emphasised another potentially positive impact of competition on managerial effort, 
through a greater threat of bankruptcy. Willig’s study (1987) has implications for the 
owners’ incentives to induce high levels of managerial effort. As competition reduces 
individual market shares but increases demand elasticity, an increase in competition may 
have an ambiguous impact on the benefits attached to better management and thus on the 
incentives to induce such a higher level of managerial effort. Martin (1993) demonstrated 
in a Cournot model that an increase in the number of competitors tends to reduce 
managerial effort; some studies stressed other aspects that define the nature of competition. 
Another important impact of competition is to introduce or reinforce the possibility of 
bankruptcy, which further promotes incentives and managerial effort, which was analysed 
by Schmidt (1997). It not only provides managers with direct incentives to expend more 
effort to avert bankruptcy and thus keep their jobs, but it also makes it cheaper for the 
owners to induce higher levels of managerial effort. Thus through the threat of liquidation, 
an increase in competition will lead to an increase in managerial effort. Another channel 
through which competition may affect managers’ behaviour is by reducing the available 
free-cash flows of firms. Jensen (1986) argued that this might reduce the scope for 
investment projects that are not very profitable but yield important private benefits for the 
managers. 
3.3.3 Competition, Innovation and Development 
Competition is often seen as a spur to economic efficiency as firms pursue and adopt 
innovations in order to gain a competitive advantage. Following the Austrian and 
evolutionary schools, much progress has been made in taking into account the 
inter-temporal nature and non-price dimensions of competition. Research and 
Development (R&D) and innovation are among the central concerns. Economists have 
long been interested in the impact of competition on innovation and, consequently, on 
economic development. The standard industrial organisation literature predicts the negative 
correlation between competition and innovation because more competition reduces the 
monopoly rents that reward entry by new successful innovators. However, empirical work 
such as Geroski (1994), Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al. (1999) has pointed to a positive 
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correlation between market competition and innovative output.26 
There is substantial empirical literature on the impact of competition on innovation. The 
main challenge is to distinguish this impact from the contributions of other factors, such as 
technological opportunities and scale economies. Using panel data to control for 
differences in technological opportunities, the evidence suggests that concentration and 
other indicators of monopoly power tend to reduce the rate of innovation (Rey, 1998). 
While many empirical studies have demonstrated that large firms tend to have higher rates 
of R&D, Blundell et al. (1993) showed that while firms with higher market share tend to 
innovate more, firms in competitive industries tend to have a higher probability of 
innovation. In particular, as large market shares generate an increase in the level of 
industry concentration, they may lead to a reduction in the aggregate level of R&D 
expenditures. Since successful innovation likely to lead to a larger market share, another 
source of difficulty in empirical studies lies in feedback effect between monopoly power 
and innovation. Blundell et al. (1995) addressed this problem by using an explicit dynamic 
count data model. Their results showed that concentration has a negative impact on the 
probability of innovation. Controlling for firm-specific effects reduces the impact of 
market share, although it remains significant and positive. However, there are offsetting 
effects at the industry level, due to the feedback effect. The overall conclusion is that more 
competitive industries (that is, less concentrated ones) generate a higher number of 
innovations. 
Several theoretical attempts have been made to reconcile the Schumpeterian paradigm 
with the empirical studies on the relation between competition and innovation.27 Some 
recent studies have given further explanations for the positive impact of competition on 
innovation and, consequently, on economic development.28 Based on the assumption that 
firms behave in the same way as profit maximisers irrespective of the level of competition, 
it is argued that monopoly conditions generate more innovation. A monopolist in economic 
theory is the sole producer of a good or service for which there are no close substitutes. It 
is argued that monopolistic firms can more easily fund R&D activities because they have 
more cash flows and face less market uncertainty. This argument relies on credit market 
imperfections and has not yet been formally analysed (Rey, 1998). Moreover, monopolistic 
firms have more incentives to undertake R&D activities since the prospect of monopolistic 
rents is more attractive than that of competitive ones. But this argument is counteracted by 
the replacement effect: a new competitor considers the entire profits from an innovation, 
whereas an incumbent is interested only in the additional profits; additional profits are 
much lower in the case of a new product that replaces a product already manufactured by 
the incumbent firm. Willig (1987) also emphasised the dual impact of competitive 
pressures on firms’ residual demands: monopolists benefit more from a cost reduction 
since they have a bigger share of the market; however, demand elasticities tend to be 
higher under competition, thereby increasing the benefits of the same cost reduction.  
Both theoretical industrial organisation and the endogenous growth literature deal with 
the relationship between competition and development. A number of models of 
endogenous growth (see Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Segerstrom et al., 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991) predict a negative relation between competition and growth. Recent 
empirical work by Nickell (1996), Blundell et al. (1996) and Aghion et al. (2001) 
                                                        
26 See Aghion et al. (2002). 
27 See Aghion and Howitt (1998) for an overview. 
28 See Rey (1998).  
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suggested that more competition leads to faster growth by enhancing the speed of 
technological progress. The literature on R&D races yields ambiguous results about the 
impact of competition on innovation and economic development.29 In case that the 
prospect of monopoly rents is what drives firms’ investment in R&D, market competition 
can be detrimental to growth; similarly, the risk of imitation discourages innovation and 
growth – hence the importance of intellectual property rights (Grossman and Helpman, 
1991). The conclusion depends crucially on assumptions about the precise timing of the 
R&D race game. In particular, when two firms are at a given point with the same level of 
technology, they become eager to get out of the consequential price war and thus invest 
even more in R&D. Then a more competitive framework can lead firms to invest more in 
R&D and thus foster innovation and growth (Rey, 1998). 
In the context of an endogenous growth model, Aghion et al. (1995) compare the 
impact of competition on firms’ innovation behaviour under two alternative behavioural 
assumptions: profit maximisation and conservative behaviour. According to the authors, an 
increase in competition reduces the benefits from adopting an innovation and so reduces 
firms’ incentives to innovate. As a result, it adversely affects economic development – the 
endogenous growth rate decreases when competition increases. The alternative behavioural 
assumption that is explored is that firms maximise short-term profits but delay the 
introduction of new technologies as much as possible. This is rationalised by introducing 
private costs associated with the introduction of an innovation. Therefore firms adopt 
innovations ‘at the last moment’. An increase in competition then implies that this last 
moment arrives sooner. Thus as competition increases, firms are forced to innovate more 
rapidly and economic development is also faster.  
Aghion et al. (1999) introduced the ‘competition as an incentive mechanism’ argument 
(Hart, 1983) into the Shumperterian growth model. It was demonstrated that the relation 
between competition and innovation would be negative if most firms are value maximising 
and would be positive if they are governed by managers who mainly care about whether 
the firm can remain in business. An alternative approach (Aghion, 2001) extended the 
basic Schumpeter model by allowing incumbent firms to innovate. Firms innovate in order 
to reduce production costs. More competition may foster innovation and growth as it may 
increase the incremental profits from innovating and thereby encouraging R&D investment 
aiming at ‘escaping competition’. In this case, a laggard firm in an industry must first catch 
up with the technological leader before becoming itself a leader in the future. The new 
approach modelling the agency problem is of particular relevance for developing 
economies. But link between the reality of developing countries and the theoretical 
concept of agency problem is missing. This provides some research gaps for future studies. 
Further empirical research on developing countries is also called for (Rey, 1998). 
3.3.4 Developing Country Perspective 
Competition can have desirable effects on growth and development, but does this 
conclusion also apply to developing countries? Is the focus of competition policy on 
allocative efficiency and consumer welfare consistent with the goal of development? 
Laffont (1998) argued that because developing countries are so far from the ideal 
‘first-best world of economists’, it is not always the case that competition should be 
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encouraged in these countries. According to this ‘second best’ theory of welfare economics, 
in case that any one of the theoretical assumptions required cannot be met, restricted rather 
than free competition may be a superior choice. The unfettered competition may not be 
appropriate for a developing economy and too much competition can be as harmful as too 
little (Singh, 1999).  
In developing countries, market-supporting institutions are weak, corporate governance 
regimes are not well functioning, and information asymmetries and contract enforcement 
problems are usually significant. Competition can act as a substitute for some institutions 
in the areas where institutional arrangements were deterred. There is evidence that 
competition can substitute for an effective bankruptcy system because it exerts pressure on 
inefficient firms to go into liquidation. There is evidence that competition can substitute for 
strong shareholder control in firms in raising productivity growth. There is also evidence 
that competition can change the nature of labour market institutions.30 In the institutional 
environment in developing countries, agency problems are likely to be more severe. 
Depending on the degree of agency problems, the same increase in competition may have a 
different impact on R&D and economic development. Competition may have a particularly 
favourable impact on R&D, productivity and growth when firms face important agency 
costs, as it is likely to be the case in developing economies. In such a situation in 
developing countries, according to Rey (1998), the main impact of competition would be 
to induce firms to behave more closely to profit maximisation. Competition has many 
more merits: it acts as a disciplining device, creating incentives that ensure that resources 
are more productively deployed, costs are reduced and profits are increased. This new 
perspective of analysis not only highlighted the necessity of competition policy for 
developing countries but have also implications for the design of competition policy in 
developing countries. 
There are many potential restrictions to competition. In developing countries the main 
institutional obstacle to domestic competition may be government restrictions on market 
entry. Soft budget constraints and preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises are 
among other major restrictions on competition. Due in part to institutional obstacles to 
competition, even in the tradable sector, international competition may not lead to 
competitive domestic market. Excessive government regulation also facilitates corruption 
and lead to adverse distributional consequences by inducing workers and firms to escape 
into the informal market. Like in developed countries, private institutions can also cause 
restrictions to competition in developing countries. For example, the monopolisation of 
domestic distribution channels can mean that even when a good can be imported freely, 
there still may not be effective competition in the domestic market. In developing countries 
the transaction costs of collusion are lower because of the weakness of legislation and the 
inefficiency of monitoring system. Hence firms have lower implicit risk aversion and little 
to lose from colluding. Therefore, measures to prevent collusions and abuses of dominant 
positions are required. 
Although horizontal constraints remain the main feature that hampers competition in 
developing countries, vertical restraints may also require monitoring. According to Cook 
(2001), there are several reasons. First, there is limited inter-brand competition in 
low-income countries so that vertical agreements can easily lead to forms of monopolistic 
collusion. Secondly, given the scale of firms in low-income countries, the scope to 
establish their own distribution channels or create new investment is lacking. Thirdly, 
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governments in developing countries may actually support restrictions on distribution and, 
therefore, vertical arrangements are viewed as anticompetitive. In developing countries, 
vertical restraints within firms may impede competition but may also increase the level of 
competition. They may contribute to an increase in the supply of goods and services and 
improve product quality. It is necessary to establish the difference between agreements 
among competitors that are designed to restrict competition and vertical restraints that are 
designed to increase efficiency (Rodriguez and Williams, 1996). Caution must be exercised 
because not all agreements among competitors are inefficient (Graham and Richardson, 
1997).  
As to the importance of competition in developing countries, Singh (1999) suggested 
that there should be a concept of ‘optimal degree of competition’, based on the studies of 
experience of Japan and South Korea. To promote a long-term and sustained growth of 
productivity, there should be a related concept of ‘optimal combination of competition and 
cooperation’ between firms, and there also should be a recognition of the concept of 
‘simulated competition’, which involves contests among those seeking state support and 
which can be as powerful as real market competition. How can competition be introduced 
or reinforced in developing economies? A simple emulation of the competition policies of 
developed countries is inappropriate. One of the key elements in the promotion of 
competition in developing countries is to remove government restrictions on market entry. 
A major discrepancy between competition issues in developing and developed countries 
relates to the source of anticompetitive restrictions. In developing countries, dominant 
firms often result from the direct action of governments’ industrial policy (Khemani and 
Dutz, 1995). As a result, dominant firms in developing countries may be inefficient, with 
the protection of market entry barriers. It is extremely harmful to the competition process 
that regulations are introduced to protect domestic firms, usually state-owned, from 
efficient entrants. Competition can be effectively injected into the economy by forcing 
firms to participate in competitive markets. This may mean relaxing government regulation, 
opening up domestic markets and forcing domestic firms into markets. Participation in 
international export markets may constitute an effective transmission mechanism for 
injecting competition in domestic markets and forcing domestic firm participate in market 
competition. According to the World Bank (2002), in developing countries, the policy 
priority should be to ensure both free market entry and exposure to international 
competition. However, in some specific industries in the particular context of emerging 
markets and transition economies, it is inappropriate to fully open domestic markets to new 
entrants and imports. Much more sophistication is needed with regard both to the 
institutional contextual characteristics and to technological industrial traits. Singh (1999)’s 
concept of ‘optimal degree of competition’ may provide a case for a more careful treatment 
to the relationship between competition and development. 
Competition can also be promoted or protected by introducing or reinforcing 
competition policy and its implementation. In the short run, a well-implemented 
competition policy may protect and promote competition, accordingly ensure that 
allocative efficiency is achieved and consumer welfare is maximised. In the long run, in 
combination with other policy instruments, competition policy may help to stimulate 
technological progress and promote economic growth. However it is difficult to assess the 
competition effects in a developing country where market imperfections are manifold. Too 
much competition may sometimes be as harmful as too little. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, the institutional contexts and technological traits of various industries are quite 
different in developing countries. Therefore, no uniform answer is applicable to different 
questions – the effects of international trade, inward FDI and government intervention 
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should all be considered when specific decisions on competition issues are being made. 
3.4 The Necessity of Competition Policy for Developing Countries 
For policy reform and institutional change, rationale not necessarily means necessity. What 
theoretical analysis provides is rationale, while the necessity lies not only in the rationale 
but also in real needs. Is there a real need for competition policy from developing countries? 
If there is an effective de facto competition maintenance mechanism, are there needs to 
replace or supplement it with a competition policy? For developing countries with different 
development level, at different developing phase, and facing different developing problems, 
there is no unique answer to these questions. The necessity of competition policy lies in 
some factors. To simplify the basic problem of necessity by focusing on only one factor is 
sometimes misleading. In this section, several practical issues associated with the necessity 
of competition policy are discussed. 
3.4.1 Privatisation and Competition Policy 
For almost two decades, a large number of developing countries and transition economies 
have been engaged in unprecedented efforts to alter their economic regimes. By the late 
1990s, most developing countries had attempted policy reforms, with varying degree of 
commitment and thoroughness. Trade liberalisation and privatisation have been the central 
components of economic reforms. It is recognised that trade liberalisation will not ensure 
competition in non-traded sectors and privatisation alone will not necessarily achieve 
greater competition (Cook, 2001). Privatisation was undertaken for a number of reasons 
including promoting competition, improving economic efficiency, reducing the drain on 
government resources caused by public sector losses, raising revenues for the government 
and to help pay off the foreign debt by raising foreign exchange through the sale of public 
assets to foreign multinationals. In most developing countries, privatisations were strongly 
encouraged if not required under the structural adjustment program of the international 
financial institutions (see Subsection 1.5.1). Privatisation was often undertaken on the 
basis of its supposed revenue raising contribution to government that faced large domestic 
and international debts rather than solely on the purpose of promote efficiency and 
competition (Yarrow 1999). It is generally acknowledged that, rather than efficiency 
reasons, the main motive for privatisation in many countries was to achieve a relaxation of 
the harsh budget constraints which the international financial institutions enforced.  
In the privatisation process of developing countries, the importance of competition has 
been recognised. The development of the private sector is viewed as a critical ingredient in 
poverty reduction strategies in low-income countries by international organisations (Cook, 
2001). However, it remains debatable whether it is competition or an ownership transfer 
from public to private that matters most for improvements in economic efficiency (see 
Section 2.1). Much of the success of privatisation is premised on the existence of 
competition (World Bank, 1995; Cook, 1997; Shirley and Walsh, 2000). The economic 
result of privatisation is largely associated with the types of markets that are provided for 
and market conditions faced by privatised firms. When public monopolies are substituted 
with private ones, economies could be worse off. Privatisation without competition, as in 
the case of monopoly utilities, implies that regulation is required as a substitute for 
competition. Foreign acquisitions can be seen as a form of privatisation. This, in fact, is an 
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international consideration related to inward FDI, which we will discuss in Subsection 
3.4.4 and in the next chapter. 
In privatisation, the need to maximise revenue from the sale of state-owned firms might 
conflict with the objective of increasing competition, particularly in case that regulation is 
weak or absent. In the overall context of widespread privatisation, the need for competition 
policy became crucial. The economic liberalisation in developing countries has not 
necessarily reduced the market dominance of pre-existing large dominant firms. In some 
cases it may has been increased as a direct aftermath of privatisation, particularly in the 
utility and infrastructure sectors. Many privatised companies were natural monopolies 
under state ownership. Privatisation of them does not necessarily lead to promotion of 
social welfare since it simply replaces the public monopoly with a private one. The former 
may be preferable to the latter from a social welfare perspective, as there may be some 
consideration given to the public interests in the former’s activities. In the new privatised 
domestic economic environment, competition and regulatory policies become extremely 
essential. The presence of a large state sector transferred to private control is probably an 
important reason why many developing countries have not until then felt it necessary to 
have a competition policy (Singh, 1999). The timing and extent of privatisation measures 
has varied between countries. Leaving aside transition economies, most developing 
countries with privatisation proceeds worth over US$1 billion between 1990 and 1997 had 
competition policies (see Table 3-4).  
Table 3-4 Privatisation and competition legislation in selected developing countries 
Country Privatisation proceeds (US$ billion) Year of competition legislation 
Argentina 27.9 1923 
Brazil 34.3 1962 
Colombia 5.0 1959 
India 7.1 1969 
Indonesia 5.2 / 
Malaysia 10.0 / 
South Africa 2.5 1955 
Mexico 30.5 1992 
Pakistan 2.0 1970 
Peru 7.5 1991 
Singapore 1.9 / 
Turkey 3.6 1994 
Thailand 3.6 1979 
Venezuela 5.9 1973 
Source: World Bank (2000) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (1997a). 
3.4.2 Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and competition policy are closely related.31 For 
developing countries, the introduction of new institutions covering IPRs needs 
considerations of competition policies. IPRs provide exclusive rights within a designated 
market that result from some forms of intellectual inventions and meeting specific 
requirements. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets or sui generis forms of 
protection may protect these rights. IPRs are designed to promote innovations and thus to 
                                                        
31 See Gallini and Trebilcock (1998) and Maskus and Lahouel (2000) for detailed discussions. 
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promote economic advancement. This takes place by giving the innovators exclusive legal 
right to the economic exploitation of their innovation for a specific period of time. IPRs 
designate boundaries within which innovators may exploit their intellectual properties 
economically. The reaping of related profits serves both to reward the innovator for his 
investment and to induce others to innovate in the future.  
IPRs create market dominance by restricting static competition, in the short run, in 
order to promote dynamic competition in the long run. Competition policy is aiming at 
promoting short-run allocative efficiency, which tends to drive prices toward marginal 
costs. This may appear to be in conflict with the exclusionary rights embodied in IPRs. 
This conflict can be reconciled if consumer welfare is viewed in the long run, that is, 
long-run consumer welfare depends on the dynamic efficiency of the economy. It is 
important to recognise that rights in intellectual property are not different from those in 
tangible assets in that they both permit the exclusion of others from the use of the assets. 
Property right is the institutional cornerstone of a market economy. Thus, IPRs, if properly 
used, are complementary rather than in conflict with the goals of competition policy. IPRs 
and competition policies share the same concern to promote technological progress to the 
ultimate benefit of consumers. Competition agencies should not only accept the legitimacy 
of IPR despite possible short-run restrictions on competition, but also recognise the unique 
features of IPR, which call for a customised approach to cases involving IPRs (OECD, 
1998a). 
Despite sharing important goals, however, IPRs and competition policies are not purely 
complementary and managing the interface between them can be difficult (OECD, 1998a). 
In competitive markets the awarding of IPRs rarely results in significant market dominance. 
However, in other circumstances a portfolio of patents and trademarks may generate 
considerable market dominance through patent-pooling agreements among horizontal 
competitors (Lahouel and Maskus, 1999). The intellectual property licensing agreements 
generally benefit competition, but they may be anticompetitive where they serve to 
cartelise an industry or to increase the market dominance of a single firm. Competition 
authorities must determine whether a particular agreement is likely to be pro- or 
anti-competitive. The problem is that restrictive clauses in a particular agreement may be 
either pro- or anti-competitive, depending on the circumstance. The manner in which 
competition policy is applied to these agreements can have an important influence on 
innovation. Competition authorities should be prudent so that competition policy 
enforcement does not hamper the creation and diffusion of innovations. Competition 
policy emphasises static market access and IPRs emphasise incentives for dynamic 
competition, this leads to tension between competition policy and IPRs. If structured 
properly, however, the two regulatory systems complement each other in striking an 
appropriate balance between needs for innovation, technology transfer and information 
dissemination (Lahouel and Maskus, 1999). Further detailed analysis of interface between 
competition policies and IPRs and cooperation between competition authorities and patent 
offices will be conducted in Part III. In developing countries that do not have a strong 
tradition of competition and innovation, strengthening IPRs could possibly raise market 
dominance and invite anticompetitive practices. Thus, competition authorities might be 
additionally needed to control the unwarranted abuse of market dominance, which may be 
extensive exploitation of an intellectual asset beyond the boundaries defined by IPRs.  
With regard to competition policy, IPRs are not only a national issue for developing 
countries. In an international context, an important reason for developing countries to 
consider implementation of competition policies is that the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) envisions a clear linkage between strengthening 
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protection of IPRs and the need for the control of anticompetitive practices. The Uruguay 
Round TRIPs Agreement obliged all WTO members to enforce IPRs, though with 
transition periods for developing countries. The TRIPs Agreement urged countries to adopt 
minimum standards of protection for IPRs that are considerably stronger than those in 
many developing economies. The standards include the provision of pharmaceutical 
product patents, the reversal of burden of proof in process patent cases, limitations on the 
issuance of compulsory licenses, the designation of a protection system for plant varieties, 
the recognition of copyrights for computer programs, the protection of well-known 
trademarks, the security of trade secrets, and a comprehensive system of enforcement 
(Maskus, 2000; Primo Braga, 1996; UNCTAD, 1996b; and Watal, 2000).  
Whether developing countries will gain from stronger protection of IPRs is debatable 
(Hoekman and Holmes, 1999). Those in favour argued that dynamic benefits resulting 
from greater incentives for innovation, both at home and abroad, and for owners of 
knowledge to license technologies will offset any static losses. The short-run impact of the 
TRIPs regime, however, is likely to cause a transfer of income from poor to rich countries, 
with at best marginal impacts on economic efficiency (Primo Braga, 1996). As Hoekman 
and Holmes (1999) suggested, the economics of this issue are complex. Many experts 
believe that as long as a producer faces competition from other brands exclusive 
arrangements do not matter. But in many developing countries the major brands may be in 
the hands of one firm or a de facto cartel. In the absence of competition policy, national 
exhaustion and legally enforceable exclusive distributor arrangements can have a major 
detrimental impact on welfare. Even if there is vigorous inter-brand competition, whether 
to adopt international exhaustion should be a matter for national authorities to decide 
independently. The TRIPs Agreement explicitly authorised the use of competition policy 
measures against abuses of IPRs. Competition policy is an institutional instrument for 
developing countries to protect their interests when intellectual property right holders will 
frequently use their IPRs to segment markets. This would imply that domestic buyers 
could purchase patented and branded products with the most favourable prices. This is 
fully compatible with the TRIPs Agreement: Article 40 allows measures to control abuses 
of IPRs through the application of competition policy (Cottier and Meitinger, 1998).  
3.4.3 International Trade and Competition Policy: Is Competition Law Necessary 
Given Trade Liberalisation? 
It is natural for a developing country to ask: is competition policy necessary given trade 
liberalisation? This consideration relates to an important theoretical problem: what’s the 
relation between international trade and competition policy. At the theoretical level, two 
main concerns are important. First, what is the relation between trade and competition 
policy; does a liberal international trade largely substitute for a competition policy? 
Secondly, what is the relation between trade policy and competition policy; does a strict 
competition policy aimed at preventing abuses of market dominance conflict with for 
instance a strategic trade policy aimed at shifting rents in favour of domestic firms? 
One of the key sources of benefits from international trade is that international 
competition constrains the ability of domestic producers to engage in anticompetitive 
practices, which would otherwise reduce welfare. This idea, known in the industrial 
organisation literature as the ‘imports-as-competitive-discipline’ hypothesis is not only a 
theoretical argument, but also supported by strong empirical evidence (see Cadot et al., 
2000). Most empirical tests of this hypothesis were based on regressing a measure of 
profitability, such as price-cost margins, on import penetration and a number of other 
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factors potentially contributing to industry profitability (see e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1996). 
The conclusion of these empirical studies, mostly carried out at the industry level, is that 
increased imports tend to be negatively correlated with the profitability of domestic sellers 
(e.g. Jacquemin and Sapir, 1991; Roberts and Tybout, 1996), particularly when domestic 
concentration is high (Schmalensee, 1989). The empirical study on the links between 
import penetration and profitability is the beginning point of any attempt at quantitative 
assessment of the links between trade and competition policies. If we take increased 
imports as a proxy for liberal trade policies, this result suggests that liberal trade policies 
and tight competition policies are, in a loosely defined sense, substitutes (Cadot et al., 
2000).  
Nevertheless, trade liberalisation may not be sufficient to generate competitive 
discipline and benefits from trade liberalisation may be dampened in the presence of 
anticompetitive forces. External liberalisation cannot substitute for a competition policy in 
case that liberalised foreign trade become subject to domestic monopolistic restrictions. 
Higher markups have been observed following trade liberalisation in sectors with high 
market concentration, low elasticity of demand, and companies abusing their dominant 
positions (WTO, 1998a, 2000a). For small but extremely open economies like Hong Kong 
and Singapore, it has been consequently argued that competition discipline was better 
enforced by trade liberalisation and that competition policy was of far lesser importance to 
them. This view, however, ignores the aspects of competition we discussed above. In 
addition, these economies can be the ‘victims’ of foreign anticompetitive practices that 
originate outside their jurisdiction but which harm competition in their market, such as in 
the case of international cartels or some M&As (WTO, 2000b). 
Several reasons can explain why trade liberalisation may not be sufficient to generate 
competitive discipline.32 First, imports have no direct competitive effects on non-tradable 
sectors. The larger the relative size of the non-tradable sectors in the economy, the less 
significant the ‘imports-as-competitive-discipline’ effect in the country, which depends 
more on government regulation.33 Secondly, domestic firms may avoid international 
competition pressures by adopting strategies based on product differentiation and other 
dimensions of non-price competition. Thirdly, domestic firms may indulge in 
anticompetitive practices, sometimes with the support of domestic authorities.  
The inherent interrelation between trade and competition policies highlights the 
necessity of a competition policy. Important resistance on the proclaimed ‘globalisation’ 
process is clearly anticompetitive. Exclusionary restraints on trade and investment by firms 
or governments hamper the ability of firms to gain access to or to compete in foreign 
markets. Trade and competition policies can be considered as two approaches to tackling 
such problems. Trade policy is focused on the actions of governments, while competition 
policy is principally focused on the behaviour of firms. In this respect, trade and 
competition policies are designed to look at restraints that stem from different sources. As 
suggested by the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) (2000), 
aspects of these policies’ tools can be mutually supportive, but overlapping policy concerns 
can lead to different conclusions regarding the effects of a particular restriction. For 
instance, examination of a vertical distribution practice under US antitrust law might find 
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33 Hoekman et al. (2001) supported this by showing that, both from a theoretical and empirical perspective, 
complex entry regulations are more likely to have larger negative effects on competition in large countries, 
whereas imports restrictions harm more competition in small countries. 
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that a restriction is efficiency-enhancing and beneficial to consumers, while the same 
restriction might be regarded from a trade policy perspective as exclusionary and adversely 
affecting access to markets. Neither trade nor competition policy tools provide complete 
solutions to the problems that emanate from the mix of government and private 
restrictions.  
The relationship between competition and trade policies is complex because they 
regularly have contrary objectives. As Levinsohn (1996) noted, whereas competition 
policy aims to curb the market dominance of domestic producers, strategic trade policy 
attempts to encourage its emergence in order to shift rents away from foreigners. In the 
presence of the pressure from import-competing interests, reduced trade barriers may lead 
governments to search for alternative instruments of protection. Grounded in the 
observation that the reductions in tariff barriers negotiated in multilateral rounds of trade 
liberalisation have led to the spread of less transparent non-tariff impediments and to 
growing use of contingent protection, one might expect a selective relaxation of 
competition rules to be used strategically to provide favourable treatment to domestic 
producers (Fox and Ordover, 1997). Richardson’s study (1996) suggested that the number 
of firms is higher in the constrained (free trade) equilibrium than in the unconstrained 
(tariff-ridden) one, which is contrary to the fears expressed earlier. Horn and Levinsohn’s 
study (1998) reached a similar conclusion that trade liberalisation would lead to a 
tightening of domestic competition policy by a welfare maximising government. Starting 
from a position where the export subsidy is set at its optimal level, they demonstrated that 
a small reduction in this subsidy, taken as a proxy for trade liberalisation, induces a 
tightening of domestic competition policy. The political economic approach to trade and 
competition policies recognises that such policies are subject to lobbying pressures from 
both domestic and foreign entities. This approach to the determination of trade policy, 
sometimes referred to as the influence-driven approach was introduced by Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), based on developments in the principal-agent theory of Bernheim and 
Whinston (1986).  
The relationship between competition policy and the multilateral trading system has 
been subject to much debate in academic literature and international organisations. In 2001, 
the future of a multilateral framework for competition within the WTO was discussed 
during the Doha Ministerial Conference. All member governments signing the Doha 
declaration recognised for the very first time that there is a valid case for the WTO to 
negotiate and conclude a Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Competition (see 
Subsection 8.2.3 for a detailed discussion). The negotiation of a multilateral agreement on 
competition in the WTO may underpin the impressive progress that has been made in trade 
liberalisation over the past few decades. Before the Doha Ministerial Conference, even the 
principle of having such an agreement within the WTO was controversial. On the one hand, 
there is wide acknowledgement that competition policy and trade liberalisation share 
common objectives of the promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare, and 
the lack of effective competition policies can harm gains from trade liberalisation (WTO, 
1997; UNCTAD, 1997a; OECD, 2001). On the other hand, there have also been arguments 
against an expanded involvement of the WTO in the area of competition policy.34 
The relationship between competition policy and the multilateral trading system is not a 
concern exclusive for developed countries. Although the debate on this issue was 
originally stimulated by developed countries’ perceptions that anticompetitive practices 
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impede foreign market entry, it has been recognised that anticompetitive behaviour also 
impacts directly on the welfare and development of developing countries (UNCTAD, 
1997a; Jenny, 2001; Hoekman and Holmes, 1999; and Levenstein and Suslow, 2001). It 
has been argued that international agreements can play a vital role in enabling developing 
countries to implement effective competition policy, by promoting cooperation in 
institution building and by providing a tool for overcoming domestic constituencies (Jenny, 
2001; Garcia-Bercero and Amarasinha, 2001; and Birdsall and Lawrence, 1999).35 
Within the WTO regime, in addition to the issue of the TRIPs Agreement, another 
consideration that highlights the necessity of competition policy with concerns to 
developing countries is the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). 
TRIMs refer to restrictions attached by host countries to the activities of MNCs. It is 
acknowledged that TRIMs distort trade flows and are therefore inconsistent with the 
principles of the WTO. The removal of a TRIM can affect trade flows and such removal is 
the intention of the TRIMs Agreement in the Uruguay Round Agreement. The TRIMs 
Agreement imposed new prohibitions on the use of TRIMs, with transition periods for 
developing countries. The abolition of TRIMs reduces host government’s bargaining 
power and accordingly reduces the potential gains from FDI for the host economy 
(Morrissey, 2000). The principal problem facing developing countries is that their legal 
systems, in particular their capability to implement competition policy and regulate MNCs 
without TRIMs, are limited. Measures to strengthen their capability to implement effective 
domestic competition policy are essential (Lloyd, 1998; Morrissey and Rai, 1995). For 
developing countries without competition policy, establishment and effective 
implementation of such a policy is crucial.  
3.4.4 FDI and Competition Policy: The Interface 
The ‘imports-as-competitive-discipline’ hypothesis suggests that liberal trade policies and 
tight competition policies are somewhat substitutes. However, the relationship between the 
liberalisation of FDI regimes and the necessity of competition policy is prominent. On the 
one hand, FDI liberalisation is a means of promoting competition among firms; on the 
other hand, in order to benefit adequately from FDI liberalisation, countries need to ensure 
that, as barriers to entry are removed, they are not replaced by anticompetitive practices of 
firms, not only domestic, but also foreign. According to UNCTAD (1997a), there is a 
direct, necessary and enlarging relationship between the liberalisation of FDI and the 
importance of competition policy.  
Theoretically, the interface between inward FDI and competition policy is based upon 
the concept of market power. In the first half of the 20th century, some mainstream 
economic theories have sought to explain particular aspects of FDI and foreign production. 
The second half of the century witnessed the introduction of more integrated theories of 
FDI. The most influential theory – the eclectic (Ownership-Location-Internationalisation, 
O-L-I) paradigm – sought to integrate streams of thinking emerged. This paradigm dates 
back to the 1960s. The eclectic paradigm formulated by Dunning proclaims that firms 
invest abroad because of the existence of the ownership, location and internationalisation 
advantages. According to this paradigm, the scope and pattern of international production 
is determined by, first, the interaction between the competitive advantages of investing 
                                                        
35 See Anderson and Holmes (2002) for a detailed discussion. 
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firms and those of the host countries, and secondly, the ways in which these firms organise 
their resources and capabilities across national boundaries regarding these two sets of 
advantages. In the 1990s, more attention was given by trade economists to incorporating 
relevant variables into their models of international transactions, while there was a renewal 
of interest in FDI as a financial phenomenon and also in its relationship with foreign 
portfolio investment. In the early stage of understanding of FDI, one possible explanation 
of FDI is that it is simply another form of international flow of financial capital based on 
differences in returns and risks between countries. This financial theory of direct 
investment is not adequate. It does not explain why this international investment would be 
large enough to establish managerial control over the foreign companies. Another possible 
explanation of FDI is that it is merely the outcome of perfect competition in which some 
firms almost accidentally happen to operate in more than one country. This approach is 
also not generally adequate. FDI is usually not easy or accidental, because establishing and 
managing successful operations in a foreign country are difficult. Local firms have 
inherent advantages in operating in their own environment. A foreign firm is at a 
disadvantage because it does not initially have the native understanding of local laws, 
customs, procedures, practices and relationships. In addition, the foreign firm has the extra 
costs of maintaining management control and it is expensive to operate at a distance, 
expensive in travel, and communication. 
Then what makes it possible for a foreign firm to overcome the inherent disadvantages 
of being foreign? To be successful, the firm entering from abroad must have some 
firm-specific advantages not held by its local competitors in the host country. The 
firm-specific advantages sometimes lie in technology or patents. It may inhere in special 
access to a very large amount of capital, an amount far larger than the local firm can 
command. Or the firm may have marketing advantage or superior managerial know-how. 
The key role played by firm-specific advantages has led scholars to move away from the 
models of perfect competition towards the perspectives associating FDI with one or 
another kind of market power. Two variants, with differing policy implications, emerged: 
the Hymer view and the appropriability theory.  
Hymer (1960) saw the role of firm-specific advantages as a way of combining the study 
of FDI with the classic model of imperfect competition in product markets. To Hymer, a 
‘direct foreign investor’ is a monopolist or an oligopolist in product markets, which invests 
in foreign enterprises to restrain competition and protect its market power. According to 
Hymer, to be able to invest in production in foreign markets, a firm must posses some 
assets in the form of the knowledge of a public-goods character. The proprietary assets 
give foreign firms a competitive edge over domestic firms and allow them to overcome the 
transaction costs of operating across national boundaries. Hymer saw those assets as the 
source of a monopolistic advantage at home and abroad. This standard theory of FDI 
claims that ‘for direct investment to thrive there must be some imperfection in market for 
goods or factors, including among the latter technology, or some interference in 
competition by government or by firms, which separates markets’ (Kindleberger, 1969). 
Hymer argued that FDI was a form of corporate behaviour associated with imperfections 
in home country market, particularly high entry barriers. This argumentation provided the 
foundation of the theory of FDI and Multinational Corporation (MNC).  
The appropriability theory (cf. Magee, 1977) claimed that the key firm-specific 
advantages that seem to make FDI take place do not imply such major threats to market 
competition. The firm must undertake costly investment to develop new technologies and 
superior management. The firm’s challenge then is to earn an adequate return on this 
investment and to continue to invest to enhance its firm-specific advantages. The return 
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that it can earn is limited by competition from other firms, which are also attempting to 
build and exploit their own firm-specific advantages. Firm-specific advantages make the 
firm engage in FDI abroad for the same reason that make it built its own facilities, instead 
of buying from others, at home. In order to appropriate the potential gains from its 
advantage, the firm often finds that it is necessary to keep control and ownership to itself. 
The economics of whether to engage in FDI is an international extension of the decision 
about the boundaries of the firm.  
If FDI really protects market power, as Hymer implied, then a fortiori host countries 
should be ready to impose restrictions on it. However, the appropriability theory has 
different policy implications from the Hymer view. Its emphasis on the productive nature 
of most firm-specific advantages motivating FDI favours host-country policies that either 
leave FDI alone or positively encourage it with favourable government treatment. Whether 
FDI should be left alone or actually favoured depends on how well the firm is able to 
appropriate the benefits of its own productive investment. If it can do so, the government 
can presumably leave it alone. If it cannot and there are ‘external benefits’ of its 
productivity that would spillover to competitors and other firms, the government should 
positively subsidise inward FDI. 
Practically, the interfaces between FDI and competition policy lie in four areas: 1) 
at-entry inward merger review, 2) outward merger review, 3) post-entry competition issues, 
and 4) dominant positions with international scope (UNCTAD, 1997a). For a developing 
country, as inward FDI plays an increasingly important role in the economy, it becomes 
vital to ensure the efficient functioning of markets. The efficient functioning of the market 
depends on the contestability36 of the markets and the nature of market competition. FDI 
can increase the contestability of domestic market at entry, or in the short run, but could 
also increase market concentration and lead to dominant positions and anticompetitive 
practices of MNCs after entry, or in the long run (see Section 4.2.2 for a detailed 
discussion). The adoption and efficient enforcement of competition policy may strengthen 
the way in which FDI liberalisation can enhance economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare and, therefore, promote the economic development of developing countries. One 
of the recommendations of the UNCTAD (1997a) was that member countries adopt, 
improve and efficiently enforce laws for the control of restrictive business practices. 
Competition policy applies to all firms operating in the national territory and supplying a 
particular market through various modes of entry, such as imports, foreign affiliates or 
non-equity forms of FDI. It does not, in principle, discriminate between domestic and 
foreign firms or between foreign firms from different origins. Competition authority 
monitors the behaviour of MNCs, with an aim of ensuring that these firms (like other firms) 
do not abuse their market dominance nor engage in anticompetitive practices.  
Inward FDI interacts with competition policy when a foreign affiliate is established by 
the means of International Joint Ventures (IJVs) or M&As. Sometimes, IJVs may involve a 
market-allocation investment cartel to restrict competition. This is especially the case when 
a large firm acquires or mergers with another. Such transactions need to be examined by 
competition authorities, particularly when they occur between competing firms. They may 
also be subjected to anti-monopoly provisions if they are viewed as a means of achieving 
or promoting a dominant position. In fact, the primal reason why competition policy has 
been considered imperative is the gigantic merger wave, which was a defining feature of 
                                                        
36 Baumol et al. (1982a) coined the term contestable to describe markets in which entry is so easy that the 
potential competition along suffices to eliminate excess profits. See Subsection 4.2.3 for details. 
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the world economy in the 1990s. A significant characteristic of the merger wave in the 
1990s is the large incidence of cross-border M&As (see Subsection 2.3.1), most of which 
took place among developed countries. During the 1990s, a considerable proportion of FDI 
inflows in developing countries took the form of M&As rather than greenfield investment. 
UNCTAD (1999) suggested that if China (the largest FDI recipient in developing countries, 
but most of its investment has been greenfield) excluded, the share of M&As in the 
accumulated FDI rose from 22 percent during 1988 to 1991 to an average of 72 percent in 
the 1992-1997 period.37 Cross-border M&A is becoming a common mode of foreign 
market entry in Latin America and Africa and, more recently, in Asian countries after the 
financial crisis (UNCTAD, 1999). The growing cross-border M&As brought about the 
concerns on the effects of M&As on competition and market structure. According to Lall 
(2000), in the absence of an effective competition policy, a liberal stance on M&As may 
lead to undue concentration or the suppression of competition in domestic market (see 
Section 4.2 for a detailed discussion). The benefits of M&As depend not only on the stance 
of foreign investors, but also on the policy environment of the host country and the 
conditions under which enterprises are acquired. To maximising the benefits and 
minimising the costs, a well-structured policy framework is necessary, in which 
competition policy seems to be crucial.  
3.4.5 Evaluating the Necessity of Competition Policy for Developing Countries 
For developing countries without a formal competition policy, the first thing that should be 
done is to evaluate the institutional ability to implement competition policy. A distinction 
should be made within developing countries between, on the one hand, countries at low 
levels of development and with low institutional capabilities and, on the other, 
semi-industrialised countries with greater institutional capabilities. Laffont (1998) argued 
that even if competition policy of the kind followed by developed countries were 
appropriate for the least developed countries in Africa, there is a long way for them to have 
the institutional capability to implement such policies. The introduction of competition 
policy requires new institutions and effective implementation of competition policy needs 
sound institutional capability. Only a strong state can implement competition policy 
(Laffont, 1998). Low-income countries lack financial resources and the human knowledge 
that make the effective implementation of competition policy possible. Although 
competition policy is proliferated in developing countries, the degree of success of 
enforcing competition law in the majority of developing countries was relatively low 
(Ghoneim, 2002). The situation is changing, particularly among the higher income 
developing countries that have recently strengthened their approach to competition policy 
(OECD, 1999). But many countries continue with weak system and processes for 
monitoring competition. The overall existing institutional environment prevented those 
countries from enjoying the benefits of such law (Steward, 2001). As Laffont advocated, 
competition is not the automatic outcome of deregulation, the existence of competition 
laws will not ensure the creation of proper institutions for effective competition.  
For developing countries where institutional enforcement capability is limited, it seems 
appropriate to make conditions favourable for procompetitive behaviour, by starting free 
trade and avoiding the creation of monopolies through regulation or protection (Hoekman 
                                                        
37 See Singh (1999) and Lall (2000). 
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and Holmes, 1999). For developing countries with a very small economy size and very low 
development level, institutional capability is apparently an obstacle for effective 
competition policy enforcement. The implementation capability itself limits the necessity 
of competition legislation. For these countries, it is important to adopt the broader meaning 
of competition policy, referring to a set of measures and instruments used by governments 
that determine the overall conditions of competition that are likely to be met in specific 
markets. The broader set of instruments includes privatisation, deregulation, trade 
liberalisation and FDI policy. But it is not sure what the optimal mixture of instruments is 
for particular countries. In developing countries with limited capability and supporting 
institutions, the priority for policymakers should be to facilitate market entry. Under 
certain circumstances, international trade can clearly promote competition in markets. 
Openness to international trade also helps exert pressure on governments to reform 
domestic market institutions that undermine the ability of firms to respond to competitive 
pressures from abroad. But the effect of this source of competition is mostly limited to 
tradable goods.  
In many low-income developing countries, a competition policy that aims at promoting 
competition rather than controlling prices and market entry is relatively new. In developing 
countries, particularly transition economics, the past elaborate systems of price and entry 
controls were established around state-owned firms. State monopolies in some cases had 
been set up through nationalisation. State monopolies were often accompanied by import 
protection under import substitution policies. The ultimate effect of these policies may 
have been to suppress rather than promote competition. For these countries, free market 
entry and exposure to international competition can quickly introduce new forces of 
competition. Governments need to build more effective supporting institutions to address 
aspects of the international trade regime that can undermine competition. At the national 
level, this may include making further progress in liberalising services as well as 
manufacturing products, provided developed countries will at the same time grant 
sufficient access for developing countries’ exports. In case this does not take place, trade 
policy regimes will suffer from considerable inefficiencies. Consequently, domestic 
competition policy regimes have to be moderated as well to these international realities. At 
the international level, it includes reducing compliance and certification costs of 
trade-related product standards (such as food safety standards) and taking advantage of the 
flexibility allowed in the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
to allow developing countries to maximise benefits (World Bank, 2002). 
For developing countries with a relatively high economic development level and 
competent government machinery, the choice of introducing and implementing 
competition law and policy seems practical. For some of them, introducing competition 
policy is more urgent and important. The necessity of competition policy for developing 
countries is contingent upon particular issues. Some developing countries have a great 
interest in introducing competition policy in order to minimise the potential negative 
consequences of implementing some WTO agreements. The need may also arise from the 
increasing importance of inward FDI, as well as domestic issues such as privatisation. 
Tackling the effects of these developments requires establishing some forms of 
competition policy. All these issues are relevant to development and social welfare of 
developing countries in relation to the present and prospective discussions on competition 
policy. Among the issues associated with the necessity of competition policy, some 
international economic considerations are especially important, as developing countries are 
increasingly involved in the world economy. With the generally substitutional relation 
between trade and competition policy, FDI is the primal international issue that necessitate 
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competition legislation. For the countries that have emerged as major recipients of FDI 
flows in recent years, particularly China, the necessity of competition policy associated 
with the structural effects of inward FDI may be especially prominent. However, for one 
country, at specific time, one issue may be the most important concern as to the 
competition legislation, but to simplify the problem by focusing on only one factor is 
sometimes misleading.  
Independent decisions and actions are required to ensure the implementation of 
competition policies that could foster an appropriate trade and investment regime, ensure 
that markets are contestable, and promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare. An 
appropriate competition regime should also take into account the market imperfections 
created by the interventionist activities of the government, in the specific social, economic 
and institutional context of a developing country, and by the political actions of other 
countries, in the framework of multilateral institutional arrangements, both of which may 
be influenced by the actions of foreign and domestic firms. Therefore the design of 
national competition policy regime should take detailed domestic conditions, particularly 
at the industry level, into account. In addition, international cooperation may thus be a vital 
part of the design of a competition policy regime, not only because it might support the 
building of domestic market-supporting institutions by providing experience and 
precedents, but also because it could contribute to international harmonisation and/or 
coordination of competition, FDI and trade policy regimes. In the absence of a specialised 
worldwide competition organisation and in view of the complementary relationship 
between trade and competition policy, the WTO may be the institution best suited to house 
a possible international competition agreement. Another interesting route towards 
multilateral cooperation in competition policy area is the International Competition 
Network (ICN). The international competition policy cooperation and the position of 
developing countries in it will be discussed later in more detail in Chapter 8 when the 
design of an appropriate version of competition policy for China will be discussed. 
Developing countries require special treatment in the sense of being allowed to pursue 
competition policies that are appropriate to their stage of development. It is important for 
developing countries to have a competition policy that is designed to take appropriate 
account of their level of development and the long-term objective of economic growth. An 
appropriate worded competition law should be developed. The practical concerns of design 
and implementation of competition policy for developing countries in general and China in 
particular will also be also discussed in Chapter 8. 
 4 FDI, Competition and Industrial 
Development 
 
 
 
 
his chapter reviews the existing literature on the effects of inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) on industrial development. As noted in Section 2.3, industrial 
development can be understood as the progress in the scale, efficiency and competitiveness 
of industries. This chapter aims at establishing an analytical framework for mapping 
concrete effects of FDI on competition and industrial development. We first address the 
relationship between FDI and economic growth and then extend the analysis of the effects 
of FDI on economic development from macro- to micro-level. The impact of FDI on the 
structure of industries raises the first concern. Another issue arises in connection with the 
technological progress in industries and the innovation conducted by foreign and domestic 
firms. The problem with the traditional approaches is that they do not reveal in detail the 
nature of the dynamic process of industrial development. More importantly, the role and 
the nature of government policies and firm strategies remain largely overlooked. 
Competition is a crucial mechanism through which FDI influences the development of 
industries. It seems that the benefits of FDI on industrial development can hardly be 
achieved without a well-functioning competitive market. In the new context of FDI as 
discussed in Subsection 2.3.1, previous regulative instruments for developing countries 
may lose their effectiveness in regulating firms and ensuring the well functioning of 
market. Can this problem be tackled by a competition policy?  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 examines what is known from the 
literature on the growth impact of FDI in the context of an open economy and investigates 
the mechanisms of the FDI-led growth. Some specific microeconomic issues are 
particularly analysed to demonstrate how FDI can assist developing countries in achieving 
their development objectives. The potential costs of FDI and the possible market failures in 
FDI processes are also addressed in this section, with a discussion of their policy 
implications. The next sections examine the FDI effect on industrial development on the 
basis of both static and dynamic approaches. Section 4.2 reviews the studies on the effects 
of FDI on market structure. Section 4.3 then extends the traditional static approach by 
investigating the determinants of the market share achievements of Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) and by considering the dynamic interaction between firm strategies 
and institutional factors. Section 4.4 discusses the FDI impact on technological progress in 
industries and on Research and Development (R&D) behaviour of MNCs and domestic 
firms. In this section, FDI is integrated into the analytical framework of a sectoral system 
of innovation. A structural upgrading model of industries on the basis of technological 
progress of domestic firms is developed to depict the progress of international 
competitiveness of industries. 
T 
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4.1 FDI and Economic Development: From Macro to Micro Perspective 
Balance-of-payment accountants define FDI as any flow of lending to, or purchases of 
ownership in, foreign enterprises that are largely owned by residents (usually firms) of the 
investing country. The proportions of ownership that define ‘largely’ vary from country to 
country. For the United States 10 percent ownership by the investing firm suffices as an 
official definition of direct investment. FDI encompasses any investment, whether new 
ownership or simple lending, as long as the investing firm owns over 10 percent of the 
foreign firm being invested in.1 The distinction between direct and portfolio (non-direct) 
investment thus relates to the issue of control. For a host country, FDI is far more than its 
balance-of-payment definition. There is increasing agreement on the benefits that a country 
may seek to reap from inward FDI. The improvement in the investment environment since 
the mid-1980s was influenced by the recognition of the perceived benefits of FDI. Now 
most developing countries consider FDI as an important impetus for economic growth. But 
as developing countries embraced FDI as a potential source of economic growth, it has 
been recognised that different forms of FDI might have different impact. In particular the 
attitudes differ between greenfield investment, that produce an immediate impact on 
domestic value-added, and cross-border Merger and Acquisitions (M&As), that take the 
form of an ownership transfer of existing enterprises. Foreign M&As may be of ambiguous 
developmental value. For the host countries, in case that the foreign investor makes a 
long-term commitment to the acquired firm and invests in upgrading and restructuring its 
technology and management, the impact is very similar to a green-field investment. But if 
foreign M&As only lead to a change of ownership without adding to production capacity 
or productivity, they just add to the foreign exchange drain on the host economy (Lall, 
2000). Large capital inflows can become large outflows when the investments are 
liquidated, giving rise to exchange rate volatility and discouraging productive investment. 
Many countries are also concerned about the adverse impact on employment.  
4.1.1 FDI and Economic Growth: Beyond the Export-Led Growth Hypothesis 
In the development literature, primary attention has been given to the role of exports in 
economic growth. Most empirical studies in this area have treated exports as the principal 
channel through which economic openness can affect the output level and eventually the 
rate of economic growth, that is, the export-led growth hypothesis. Since the mid-1980s, 
there is increasing agreement on the macroeconomic benefits that a developing country 
may seek to reap from FDI. The potential channels through which inward FDI can 
influence macroeconomic performance can be generalised into four respects. First, as 
external direct investment from foreign countries, it boosts the total funds available for 
investment in the host economy and provides a less volatile source of funds than indirect 
investment, that is, loans and portfolio investment. Second, as external direct investment 
from foreign firms, it is not only a source of funds, but also a vehicle for the transfer of 
technology and managerial know-how. Third, FDI may contribute to economic 
                                                        
1 Balance-of-payment accountants also define foreign direct investment as any lending to, or purchases of stock 
in, firms controlled by parties in the investor’s home country even if each individual investor does not own 10 
percent of the firm being invested in.  
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development by raising both the quantity and the quality of employment. Fourth, FDI may 
increase the volume of international trade and thus promote economic growth.  
Export-led growth 
The export-led growth hypothesis postulates that exports are a main determinant of overall 
economic growth. There have been some arguments that provide the theoretical rationale 
for this hypothesis. 2  First, the export sector may generate positive externalities on 
non-export sectors through more efficient management and improved production 
techniques (Feder, 1982). Secondly, export expansion may increase productivity by 
offering potential for scale economies (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Thirdly, exports are 
likely to mitigate foreign exchange constraints and can thereby provide greater access to 
international markets (Esfahani, 1991). Fourthly, the endogenous growth theory 
emphasises that exports are likely to increase long-run growth by allowing a higher rate of 
technological innovation and dynamic learning from abroad (Romer, 1986, 1989; Lucas, 
1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Edwards, 1992). Nevertheless, the empirical support 
for the export-led growth hypothesis is rather shaky.3 While most cross-sectional studies 
have found a positive association between exports and growth, a considerable number of 
recent time series studies found mixed results either supporting or rejecting the export-led 
growth hypothesis. The lack of the unambiguous support for this hypothesis may stem 
from some methodological problems, argued by Giles and Williams (2000). It may also be 
the result of the omission of relevant mechanisms through which openness can promote 
growth (Cuadros et al., 2001). The benefits of economic openness lie not only in trade but 
also in attracting FDI. Furthermore, there is strong interaction between these two key 
factors that define the process of economic openness. Since the mid-1980s, FDI flows have 
been growing at a pace far exceeding the volume of international trade and the aggregate 
stock of FDI rose fast with sales of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs substantially exceeding 
the value of world exports (Barrell and Pain, 1997). In the new context for FDI, focusing 
only on trade as a proxy for openness may therefore be misleading (Goldberg and Klein, 
1999). Increasing attention has been directed toward the FDI effect of economic growth. 
FDI-led growth 
Theoretically, FDI affects host-country growth through two channels, that is, an impact on 
factor input and changing efficiency in the use of the production factors. In standard 
neoclassical economics, the level of output is determined by a bundle of inputs, while FDI 
is treated as additional investment that increases capital input. Investment is considered to 
be a key factor in economic growth. Most empirical studies of cross-country differences in 
growth rates have suggested that high growth is associated with high investment rates.4 
According to the ‘resource gap’ approach, developing countries are trapped in a low 
growth path because of the lack of financial resources and FDI can fosters economic 
growth in the host economy by providing additional capital to the host economy and 
alleviating the shortages of capital and foreign exchange. FDI can provide financial 
resources for developing countries and may play an important role in expanding total 
investment in host countries. FDI has its own advantages relative to other sources of 
international finance. A body of literature, especially following the financial crises in 
                                                        
2 See Cuadros et al. (2001) for a detailed discussion. 
3 For a survey of literature on relation between exports and growth, see Edwards (1993) and Giles and Williams 
(2000). 
4 See UNCTAD (1999) for a discussion.  
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emerging markets in the 1990s, has stressed these advantages.5 Above all, FDI tends to be 
less volatile than other capital flows, thereby exerting more durable effects on growth 
(Lipsey, 1999). Moreover, FDI, as equity investment, will not lead to excessive leverage of 
the corporate sector, as excessive reliance on borrowed funds will do. This in turn lowers 
the debt burden and financial risk in the economy. 
Beyond the basic macroeconomic stimulus from factor inputs, FDI may influence 
growth by raising factor productivity, or the efficiency of the usage of resources. Industrial 
organisation studies treat FDI as a ‘combination of capital stock, know-how and 
technology’ (De Mello, 1997), whereby it may affect both factor input and factor 
productivity. It is the ability of FDI to transfer not only production knowledge and 
managerial skills that distinguishes it from other forms of foreign financial investment, 
such as portfolio investment and foreign aid (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). Many 
empirical studies on the FDI-growth relation were to investigate whether FDI significantly 
affects the rate of economic growth via increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Most 
empirical studies concluded that FDI generally make a positive contribution to both factor 
productivity and economic growth in host countries, beyond what domestic investment 
normally would trigger.  
Endogenous growth theories reinforce the link between FDI and growth. They postulate 
that, when investment is taken into a broad sense to include expenditures not only on 
capital goods but also on technology enhancement and human capital formation, 
diminishing returns to investment may not exist. Therefore countries that devote a high 
proportion of output to investment may sustain more rapid growth than countries invest 
less. 6  The endogenous growth model point out that technological and knowledge 
externalities counterbalance the effects of diminishing returns to capital accumulation and 
keep the economy on a sustained long-term growth path. FDI not only introduces new 
capital goods and production processes, but also provides the technological and knowledge 
externalities. It provides a channel for knowledge acquisition and can contribute 
significantly to the increase of the knowledge stock in the host economy. FDI can therefore 
have both short-term and long-term impacts on host country economy and can (potentially) 
boost long-term growth. According to a survey (OECD, 2002a) of the main findings of a 
number of recent empirical studies conducted on the basis of estimated endogenous growth 
models, most of the 14 studies reviewed indicated that FDI does contribute positively to 
income growth and factor productivity in host countries. 
Relation between international trade and FDI 
International trade and FDI can be linked in a variety of ways. It is natural to think of FDI 
into a host country as a substitute for exports by the parent firm (or other home-country 
firms). However, the relation between trade and FDI is not straightforward. In contrast to 
the situation in which firms perform most of their activities in a single country, FDI leads 
to more trade as the firm’s overall production is spreading across units in different 
countries. Trade among parent and affiliates engaged in various stages of production shows 
                                                        
5 See OECD (2002a) for a discussion. 
6 The endogenous growth theory objects to the convergence properties of the neoclassical model and claim that 
capital-scarce countries do not grow faster than capital abundant countries, differences in rates of return on capital 
are less than one would expect given the disparities in capital-labour endowments, and capital does not flow 
internationally towards the poorest countries. The objections to the neoclassical approach expressed in the recent 
literature have the common perception that the shortcomings of traditional theory have one source: a specification 
of the technology that gives too prominent a role to diminishing returns to capital (Ros, 2000). 
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that FDI and trade could be complements. Yet FDI is not always used to locate different 
stages of production in different countries vertically. Rather, many subsidiaries largely 
duplicate the production activities of the parent firm or subsidiaries located in other 
countries horizontally. In this case, the effects of FDI on trade are more complex and FDI 
and trade could be either substitutes or complements.7 In many industries a firm must 
make a reasonable trade-off between: 1) centralising production in one or a few locations 
and exporting to many other countries, to achieve scale economies, and 2) spreading 
production to many host countries to take advantages of specific locations, or to avert 
impediments to importing into these countries. When scale economies are less important, 
or when transport costs and trade barriers are higher, for example, the trade-off would lead 
to FDI substitute for trade. To some extent this kind of FDI is also likely to promote trade 
for two reasons. First, the affiliates’ production of the final product may require 
components and materials as input into production from the parent firm, affiliates in other 
countries, or independent suppliers in other countries. Although trade in final products may 
decrease, trade in materials and components increases. Secondly, this kind of FDI may also 
increase trade in final products because the affiliate improves the general marketing of the 
firm’s products in the host country. The local affiliate displaces some trade for the specific 
products that it produces, but may expand trade through better local marketing of other 
specific products produced by the MNC in the home country or other countries. 
Most studies conclude that FDI, on balance, is somewhat complementary to 
international trade (Pugel and Lindert, 2000). The overall complementarity seems to reflect 
both higher home exports of components used in affiliate production and higher home 
exports of final goods. For host countries, FDI may encourage export promotion, import 
substitution, or greater trade in intermediate inputs, especially between parents and affiliate 
producers (Goldberg and Klein, 1998). However, the empirical evidence about the 
relationship between trade and FDI is ambiguous.  
MNCs are heavily involved in international trade. According to Pugel and Lindert 
(2000), about one-third of the world international trade occurs as intra-firm trade between 
units of MNCs located in different countries. Another third of the world’s international 
trade involves a MNC as the seller (exporter) or buyer (importer), trading with some other 
firm. UNCTAD (1999) estimated the share of trade involving MNCs at around two-thirds 
of world trade for the second half of the 1990s. MNCs have a strong influence on the 
patterns of world trade since much of the international flow of goods is handled within 
MNCs in the form of intra-firm trade. In the case of the US MNCs, the share of intra-firm 
exports rose from 29 percent in 1990 to 31 percent in 1998, while it remained stable in the 
case of Japanese MNCs at around 38 percent. It has been observed that inward FDI has 
contributed to boosting the export performance of a number of developing countries. 
Export-oriented FDI from MNCs increases the speed with which a developing host 
economy becomes integrated within a global production network in sectors in which it 
may previously have had no experience (OECD, 1998b). Rodríguez-Clare (1996) and 
Calderón et al. (1996) argued that MNCs as leaders in some most important industries can 
help developing countries to expand their industrial exports and that the host country can 
benefit from an FDI-led export growth. What MNCs can bring for developing countries is 
not only additional resource of capital, technology managerial know-how, but also access 
to global, regional and home-country markets. This also involves foreign affiliates’ 
privileged access to MNCs’ intra-firm markets. One of the contributions that MNCs can 
                                                        
7 See Pugel and Lindert (2000) for a discussion. 
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make to host economies is to enhance their export competitiveness. MNCs can help raise 
export competitiveness in some or all of aspects (UNCTAD, 2002). But, being integrated 
in the supply and trade networks of MNCs, can also for instance force developing 
countries in a more or less permanent position of dependence – certainly when the division 
of labour chosen by the MNC positions the nation at the ‘lower end’ of the supply chain (cf. 
Van Tulder, 2004). 
Preconditions of FDI-led growth 
The effect of FDI on economic growth depends on social, economic and policy conditions 
of the host country economy. As to the generic benefits of FDI, or benefits of boosting the 
total funds available for investment in the host economy, it depends on macroeconomic 
factors such as the savings/investment balance of the host economy and on its degree of 
integration into the international financial system (OECD, 2002a). For example, in 
developing countries in which domestic investment is limited by financial constraints, FDI 
can help promote growth simply by bringing in additional capital and by bridging the 
resource gap. Beyond these generic benefits, these macroeconomic conditions are 
extraneous, but there are some other conditions that are equally important, including 
technological capability, human capital and the development of domestic financial 
markets.  
The ability to reap the potential benefits from FDI relies heavily on the technological 
capabilities of domestic firms. FDI tends to have far less growth impact in technologically 
less advanced countries. In empirical studies of FDI effect, the studies for developing 
countries tend to produce more mixed results than those for developed countries. 
According to Blomström et al. (2000a), this is because that FDI contributes to economic 
growth when a sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced technologies is available in 
the host economy. Secondly, the beneficial impact of FDI is enhanced in the host 
economies with high human capital stock. The quality of human resource in the least 
developed countries may be too low to make effective use of the technology introduced by 
foreign firms (Borensztein et al., 1995; Salvatore, 1998; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; 
Kokko, 1994). Borenzstein et al. (1998) found that FDI contributes to growth, while the 
magnitude of this effect depends on the stock of human capital in the economy. Blomström 
et al. (2000b) also demonstrated that FDI inflows have a significant positive effect on 
income growth for the most advanced developing countries, but no such effect for the least 
developed countries. Thirdly, the development of a domestic financial system in the host 
economy is a prerequisite for FDI to have a positive impact on economic growth (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2000). The impact of financial system development on growth has been 
widely studied empirically (e.g. Beck et al., 2000). The growth effects of FDI mostly work 
through the adoption of new technologies that depend upon the availability of financial 
resources. Alfaro et al. (2001) developed a model showing that financial market constraints 
hinder the capability of domestic firms to benefit from FDI. This model was tested 
empirically by introducing both the measure of FDI inflows and of financial market 
development, as well as an interactive term of the two in the augmented growth regression. 
In the least developed economies, FDI seems to have a less positive effect on growth 
than in developed economies. This has been attributed to the presence of ‘threshold 
externalities’, which provides one explanation of the disparities between empirical studies. 
Apparently, developing countries need to have reached a certain threshold level of 
development before they can reap the benefits associated with FDI (Saggi, 2000).  
The beneficial impact of FDI on growth is argued to be enhanced in the environment 
characterised by an open trade and investment regime. Bhagwati (1978) hypothesised that 
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the volume and efficacy of inward FDI will vary according to whether a country is 
following the export promotion or import substitution strategy. He argued that a strategy of 
export promotion is likely to both attract higher volume of FDI and promote more efficient 
utilisation than is a strategy of import substitution. Without an environment of an open 
trade and investment regime, FDI may serve to enhance the rate of ‘private return’ to 
foreign investment while exerting little impact on ‘social rates’ of return in the host 
economy (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996). With such an environment, FDI can play a key 
role in improving the capacity of the host country to respond to the opportunities offered 
by global economic integration (OECD, 1998b) and can promote growth through the 
association between FDI and international trade flows. This argument is challenged by the 
fact that economic growth may also be enhanced in relatively closed economic systems. 
Furthermore, there still lack evidence at the industry level to support the argument in 
favour of an open economic system. The lack of empirical studies in this respect is largely 
due to the complexity of policy environment in industries and the difficulty to identify the 
various dimensions of government policies and to separate the effect of one policy from 
another. 
4.1.2 The Mechanisms of FDI-led Growth: From Macro to Micro Level Analysis 
In mainstream economic literature, the positive effects of inward FDI on economic growth 
are stressed. This subsection examines the microeconomic mechanisms of FDI-led growth, 
exploring the arguments and evidence applied by the literature when the positive effects of 
inward FDI are concerned. The inclusion of FDI in neoclassical growth equations poses 
two major methodological problems. One is that of reverse causality, that is, the causality 
runs from growth to FDI. Another problem relates to the ‘spurious correlation’ caused by 
omitted variables in growth equations. Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 1.1, the 
standard growth accounting approach provides only a simple decomposition of output 
growth into its sources, without explaining through what mechanism these changes took 
place. FDI can influence macroeconomic performance through complex channels and 
different mechanisms. At the macro level, the FDI impacts on employment and on the 
international trade flows are the channels involved. As noted in Section 2.3, FDI is 
fundamentally a microeconomic phenomenon, which calls for firm- and industry-level 
analysis. FDI may have effects both on the recipient industry as well as on the upstream 
and downstream industries (see Figure 4-1). Foreign entrants inject competition into the 
recipient industry and may also develop (horizontal) linkages to the domestic competitors. 
Furthermore, FDI will typically change the condition of supply and demand in a number of 
related industries. The (backward and forward) linkages may extend to the domestic firms 
in the upstream and downstream industries thus the effects of FDI on industrial 
development go beyond the boundary of the recipient industry. The externalities that are 
introduced by foreign entrants from spillover effects may also benefit domestic firms both 
in the recipient industry and in other industries. On the other hands, the competition 
introduced by the foreign entrants in domestic factor markets may influence all domestic 
firms. 
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Figure 4-1 Mechanisms of FDI-led industrial development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some microeconomic mechanisms of growth promotion have been the focus of 
considerable interest in recent empirical studies. FDI may have a positive impact on the 
development of recipient industries through direct introduction of capital, technology and 
managerial know-how and indirectly through spillover effects on domestic firms. FDI can 
influence indirectly the host economy through various channels: the demonstration and 
diffusion effects as well as the competition and stimulation effects. First of all, FDI can 
contribute to domestic economic growth because foreign firms tend to be more efficient 
than domestic firms.8 Since the mid-1980s, endogenous growth theory9 has emerged and 
provided persuasive reasons to link externalities, R&D, investment in human capital to the 
rate of economic growth. Many growth-promoting factors identified by the new growth 
                                                        
8 For empirical examples see Wilmore (1986), De Gregorio (1992) and Borensztein et al (1995). An analysis of 
pairs of foreign and domestic firms of similar size drawn from 80 manufacturing industries in Brazil concluded 
that foreign firms have a significantly higher ratio of value-added to output than domestic firms (Wilmore, 1986). 
Similar results were obtained by De Gregorio (1992) in twelve South American countries and by Borensztein et al. 
(1995) for a sample of 69 developing countries. 
9 The new growth theory endogenised technological change. Rather than viewing technology as exogenously 
given, Romer (1986) assumed that knowledge is an input in production that has increasing marginal productivity. 
The focus on knowledge as the basic form of capital suggested departs from the standard aggregate growth model. 
New knowledge is assumed to be the product of research activities that exhibits diminishing returns. Investment 
in knowledge suggests a natural externality – the creation of new knowledge by one firm is assumed to have a 
positive effect on other firms because knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or kept secret. Production of 
consumption goods as a function of the knowledge stock and other inputs exhibits increasing returns – knowledge 
may have an increasing marginal product. These elements combine to produce a competitive equilibrium model 
of economic growth (Romer, 1986). The new growth theory offers an alternative view of long-run prospects for 
growth. It objects to the convergence properties of the neoclassical model and claim that capital-scarce countries 
do not grow faster than capital abundant countries, differences in rates of return on capital are less than one would 
expect given the disparities in capital-labour endowments, and capital does not flow internationally towards the 
poorest countries. 
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theory can be initiated and nurtured to promote economic growth through FDI 
(Balasubramanyam, 1996). Based on the new growth theory, increasing interests has been 
directed towards the indirect effects of FDI, namely, spillovers and other externality effects, 
and the linkage between foreign facilities and domestic firms.  
The relationship between FDI and technological progress and human capital 
enhancement is the focal concern when studying the mechanisms through which FDI 
contributes to economic development. Access to better technology is the vital source of 
sustained growth. 10  The models of technology diffusion suggested that the rate of 
economic growth of a backward economy depends on the extent of adoption and 
implementation of new technologies that are already in use in leading countries. 11 
Developing countries tend to lag in the use of technology. Most technologies deployed, 
even in mature industries, may be outdated. More importantly, the efficiency with which 
they use given technologies is often relatively low. Technical inefficiency and 
obsolescence lead to low productivity, affect the quality of their products, and handicap 
their ability to meet market demand. FDI can create new technological capabilities in the 
host economy and have beneficial spillover effects. In resource-based and low-technology 
manufacturing activities, the benefits of technology transfer may be low; in 
high-technology activities, however, they may be considerable.12 Recent empirical studies 
suggested that FDI could be an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, 
contributing relatively more to economic growth than domestic investment (Borensztein, 
1998). Human resource is another important dimension that cannot be neglected when we 
discuss the impact of FDI on economic development. Labour and human resources are 
indispensable factors of production in all economic activities. The increase of quality of 
labour generally contributes to increasing productivity and output. For all countries, 
reducing unemployment and raising the quality of employment are important to achieve 
income growth and an equitable distribution of income. They are critical components of 
development and provide means to translate economic development into social and human 
development. Employment and the quality of employment, both of which can be promoted 
by inward FDI, are linked with development intensively.  
The microeconomic mechanisms of growth promotion include several aspects (see 
Figure 4-1). One of the main mechanisms through which FDI can enhance technological 
capabilities and human resources, and thus industrial development and economic growth, 
is by the spillover effects. Spillover effects refer to the externalities that are introduced by 
foreign entrants. Empirical studies addressing this question are generally focusing on the 
beneficial effects of these externalities to domestic firms in the recipient industry. These 
studies are more microeconomic in nature and few attempts have been made in the 
macroeconomic context to take into explicit account such spillover effects 
(Bende-Nabende et al., 2000). Most empirical studies on FDI spillovers have focused on 
productivity13, although non-productivity spillovers, notably the market access spillovers, 
have also been examined (cf. Aitken et al., 1994; Buckley et al., 2002). The impact of FDI 
on enhancing technological capabilities depends on more than the static process. It also 
                                                        
10 For a recent review of the significance of technology to development see Radosevic (1999). 
11 For previous discussions on technology diffusion see Nelson and Phelps (1966), Jovanovic and Rob (1989), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Segerstrom (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
12 In many developing countries MNCs engaged largely in low-technology and labour-intensive production, 
where the level of technology transfer found to be low (OECD, 2002a). 
13 For empirical examples see Subsection 4.4.1 and Subsection 5.2.3.  
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depends on the dynamics process: how much upgrading of local capabilities takes place 
over time, how far local linkages deepen, and how closely subsidiaries integrate 
themselves to the local ‘learning system’ (Lall, 2000). The effects of FDI rely on the 
technological capabilities of domestic firms. The relatively low technological capabilities 
of domestic firms in developing countries provide one of the reasons why, in the empirical 
researches of productivity spillovers from FDI, the studies for developing countries tends 
to produce more mixed results than that for developed countries. A survey by De Mello 
(1997) pointed out that recipient countries’ technological capabilities will influence the 
scope for spillovers and accordingly determine different roles played by FDI in fostering 
growth. 
A related question to that of spillovers is whether foreign firms develop linkages to 
local firms. Broadly defined, linkages can also involve domestic non-business entities such 
as universities and training centres (UNCTAD, 2001). Strong linkages imply that the direct 
beneficial effects of FDI may be magnified. Linkages are of particular significance to 
developing countries because they could provide an effective means of diffusing valuable 
knowledge and skills throughout the economy, based on the strong knowledge and skill 
base of MNCs. The economic growth process can become self-reinforced and -sustained if 
linkages emerge from MNCs to the host economy. The primal way to promote spillovers 
and to reap the benefits of FDI for economic development is therefore through production 
linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. Figure 4-1 shows that there are 
backward, forward and horizontal linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. 
Backward linkages exist when foreign affiliates buy goods and services from domestic 
firms in upstream industries; forward linkages may occur when foreign affiliates sell goods 
and services to domestic firms in downstream industries; horizontal linkages involve 
interactions between foreign affiliates and domestic firms in competing activities. Among 
the three kinds of linkages, the backward one is the most important. Backward linkages 
may directly raise the output and employment of domestic suppliers. Moreover, for 
domestic suppliers, backward linkage may be the most effective channel through which 
local learning takes place. Backward linkage can promote efficiency and productivity of 
local firms. For instance, foreign firms usually place higher demands on the quality of the 
intermediates and on timely delivery, which force local suppliers to conform and thus 
become more efficient. The backward linkages can in turn lead to various indirect effects 
for the host economy. For instance, more efficient local suppliers of intermediates will also 
benefit domestic downstream firms in the value chain of production – therefore, backward 
linkages may also create forward-linkage (second-round linkage) effects to the 
downstream domestic firms, thereby promoting horizontal linkages and spillovers (see 
Figure 4-1). This indirect impact of backward linkages on the development of domestic 
recipient industry has been demonstrated by the model developed by Markusen and 
Venables (1999), which assessed the overall impact of the competition effects from FDI on 
recipient industries and the backward linkage effects on the upstream industries.  
The fundamental mechanism through which FDI promotes economic development, 
according to the literature, is competition. Foreign entry may reduce the concentration and 
promote competition. Beneficial effects may stem from competitive pressures that foreign 
firms exert in the incipient industries. Tougher competition may force firms to reduce 
organisational inefficiencies in order to stay competitive.14 Competitive pressures may 
force firms to become more productive and efficient. Countries tend to protect those 
                                                        
14 For evidence see, for example, Blomström and Sjöholm (1998) and Kokko (1994). 
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sectors where the domestic industry has a comparative disadvantage due to the sectoral 
bias in trade protection (Graham and Krugman, 1995). Allowing inward FDI into these 
sectors may therefore crowd out local firms. Empirical studies have indicated that the net 
gains from FDI are larger if they take place in sectors where the country has low barriers to 
trade (Salvatore, 1998) or, more generally, in sectors where the local firms are competitive 
(Kokko, 1994; Salvatore, 1998). 
4.1.3 Negative Aspects of the FDI Impact 
By addressing the potential costs of inward FDI and the market failures in the FDI process, 
this subsection outline options for domestic policies to mitigate the negative aspects of the 
impact of FDI. MNCs can provide developing countries with proprietary assets, which are 
usually firm specific and difficult for domestic firms to acquire independently. Because 
MNCs are unwilling to part with their ownership advantages, FDI become particularly 
important for developing country to acquire these advantages and to establish 
competitiveness. However, the associated costs of inward FDI and MNC presence to 
developing countries should not be neglected. In the investment process, there are market 
failures and the objectives of MNCs can differ from those of host governments, which may 
possibly lead to adverse effects on development. Effective FDI policy in the context of 
constantly changing world economy is a demanding task. The challenge lies in to access to 
the proprietary assets of MNCs, but to disentangle these two kinds of effects, taking 
measures to maximise one and minimise the other.  
Potential costs of FDI 
FDI may provide host countries a package of tangible and intangible valuable assets. But it 
also offers a mixture of positive and negative effects. As most countries undertook 
substantial revisions in their FDI regimes, with a view towards FDI liberalisation, in some 
cases, the shift towards market forces may have been carried too far, too early, or in an 
inappropriate manner because possible costs of FDI were often ignored. Literature has 
identified cases in which certain costs of FDI can mitigate or even reverse the potential 
benefits of FDI. Three costs are particularly relevant. First, there are potential negative 
effects of FDI on the host economy by ‘crowding out’ domestic investment and 
suppressing local entrepreneurship. Secondly, there is an imminent risk that increased 
imports and profit repatriation could cause deterioration in their balance of payments. 
Thirdly, transfer-pricing practices, tax allowances and other financial incentives granted to 
foreign firms may reduce tax revenues of host country.  
The central concern is to what extent FDI may crowd out domestic investment. This 
question has been studied theoretically, through the way of including domestic investment 
into growth equations (Borenstein et al., 1998) or estimating investment equations that 
incorporate FDI (McMillan, 1999; Agosin and Mayer, 2000). It should be cautioned that 
MNCs improve welfare only if they generate benefits beyond those that are generated by 
the domestic firms they displace. The risk of ‘crowding out’ domestic firms by FDI can 
take two forms: in product markets by adversely affecting local firms in competing 
activities and in factor markets by reducing access for local firms (particularly to finance). 
In this case, increased consumer surplus due to foreign entry must be weighed against 
losses in producer surplus. Foreign entry has short-term and long-term effects. In the short 
run the productivity of domestic firms may be reduced, while in the long run, the increase 
of competition induced by FDI may force inefficient domestic firms to exit and surviving 
efficient firms to improve their performance, leading to improvement of social welfare (Hu 
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and Jefferson, 2002).  
The neoliberal approach to inward FDI led many governments not only to remove all 
restraints to FDI inflows but also to abandon their tools to guide and bargain with MNCs. 
Countries got engaged in a (financial) ‘incentive wars’.15 This ‘incentive wars’ lead 
countries into a financial incentives-competition race towards the sky, a fiscal 
incentives-competition race towards zero, or a policy-competition race towards the bottom 
(UNCTAD, 1999). In fact, financial, fiscal and policy incentives are among a portfolio of 
location advantages that include access to markets and immobile tangible and intangible 
resources. There are much more important advantages that developing countries can offer. 
Attracting FDI by only focusing on providing incentives in practice rarely makes a country 
win the competition for FDI attraction. It does not contribute to its economic development 
as well. The building of a favourable investment environment is a key that affects the 
business operation at the micro-level and is claimed to influence the competitiveness and 
growth of a country at the macro-level (Ng and Tuan, 2002). 
Market failures in the FDI process 
Markets are not perfect and market failures may lead agents to fail to exploit endowments 
or to develop new endowments. Where market mechanism is weak and supporting 
institutions are absent, information may not flow efficiently, risky projects may never be 
undertaken, costly learning may not be undergone, and externalities and linkages with 
other agents may result in under-investment (Stiglitz, 1996). There are detailed analyses of 
market imperfections in developing countries. While many macroeconomic models rely on 
some forms of market imperfection, they do not adequately address where these 
imperfections stem from. Based on advances in game theory and the economics of 
information16, the literature in this area has witnessed a remarkable explosion since the 
1980s. This literature explains the source of distinctive institutional characteristics of the 
informal economy in developing countries. The market imperfections in developing 
countries include: fragmented labour and credit markets, persistent lack of market clearing, 
pervasiveness of long-term contracts, unequal treatment of similar workers or firms, and so 
on.17 These market imperfections are typically difficult to explain within the traditional 
neoclassical theory. Neither are most of them consistent with traditional understanding of 
monopoly or oligopoly. Accordingly many scholars have pointed out the irrelevance of 
neoclassical economics to the context of developing countries and the need for alternative 
paradigms. The economics of information provide a cogent explanation of many 
institutional characteristics in developing countries, within the context of an analytical 
framework grounded on the same methodology as the traditional approach.  
With regard to market failures associated with the process of inward FDI, however, the 
research has been rare and the focus hitherto is the effects of government policies on 
market imperfections and the investment decisions of MNCs (cf. Brewer, 1993). The 
proper consideration of the role of MNCs in development requires a more complex 
framework for analysing the development process, taking account of the market, as well as 
institutional, imperfections. According to Lall (2000), there may be market failures in the 
investment process caused by information and coordination failures. MNCs may have 
                                                        
15 See UNCTAD (1996a, 1996c). 
16 The idea of the possible failure and decadence of markets has been advanced in works by Akerlof (1970) and 
Arrow (1971). 
17 For a detailed discussion see Mookherjee and Ray (1999). 
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inadequate information on potential locations selection and the investment 
decision-making maybe subjective and biased. Prospective investors, even the largest firms, 
do not always conduct systematic worldwide search for opportunities. Most firms consider 
only a small range of potential locations (IFC and FIAS, 1997). The coordination between 
investing firms and host country governments plays a crucial role in the FDI process. 
However, there may be failures of coordination between MNCs and host countries. In 
order to attract MNCs’ mobile assets, effective promotion could go beyond simply 
focusing on advertisement into coordinating the supply of immobile assets according to the 
specific needs of MNCs. However, a developing country may not be able to meet MNCs’ 
needs because of the limitations in technology, human capital, infrastructure and 
institutions. 
The market failure also arises from divergences between the private interests of foreign 
investors and the public interests of the host country. Private and public interests may 
diverge for both foreign and domestic investment. However, some divergences are specific 
to foreign investment because it differs from domestic investment in that the focus of 
decision-making lies abroad and the foreign investor has less commitment to the host 
economy and is also more mobile (Lall, 2000). The basic objectives of MNCs and host 
country governments are different: governments seek to promote welfare and development 
while MNCs seek to enhance their performance and profitability. Therefore, FDI inflows 
are not always in the best interest of host countries and some can have adverse effect on 
development. In some scenarios, MNCs’ objectives may differ from those of developing 
countries. For instance, the presence of MNCs in a host economy may crowd out local 
firms, thus conflicting with the goal of domestic enterprise development. MNCs may 
advocate stronger intellectual property right protections while a host country may favour 
weak ones to permit greater diffusion of technologies.  
Another source of market failure in the investment process and afterwards, relates to the 
fundamental mechanism of market – competition. According to the mainstream 
explanation of FDI, as discussed in Section 3.4.4, FDI itself is a manifestation of market 
failure. The existence of market dominance, as well as the abuse of it, is one of the 
fundamental market failures that economists and policy makers attempt to tackle. Three 
sources of market dominance that are under the control of competition policy, collusion, 
predatory practice and M&A, are directly related to FDI. The interface between 
competition policy and FDI, as discussed in Subsection 3.4.4, necessitates a policy solution 
for the market failures in the FDI process. In developing countries, without an effective 
competition policy as necessary market-supporting institution, market failures in the FDI 
process in terms of market dominance are becoming a prominent issue and cast potential 
negative effects on industrial development. 
Policy implications 
For developing countries, a passive laissez faire approach to inward FDI is not sufficient 
due to the existence of potential costs and market failures. While FDI provides a package 
of valuable assets and offers a mixture of positive and negative effects, this does not mean 
that simply opening up to FDI is the best way to obtain them. The market failures in the 
investment process and divergences between the objectives of MNCs and governments 
provide the space for government policies. Polices on FDI are needed to counter several 
sets of market failures: the first arises from information and coordination failures in the 
investment process; the second arises from divergences between the private interest of 
investors and public interests of host country, or the basic objective of MNCs and 
governments; thirdly, there are market failures in the FDI process in terms of market 
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dominance and the abuse of it. These market failures may lead a country cannot be able to 
attract the volume and quality of FDI they desire, or lead FDI to have negative effects on 
development.  
Due to the existence of information imperfection, it may be worthwhile for country to 
invest in advertising to alter the perception of potential investors by improving its image, 
taking economic fundamentals as given, (Wells and Wint, 1990). Such kind of promotion 
can be extremely effective in raising the inflow of FDI and it quality, as demonstrated by 
the experience of Ireland, Singapore and Costa Rica (Spar, 1998). Due to the existence of 
the coordination failures, it is helpful if the host government discovers MNCs’ needs and 
meets them in the competition to attract FDI. The cases of large investment projects of 
MNCs in China have illustrated how the process of coordination influent the location 
decision of foreign investors. For example, in the competition for a large investment 
project in semiconductor industry, Shanghai and Suzhou endeavoured to provide almost 
whatever MNCs wanted in order to influent their location choice. The case of Costa Rica 
has illustrated that it was preparation to invest in training to meet Intel’s skill needs that 
attract the investment (Spar, 1998). Although there are divergences between the private 
interest of investors and public interests of host country, there is a considerable overlap 
between the objectives of MNCs and host countries. Since the overlap is incomplete, it is 
important for developing countries not only attempt to attract FDI, but also try to maximise 
its contribution to the ultimate goal of development. Policies matter, perhaps more than 
ever (UNCTAD, 1999). 
In the FDI process, there are bargains between the host country and MNCs. The 
outcome of FDI is influenced by how effective the host country bargains with MNCs. 
However, the bargaining power of developing countries is usually weak compared to 
MNCs. Weak bargaining power on the part of host governments may possibly result in the 
unequal distribution of benefits or abuses of market power by MNCs. Therefore regulation 
is needed. Necessary regulation consists of several aspects. One concern arises with 
respect to the environment. In their home country, MNCs face high environmental 
standards from environmental regulations. While in many developing countries, 
environmental regulations are lax or poorly enforced. Facing the danger of being a 
‘pollution heaven’, developing countries should upgrade their level of environmental 
regulation. Another important regulation issue is that of transfer pricing. MNCs can now 
use transfer pricing over very large volumes of trade and service transactions to evade 
taxes or restrictions on profit remission. Developing country tax authorities are generally 
ill equipped to tackle this. 
The capability of host countries to regulate firms in the means of competition policy 
emerges as an important policy issue. In the new context of FDI as discussed in Subsection 
2.3.1, legitimate regulative instruments become less and less. Competition policy provides 
developing countries a standard tool to protect market competition and to ensure 
competitive business behaviour by firms, not only foreign but also domestic. Table 4-1 
preliminarily summarises the potential effects of FDI on industrial development. At the 
firm level, FDI may crowd out or crowd in domestic firms. At the industry level, FDI may 
have both (static) structural and (dynamic) technological effects and the effects may be 
positive or negative. The effects at these two levels are closely interrelated. The next two 
sections of this chapter address the structural effect of FDI and Section 4.4 discusses the 
technological effect. The empirical evidence for these effects is simply summarised in this 
table, which highlights the directions for future empirical quests in this area (see the 
following sections in this chapter for details). 
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Table 4-1 Potential effects of inward FDI on industrial development: a summary 
Item Positive effects Negative effects Empirical evidence 
Domestic 
enterprises 
Crowding in 
– Linkage 
– Spillovers 
Crowding out 
– By intensified competition  
– By reducing access for local firms 
to factors 
– By anticompetitive practices 
The evidence for crowding 
out is rare; the effect of 
crowding in is an 
understudied area. 
Structural 
effects 
Positive industrial performance 
– Lower price 
– High product diversity and quality 
– High international competitiveness 
Increasing competition 
Negative industrial performance 
– Higher price 
– Low product diversity and quality 
– Low international competitiveness 
Market dominance of MNCs 
– Dominant positions of MNCs 
– MNC abuses of market dominance 
(anticompetitive practices of MNCs) 
Large body of literature on 
the FDI impact on 
concentration exists. 
Studies on the structural 
effect at the firm level 
(market share) and on the 
determinants of this effect 
are rare. 
Dynamic 
(technological ) 
effects 
Technology transfer 
– Linkage 
– Spillovers 
Innovation spillovers 
Inappropriate technology 
– Backward technology 
– Polluting technology 
Large body of literature on 
productivity spillovers 
exists; studies on the FDI 
spillovers on the innovation 
activities lack. 
4.2 FDI and Market Structure: The Static Approach 
Study on economic development is usually from a macro perspective while knowledge on 
FDI needs a micro view. There is gap between these two perspectives preventing us from 
understanding the role of FDI to economic development. The ultimate objective of FDI 
promotion is to enhance economic development and social welfare in countries. Success in 
this respect depends not only upon increasing FDI inflows – and the technology, 
managerial know-how and market access associated with the injected capital – but also on 
ensuring that the markets in which MNCs participate operate efficiently and the industries 
develop healthily. In order to benefit adequately from inward FDI, countries need to ensure 
the efficient functioning of the market, which depends largely upon the contestability of 
markets and the nature of competition. Competition in general improves efficiency and 
enhances welfare (see Section 3.3). But entry by MNCs may not always increase 
competition. The theory of industrial organisation is the key in devising an analytical 
framework to approach the structural impact of FDI on domestic industries.18  
Markets play a central role in resource allocation in a market economy. How well they 
perform depends in part upon their structure. The core concept used in the economic 
analysis of competition is market structure. A distinction between monopolistic and 
competitive market structure has long been recognised. Cournot (1938) took the most 
important single step towards a modern theory of why market structure matters (see 
Section 3.1). Since Bain (1959), the notion of market structure is intimately related to the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm, which interlinks three questions: 1) 
what determines firm and market performance; 2) what determines firm conduct in the 
                                                        
18 A number of new models have been developed for exploring the relation of FDI and market structure. Yin 
(1999) developed a supply-demand model of differentiated oligopoly. Glass and Saggi (2002) constructed a 
dynamic O-L-I model based on the quality ladders model of innovation by Grossman and Helpman. 
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market; and 3) what determines market structure? Since the 1980s, noncooperative game 
theory has assumed the central importance in the theoretical development of industrial 
organisation, but the empirical analysis of market structure has still been guided by the 
S-C-P paradigm.  
4.2.1 Market Structure: Measuring Competition 
It is difficult in practice to measure the degree of competition in a give industry. The 
concept of market structure provides a basic theoretical instrument for the assessment of 
competition in a given industry. As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, there are mainly three 
approaches to measuring competition. The first approach analyses market structure by 
considering factors such as the degree of market concentration. The second approach 
examines the consequences of market structure, such as the persistence of profitability, 
rather than market structure itself. The third approach investigates the behaviour of firms. 
These three approaches to the assessment of competition are consistent and complementary. 
Any approach is based upon the concept of market structure and the analysis of market 
structure is crucial to measure competition. Market structure consists of a set of variables 
that are observable and are perceived as determinants of firm behaviour. The measurement 
of market structure begins with the effort to define a relevant market. Each market exists in 
two main dimensions: how broad the market’s geographic boundary should be and what 
range of products should be encompassed. Three elements of market structure are 
generally identified in literature: 1) the degree of market concentration, namely the number 
and significance of firms supplying a particular market, 2) the extent to which markets are 
contestable, and 3) the degree of product or process differentiation.19 Market structure is 
of interests mainly because of its putative effect on firm behaviour. The traditional 
theoretical emphasis has been on pricing behaviour. Market share can also influence other 
aspects of business behaviour, the most important of which may be technological 
innovation. Traditionally, the element of market structure that has attracted the most 
attention is market concentration, which refers to the size distribution of firms that sell a 
particular product or collection of products. Market concentration is usually regarded as a 
significant dimension of market structure because it is thought to play an important part in 
determining market power and hence business behaviour and firm performance. Although 
high concentration need not be equated with a lack of competition, it facilitates abuses of 
market dominance and anticompetitive practices, which are a major interest for 
competition authorities.  
Another central concept in competition analysis is market dominance, or market power. 
Prevention of the abuse of market dominance is the central concern of competition policy 
(see Section 3.2). Given the importance of market dominance in economic analysis and to 
competition policy in practice, considerable efforts have gone into its measurement.20 To 
                                                        
19 In a seminal work on the elements of market structure, Bain (1959) pointed out four aspects: 1) the extent of 
seller concentration; 2) the extent of buyer concentration; 3) the importance of product differentiation; 4) the 
condition of entry. (Market share varies on the buyers’ side, as the second point suggested by Bain. However, we 
focus on the sellers’ side in this study.) Bain’s framework comprises a small number of structural characteristics 
now seems to omit a number of critical structural variables such as information and cost conditions. Stigler (1968) 
pointed out that firms are more likely to be able to sustain noncompetitive behaviour the better their information 
on each others’ actions. The game theoretical approach has expanded this insight and further stressed the 
importance of information. Baumol et al. (1982a) stressed the importance of sunk costs. 
20 See Geroski (1988), Scheffman (1992) and Baker and Bresnahan (1992) for the discussions of empirical 
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convert the formal results of economic theory into the operational requirements of 
competition policy, market dominance has to be measured by using indices. The Lerner 
index of market power and the Bain index of excess profits are two important indices of 
market dominance. The former measures difference between price and marginal cost 
(Lerner, 1934) and the latter considers persistent excess profit (Bain, 1956).21 When using 
profitability as an index of market power in any antitrust case, however, the data have to be 
treated with great care if the correct conclusion is to be made. The use of profitability to 
test a number of hypotheses about market structure and market performance has been 
heavily criticised, generally to cross-sectional studies involving many industries. An 
alternative to these theoretical measures focusing on profitability is to use the 
characteristics of the size distribution of firms. Shepherd (1997) argued that market share 
and concentration measures are useful in determining market structure and so the likely 
conduct of firms. Under Shepherd’s classification, abuses of market dominance are more 
likely to take place in industries with four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) exceeding 60 
percent (tight oligopoly). As a consequence, competition policy should look at the firm 
behaviour in these industries. However, Baumol et al. (1982a) argued that concentration of 
market share in the hands of a few firms does not necessarily lead to the abuse of market 
dominance and questions must be asked mainly as to the likelihood of entry (see 
Subsection 4.2.3). 
One of the general premises of the S-C-P paradigm has been that concentrated industrial 
structures facilitate activities aimed at the abuse of market dominance by incumbent firms, 
to the detriment of consumer interests. The market concentration doctrine, which holds that 
high concentration ratio is a reliable index of monopoly power, has been challenged since 
the early 1970s (cf. Demsetz, 1973). Firms in concentrated industries are likely to be more 
profitable. However, it could also be that concentrated structures result because large firms 
are more efficient and competitive; the observed effect is again likely to be higher 
profitability of concentrated industries. The advent of game theory into industrial 
organisation in the 1980s highlighted the endogeneity of market structure. Game theoretic 
models established conditions under which structure, conduct and performance are jointly 
determined, depending only on consumer preferences, technology, and assuming 
non-cooperative behaviour of firms to influence or change these, through advertising, 
R&D and investment in capacity. The game theoretical approach presented significant 
theoretical advances in the analysis of market structure. The work of Sutton (1991, 1998), 
for instance, has attempted to disconnect the analysis of industrial concentration from the 
limitations associated with the S-C-P paradigm by identifying the intensity of price 
competition and the level of endogenous sunk costs as the key determinants of 
concentration. 
The theoretical justification for the link between industrial concentration and market 
dominance can be traced to oligopoly pricing models developed by Clarke and Davies 
(1982) and Dixit and Stern (1982). Under a general Cournot quantity-setting framework, 
the aggregate industry-level price-cost margin will be greater the less elastic demand and 
the larger the sum of the squared market shares (Davies, 1994). The latter variable is 
known as the ‘Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’ (HHI) and is advocated as having desirable 
                                                                                                                                            
approaches to measuring market dominance. 
21 Using these indexes to examine market power has two associated problems. Firstly, estimates of marginal costs 
are not included in firms’ annual reports. Secondly, perfect competition does not exist in reality so all firms can 
potentially raise prices above marginal costs and enjoy some element of market power. 
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properties as a measure of concentration. The HHI is, however, demanding from the 
compiling perspective because its calculation requires data for the market shares of all 
firms within an industry. Consequently, empirical research frequently employs the 
concentration ratio as a substitute for the HHI. The concentration ratio is measured as the 
sum of the market shares of, typically, the four, five or eight largest firms in an industry 
with firms being ranked by sales.  
Any measurement of industrial concentration attempts to capture the prevailing 
structure and the extent to which the competition mechanism functions in an industry. Any 
concentration measurement to some extent attempts to capture the importance of the 
number and relative size of firms within an industry. The more accurate the concentration 
measure, the clearer the picture of competition in any given industry. Some researchers 
(e.g. Hannah and Kay, 1977) have specified a collection of desirable properties and 
considered indices that might satisfy them. Some commonly used measures of industrial 
concentration are listed in Table 4-2.22 In an international setting, a problem for using 
concentration ratios is the omission of imports and exports. In case that the imports are 
excluded from domestic sales, the concentration measures will overstate the degree of 
importance of the top firms. For example, if for an industry CR4 equal to 0.6 while foreign 
firms accounted for 40 percent of the market, the ‘true’ CR4 would be 0.36. The opposite 
would apply if exports were excluded.23 
Table 4-2 Measures of industrial concentration 
Index Definition Properties Origin 
Concentration ratio 
(CR) 
CR measures the combined 
market share of top N firms in an 
industry, where N is normally 
between three and eight 
CR only focuses on the top firms 
in the industry and takes no 
account of the market share 
distribution of other firms. 
Most 
commonly used 
by industrial 
statistics 
Lorenz curve 
 
A Lorenz curve is used to show 
the share of the industry 
accounted by various proportions 
of firms. 
A line describes percent of firms 
take percent of output. 
Lorenz (1905) 
 
 
Gini coefficient The value of Gini coefficient is 
determined by the extent to 
which the Lorenz curve deviates 
from the line of absolute 
equality. 
Gini coefficient focuses on the 
inequality of firm size but 
ignores the importance of firm 
number. 
Introduced by 
Gini in 1912 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) 
HHI is determined by the sum of 
the squares of the market share 
of each firm. 
The higher the value of the 
index, the less likely the industry 
will exhibit competitive 
behaviour. 
Hirschman 
(1945) 
Herfindahl 
(1950) 
The variance of 
logarithms (VL) of 
firm size 
Using the variance of logarithms 
of market shares to measure the 
inequality in firm size. 
The variance of logarithms of 
firm size focuses on the 
inequality of firm size but 
ignores the importance of firm 
number. 
Hart and Prais 
(1956) 
Hannah and Kay 
index 
Using a similar measure to the 
HHI, Hannah and Kay index is a 
natural generalisation of the 
HHI.  
There are no criteria on which to 
base the choice of the power, 
which measures the extent to 
which the index is influenced by 
larger firms. 
Hannah and 
Kay (1977) 
                                                        
22 For detailed discussions of various concentration measures see Curry and George (1983), Davies (1994), and 
Martin (1993). 
23 See Utton (1982) for a detailed discussion. 
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At the empirical level, the choice of an appropriate measure of concentration is more 
frequently decided by the nature of published date and the methodology employed by the 
national production census. For a number of years, the census authorities in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom have published information on industrial 
concentration for a large number of products in manufacturing industries.24 The US 
Census of Manufactures regularly publishes the percentage of sales of specific products 
accounted for by the four, eight and 50 largest sellers. In the United Kingdom, the Census 
of Production includes similar information, but for the five largest sellers in more widely 
defined industries. However, concern with the relevant market brings about the first 
problem with the use of census data in the analysis of competition issues. Although we 
may be able to define a market satisfactorily for theoretical purpose, when we attempt to 
measure it empirically we run into difficulties, especially when using census information. 
The census data are designed to measure output from manufacturing industry in a 
particular year, not to measure ‘market’ in a way suitable for competition enquiry.  
In the practice of competition policy, concentration index can be uses as a screening 
device. It can be generally recognised that – other things being controlled – the larger the 
number of independent firms operating after the merger the less likely that it will be 
detrimental to consumers. The intuition for this result is straightforward, as the ability of 
firm or merging firms to abuse market dominance clearly depends on the number of 
competitors. In the extreme case of a merger to monopoly, for instance, the new firm will 
not face any restraint imposed on its pricing decision from within the industry. At the other 
extreme, in an industry which is extremely fragmented and in which each firm possesses 
only a tiny market share, the impact of a merger on the market price will be irrelevant. This 
may simply provide rationale for using a concentration index as a screening device for 
market dominance. Until well into the 1970s the empirical analysis of market 
concentration as a screening device for possible competition policy action was largely 
based on static measures, such as the combined market share of the large four or five 
sellers (Utton, 2003). Often the measurement applied only to sales of domestically 
produced output and took no account of the international trade. More recently there has 
been much greater concern for the dynamics of market structure and also foreign 
competition. Thus for the correct analysis of market dominance the important point may 
not be that one firm has a large market share, but whether the change of the share has been 
rapid and which firm(s) is providing the most immediate competition. Therefore, several 
aspects should be investigated to assess whether abuses of market dominance are taking 
place: how market shares of established firms have changed over time; how potential 
entrants could affect the level of competition; the extent to which the power of buyers in 
the industry may offset the power of sellers. 
4.2.2 FDI and Market Concentration 
The relation between FDI and market concentration can be used as a starting point for 
examining the relationship between inward FDI and market structure (UNCTAD, 1997a). 
The traditional literature claims that FDI tends to reduce concentration and increase 
competition in host country industries.25 The studies on developed countries, such as 
Australia (Brash, 1966), Canada (Safarian, 1969), France (Fishwick, 1982), the United 
                                                        
24 See Utton (2003) for details. 
25 See Vernon (1977) and Caves (1982) for surveys. 
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Kingdom (Steuer et al., 1973) and the United States (Knickerbocker, 1976), reported no 
positive association between FDI and market concentration. But this conclusion has long 
been challenged by some scholars who argued that its empirical verification was made 
only with reference to developed countries. For developing countries, which have a very 
different industrial structure from their developed counterparts, the entry of MNCs may 
have different effects and increase concentration instead. There has been ample empirical 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the level of FDI and MNC activity is positively 
associated with the level of market concentration in developing countries. The evidence 
from Brazil (Newfarmer, 1980; Willmore, 1989; Newfarmer and Marsh, 1992), Central 
America (1976), Guatemala (Willmore, 1976), Malaysia (Lall, 1979; Kalirajan, 1991) and 
Mexico (Newfarmer and Mueller, 1975; Connor, 1977; Blomström, 1986a) reported a 
significant correlation between participation of foreign firms and high level of industrial 
concentration. Some developed countries are also among the countries in which the level 
of FDI is positively associated with the level of market concentration.26  
This evidence could be interpreted to indicate a correlation between MNC activity and 
industrial concentration in domestic markets. The models tested for a relation between FDI 
and market concentration have typically involved a cross-sectional equation with a 
measure of FDI as one of the determinants of concentration.27 The positive correlation 
found is indeed a first step for analysing the structural effects of inward FDI. But these 
empirical studies usually did not answer the question whether MNCs raise concentration 
only by introducing new technology and managerial know-how, or they are an independent 
source of concentration after other factors that are commonly thought to determine 
concentration have been taken into account. Many factors have been identified in the 
industrial organisation literature to determine concentration. These factors include market 
size, market growth, economies of scale, capital intensity, advertising intensity, and so 
on.28 In developing countries, inward FDI may not only influence concentration via these 
industrial parameters, but also, in addition to this, may have an independent impact on 
market structure. Perhaps the most thorough study on the effects of FDI on concentration 
is Lall (1979)’s study of Malaysia (see also Newfarmer and Marsh, 1981). Lall found that 
FDI increases concentration not only by introducing new processes and products and by 
raising the capital intensity of production, but also does so independently of the variables 
controlling this. Blomström (1986a) did similar work for Mexico. He used more 
comprehensive data than Lall and found virtually the same conclusion that MNC presence 
is an independent source of concentration after other factors have been controlled for. 
However, a problem remains: as an independent source of concentration, how FDI cause 
higher industrial concentration independently?  
One basic problem of the empirical studies of the relation between FDI and market 
concentration is that the association of FDI with concentration does not clearly define the 
causal relationship between the two variables. Does FDI cause higher industrial 
concentration or is it attracted to concentrated market? If FDI cause higher industrial 
concentration, how does FDI do so, not by introducing new processes and products and by 
raising the capital intensity of production, but as an independent determinant? For the first 
question, Caves et al. (1980) found that MNCs create a supply of new entrants that would 
otherwise be deterred by economies of scale and other entry barriers (see Subsection 4.2.3). 
                                                        
26 See e.g. Dunning (1958), Steuer et al. (1973) and Davies et al. (1996) for the United Kingdom. 
27 Driffield (2001) introduced a new model based on concentration change. 
28 See Curry and George (1983) for a survey. 
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If MNCs cause concentration, they may decrease competition; if they are merely attracted 
to concentrated markets, they may increase competition. This can be largely clouded by the 
complexities of simultaneous changes in the number of competitors, technologies and 
market size. The traditional static approach cannot tackle these complexities. 
The central issue is pertaining to the channels through which MNCs influence market 
structure. Do MNCs increase concentration through their mode of entry (M&As or 
greenfield), their behaviour, or scale barriers with large-scale investment relative to market 
size? The nature of MNC behaviour in host markets is associated with their ownership 
advantages or their possession of a unique combination of proprietary assets. According to 
Hymer’s theory (see Section 3.4.4), firms operating in those markets usually possessed 
some intangible assets, such as proprietary technology, differentiated product and 
managerial know-how. The asset package of MNCs is the basis of their competitive 
advantages. The firm-specific advantages of MNCs and the transfer of such advantages 
may raise impediments to entry for local firms or make competition too strong for existing 
local firms and thus have an independent and positive influence on concentration 
(Blomström, 1986a). The fact that MNC possesses specific ownership advantage may also 
result in specific business practices of them. For example, since short-term loss is not too 
serious a problem for a foreign subsidiary of a MNC, local competitors may be driven out 
of business by entering into the price-cutting war started by the foreign competitor. As 
Newfarmer (1980) noted for the Brazilian electrical industry, MNCs may purchase 
domestic firms on especially favourable terms because of their strong command over 
technology and input markets. This kind of conduct may drive domestic competitors out of 
business, therefore influencing market structure. Foreign entry may also reduce 
concentration if entry into concentrated industries is easier for MNCs than for domestic 
firms.29 There is phenomenon of defensive investment, in which firms in an industry 
gravitate abroad together as each fears the other will gain a competitive edge 
(Knickerbocker, 1973). By studying the pharmaceutical industry in Brazil, Evans (1977) 
demonstrated that MNCs create miniature replicas through their investment in subsidiaries 
and thus tend to reduce concentration. 
The time dimension of the concentration effects of inward FDI has been addressed by 
the two-stage model developed by Dunning (1975). This model suggested that the 
structural effects of MNC entry will occur in two conceptually distinct stages. The first, 
at-entry effect encompasses the direct consequences of FDI on market structure. The 
second, post-entry effect concerns the reaction of competitors, including international 
rivals, other foreign affiliates and domestic firms. This approach highlights the core of the 
time dimension of the structural effects that FDI could pose on domestic industries. 
However, the dynamic process of the structural change in industries catalysed by inward 
FDI and the transitional process between these two distinct but continuous stages remain 
largely overlooked by the literature (see Section 4.3 for an effort of theoretical extension). 
The at-entry impact of foreign entry depends on pre-existing market structure and entry 
mode. For new entry to reduce industrial concentration, entry must be via greenfield 
investment and must not displace an existing firm. Greenfield investment will add to the 
number of firms engaged in the production of a good or service and, in case that the 
production is for sale in the country market, to the number of sellers in the market. An 
exception would be when sales through the establishment of a foreign affiliate simply 
replace sales through exports by the parent firm or another affiliate of the MNC (UNCTAD, 
                                                        
29 For evidence see Gorecki (1976). 
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1997a). This suggests that initial direct effect of greenfiled investment is normally to 
reduce – or at least leave unchanged – concentration. However, if an entrant’s scale of 
production and sales were significantly large than that of incumbent firms in the local 
market, it would immediately secure a large share of the market, thereby increasing 
concentration. By contrast, FDI through M&A leaves the number of firms unchanged. If 
the M&A results in increased sales for the newly created foreign subsidiaries, entry 
through M&A would increase concentration. Entry via M&A is restricted by the 
availability of local firms to entering MNCs. Entry has to be via greenfiled investment 
when the investment is in this industry in which no local producers are present. M&A 
obviously cannot be a factor in the newly emergent industries where no local producer is 
present (UNCTAD, 1997a).  
Whatever its entry mode, inward FDI can influence market concentration in the relevant 
market in host country, that is, the post-entry effect. The actual impact of MNC 
participation on product market concentration depend on a number of factors (UNCTAD, 
1997a): 1) the number and size of MNC operations relative to local firms and other 
competitors in domestic markets, 2) the reaction of domestic firms to MNC entry and 
operations, 3) the competitive performance of MNCs relative to that of domestic firms and 
its effects on indigenous firms in terns of their long-term survival and strengthening of 
their capabilities, and 4) the behaviour of MNCs and other firms in the market. Empirical 
studies suggested that, in developed countries, these factors work, on balance, to reduce 
concentration or leave it unchanged. The average size of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs 
often tends to be larger than that of domestic competitors, according to empirical studies 
on developed as well as developing countries (see Dunning, 1993). The after-entry 
strategies of MNCs could expand their foreign affiliates and widen the gap (Frischtak and 
Newfarmer, 1994). There is considerable evidence to suggest that, because of their 
competitive advantages, MNC affiliates are often more efficient and productive than local 
firms (UNCTAD, 1995; UNCTAD, 1997a). But, over time, the competitive advantages of 
foreign affiliates may be eroded and domestic firms may enter and increase their market 
shares. There are empirical studies (e.g. Well, 1993) suggested this phenomenon. However, 
this process still has not been conceptualised in a manner that could capture the essence of 
this evolutionary process and, therefore, help policy makers understand the evolution of 
industries (see Subsection 4.4.3 for an effort to fill this gap). 
4.2.3 FDI and Market Structure: Other Elements 
After addressing the relationship between FDI and market concentration, in this subsection 
we discuss the impact of FDI on other elements of market structure, most importantly 
market contestability. Theoretically, a contestable market is the one in which the following 
conditions are satisfied: 1) there are no barriers to entry or exit; 2) all firms, both 
incumbent and potential entrants, have access to the same production technology; 3) there 
is perfect information on prices, available to all consumers and firms; 4) entrants can enter 
and exit before incumbents can adjust prices. 30  Degree of market concentration is 
probably the easiest to use in measuring competition, compared with the other approaches. 
But focusing only on current market structure variables misses the importance of potential 
competitors – those that could enter the market and, therefore, act as a discipline on 
                                                        
30 See Baumol et al. (1982b). 
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incumbent firms. The analysis of contestable markets (Baumol et al., 1982a) is designed 
for cases in which the existence of scale economies precludes a large number of 
competitors. The theory of contestable markets suggests that an industry that consists of 
one or a few firms may be efficient. The basic idea is that incumbent firms will maintain 
prices close to the competitive level because of the threat exerted by potential entrants. 
Entry barriers are central to any analysis of market structure in this respect.  
Adam Smith’s emphasis on ‘free’ competition (mobility of resource across industries) 
implied a key dimension of market structure: the ease with which new firms can enter an 
industry. In a seminal work, Bain (1956) quantified the ‘barriers to entry’ concept in terms 
of the ‘condition of entry’. In case that there are not impediments to entry, if incumbents 
raise price, entry will occur and the entrants will be able to produce as efficiently as 
incumbents because of the access to the same production technology.31 Entry barrier can 
be defined in several ways. Bain (1956) defined entry barrier as factors that allow 
established firms in an industry to earn supernormal profits without attracting entry. Stigler 
(1968) defined entry barrier as a cost of producing which must be borne by a firm that 
seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry. Caves and 
Porter (1977) argued that entry barriers apply not only to entrants, but also between 
different groups of established firms within industries. Groups may arise from differences 
in products or ownership structures. Demsetz (1982b) asserted that barriers persist in the 
long run only if they are erected and supported by the state. 
There is no one simple, agreed system of typology of market variables that may provide 
impediments to the entry of potential firms. Bain (1956) identified three types of entry 
barriers: economies of scale, absolute cost advantage and product differentiation.32 These 
three categories of entry barriers have been added to and refined. Shepherd (1997), for 
instance, listed 21 kinds of impediments as ‘common cause of entry barriers’. Entry 
barriers may be thought of as either ‘natural’, which stemming from the structure of the 
relevant industry, providing shelter for the incumbent firms, or ‘artificial’, those that are 
‘created’ by incumbents deliberately to prevent potential entry (Howe, 1978). Shepherd 
(1997) also divided entry barriers into two types: ‘exogenous causes’ that reflect the 
structural conditions of the market, such as technology, which are normally regarded as 
beyond the control of the existing firms, and ‘endogenous causes’ that identify the 
strategies that allow firm to erect barriers. Jacobson and Andreosso-O’Callaghan (1996) 
introduced the concept of ‘barrier of the first order’ to refer the domestic entry barriers, 
while ‘barriers of the second order’ refer to the additional impediment firms face when 
trying to break into foreign markets. 
The opening up of markets to inward FDI and other forms of MNC participation can 
directly contribute to increasing the contestability of domestic markets (UNCTAD, 1997a). 
With the removal of entry restrictions and the establishment of standards of national 
treatment, inward FDI inject a new competitive force into domestic markets from abroad. 
Furthermore, MNCs may be better able than domestic firms to overcome some entry 
barriers that limit the number of competitors and harm market contestability. The 
                                                        
31 Moreover, if price declines as a result of the entry, the entrant will be able to exit the industry quickly and 
costlessly because there are no barriers to exit. When incumbent firms set prices such that they make profits 
without providing an incentive for entry, prices are said to be sustainable. A sustainable monopoly price is that 
which clears the market, allows the monopolist to break even, and leaves no opportunity for profitable entry. 
Sustainability therefore defines the equilibrium in a contestable market. 
32 See Lipczynski and Wilson (2001). 
FDI, competition and industrial development  157 
 
ownership advantages, or proprietary assets, of MNCs make them better able to enter some 
domestic industries with high cost-related entry barriers. Degree of entry barriers may also 
influences the impact of FDI on market concentration. In industries with high barriers to 
entry, inward FDI can make a significant difference to market concentration. This is 
especially relevant in the case of industries that have high start-up costs and economies of 
scale that make entry difficult. 
Product differentiation is another important aspect pertaining to the FDI impact on 
market structure. The presence of a strong foreign owned sector will help increase the 
quality and range of products supplied to domestic consumers, even if not all these are 
produced locally (Dunning, 1993). Non-price competition through product differentiation 
based on advertising as well as through innovation is a typical feature of market 
competition in the industries into which MNCs entered. MNCs usually tend to have higher 
level of advertising than domestic firms. There is considerable evidence to show that 
competition from MNCs, particularly in developing countries, results in the introduction of 
new products and improvements in the quality and variety of existing products (UNCTAD, 
1997a). It has long been recognised that manufacturing affiliates may serve as a marketing 
bridgehead for the parent company in a way in which a pure sales operation may not. This 
may enable MNCs to gain easier access to the local market for its other goods. This is 
especially likely in case that the MNC acquires or collaborates with a local firm 
experienced in marketing. Foreign-owned firms engage in more product differentiation 
than local firms, especially in developing countries. Caves (1974) argued that the ability to 
secure customer loyalty through cross-border product branding is one of main advantages 
of foreign firms. This is demonstrated by the advertising/sales ratio of foreign subsidiaries 
(vis-à-vis domestic firms) in many countries including the United Kingdom (Dunning, 
1958, 1985), Brazil (Willmore, 1986) and Malaysia (Lall, 1978).33 However, Lall and 
Siddharthan (1982) found a negative correlation between advertising intensity and foreign 
presence. Product differentiation also strengthens the FDI impact on market concentration. 
Manrique (1982), Newfarmer and Marsh (1992) and Willmore (1989) showed that product 
differentiation tends to increase concentration in consumer industries serving primarily 
local markets.34 
4.3 Determinants of Market Shares of MNCs: A Dynamic Extension of the 
Static Approach 
The association between inward FDI and market concentration can be strong in developing 
countries. However, any observed correlation between concentration and FDI based on the 
cross-industry studies needs to be carefully considered before concluding that there is a 
causal relationship. Since FDI inflows and industry concentration share common causes, 
the positive correlation between foreign presence and market concentration in host 
countries could imply not only that foreign presence leads to higher concentration or that 
higher concentration stimulates MNC entry; it could also imply that both are related to a 
third factor. The traditional cross-industry studies simply involved a cross-sectional 
                                                        
33 They also face the question whether the higher advertising/sales ratios reflect other characteristics of MNCs, 
such as their size or product diversity.  
34 Most of the above studies rely on data about US MNCs, and it may be questioned whether these findings can 
be generalised to other foreign investors. 
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equation with a measure of FDI as one of the determinants of concentration. The positive 
correlation tested by the cross-industry studies, if carefully interpreted and supplemented 
by other information, can be used as a reasonable starting point for examining the 
competitive effects of inward FDI. The traditional approach overlooks the role and the 
nature of government policies and firm strategies. The ownership advantage of MNCs has 
been one of the cornerstones of the economic theory of FDI. However, competitive 
advantages of MNCs that stems from their entry strategies for foreign markets rather than 
their ownership of proprietary assets are generally overlooked in the international business 
literature. The actual relationship between inward FDI and market structure should be 
examined on a case-by-case basis by the intra-industry studies with sufficient 
consideration of firm strategies and institutional factors.  
Although the traditional static approach surveyed in the last section highlights the core 
of the structural problem that FDI could pose on domestic industries, real markets, 
particularly those in developing countries, are constantly undergoing change. The FDI 
impact on competition is dynamic in nature and should therefore be studied longitudinally. 
However, there is very little empirical work on this issue, due partly to the lack of a 
conceptual design and succinct testable hypotheses. This section, therefore, seeks to extend 
the static analysis into the difficult area of dynamics and introduce a crucial question: 
namely, how market share achievements of foreign firms are determined over time? A 
conceptual framework is developed to facilitate the empirical studies on the dynamic 
relationship between FDI and market structure. The transaction-cost analysis of MNCs 
implies their prevalence in industries with concentrated sellers (Caves, 1971). Therefore 
we focus on MNCs and their business practices in this section. 
4.3.1 Pro- and Anti-Competitive Effects of the Business Practices of MNCs 
FDI has largely enlarged the role of international production in the world economy. More 
firms in more industries and countries are expanding abroad through direct investment. 
Today, approximately 60,000 parent companies worldwide have established over 800,000 
affiliates abroad, with inward FDI stock valued at roughly US$ 4,000 billion (OECD, 
2002a; UNCTAD, 2001). They provide an important source of industrial production and 
employment in many developing economies. In the new context of global economy, the 
nature and content of MNC activity has undergone a marked transition, as their ownership 
advantage, or mobile assets, have become more mobile around the globe. Although 
scholars and policy makers have addressed the role MNCs played in a host country’s 
economic development since the 1960s, the net costs and effects of MNCs for a host 
country have proven difficult to estimate and are sill subject to debate (Fortanier, 2004). 
The presence of MNCs may crowd out local firms and the restructuring of acquired firms 
may result in massive layoffs.35 The ownership advantage of MNCs makes them more 
possibly than domestic firms to engage in non-competitive conduct. Their freedom to 
exercise their market power will depend on the domestic policy environment and the 
reaction of domestic firms (Frischtak and Newfarmer, 1994). If MNCs dominate the 
domestic markets, the potential abuse of their dominant positions may pose severe threat to 
the industrial performance and development in developing countries. 
The business practices of MNCs may affect the nature of competition in a host economy. 
                                                        
35 For the recent discussions of the negative effects of MNCs on host-country economies, see Korten (1995) and 
Hertz (2001). 
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MNCs can inject competition into markets for goods and services and contribute to 
improving efficiency. The characteristic features of MNCs that cause FDI can also have 
positive consequences for market competition and, hence, for the industrial performance 
and development. However, the same competitive strength could, under certain conditions, 
also create opportunities for MNCs to eliminate competitors, gain dominant positions 
within markets and even abuse their market dominance and engage in anticompetitive 
practices, hence leading to possible reduction in efficiency. In case that concentrated 
market emerged as a consequence of MNCs’ entry and participation, there may be more 
possible for them to indulge in anticompetitive practices in domestic markets. Firm 
behaviour has close relation with market structure. High market share are more likely to be 
associated with the possibility of anticompetitive practices such as collusion, exclusionary 
vertical practices and predatory pricing (see next subsection for a detailed discussion). 
The subsidiaries of MNCs, because of its possession of ownership advantages and its 
status in an international production system, have more competitive advantages and greater 
conduct options available than domestic firms. These characteristic features of MNCs may 
affect the structure of the domestic market and can also have consequences for the degree 
of competition in a given market and, hence, for the performance of firms and an industry 
as a whole. The entry and operation of a MNC can inject competition into a domestic 
market, particularly if the market has a limited number of sellers relative to its size prior to 
the entry of foreign firms. The entry of MNCs can then be expected to improve the 
performance of industrial development and increase consumer welfare by lowering prices, 
improving product quality and introducing new technologies, in case that the relevant 
market continues to function efficiently.  
Because subsidiaries of MNCs behave differently compared with domestic firms, one 
can evaluate the impact of MNCs on not only industrial but also firm performance. MNCs, 
because of their distinctive features, are often more efficient in production than their 
domestic counterparts. A number of studies suggested that average productivity levels are 
higher in foreign affiliates than in their domestic rivals (Dunning, 1993; Globerman et al., 
1994). In developing countries, evidence suggests that foreign affiliates are often more 
efficient in production than domestic firms.36 According to studies for Brazil (Willmore, 
1986), Singapore (Lecraw, 1985), India (Kumar, 1990), Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
(Ramstetter, 1993, 1995, 1996), labour productivity in foreign affiliates tended to be higher 
than that in domestic firms in the same industry. Studies of TFP for a few countries also 
indicate a tendency for foreign firms to have higher productivity. There is some evidence 
from industry-level studies within developing countries to suggest that MNCs were 
profitable than their domestic competitors.37 There are many other relevant studies on 
competitive behaviour, the efficiency of firms and the impact on performance.38  
However, the discriminating characteristics, of itself as well as the environment, allow a 
MNC or its affiliates to pursue distinctive patterns of conduct or behaviour – some of 
which may have nothing to do with its efficiency. The entry of MNCs and their activities 
may not only enhance performance, with the competition they inject in, but also, under 
certain conditions, carry a potential for anticompetitive practices that could negatively 
affect the performance of markets and industries. Systematic studies on anticompetitive 
behaviour of MNCs are lacking (UNCTAD, 1997a). However, MNCs have involved in 
                                                        
36 See UNCTAD (1997a) for a survey. 
37 See UNCTAD (1993b) for a survey. 
38 See UNCTAD (1993b) and Dunning (1993) for surveys. 
160  Chapter Four 
 
many antitrust cases in recent years, which highlights the significance of this issue. The 
main types of anticompetitive practices in which MNCs may engage and that are of 
interest from the viewpoint of host countries include collusion, monopolising M&As, 
exclusionary vertical practices and predatory behaviour (UNCTAD, 1997a). The collusive 
practices, ranging from hard-core cartel to tacitly collusive behaviour, have always been 
one of the central concerns of competition authorities. According to Caves (1996), a MNC 
might be less inclined to join in with cosy collaborative local arrangements. But there are 
some essential features of MNCs that might strengthen the prospect of collusion (see e.g. 
Bernheim and Whinson, 1990). Although the potential for such collusion involving MNCs 
that is of specific relevance to host counties exists, there is no systematic evidence of such 
collusion. Most of the evidence regarding collusion predated the Second World War (Jones, 
1986; Caves, 1996). A World Bank report (see UNCTAD, 2001) estimated the effect of 
price fixing agreement on developing countries. It reported that 6.7 percent of exports to 
developing countries, which were worthy of US$ 81.1 billion, came from industries in 
which price-fixing agreements have been detected. 
4.3.2 Market Share and Market Dominance: Theoretical and Policy Concerns 
Market share represent a firm’s share of total industry sales, which is the leading element 
of market structure and is a simple fact which is central to the study of industrial 
organisation (Shepherd, 1972). The structure of a market is largely characterised by the 
size distribution of different competitors in an industry, which can naturally be considered 
as the distribution of the market shares of firms. For firms, market share can be considered 
a key measure of business performance. Market share is a relatively visible and easily 
monitored indicator of the strategy performance of firms. As a simple structural indicator, 
market share is the most general, direct single indicator of the firm’s ability to exert market 
power (Shepherd, 1987). Within each market, each firm’s market power varies with its 
market share. Although the market power is not in direct proportion to the market share, a 
dominating market share does provide a high degree of market power in the market. To the 
extreme, a pure monopoly with the market share of 100 percent controls the entire market 
and can exert the maximum market power that is possible under the specific conditions of 
the market. However, market shares may be misleading indicators of the market power 
enjoyed by a single firm or a group of firms. Endogeneity of market structure variables, as 
highlighted in the famous Harvard-Chicago debate 39  or in the recent industrial 
organisation literature, complicates the relationship between market share and market 
dominance. 
Market structure is of interest largely because of the effect it is believed to have on firm 
behaviour. High market share are likely to be associated with the possibility of 
anticompetitive practices. Observing market shares and its distributions is a logic starting 
point in an enquiry into possible position of market dominance. Once the relevant market 
has been defined, it is a reasonably simple matter to compute the market share of the 
leading firm(s). In antitrust practice, both in the United States and in the European Union, 
market dominance has often been inferred from some structural characteristics, most 
importantly from market shares, assuming some market share and market dominance to be 
positively correlated. However, market share along may be a poor guide for competition 
                                                        
39 See e.g. Comanor and White (1992), Hay and Werden (1993), Mueller (1993, 1996, 1997), Kovacic and 
Shapiro (2000) and White (2000) for discussions from an antitrust perspective. 
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analysis. In some important US antitrust cases in the early years, market shares was placed 
at the centre of an antitrust investigation with the presumption that the lager the market 
share the greater the market power. Since the 1970s, it has been recognised that, as long as 
consumer interests are served by efficient firms, even firms with substantial shares of 
markets, competition policy should not intervene. However, when large firms abuse their 
market dominance to exclude rivals in unreasonable manners, competition policy should 
act to preserve competition, both on prices and regarding product improvements stemming 
from innovation. 
Despite shortcomings, market shares may contain valuable information on horizontal 
competition (White, 2000). The analysis of market share can act as a screening device for 
possible antitrust action. A high market share may justify a more thorough antitrust 
investigation, while a small market share tends to have the opposite effect – it is because 
those anticompetitive problems are unlikely to arise in the latter case. Some antitrust laws 
or implementation directives or guidelines have market share thresholds incorporated to 
simplify the inference of a dominant market position or when to challenge a merger. But 
we should be careful when interpreting market share for two reasons: first, a high market 
share in rapidly evolving industrial context may have no relation with anticompetitive 
concerns; secondly, although individual market shares of leading firms can be low and may 
be well below certain thresholds, these firms may, as a group, be jointly abusing market 
power to the detriment of customers (Canoy and Weigand, 2002).  
There have been abundant empirical researches focusing on the relation between market 
structure and performance mainly since the 1960s. This relates to a central issue in the 
industrial organisation field: whether market structure determines performance or market 
power really does raise price and profits, in the patterns that can be tested empirically. The 
econometric research in this area began in the 1930s, at first centred on the relation 
between industry-level concentration and price, and then individual-company market share 
and profit rates. The market share data have been far scarcer than concentration ratios and 
thus those ratios took the centre stage in the literature of industrial organisation from the 
1930s to the 1970s. Market share research has expanded since the 1970s, but it usually has 
to rely on relatively rough estimates of market share. The effect of market share on firm 
profitability has been estimated with regression models including the main structural 
elements as determinants. These elements include the industry-level factors, such as 
market concentration and entry barriers, and firm-level factors, such as market share, firm 
size, advertising intensity and firm growth. According to Shepherd (1987), various studies 
reported consistent findings – market share’s partial correlation with profit rates is highly 
significant. The studies demonstrated that a large-share firm earns significantly higher 
profits than a small-share firm, which accord with common business experience. In these 
studies, the industry-level structural elements (market concentration and entry barriers) 
played much weaker roles, compared with market share. 
4.3.3 Determinants of Market Share Achievements of MNCs 
Examining the determinants of the market share achievements of foreign firms in domestic 
markets is the central concern when we study the structural effect of FDI on industries. By 
investigating the determinants of market share achievements of MNCs, the sources of their 
market power can be identified. Literature in industrial organisation and business 
administration can help us to identify the sources of market power, which may have 
important implications for designing an efficient policy to promote industrial development.  
In the fields of industrial organisation, strategic management and marketing, a 
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substantial body of literature has been directed towards a better understanding of the 
determinants of market share achievement. The determinants of market share performance 
are usually classified into firm- and industry-specific factors. The former includes average 
cost, investment, pricing, advertising and efficiency. The latter includes market growth rate, 
product life cycle stage, market structure, technological change, demand concentration, 
distribution and customer responds. Methodologically, there are two approaches to the 
study of the determinants of market share performance. The static approach focuses on 
established or mature industries, departing from a relatively fixed number of competitors 
in one industry. It investigates how competition determines the market share achievements 
of different competitors. In the dynamic approach, the industry is considered to be in a 
process of industrial development and change through technological improvement and 
learning. Consequently, the timing of firm decisions and new market entries are considered 
vital factors that determine market share achievement. Market share research can also be 
divided into cross-industry and intra-industry studies.40 The studies on industry-specific 
factors can only be based on cross-industry data. The studies on firm-level factors such as 
entry strategies can be based on both cross-industry and intra-industry samples. Facing the 
complexity of foreign market entry, intra-industry case studies are more relevant to 
generate insights and to expand and generalise theories.  
Investigations into foreign market share achievement extend market share studies 
beyond a mere domestic setting. In addition to profitability and business survival, foreign 
market share has increasingly been recognised as a major measure of performance in 
international markets. The performance consequence of foreign market entry strategies has 
received considerable attention from international business researchers (Wilson, 1980; 
Root, 1987; Ryans, 1988; Li and Guisinger, 1991; Mascarenhas 1992a, b; Mitchell et al., 
1992; Woodcock et al., 1994; Li, 1995; Luo, 1998; Shaver, 1998; Pan and Chi, 1999; Pan 
et al., 1999; Isobe et al., 2000; Brouthers, 2002). Although preceding studies that address 
the relation between entry strategies and market share achievement exist in the IB literature 
(Ryans, 1988; Mascarenhas 1992a, b; Mitchell et al., 1992; Luo, 1998; Pan et al., 1999), 
gaps remain. First, institutional factors are normally overlooked and the investigation of 
entry strategy has focused mostly on the mode of entry and, more recently, the timing of 
entry. There have rarely been studies that consider the multiple dimensions of entry 
strategy systematically and pay sufficient attention to more detailed aspects of entry 
strategy. Second, although the performance consequence of entry strategies and some other 
relevant factors has been studied, the relationship among these factors has not been 
clarified in a logical theoretical framework.  
The study of the determinants of foreign market share can be based on the established 
theories and methodologies of market share determinants in the non-international setting, 
especially on the dynamic approach. However, to study the relation between strategic as 
well as institutional factors and foreign market share achievement, simply putting entry 
strategies into the spectrum of market share determinants is not appropriate. Figure 4-2 
presents a theoretical model for analysing determinants of market share achievements of 
foreign firms in domestic markets.  
                                                        
40 Many studies pertaining to market share are cross-industry research, using the PIMS (Profit Impact of Market 
Strategies) database (Caves and Porter, 1978; Buzzell and Wiersema, 1981; Lillis et al., 1985; and Robinson and 
Fornell, 1985). 
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Figure 4-2 Determinants of foreign market share achievement: a theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model shows that market share achievement should be considered as the outcome 
of competition. Entry strategies of foreign firms can influence the outcome of competition 
and make a difference to the market share achievements of firms entering a foreign market 
from abroad. Based upon specific entry strategies, a firm may preempt its competitors and 
develop competitive advantages by acquiring and accumulating strategic resources 
(superior resources and capabilities of a firm also affect its optimal entry strategies.) 
However, it is the competition process that ultimately determines the market share 
achievements of different competitors. Entry strategies per se do not affect market shares, 
but entry strategies do give firms particular sustainable competitive advantages, which can 
translate into market share differential. The model shows that competitive advantages stem 
from both proprietary assets and entry strategies. 
Foreign firms face interrelated questions with regard to foreign market entry strategies: 
where to enter (location of entry), how to enter (mode of entry), when to enter (timing of 
entry), on what scale (scale of entry) and at what pace (sequence of entry). One stream of 
research in international business investigates the determinants of entry strategies, 
indicating how firms systematically make their entry strategic decisions. Another stream of 
research examines the consequence of entry strategies, showing that entry strategic 
decisions affect business performance of firms. In the studies of the performance 
consequence of entry strategies, the most attention is devoted to various modes of entry 
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1994; Li, 1995; Shaver, 1998; Pan and Chi, 1999; Pan et al., 1999; Brouthers, 2002). The 
timing of entry has received increasing interest (Ryans, 1988; Mascarenhas 1992a, b; Luo, 
1998; Pan and Chi, 1999; Pan et al., 1999; Isobe et al., 2000; Gaba, 2002). But other 
aspects of the complex set of entry strategies (as illustrated in Figure 4-3) remain largely 
neglected. One of the most critical strategic decisions faced by managers responsible for 
the development of an entry strategy for a new market but usually neglected by scholars is 
the scale of entry. A notable exception is Mascarenhas (1997). Another important aspect 
relates to the sequencing of foreign market entry. The sequencing of foreign market entry 
in terms of entry mode has been examined (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Guillen, 2003; Delios and Henisz, 
2003). But the sequencing of foreign market entry in terms of entry scale still has hardly 
been considered.  
Figure 4-3 Foreign market entry strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 illustrates that institutional factors can be supposed to influence entry 
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also after entry, therefore bridging entry strategies and the after-entry competition process.  
With regard to the dynamic process of foreign market entry, the determinants of market 
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The at-entry strategic and organisational factors are the specific focus of this study. The 
after-entry factors, mostly operational factors such as cost, pricing and advertising, are 
included in the ‘black box’ of competition process in Figure 4-2. A vital question for the 
studies on foreign market share achievement is which category of factors plays a key role 
in determining market share achievement. Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) for instance 
addressed this question with regard to entry order. They argued that entry order effects are 
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weaker than effects related to price and advertising. Empirically, by decomposing the 
sources of market share variation, it could be possible to measure what proportion of the 
variation in market share achievement can be attributed to at- and after-entry factors 
respectively. The more the variation of market shares can be explained by the at-entry 
strategic and organisational factors, the more dynamic the industry is. The static research 
approach of the study of market share achievement focuses primarily on the (static) 
after-entry factors, while the dynamic approach focuses on entry strategy or other dynamic 
factors such as organisational learning and technological change.  
4.4 FDI, Technology Transfer and the Sectoral System of Innovation: The 
Dynamic Approach 
The preceding two sections analyse the structural effects of FDI on domestic markets. 
Apart from this line of inquiry, this section addresses the dynamic effects of FDI on 
domestic industries. Efficiency raises and industry develops as firms enforce stricter and 
more cost-conscious management, reduce slack, and motivate employees to work harder, 
because of the underlying desire for profits and the ongoing pressure from competition. 
Industrial development is more the outcome of dynamic sequences than this static one: 
technological advance plays the central role in driving industrial growth. Since Schumpeter, 
there has been considerable work on the factors generating technological advance, in 
particular, on the factors enhancing the ability of organisation to generate innovation and 
technological change in turbulent environment. MNCs play the leading role in creating and 
disseminating technology. The technological gaps between developing and developed 
countries may be bridged through FDI, which can contribute to technological advance in 
domestic industries both by technology transfer and by promoting domestic R&D activities. 
In other words, FDI can not only transfer new technology to domestic industries but also 
help build capability and promote activities that generate new technology in host countries 
(The first two subsections in this section address the two aspects respectively). Prior 
studies that addressed the FDI effect on technological progress in domestic industries 
principally focus on the first concern, namely, the technology transfer from FDI. The 
specific impact of FDI inflows on the innovation activities has been rarely addressed. 
4.4.1 FDI and Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer refers to a process of acquiring technological capability from abroad 
(UNCTC, 1987).41 The means used to acquire the technological capability include buy, 
borrow, steal, imitation, copy, adapt and beg (Meissner, 1988). According to Pattie (1987), 
the main methods for technology transfer are the exchange of ideas, the exchange of 
people and the transplant of equipment. It has been widely recognised that technological 
progress accounts for a relatively low proportion of growth experienced by developing 
countries (Shaw, 1992). Many developing countries do not have enough facilities for R&D 
and cannot afford to invest in R&D. It will take longer time and more money for them to 
                                                        
41 The term ‘technology diffusion’ can also be used interchangeably with ‘technology transfer’. The term of 
‘technology transfer’ more focuses on the sender and receiver of technology, while the term ‘technology 
diffusion’ has a more general implication. See Subsection 4.1.2 for a discussion of the theory of the relationship 
between technology diffusion and economic growth. 
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generate the came technology already developed by developed countries. These constrain 
developing countries from undertaking R&D activities, which would result in the 
generation of new technologies. Therefore technology transfer is the only choice for them 
to obtain new technology. These countries have to adopt the mould of technology 
followers due to the high costs of R&D and the uneven development of technology in the 
world and have to adopt production procedures from developed counties after they become 
standardised. Rosenburg (1982) suggested that the basic advantage of being a follower is 
tat the recipients could develop through mere transfer of already existing technologies 
without having to reinvest in them. As noted in Subsection 4.1.2, growth rates in 
developing countries are in part explained by a catch-up process in the level of technology. 
There are three basic ways through which a firm can exploit its specific technology 
abroad – and consequently for recipient countries to acquire that technology: 1) a firm may 
export products that embody the technology; 2) a firm may license its technology to a 
foreign firm; 3) a firm can invest abroad (OECD, 2002a). Technology transfer through FDI 
is the primal means for developing countries to acquire technologies due to the specific 
merits that are unavailable when using other methods of transfer. First, FDI involves the 
explicit transfer of technologies, which maybe especially beneficial for countries with low 
technological capabilities (Saggi, 2000). Second, FDI consists of not only technology but 
also an ‘entire package’ which includes complementary resources such as managerial 
know-how and human resources (UNCTAD, 1999; OECD, 2002a). Third, many 
technologies transferred through FDI are not available on the market. MNCs are reluctant 
to sell new and sophisticated technologies on the market and usually utilise them through 
their own foreign affiliates rather than through joint ventures or licensing agreements 
(Mansfield and Romeo, 1980; McFetridge, 1987). Fourth, some technologies, if available 
on the market, may be less costly to acquire through FDI than licensing. Fifth, the 
technologies are usually more efficiently exploited by MNCs that developed them than by 
outsiders (OECD, 2002a). Several theoretical studies on economic growth have 
highlighted the role of FDI in the technological progress of developing countries (cf. 
Findlay, 1978; Wang, 1990). Empirical studies suggested that FDI has been a major 
channel for the access to advanced technologies and plays a central role in the 
technological progress (cf. Borensztein et al., 1998).  
It has long been argued that MNCs must possess technological advantages before 
engaging in FDI activities. FDI can contribute to technology acquisition of host economies 
by adopting production process in and transferring knowledge to the local affiliates within 
the administrative framework of MNCs. In addition to this direct effect, a crucial channel 
through with FDI can transfer technology and promote industrial development is the 
technology or knowledge externalities being extended from MNCs to domestic firms. The 
externalities, or spillovers, from FDI are especially important for developing countries 
because they are usually constrained from conducting R&D, which would generate new 
knowledge. The main mechanisms through which FDI can enhance technological 
capabilities and human resources, thus affecting development is by the generation of 
spillovers, which have attracted considerable interests in recent empirical studies. In prior 
research on FDI spillovers in literature, the determinants of productivity are usually the 
central concern and spillovers are generally measured as the impact of the presence of 
foreign firms on the productivity of domestic firms (e.g. Caves, 1974; Globerman, 1979; 
Blomström and Persson, 1983; Blomström, 1986b; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Kokko, 
1992; Kokko, 1994; Kokko et al., 1996; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Liu et al., 2000; 
Chung, 2001; Buckley et al., 2002). These empirical studies tested the hypothesis that 
technological spillovers result in both higher factor productivity for local firms and in 
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higher factor rewards. Research on the impact of FDI on domestic firms dates back to the 
study of Caves (1974) who found that productivity levels are higher for domestic firms that 
compete in industries with a high FDI presence in Australia. Globerman (1979) also found 
similar evidence of positive FDI spillovers in Canada. Blomström and Persson (1983) and 
Blomström (1986b) found evidence that FDI has led to significant positive spillover effects 
on the intensive productivity of domestic firms and on the rate of growth of domestic 
productivity in Mexico.42  
However, there are cases where spillovers have apparently not taken place at a 
considerable scale, as suggested by the studies of FDI in various European countries 
(Cantwell, 1989). Some studies on developing countries also reported result that 
questioned the potential positive spillover effects of FDI. For example, Hahhad and 
Harrison (1993) found that although dispersion of production is smaller in sectors with 
more foreign firms, FDI does not accelerate the productivity growth of domestic firms. 
Aitken and Harrion (1999) demonstrated that the earlier findings in support of positive 
spillovers are likely to be driven by the endogeneity of FDI. FDI may choose to go to 
better performing industries. Once the industry specific factors are controlled for there is 
no evidence for positive spillovers. Based on a cross-country regression analysis of 69 
developing countries, Borensztein et al. (1998) found that the positive correlation between 
FDI and TFP growth holds only when a host country has achieved a minimum threshold of 
human capital development. The mixed results of the studies on FDI spillovers may also 
reflect the omission of important variables such as R&D expenditure and employees with 
technical degrees (Diankov and Hoekman, 2000), or due to the fact that these studies used 
different proxies for foreign presence (Görg and Strobl, 2001). 
A possible reason for the contradictory finding of the studies on FDI spillovers may be 
attributed to various host country and industrial characteristics (Kokko, 1994). Kokko 
(1992) divided industries into two groups according to the productivity gaps between 
foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms. He found that productivity is more sensitive to 
foreign presence when the gap is small and then the two groups engage in comparable and 
directly competing activities. The technology transfer from MNC affiliates seem to be 
larger in countries and industries where the educational level of the domestic labour force 
is higher, where local competition is tougher, and where the host country imposes fewer 
requirements on the affiliates’ operation (Blomström, 1992; Kokko, 1992). Kokko (1994) 
examined technology spillovers in Mexican manufacturing industry and found that factors 
related to technology alone do not inhibit spillovers, but that large productivity gaps and 
large foreign market shares together appear to make up significant obstacles. He argued 
that the industries where large productivity gaps and large foreign market shares occur 
simultaneously are characterised by differentiated products and/or significant economies of 
scale, which allow foreign affiliates to crowd out domestic firms from important segments 
of the market. 
MNCs are recognised to be efficient vehicles for the transfer of technologies. However, 
domestic firms play the leading role for local learning to create spillovers. The technology 
spillovers from FDI is largely depend on whether foreign firms developed linkage, 
especially backward linkage, to local firms.43 Hobday (1995) found a large number of 
situations in which initial MNC investment in East Asian newly industrialise economies 
                                                        
42 See Blomström and Wolf (1994). 
43 Some empirical evidence of backward linkage includes Behrman and Wallender (1976), Lall (1980), UNCTC 
(1981) and Watanabe (1983).  
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created backward linkages to domestic suppliers. Linkage creation by foreign affiliates in 
host countries depends largely on MNCs’ decisions on how to source inputs (Chen, 1996). 
According to Rodríguez-Clare (1996), more linkages are created when the production 
process of an MNC uses intermediate goods intensively. In some cases local content starts 
at a low level and linkage with local suppliers developed over time.44 For foreign affiliates, 
the ability to source or subcontract locally can reduce production costs, increase 
specialisation, and adapt their products better to local conditions. The trend of greater 
outsourcing can explain why supplier clusters are of growing important in the location 
decision of MNCs. For domestic suppliers, linkage may be the most important channel 
through which local learning takes place. Linkage can promote the adoption of new 
technology for local firms, which will face higher demands on the quality of the 
intermediates. MNCs may provide technical assistance or training to raise the quality of 
the intermediate products from local suppliers (Lall, 1980). McIntyre et al. (1996) pointed 
out that quality requirement seem to be the driving force for technology transfer through 
backward linkages. Based on a survey of empirical literature, Lall (1981, 1992) concluded 
that there are relatively strong linkages between import substituting MNCs and domestic 
firms in large economies and particularly in countries that have strict requirements of local 
content. Purely export-oriented MNCs, on the other hand, tend to have weaker linkages 
with the local industry. According to Lall, one explanation for this is that factor costs seem 
to be more important for the location choices of these firms than access to locally produced 
intermediate goods. For export-oriented MNCs that operate in complex industries such as 
electronics, it is found that efficiency requirements reduce the scope for domestic linkages 
in developing countries to practically nothing (Lall, 1981). Situation in these industries in 
specific developing countries changed in the 1990s, as local intermediate producers grew 
up and even formed supplier clusters to feed MNCs, such as what took place in Taiwan 
earlier and the Pearl River Delta later. 
Spillovers can take place through demonstration effects, the mobility of personnel, 
enterprise spin-off and competition (UNCTAD, 2001). The demonstration effect means 
that the (successful) adoption of a technology by MNCs in the domestic market may lead 
domestic firms to update their own production methods. The (successful) introduction of a 
new technology by the MNC first-movers reduced the risk for the domestic followers to 
adopt the same technology and provided objectives for domestic firms to imitate, thus 
reducing the costs for them to adopt the technology. Technology may be transferred and 
disseminated in a host country through the mobility of personnel and enterprise spin-off. 
Employees of MNC affiliates acquire knowledge from their employers. By switching 
employers or setting up their own business, they spread technology. MNCs usually attempt 
to avoid such mobility by paying ‘efficient wage’, including a premium in order to keep 
employees from switching jobs to domestically owned competitors (Globerman et al., 
1994). The evidence of technology transfer through the mobility of personnel has been 
reported by empirical studies (Bloom, 1992; Pack, 1997). Several studies have examined 
the aspect of human resource management in association with FDI, which provided some 
insights on the effects of personnel mobility on technology transfer.45 
Among the channels through which spillovers take place, competition plays a basic role 
and reinforces other mechanisms such as demonstration effects and the mobility of 
                                                        
44 The case study of the Asian electronics industry demonstrated that linkage was negligible at entry, but within 
five years had grown substantially (Rasiah, 1994). 
45 See e.g. Katz (1987), Gershenberg (1987) and Aitken et al. (1996). 
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personnel. Wang and Blomström (1992) stressed that the more competition the MNC 
affiliate faces from domestic firms, the more technology they have to bring in to retain 
their competitive advantage and hence the larger the potential spillovers. Blomström et al. 
(2000c) found that competition spurs quicker adoption of new technology by both 
domestic and foreign firms. Kokko (1994, 1996) argued that the spillover effects might 
arise from a process of competitive interaction between foreign and domestic firms. Based 
on empirical studies of Mexican manufacturing, he found that spillovers took place more 
likely where foreign and domestic firms are in direct competition and where the 
technological gap between them is not too great. More evidence bearing upon this 
hypothesis was provided by Kokko et al. (1996) who found, for Mexico and Uruguay, 
those spillovers are difficult to identify in industries where foreign affiliates have much 
higher productivity levels than local firms. 
4.4.2 FDI, Innovation Spillovers and the Sectoral System of Innovation 
FDI may transfer not only new technologies but also the means of generating them to host 
countries. Only focusing on the acquisition of exogenously generated technologies would 
usually leave local firms utterly dependent on foreign entities to dictate the pace of 
domestic technological progress. By influencing the innovation capability and propensity 
in domestic industries, FDI may contribute to the endogenous technological progress rather 
than simply transferring technology exogenously generated to the host countries. This can 
be realised directly by the localisation of R&D activities of MNCs and indirectly by 
imposing structural effects on the system of innovation in the domestic countries. Not only 
technology but also activities generating it can be extended from MNCs to domestic agents 
in a process of innovation spillovers. Institutional factors play crucial roles facilitating this 
process. Although preceding studies that addressed FDI spillovers on firm R&D activities 
exist in the literature (cf. Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001), the specific impact of FDI 
inflows on the innovation propensity of firms – and thus of the impact of inward FDI on 
domestic innovation systems – has been rarely addressed. 
System of innovation 
Innovation processes are mediated through institutions and under constant change. One 
approach in which technological and institutional changes are explicitly linked is that of 
systems of innovation, which has been established since the seminal works of Freeman 
(1987), Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993). This approach considers innovation as based 
on an interactive and interdependent process among a wide variety of actors. The approach 
of innovation system provides a valuable conceptual framework for innovation studies. 
However, the lack of rigor and specificity in the approach of innovation system prevents 
the further theoretical development of this approach into a ‘theory’ of innovation.46  
A system of innovation is a set of institutions and organisations that are responsible for 
generation, diffusion and adoption of innovations. Different actors, such as firms, non-firm 
organisations and government agencies, are the components of a system of innovation. It is 
widely recognised that the interaction between different organisations in an innovation 
system are crucial in the process of searching and acquiring knowledge that are the basis 
for the generation of innovations (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991; Lundvall, 1992; Storper, 
                                                        
46 The best way to overcome this obstacle is by actually using this approach in empirical research (Edquist, 
2001). 
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1997). Firms are the core actor in an innovation system, because they are the most 
important organisations responsible for generation, diffusion and commercial adoption of 
innovations in a modern market economy. Firms do not innovate in isolation and 
consequently innovation has to be seen as a collective process. In the innovative process 
firms interact with other firms as well as with non-firm organisations such as universities, 
research institutes and government agencies. The approach of innovation system considers 
innovation process to be evolutionary and suggests that institutions shape (and are shaped 
by) the activities of actors and the relations between them.  
A system of innovation is responsible for generation, diffusion and adoption of new 
technologies. The basic output of an innovation system is the new technology, which can 
be measured by certain outcome of R&D activities such as patents. Different actors 
conduct R&D activities in the innovation system to produce such output. The institutions 
incorporated in the innovation system must facilitate and stimulate the R&D activities. 
From the input perspective, certain factors are necessary for the build-up, maintenance and 
operation of R&D facilities. These factors include R&D expenditures, research personnel 
and equipment. An innovation system stimulates inputs on R&D activities, facilitates the 
process of R&D activities, and produces technological innovations as output. The 
performance of an innovation system can be generally evaluated by the amount of input 
and output. The components and the relations between them form the basic structure of an 
innovation system. Different structures of innovation systems have manifold implications 
for performance.  
FDI and the sectoral system of innovation 
The concept of innovation system can be national, regional, sectoral, or particular 
technology oriented. The main emphasis of the approach of innovation system was initially 
at national level (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1982; Nelson, 1993). The approach of 
innovation system may also focuses on regions within countries (e.g. Cooke et al., 1997; 
Braczyk et al., 1998; Cooke, 2001). The Sectoral Innovation System (SIS) approach 
focuses on various sectors (e.g. Carlson and Stankiewicz, 1995; Breschi and Malerba, 1997; 
Nelson and Mowery, 1999). The SIS approach provides the best starting point for us to 
understand the innovation processes and dynamics in industries. The formation and 
evolution and of a SIS is an integral part of industrial development, which is the central 
concern of this chapter. 
The functions of innovation systems are generally the same, but they may be conducted 
by different organisations in the context of different institutions. Since the mid-1980s, 
most countries in all regions that until then had maintained widespread restrictions on FDI 
undertook substantial revisions in their FDI regimes, with a view towards incorporating 
FDI more fully into their development strategies (UNCTAD, 1999). The changes of FDI 
regimes altered the institutional context dramatically in innovation systems and 
accordingly the structure of them, thus influencing the performance of them. To construct 
a basic conceptual structure for the empirical analysis of the relationship between FDI and 
innovation in industries, we need to expand the SIS approach by integrating FDI into the 
basic analytical framework. The boundary, components and the relations between the 
components change after we integrate FDI into the conceptual framework of innovation 
system (see Figure 4-4). Subsidiaries of foreign firms become an important part of the firm 
sector in innovation systems. Accordingly, their relations with local firms, government and 
non-firm organisations add the complexity of innovation systems. As MNCs increasingly 
relocate resources and facilities in the host economy, MNCs themselves become important 
players in the innovation system of host country. In the process of international production, 
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MNCs are shifting not only their proprietary assets, but also some functions that create 
these assets, such as R&D and training, within the international production system. In the 
cases where R&D is performed by MNCs in developing countries, significant efficiency 
gains have been generated, both within and across industries (Bernstein, 1989). It has been 
argued that R&D by MNC affiliates is better than domestic R&D expenditures because 
MNC affiliates have access to the aggregate knowledge base of the parent company and 
can use the parent firm’s R&D facilities (WTO, 1998b). 
Figure 4-4 National system of innovation with inward FDI 
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within the national innovation system. In addition to domestic efforts, inward FDI provides 
a new channel to realise technological catch-up and fill the technology gaps for developing 
countries. As MNCs shifting their mobile assets to specific locations in developing 
countries, the host countries will build up their own competitiveness. Attracting MNCs’ 
mobile assets requires host countries to improve the quality of their immobile assets. The 
ability to provide their own competitive advantages, or immobile assets, becomes a critical 
part of FDI attraction strategy for developing countries. While the complicated interactions 
between foreign and domestic firms are integrated into the process of industrial 
development, promoting technological catch-up by the means of technology transfer 
becomes a necessary part of the science and technology policy. Technology is not a global 
public good and the technology gaps between rich and poor countries are not easily 
overcome. In the context of globalisation of technology and innovation, successful 
economies are characterised by autonomous innovation activities and by the ability to 
absorb global technologies actively (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). For developing 
countries, the improvement of the technological status of industries to catch up with 
developed countries is a major objective.  
In this context, the relationship between foreign and domestic firms becomes the core 
factor in the structure of innovation systems because the competition, linkage and 
spillovers between foreign and local firms (see Figure 4-1) may significantly improve the 
performance of innovation systems by contributing to the intensification of innovation in 
host country industries. MNCs are the most active and important players in the world 
economy. They have been acknowledged as one of the principal vehicles for the 
international transfer of technology and managerial know-how. MNCs can bring modern 
technologies into developing countries and promote efficiency with these technologies. In 
some cases, MNCs may set up local R&D facilities and upgrade technologies as 
innovations emerge and consumer needs change. They can stimulate technical efficiency in 
local firms, both vertically and horizontally, by the means of spillovers and competition. 
The international production systems have acted as a catalyst for international technology 
spillovers, providing new opportunities for the formation of local innovation capabilities in 
developing countries. During the past two decades, international production systems have 
emerged with which MNCs locate different parts of production processes across the globe 
(see Subsection 2.3.1). The possible involvement of domestic firms in international 
production systems may help to improve the performance of domestic innovation systems. 
As the national innovation system increasingly overlaps with the international production 
systems, it becomes more complicated and more integrated with the outside world (see 
Figure 4-4). 
4.4.3 Industrial Development Ladder: Interrelationship between MNCs, Domestic 
Firms and Government Polices 
The ownership advantage of MNCs is a cornerstone of the theory of FDI. In the relevant 
literature, however, the view on domestic firms has been mainly on their inherent 
advantages associated with operating in their own environment. It should be recognised 
that competitive advantages of MNC affiliates may be eroded and domestic firms may 
develop their own advantages in the forms of proprietary technology, differentiated 
product and management know-how. The process during which this takes place has not 
been conceptualised to capture the essence of this evolutionary path of industrial 
development (see Subsection 4.2.2). To overcome the gap, this subsection presents a model 
of industrial development in which the overall structure of an industry evolves up a ladder, 
FDI, competition and industrial development  173 
 
which generally reflects the enhancement of the competitiveness of the industry, in 
particular of domestic firms. In addition to Subsection 4.3.3, this model could be 
considered as another extension of the traditional static approach. We define two categories 
of industrial development: the endogenous industrial development, which refers to 
industrial development without inward FDI, and the exogenous industrial development, 
which refers to industrial development with the spur of inward FDI. Figure 4-5 depicts the 
processes of these two categories of industrial development, reflected by the phases of 
structural change up a development ladder. 
Figure 4-5 Industrial development ladder: structural upgrading and the role of government policies 
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imports and exports coexist, which is a very common phenomenon in real-world 
industries. 
The process of the exogenous industrial development is more complex than that of the 
endogenous industrial development due to the involvement of foreign firms in the 
domestic industry. The process of exogenous industrial development consists of six phases 
of structural change. In the first phase, the same as in the process of the endogenous 
industrial development, the domestic industry does not exist and the market is dominated 
by imports. In the second phase, foreign firms enter and the domestic market is served by 
both imports and the foreign firms engaged in local production. In the third phase, 
domestic firms enter and take a part of the domestic market. In the fourth phase, products 
domestically manufactured by both foreign and local firms crowd out all imports and 
dominate the domestic market. In the fifth phase, domestic industry (including both local 
and foreign firms) begins exporting to international markets. In the sixth phase, domestic 
firms further grow up and crowd all foreign firms out of the domestic market. As in the 
conceptual process of the endogenous industrial development, this process highlights the 
continuous strengthening of the competitive position of domestic firms vis-à-vis their 
foreign counterparts, both as importers that serve the domestic market via exporting and as 
local producers that enter the domestic market through FDI. Similarly, this model neglects 
the situations in which imports and exports coexist. Another neglected situation is that in 
which inward FDI aims at exporting rather than serving domestic market. This model also 
neglects the size of F and D in Phase 3, 4, 5 and the different shares of foreign and 
domestic firms in E in Phase 5. On the basis of the underlying premise that domestic firms 
continuously strengthen their competitive position vis-à-vis foreign firms, the share of 
foreign firms is always decreasing. 
The model depicted in Figure 4-5 provides a framework for analysing industries. First, 
every industry in an open economy can be identified into one of the eight scenarios 
generalised by the model. Thus this model can be utilised as a conceptual instrument to 
compare industries of one country depending on the relative size of I, D, F and E (in 
particular I and E).47 Second, each phase in the two categories of industrial development 
constitutes one major step up the industrial development ladder and it can apply to every 
industry depending on where it is located on the ladder. Therefore the model provides a 
theoretical instrument to evaluate an industry according to its development level within the 
conceptual process that is logically incorporated in the model. Third, the transition from 
one phase to the other reflects major patterns of structural change in industries. A transition 
may take place alone the two lines as the arrows direct, or in a revere direction; a transition 
may also take place phase by phase, or jump from one phase to the phases behind the right 
next; a transition may even take place between the two lines of structural upgrading (for 
instance, when inward FDI is liberalised). Patterns of transition may generalise different 
schemas that have specific implications for government policies. Eight basic patterns as 
depicted by the arrows in Figure 4-5 are of particularly noteworthy policy concerns. For 
instance, in the process of the endogenous industrial development, the transition from 
Phase 1 to Phase 2 and Phase 3 reflects the aim of the import substitution policy and the 
transition from Phase 3 to Phase 4 highlights the purpose of the export promotion policy.  
The difference between the two categories of industrial development lies in the role of 
                                                        
47 The trade competition index, for instance, is usually used to measure the international competitiveness of an 
industry. Trade competition index = (E-I)/ (E+ I). Other similar indexes can be possibly developed to measure the 
structure of an industry by taking I, D, F, E into account. 
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foreign firms. Participation of foreign firms, especially MNCs, can act as a ‘catalytic 
promoter’ to the development of domestic industries. In addition to domestic efforts that 
are highlighted by the Japanese and South Korean model, inward FDI provides a new force 
to develop the domestic industry. The evolutionary process of technological catch-up and 
industrial development accelerates with the ‘catalysis’ of FDI and the complicated 
interactions among foreign firms, domestic firms and government are integrated into this 
dynamic process. Of critical importance for developing countries is that MNCs can 
promote industrial development by transferring technology and managerial know-how. 
MNCs can bring modern technologies into the industries of developing countries. In 
addition to technology, MNCs also possess advanced managerial know-how and can 
transfer this to host countries. The transfer of proprietary assets to host countries offers 
significant benefits to industrial development and may help developing countries to 
promote their competitiveness. Proprietary assets reside in the firms that create them and 
they cannot be easily copied or reproduced by others because the cost can be very high, 
particularly in developing countries. And, usually, MNCs are reluctant to sell their most 
valuable proprietary assets to unrelated firms that can become competitors or ‘leak’ them 
to others (Lall, 2000). In a world of intensifying competition and accelerating 
technological change, therefore, the role of MNCs for the technological advancement of 
developing countries is crucial.  
Furthermore, MNCs can also provide access to export markets, both for existing 
activities and for new businesses. MNCs play a dominant role in high technology 
production and export. Their participation becomes almost a necessary condition for 
developing countries to enter into this most dynamic area of innovation and to build up 
competitiveness (UNCTAD, 2002). A number of developing countries, including China, 
are among the principle beneficiaries (UNCTAD, 2002). The experience of them has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of MNC participation on the promotion of innovation and 
competitiveness in technology sector for developing countries. However, this conclusion 
was generally based up the analysis of the aggregate data of exports. Although UNCTAD 
distinguished primary products and manufactures (including resource-based, 
low-technology, medium-technology and high-technology products), the overall trend of 
each category can only capture the net result and different performance of various 
industries may generate valuable insights and more practical guidance for policies. This 
empirical gap will be addressed in Part III. 
Behind the ideal process of industrial development summarised by the model are the 
enhancement of local technological capability and the increasing competitiveness of 
domestic firms as well as the domestic industry as a whole. The development of domestic 
enterprise is a policy objective of most countries. Upgrading capabilities of domestic firms 
yield greater benefits than just receiving the technology and managerial know-how from 
MNCs. As discussed in the last section, the level of local capabilities determines the 
benefits of spillovers from MNCs. Countries that have relatively stringent restrictions on 
inward FDI and force MNCs into some kinds of partnership with local firms seem to 
obtain relatively little spillovers. The reason is that MNCs are more reluctant to bring new 
and sophisticated technologies to countries where they have less control over their 
proprietary knowledge (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1998). In the conceptual process of 
industrial development illustrated in Figure 4-5, domestic firms continuously develop their 
competitive advantages. This process of advantage development drives sustainable 
industrial growth. However, this ideal process of industrial development is not easy to 
attain in reality. A primal necessity is a policy framework to facilitate and accelerate the 
process, which is the essence of national strategy to promote industrial competitiveness.  
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Economic internationalisation has influenced both the location advantages of host 
countries and the ownership advantages of MNCs. They accordingly adjusted their 
strategies and policies to the new context (see Subsection 2.3.1). As argued in Subsection 
4.1.3, the potential costs of inward FDI and the market failures in the process of FDI 
provide a case for government policies. In developing countries, market mechanism is not 
well functioning due in part to the lack of market-supporting institutions. There is a large 
space for government policies, but not in the earlier version of widespread intervention and 
strict protection. In the past, most governments of developing countries used ownership 
restraints, operation restrictions and performance requirements to direct MNCs into desired 
directions. Since the mid-1980s, these policy measures have been increasingly difficult to 
use in the new investment and trade policy framework. Governments now focus more on 
improving the environment in which MNCs operate – macroeconomic management, 
infrastructure provision, human capital, competition policy, and the like (UNCTAD, 1999). 
These ownership advantages of MNCs mean that they can provide assets to domestic 
industries that other firms cannot – in case that the host country can induce them to invest 
and to transfer their advantages. MNCs, like domestic firms, respond to business 
environment and government policies. However, MNCs are more flexible than domestic 
firms to escape the constraints of policy environment. They can move their business 
activities abroad more easily, or use internal channels such as transfer pricing that not open 
to domestic firms (UNCTAD, 1999). Therefore, governments of developing countries are 
now increasingly competing with each other to produce their specific location advantages, 
or immobile assets, in order to attract MNCs’ investment (Narula and Dunning, 1999).  
In addition to FDI policy, the trade policies characterised by both import substitution 
and export promotion can be utilised to promote the development of industries, but at 
different stages of industrial development.48 Both categories of trade policies can be used 
in the process of endogenous as well as exogenous industrial development. For the latter, 
FDI policy becomes a critical concern for industrial development in addition to trade 
policy. Furthermore, the roles of industrial policy, innovation (science and technology) 
policy and competition policy are important throughout the whole process of industrial 
development. Figure 4-5 depicts the possible usage and combination of different policy 
instruments in the promotion of industrial development. 
There is no universally optimal policy framework for promoting industrial development. 
Policies should fit particular conditions of countries and industries at a particular moment 
and evolve or adjust according to the changing environment. With regard to an effective 
FDI policy, the challenges for developing countries stem from two respects. First, to 
implement polices and to establish relevant institutions that help improve investment 
environment and attract inward FDI, but to avoid engaging ‘incentive wars’ taking place 
both between counties and between localities within a country. Secondly, to implement 
polices and to establish relevant institutions that help them benefit from inward FDI as 
much as possible and meanwhile minimise the costs of FDI. By facing these challenges 
actively and properly, developing countries can establish a policy framework to reap the 
benefits of FDI, to tackle the negative effects of FDI and to promote long-term sustainable 
industrial development. 
The interface between competition policy and FDI (see Subsection 3.4.4) reflects a 
                                                        
48 Here ‘import substitution’ does not mean the traditional trade regime, which relies on tariffs and quotas on 
trade to restrict import and protect insufficient domestic firms. Rather, it means the promotion of the development 
of domestic firms in the industries that are insufficient to supply the domestic markets. 
FDI, competition and industrial development  177 
 
policy solution for the market failures in the FDI process. The analysis of market failures 
in the FDI process in terms of the abuse of market dominance (see Section 4.1.3) further 
highlights the potential necessity of competition policy. Competition is one of the 
fundamental mechanisms through which inward FDI promote economic development (see 
Subsection 4.1.2). The benefits of FDI can hardly be achieved without a well-functioning 
market. As we noted earlier, the dynamic effects of FDI on enhancing technological 
capabilities and human resources depends upon the interaction between governments, 
firms and markets. Spillovers can take place through many channels, among which 
competition is the basic one. There is risk of ‘crowding out’ domestic firms by FDI. If 
there are competitive markets, then although in the short run the productivity of domestic 
firms may be reduced, but in the long run, the intensified competition induced by FDI may 
force inefficient domestic firms to exit and surviving efficient firms to improve their 
performance, leading to the overall improvement of social welfare. To maximise the 
benefits of FDI, an effective competition policy or other institutional arrangements that can 
fulfil the similar function is needed to protect and promote market competition. 
The extent of dynamics process of industrial development depends on the interaction of 
the following factors: 1) the development of domestic markets, 2) the strategies and 
resources of the MNC, 3) the capabilities of domestic firms, and 4) government policies. 
The more competitive and outward-oriented the regime, the more dynamic is the 
technology upgrading process (Lall, 2000). Government policy cannot substitute the basic 
function played by market mechanism in resource allocation and should be based on it. 
Policy intervention should target at market failure not market itself. It is appropriate to 
reduce government regulation within the market: to simply abolish obstacles in the way of 
FDI, to minimise business costs and to leave resource allocation to the market. Moreover, 
MNCs’ activities provide beneficial effect to economic development but do not substitute 
for domestic efforts. The proprietary assets, or ownership advantages MNCs, can bring 
may complement a country’s own capabilities and provide some missing elements for 
national competitiveness. MNCs not only provide access to a complex package of tangible 
and intangible assets that vary over time and from one host country to another, they also 
catalyze domestic investment and capabilities. Thus the complementary role from MNCs is 
very valuable and sometimes indispensable. Nevertheless, to put the growth potential into 
reality and to build up national competitiveness in a sustainable manner, MNCs are among 
the participants and can only play a complementary role. Efforts from domestic firms are 
vital. It should be recognised that FDI complement domestic efforts to achieve 
development goals, thus FDI policies could not be pursued in isolation. Instead, they 
should be inextricably linked with policies in the core areas of economic development. 
Although linkage promotion is not a new policy issue for developing countries, it deserves 
renewed attention when considering the way to tap the benefits of FDI to development 
(UNCTAD, 1999).  
  
 
Part III   Empirical Study 
 
 
 
 
he Chinese model of economic development has been materialised at the industry 
level on the basis of the rapid development of numerous Chinese industries. This 
part seeks to explore the impact of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the 
development of China’s manufacturing sector and to explain how FDI has influenced 
industrial development through the competition mechanism, based on a general assessment 
in Chapter 5 and in-depth investigations into two specific industries in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7, both of which are organised in a similar manner and present a matched pair of 
cases. The theories reviewed and extended in Part II and the analytical framework 
established thereby provide the theoretical underpinning for empirical studies in this part. 
The two case studies present both the evolutionary process and the status quo of specific 
industries, comment on the successes and failures in the development processes of these 
industries, and note the opportunities and challenges for future developments. These 
empirical chapters analyse both the positive impacts brought by FDI through its structural 
as well as dynamic effects and the associated costs – to what extent markets have been 
‘given’ to Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the expense of domestic firms, without 
efficiency progress and possibly with the tolerance of the dominant positions and 
anticompetitive practices of MNCs. Multiple dimensions of industrial development are 
investigated in order to provide an overall assessment of the FDI impact on industrial 
development with particular attention to the FDI effect on competition and its 
consequences. 
The ‘two-case’ case study approach presents a comparison between two paths of 
industrial development in two Chinese manufacturing sectors: 1) the automotive sector, 
specifically the passenger car industry; 2) the electronics and Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) sector, specifically the telecom equipment industry. 
The Chinese government has identified both sectors as ‘pillar industries’. Both have 
attracted a large amount of FDI inflows and have strong MNC presence. However, the two 
sectors experienced different performance of industrial development during the reform 
period largely due to different competitive situations, which were mainly determined by 
different patterns of government policies. In the passenger car industry, a key segment in 
the automotive industry, incumbents have been shielded from competition by the 
government-imposed impediments to both market entry and import. While in most 
segments of the electronics & ICT industry, an ‘open competitive’ model of industrial 
development has been adopted. The patterns of industrial policies can generally be 
classified according to the degree of entry restrictions and trade barriers. The consequences 
of these two patterns of industrial policies, particularly their implications for the FDI 
T 
  
impact on industrial development, are analysed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. With regard to 
the methodological concerns of case study, the second case can be considered as an 
experiment duplicating the exact key conditions (the status of ‘pillar industry’ and the 
strong presence of MNCs) of the first case while altering another key condition (patterns of 
industrial policies). The contrasting results reflect the causal relationship between the 
orientation of industrial policy and the FDI impact on industrial development. 
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he rapid growth of China’s industrial sector during the reform period has paralleled 
dramatic changes in the structure of ownership (see Subsection 2.1.2). Despite their 
shrinking share of industrial output, State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) have retained a 
‘backbone’ position in the industrial sector. However, the non-state sector has already 
accounted for two thirds of the total industrial output. In the first phase of China’s 
economic transition, industrial development was largely driven by the rapid expansion of 
Township and Village Enterprise (TVEs). Since the beginning of the second phase of 
economic transition, Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) have become a central force that 
reshaped China’s industrial landscape. Large-scale inflows of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) have introduced an important competitive force into domestic markets and the new 
competition injected from abroad has conferred a strong impact on the development of 
Chinese industries. Meanwhile, the development of the manufacturing sector has also been 
strongly influenced by China’s industrial policy regime selectively supporting the 
development of ‘pillar industries’, which include machinery, electronics, petrochemical 
and automotive industries, and the growth of high-technology industries, which includes 
information technology, biological engineering, new materials, and so on. Industrial 
guidance of FDI and various restrictions imposed on business practices of FIEs can be seen 
as important instruments of industrial policy in China. This chapter aims to generally 
document the impact of FDI on competition and industrial development in Chinese 
industries, with consideration to the specific context of Chinese industries, which are 
characterised by the strong presence of a state sector and the prevalence of government 
intervention. This chapter provides contextual and methodological foundation for further 
empirical investigations into specific industries in the next two chapters. This chapter also 
reviews the empirical literature that investigates the relationship between FDI and China’s 
industrial development, focusing on the intra- rather than inter-industry impact of FDI. 
This means that the impact of inward FDI on recipient industry rather than upstream and 
downstream industries is the central concern, which is associated with the focus on the 
mechanism of competition rather than spillovers and linkage, through which FDI may also 
influence the performance of domestic firms and industries. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1, which documents the distribution of 
FDI in Chinese industries, covers FDI inflows both in different sectors in the Chinese 
economy and particularly in different industries in the industrial sector. Section 5.2 
generally assesses the impact of FDI on competition and industrial development in China. 
Extending from the general assessment of the FDI impact on industrial development in the 
last section, Section 5.3 discusses the methodology of technical econometric works on the 
relationship between FDI and industrial development, highlighting the relevance of the 
approach of longitudinal case study. This section also provides methodological guidelines 
for the empirical studies in the next two chapters. 
T 
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5.1 FDI in Chinese Industries 
Subsection 2.3.2 has addressed the overall trends and structural features of inward FDI in 
China, such as entry modes, project scale, geographic distribution and home-country 
sources. In terms of industrial distribution, we have only mentioned the total amount of 
FDI in China’s industrial sector. In order to generally assess the effects of FDI on the 
development of China’s manufacturing industries, this section documents in detail the 
industrial distribution of FDI in Chinese industries, focusing on the manufacturing sector. 
The role of government policy in guiding the industrial orientation of FDI projects is also 
investigated. A large part of China’s FDI has been from the ethnically Chinese economies – 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and Singapore, although Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
from Western countries and Japan taking increasing share (see Subsection 2.3.2). What has 
been the difference between these Overseas Chinese and non-Chinese FDI in terms of their 
contribution to industrial development? This section also addresses this issue, mainly 
based on the review of a number of important empirical studies. 
5.1.1 FDI in Different Sectors 
FDI in China is principally directed to the industrial sector: 75.4 percent of projects and 
66.1 percent of the contractual amount of FDI has been focused on industry until 2002. 
Within the industrial sector, the main focus has been the manufacturing sector, although a 
notable amount of FDI has also been directed towards the mining and construction sector. 
Until the end of 2002, 927 FIEs had been established in the mining sector and US$ 4.05 
billion had been invested. The percentage of FDI projects and contracted amount in the 
construction sector was 2.3 and 2.7 percent respectively. The service sector has totally 
accounted for 21.7 percent of projects and 32.1 percent of contractual amount until 2002. 
The agricultural sector has accounted for 2.9 percent of projects and 1.9 percent of 
contractual amount until 2002 (see Table 5-1). 
Table 5-1 FDI inflows in different sectors as of 2002 
Sector Number of projects Percentage Contractual amount (US$ billion) Percentage 
Agriculture 12,217 2.88 15.76 1.90 
Industry 319,923 75.42 546.86 66.05 
Service 92,056 21.70 265.45 32.05 
Total 424,196 100.00 828.07 100.00 
   Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) FDI Statistics. 
   Note: Industry includes mining, manufacturing, utilities and construction. 
Within the service sector, FDI inflows have been largely concentrated in the real estate 
and so-called ‘social services’ (see Table 5-2).1 FDI in the industries of real estate and 
social services has accounted for 21.9 percent of the total contractual amount of FDI 
inflows into China. Other industries within the service sector that has attracted over 2 
percent of the total FDI inflows include domestic trade (whole sale and retail) and 
                                                        
1 The FDI statistics provided by MOFTEC (MOC) does not provide detailed composition of the accumulative 
amount of FDI in different industries as of 2002. The ‘social service’ industries here include a broad spectrum of 
services and utilities except for those listed separately in Table 5-2. Please compare with the more detailed data 
for 2003 in Table 5-3. 
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transportation & warehousing. These two loosely defined industries have taken 3.2 and 2.3 
percent of the total FDI inflows respectively. Real estate is one of the industries that have 
attracted a large amount of FDI. According to the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) (2003), 
5185 foreign-invested real estate developers had been established until the end of 2002. 
The contractual value of FDI had become US$ 34.5 billion and the realised value of FDI 
had become US$ 32.6 billion.2 
Table 5-2 FDI inflows in the service sector as of 2002 
Sector Number of projects Percentage 
Contractual amount 
(US$ billion) Percentage 
Real estate and social services 45,490 10.72 181.08 21.87 
Whole sale, retail and food services 21,358 5.03 26.46 3.20 
Transportation, warehousing and post 4,729 1.11 18.80 2.27 
Hygiene, sports and social welfare 1,119 0.26 5.17 0.62 
Scientific research and services 2,933 0.69 3.31 0.40 
Education, culture and media 1,412 0.33 2.30 0.28 
Others 15,015 3.54 28.33 3.42 
Service sector total 92,056 21.70 265.45 32.05 
Source: MOFTEC FDI Statistics. 
In 2003, manufacturing sector remained the main target of FDI inflows, with 
approximately 70 percent of the number of projects and the amount of contractual as well 
as realised value of FDI (see Table 5-3). Real-estate sector accounted for 3.8 percent of all 
FDI projects and 9.8 percent of the realised amount of FDI inflows. The third largest target 
of FDI inflows was social services, which attracted 10.3 percent of all FDI projects and 5.9 
percent of total FDI inflows. Domestic trade (whole sale and retail), transportation and 
warehousing, and construction remained the major targets of FDI inflows within the 
service sector, totally hosted 7.6 percent of total FDI projects and 4.9 percent of the 
realised amount of FDI inflows. FDI inflows to China’s financial sector increased but still 
took an insignificant share of the total FDI inflows. 
Table 5-3 Sectoral composition of FDI inflows in 2003 
Sector 
Number 
of 
projects 
Percentage
Contractual 
amount 
(US$ billion)
Percentage
Realised 
amount 
(US$ billion) 
Percentage 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1,116 2.72 2.28 1.98 1.00 1.87 
Mining 211 0.51 0.66 0.57 0.34 0.64 
Manufacturing 29,281 71.28 80.75 70.17 36.94 69.03 
Construction 396 0.96 1.68 1.46 0.61 1.14 
Transportation, storage and post 506 1.23 5.01 4.35 0.87 1.63 
Whole sale, retail and food services 2,207 5.37 2.38 2.07 1.12 2.09 
Finance and insurance 23 0.06 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.43 
Real estate 1,553 3.78 9.11 7.92 5.24 9.79 
Social services 4,242 10.33 7.04 6.12 3.16 5.91 
Hygiene, sports and social welfare 85 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.24 
Education, culture and media 70 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.06 0.11 
Scientific research and services 558 1.36 0.75 0.65 0.26 0.49 
Total 41,081 100.00 115.10 100.00 53.50 100.00 
Source: MOC. 
                                                        
2 For the difference between contractual and realised amount of FDI, see footnote 63 in Chapter 2. 
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5.1.2 FDI in China’s Manufacturing Sector 
The manufacturing sector has accounted for approximately 70 percent of China’s total FDI 
inflows. The distribution of FDI in various industries in China’s manufacturing sector is 
reflected both by the absolute level of FDI inflows in industries and by the relative degree 
of FIE presence in them. Accumulated amount of FDI inflows in a number of important 
industries has been published in a recent report (MOC, 2003, in Chinese) and is 
summarised in Table 5-4. Electronics and telecom equipment, petroleum chemicals, 
building materials, pharmaceuticals, automotive industry and beverages are the industries 
that have attracted the largest amount of FDI in China’s manufacturing sector. 
Table 5-4 FDI inflows in selected manufacturing industries as of 2002 
Sector Number of projects Contractual amount (US$ billion) 
Realised amount 
(US$ billion) 
Automotive 1,256 4.57 4.47 
Beverages* 1,137 3.38 2.49 
Building materials** 3,967 10.06 6.37 
Chemical fibber 352 1.64 1.27 
Electricity 384 4.57 6.97 
Electronics and telecom equipment*** 9,409 47.87 28.06 
Household and personal products 326 0.43 0.40 
Nonferrous metals 651 3.00 1.33 
Papermaking and paper products 285 1.68 1.91 
Pharmaceuticals 1,587 5.41 3.63 
Petroleum chemicals 6,708 20.28 12.72 
Steel 273 4.18 1.43 
Tire 57 0.68 0.92 
Source: MOC (2003, in Chinese). 
Note: 1) * Including dairy products, liquor, beer, wine, soda drinks, mineral water, juices, solid drinks, and other 
soft drinks. 2) ** Including cement, plate glass, building ceramics, hygiene ceramics, and so on. 3) *** Not 
including the industries of computer, mobile telephony and integrated circuit. 
The most latest and comprehensive data on China’s industrial sector has been from the 
Third National Industrial Census, which was conducted by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC) in 1995. 3  This industrial survey adopted an industrial 
classification standard similar to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
and included totally 28 two-digit industries and 191 three-digit industries, which included 
19 mining, 165 manufacturing and 7 public utilities.4 According to the Third National 
Industrial Census, the contribution of FIEs to Chinese two-digit manufacturing industries 
in terms of their share of value-added ranged from 0.6 percent in tobacco to 65.0 percent in 
the electronics and telecom equipment industry (see Table 5-5).5 
                                                        
3 The data were published in 1997. The National Industrial Census has been conducted every ten years by the 
NBSC. The previous census was conducted in 1985, and the next census in 2005 is being prepared and will cover 
enterprises in all sectors rather than only industrial sector. 
4 The national standard on industrial classification, ‘National Economy Industrial Classification and Codes’, 
(GB/T 4754) was first formulated in 1984. The first revision of the classification (GB/T 4754-1994) was in 1994. 
The second revision of the classification (GB/T 4754-2002) was in 2002. The new version industrial classification 
divides the industrial sector into 30 two-digit, 169 three-digit, and 482 four-digit industries. 
5 The electronics and telecom equipment industry has been renamed ‘Telecom equipment, computer, and other 
electronic equipment’ industry in the new version of industrial classification standard. 
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Table 5-5 FIE percentage of value-added in two-digit manufacturing industries, 1995 and 2000 
Rank Industry FIE percentage 1995 FIE percentage 2000 
1 Electronics and telecom equipment 65.0 65.4 
2 Garments and other fabric products 53.1 48.8 
3 Leather, fur and eiderdown products 51.7 54.6 
4 Cultural, education and sports products 48.6 59.5 
5 Instruments and office machinery 43.5 49.4 
6 Plastic products 40.4 44.3 
7 Furniture manufacturing 36.1 43.9 
8 Food manufacturing 34.8 41.9 
9 Electric equipment and machinery 32.9 34.2 
10 Pharmaceuticals 30.6 24.6 
11 Metal products 30.5 34.8 
12 Timber processing 28.1 28.0 
13 Rubber products 27.7 35.6 
14 Transportation equipment 26.8 30.8 
15 Beverages 23.4 27.9 
16 Textile industry 22.9 20.7 
17 Food processing 22.1 20.7 
18 Printing and record medium reproduction 21.5 29.4 
19 Papermaking and paper products 19.2 28.8 
20 Chemical fibber 19.1 39.3 
21 Ordinary machinery  18.1 22.2 
22 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 15.7 21.5 
23 Non-metal mineral products 13.4 17.3 
24 Special-purpose equipment 12.2 14.9 
25 Non-ferrous metals 10.8 11.2 
26 Ferrous metals 5.2 4.7 
27 Petroleum processing 0.8 5.7 
28 Tobacco 0.6 / 
Simple average* 27.9 31.9 
   Source: Third National Industrial Census, Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese) and NBSC. 
   Note: * Not including the tobacco industry. 
Based on an analysis of foreign presence in three-digit industries in China’s industrial 
sector in 1995, we can find that the industries which has attracted highest share of foreign 
capital were low-technology industries, such as toys and textile, and electronics and 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industries, such as computer, telecom 
equipment and office machinery. Table 5-6 lists the top 15 three-digit manufacturing 
industries, which have the highest FIE percentage of capital or employment. This table also 
shows the share of the investment of Overseas Chinese and non-Chinese foreign investors 
in total investment in each industry.6 As illustrated in Table 5-6, FDI from overseas 
Chinese was mainly concentrated in low-technology industries, such as toys, food 
processing and textile, while non-Chinese FDI projects had a large presence in 
high-technology industries especially in the electronics and telecom equipment industry. 
                                                        
6 See Buckley et al. (2002). 
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Table 5-6 FIE percentage of capital and employment in 1995: the top 15 industries 
Industry FIE percentage of capital 
FIE percentage of 
employment 
Overseas Chinese 
percentage of 
investment 
Non-Chinese 
percentage of 
investment 
Other electronic devices 58.1 45.5 22.3 25.4 
Office machinery 56.6 38.1 15.8 35.9 
Toys 55.9 62.4 39.7 5.8 
Computer 48.0 43.3 15.8 21.7 
Cakes and sugar confectionery 46.6 22.1 21.1 12.7 
Household plastic grocery 45.9 36.3 26.8 7.7 
Other food processing 44.2 37.4 21.1 13.6 
Telecom equipment 41.7 30.8 10.1 17.3 
Electronic devices 41.2 31.8 19.1 16.1 
Clocks and watches 40.6 28.1 25.4 4.1 
Fishing tools and materials 40.5 37.9 27.3 9.1 
Garments 39.8 47.7 23.9 9.8 
Household electronic apparatus 39.3 42.7 19.0 17.2 
Other textile products 39.1 25.8 27.8 13.8 
Household chemical products 37.2 16.5 7.2 25.4 
Source: Buckley et al. (2002). 
Note: Due to the difference in statistic scope, the registered capital is not equal to the amount of investment. 
Five years later, the FIEs’ position in Chinese industries further strengthened (see also 
Table 5-5). In total 27 two-digit manufacturing industries (not including tobacco industry 
in which FDI has been not permitted), the FIE percentage of value-added increased in 21 
industries. The average FIE percentage of value-added in these 27 industries increased 
from 27.9 to 31.9 percent. The contribution of FIEs to China’s two-digit manufacturing 
industries in 2000 in terms of their share of total assets, sales and value-added is illustrated 
in Table 5-7. In China’s industrial sector, FIEs accounted for 24.0 percent of total 
value-added in 2000. FIEs utilised their assets more efficiently: they occupied 10.2 percent 
of total assets and generated 26.8 percent of total sales of the industrial sector in 2000. 
FIEs has presented in Chinese industries with different degree of significance. The 
industries in which FIEs have the largest presence in terms of their share of total assets 
includes: 1) electronics and telecom equipment, 2) cultural, education and sports products, 
3) leather, fur and eiderdown products, 4) garments and other fabric products, 5) furniture 
manufacturing, 6) instruments and office machinery, 7) plastic products, 8) metal products, 
9) food manufacturing, and 10) timber processing (see Table 5-7). Foreign presence in 
terms of sales and value-added showed a similar pattern. The ten industries ranked by the 
FIE percentage of assets were approximately the same industries in which FIEs accounted 
for the highest share of assets and value-added.  
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Table 5-7 FIE percentage of total assets, sales and value-added in 2000: the top 10 industries 
Industry FIE percentage of total assets 
FIE percentage of 
total sales 
FIE percentage of 
value-added 
Electronics and telecom equipment 37.44 72.21 65.39 
Cultural, education and sports products 34.69 60.46 59.46 
Leather, fur and eiderdown products 34.01 57.26 54.62 
Garments and other fabric products 28.08 49.05 48.83 
Furniture manufacturing 26.76 45.96 43.88 
Instruments and office machinery 24.08 57.48 49.39 
Plastic products 22.11 43.99 44.32 
Metal products 21.52 39.27 34.82 
Food manufacturing 17.60 40.81 / 
Timber processing 17.44 32.76 27.99 
Total industrial sector 10.18 26.79 23.98 
   Source: Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese). 
FIEs were more profitable than domestic firms: based on 10.2 percent of total assets and 
26.8 percent of total sales, they accounted for 29.2 percent of total profits of the industrial 
sector in 2000 (see Table 5-8). The industries in which FIEs had the highest share of profits 
are almost the same as those in which FIEs contributed most to total sales and value-added 
(see Table 5-7). However, FIEs in the transportation equipment industry is apparently 
much more profitable than in other industries. With 30.9 percent of total sales and 30.8 
percent of value-added, the FIEs in China’s transportation equipment industry earned 65.6 
percent of profits. 
Table 5-8 FIE percentage of profits in 2000: the top 10 industries 
Industry Total profits (RMB¥ billion) 
Profits of FIEs 
(RMB¥ billion) Percentage of FIEs 
Electronics and telecom equipment 49.71 35.02 70.45 
Instruments and office machinery 3.82 2.57 67.18 
Transportation equipment 19.48 12.79 65.64 
Cultural, education and sports products 2.28 1.29 56.38 
Garments and other fabric products 8.64 4.35 50.37 
Plastic products  7.08 3.43 48.46 
Leather, fur and eiderdown products 3.49 1.62 46.39 
Chemical fibber 6.35 2.92 45.88 
Food manufacturing 5.48 2.40 43.88 
Ordinary machinery 9.68 4.21 43.46 
Total industrial sector 439.35 128.25 29.19 
  Source: Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese). 
5.1.3 Guiding the Industrial Orientation of FDI: The Role of Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy is the government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote 
productivity-based growth (World Bank, 1992). Industrial policy acts as a substitute for the 
allocative function of the market and may be justified by the existence of some forms of 
market failure in industries. As suggested in Subsection 1.4.2, industrial policy has been 
asserted the central factor behind the rapid industrialisation of East Asian economies, such 
as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade 1990). The 
experience of these countries highlighted the critical role of industrial policy and 
demonstrated that governments can use an array of incentives to encourage private 
investment in strategic industries. The government identified the strategic industries that 
are believed to be critical for economic development and directed resource allocation 
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towards selected industries. Industrial policy encourages the development of industries that 
would not have taken place merely depending on firm response to market signals. 
Like in Japan and South Korea, industrial policy has played an important role for 
economic development and industrialisation in China. In the 1989 ‘Decision on the Gist of 
Current Industrial Policy’ issued by the State Council, a list of industries and products was 
identified as focal point of industrial policy. The industries and products include: 1) 
agriculture, 2) selected industries in light industry and textile industry, 3) infrastructure and 
basic industries, 4) machinery and electronics industries, 5) high-technology industries, 
and 6) manufactured products for exports. The document also identified products that need 
to be suppressed and controlled. In 1991, the People’s Congress approved the ‘Eighth 
Five-Year Plan’ (1991-1995) and the ‘Ten-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development’ (1991-2000). The ‘Ten-Year Plan’ emphasised the strengthening of 
agriculture, basic industries and infrastructures and called for the efforts to restructure and 
upgrade the manufacturing industry. The ‘Eighth Five-Year Plan’ stressed the development 
of specific sectors, which were general in line with the 1989 decision. In 1994, the State 
Council issued the ‘Outline of State Industrial Policy in the 1990s’, which provided the 
basic framework for China’s industrial policy regime. In addition to the continuous 
emphasis on agriculture, basic industries and infrastructures, the outline stressed the 
development of pillar industries, which included the machinery industry, the electronics 
industry, petroleum processing, automotive industry and construction. The outline 
prescribed that national industrial policy is decided by the State Council and the State 
Planning Commission (SPC) (renamed the State Development Planning Commission, 
SDPC, after 1998 and the National Development and Reform Commission, NDRC, after 
2003) is the government agency which is responsible for the promulgation and 
harmonisation of national industrial policies. Different industrial policies were 
promulgated by the SPC, coupled with other relevant government agencies. The 
implementation of different industrial policies were carried out by the administrative 
agencies of different industries and coordinated by the SPC. The government agencies 
responsible for economic management (such as planning, public financing, central banking, 
taxation, international and domestic trade, tariff, securities market regulation, 
administration of industry and commerce, state-owned asset management) should 
coordinate with the SPC before adopting any important policy measures which would 
influence industrial development. On the basis of the ‘Outline of State Industrial Policy in 
the 1990s’, the former SPC promulgated a series of industrial policies for a number of 
industries. 
In 1996, the People’s Congress approved the ‘Outline of the Ninth Five-Year Plan 
(1996-2000) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-term Target for 
the Year 2010’. The plan stressed the needs to promote the growth of the pillar industries, 
to develop the high-technology industries, to restructure the light and textile industries, and 
to actively increase the proportion of the service sector in the national economy. The plan 
reasserted the development of pillar industries, which includes machinery, electronics, 
petrochemical, automotive and construction. The plan also emphasised the progress of 
high-technology industries, which includes information technology, biological engineering, 
new materials, nuclear, aerospace, aviation, ocean engineering, and so on. The plan 
emphasised the importance of the informatisation of the national economy and the rapid 
development of information infrastructures. The plan specified the focus of the 
development of the electronics & ICT industry and emphasised integrated circuit, 
new-type components, computer and telecom equipment, which would provide 
information systems and equipment for the development of the economy and the society. 
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The research and development of the new generation integrated circuits was particularly 
emphasised. In line with this strategy, a series of new polices have been implemented to 
support the development of the ICT sector, particularly telecom equipment, integrated 
circuit and software (see Subsection 7.1.2 for details). In the ‘Outline of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan’ (2001-2005) approved by the People’s Congress in 2001, the development 
of high-technology industries was further emphasised. Stressed was the breakthrough and 
leap-forward in specific areas, such as high-speed broadband information network, Deep 
Sub-Micron (DSM) integrated circuit, biological engineering, new-type jet passenger 
airplane, new-type rocket, and so on. The industrialisation of digital electronic products, 
new-type monitors, fabric electronic materials and devices, modernised Chinese medicine 
and satellite application was also stressed. On the basis of the ‘Outline of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan’, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) also formulated the ‘Outline of 
the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Information Industry’. 
The objective of industrial policy can be realised through a broad package of policy 
instruments including import protection, export promotion, FDI restrictions, performance 
requirements, tax incentives and other measures to promote the development of specific 
industries. Both price mechanism and non-price means can be utilised to encourage firms 
to take actions that can promote rapid industrialisation. A broad range of incentives is 
available: financial support, direct subsidies, favourable tax treatment, and so on. Different 
from the ‘macroeconomic industrial policy’, the industrial policy we discussed here 
principally relies on industry-oriented policy measures. Other policy measures targeted at 
specific firms, regions and economic aspects can also be considered as instruments of 
industrial policy. The types of industrial policy instruments used by developing countries 
have changed greatly, especially since the mid-1980s, due to restrictions from multilateral 
and regional agreements, as well as domestic regulatory reform. As a transition economy 
in which the legacy of the planned economy still exists, the state ownership is still 
significant, and a strong government persists, China has a large number of policy measures 
to implement its industrial policy. As summarised by Zhang and Long (1997), the Chinese 
government has relied on six types of industrial policy instruments: 1) central government 
planning and financing, 2) empowering key industries with direct financing, 3) preferential 
tax rates and favourable financing for targeted industries, 4) infant industry (trade) 
protection, 5) pricing policies, and 6) administrative measures. Lu (2000) added two other 
additional policy instruments, namely, the guidelines to channel FDI into desired industries 
and various restrictions imposed on business practices of FIEs. The business restrictions on 
FIEs include local content requirements, prohibition of running distribution network, 
screening, as so on. The former has direct effects on the development of the domestic 
upstream industries, while the latter guarantees the domestic control of the downstream, 
distribution sector. The array of industrial policy instruments summarised by Zhang and 
Long (1997) and Lu (2000) neglects some specific factors and does not elucidate the 
relationship between industrial policy and other relevant policies. Table 5-9 summarises 
the policy instruments of China’s industrial policy. As demonstrated in this table, the 
planning mechanism, public finance, trade policy, FDI policy, innovation policies and 
measures of SOE reforms has been inextricably intertwined with industrial policy. In 
particular, China’s trade and FDI policies have been utilised as instruments of industrial 
policy, with selected protection of or support to specific industries. The implementation of 
industrial policies involves many government agencies: the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), the MOC, the MOF, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) and the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). The former 
MOFTEC and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) had played important 
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roles prior to the 2003 government reform in which their function was incorporated into 
the MOC and the NDRC. 
Table 5-9 Instruments of China’s industrial policy 
Policy instrument Measures or targets Government agency* 
Plan related policies   
1 Central government planning  Five-Year Plan; development 
strategies 
NDRC 
2 Price policies Price controls on specific products 
or services 
NDRC 
3 Administrative means SOEs NDRC (SETC previously) 
4 Direct state financing and 
investment 
Government investment and 
financial grants 
NDRC 
Finance related polices    
5 Tax incentives Tax reduction or exemption for 
specific industries, firms, projects, 
or R&D spending 
MOF and SAT 
6 Preferential interest rates and 
favourable financing 
Low-interest loan; preferential 
public listing 
PROB, CBRC and CSRC 
Trade related policies   
7 Export promotion measures Refunding taxes on exported goods; 
export credit 
SAT and the Export-Import 
Bank of China 
8 Tariff and non-tariff protections Tariffs, quotas, and so on MOC (MOFTEC previously) 
9 Anti-dumping and anti-subsidies Anti-dumping and anti-subsidies 
investigation and duties 
MOC (MOFTEC previously) 
FDI related policies   
10 Industrial guidance Catalogue for the guidance of FDI; 
project screening 
MOC (MOFTEC previously) 
11 Business restrictions on FIEs Local content requirements, 
restrictions on distribution and 
specific restrictions on some sectors 
MOC (MOFTEC previously) 
Innovation related policies   
12 Preferential treatment for R&D 
expenditures 
R&D expenditures deducted 
pre-tax 
SAT 
13 ‘Special projects’ and government 
financial grants 
‘Special project’ related to specific 
industries 
MOST and MII 
Supportive polices for large domestic 
firms (SOEs) 
  
14 Identification of and support to the 
National Key Enterprises (NKEs) 
Large-sized SOEs NCRC (SETC previously) 
15 Government led M&As and 
restructurings 
Large-sized SOEs  
Note: * The present government agencies in charge of the implementation of specific policies; not including the 
previous government agencies in charge (except for important ones) and the previous names of the present 
agencies. 
Industrial policy instruments utilised by the Chinese government were also under 
constant revisions due to the deepening process of economic transition and changing 
economic environment. Some policy instruments were increasingly difficult to use. As 
most prices are now determined by the markets (see Subsection 2.2.1), it is impossible to 
use the pricing polices directly in most product markets. With the deepening of the SOE 
reform (see Subsection 2.1.3 for details), direct administrative means are becoming 
increasingly unable to apply in most circumstances. As a non-discriminative business 
environment is emerging, the scope of policies towards specific categories of firms rather 
than specific industries will decrease; the policy measures will become more 
industry-oriented. After the entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), discriminative 
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treatments, such as local content requirements and distribution restrictions, towards FIEs 
will be gradually eliminated and business restrictions cannot be used as instruments of 
industrial policy. Tariff and non-tariff trade barriers to protect infant industries will be 
gradually abolished after China’s WTO accession. The standard policy measures such as 
tax incentives have become increasingly important. Direct financial subsidies for Research 
and Development (R&D) expenditure on specified Science and Technology (S&T) projects 
have increasingly become an instrument of industrial policy. Led by the NDRC, a number 
of government agencies are involved in the implementation of China’s industrial policy. 
The MOST played a major role in establishing special S&T projects and granting financial 
support to specific entities. Most of the funds are from the budget of the central 
government, thus the MOF is also involved. Main R&D subsidiary projects and 
government agencies in charge of them are listed in Table 5-10. 
Table 5-10 Funds or programs supporting R&D projects 
Fund or program Government agency in charge 
‘863’ Special Projects Funds MOST 
National S&T Breakthrough Plan MOST (also MOF) 
Industrial Technology Research and Development Funds* MOF and NDRC (SDPC and SETC) 
Innovation Fund for Small Technology-based Firms MOST 
High Technology Development Funds NDRC 
Development Fund of the Electronic and Information Industry MII 
Note: * In 2002, the funds were separated from the ‘three technology costs’ managed by the SDPC and 
the SETC. The remaining part of the ‘three technology costs’ is managed by the MOST. 
Industrial guidance of FDI can be seen as one of the important instruments of industrial 
policy in China. Industrial guidance, along with regional guidance, is the main part of the 
guiding function of China’s FDI regime, which covers the encouragement, guidance and 
administration of FDI projects and is embodied in a large number of laws and regulations. 
In line with the industrial policy, the Chinese government has adopted a ‘selective 
promoting’ strategy to attract preferred FDI projects. A series of regulations have been 
promulgated by the MOFTEC and other government agencies (see Table 5-11). In June 
1995, the SPC, the SETC and the MOFTEC jointly promulgated the ‘Tentative Provisions 
on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment’ and the attached catalogue of industrial 
guidance for FDI. This detailed catalogue categorises FDI projects into four kinds: 
encouraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited. In 1997, the catalogue was revised and 
the scope of the encouraged projects was broadened. The revised catalogue reflected the 
needs from the industrial policy to adjust industrial structure and to acquire advanced 
technology. It also highlighted the policy to encourage FDI in the Central and Western 
regions.7 The revised catalogue aimed to promote export-oriented FDI projects. The 
projects previously in the ‘permitted’ category that export 100 percent of their products 
were listed in the ‘encouraged’ category. In February 2002, the newly promulgated 
‘Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment’ replaced the previous 
‘tentative provisions’ and a new catalogue of industrial guidance for FDI was issued 
consequently. The number of ‘encouraged’ categories increased from 186 to 262 and the 
number of ‘restricted’ categories decreased from 112 to 75. The utility industries began to 
be permitted for foreign entry. The promises that China had made for its WTO accession 
                                                        
7 In 2000, the ‘Catalogue of Advantageous Industries of FDI in Central and Western Region’ was promulgated. 
The listed industries were treated as encouraged industries in the catalogue of industrial guidance for FDI. 
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was reflected in this revision – the further opening up of the service industries which 
includes financial services, tourism, telecommunications, transportation, accountancy, law 
services, and so on. In June 2003, the MOST and the MOC jointly promulgated the 
‘Catalogue of Encouraged Hi-tech Products for Foreign Investment’, which listed 917 
high-technology products within 11 categories, including information technology, software, 
aerospace, optical electronics, biological medicine & medical instruments, new materials, 
new energy, environment protection, geological instruments, nuclear and modern 
agriculture.  
Table 5-11 Regulations for industrial guidance of FDI 
Regulation Year of promulgation 
Provisions of the State Council on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment 1986 
Supplementary Provisions to Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade for the Implementation of Examination and Confirmation of 
Products Export Enterprises and Technologically-advanced Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment 
1992 
Tentative Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment 1995 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries 1995 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries  1997 
Catalogue of Advantageous Industries of FDI in Central and Western Region 2000 
Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment 2002 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries 2002 
Circular of the State Economy and Trade Commission on the Promulgation of the 
Guidance of Recent Development in the Industrial Sector 
2002 
Catalogue of Encouraged Hi-tech Products for Foreign Investment 2003 
5.2 FDI, Competition and Industrial Development in China 
Fixed asset investment, currently above 40 percent of GDP, has been the principle driver of 
China’s economic growth. The sources of investment have come from both state and 
private sectors. From 1981 to 2001, the percentage of private investment in total 
investment grew from 18.1 to 38.4 percent (for the percentage of FDI, see Table 2-7). As 
the state-led investment projects are normally based on uneconomic government decisions 
and domestic private investment is largely constrained, FDI provides a crucial source of 
private investment. The increasing FDI inflows have brought in not only capital but also 
associated technology, managerial know-how and market access. Thus, compared with 
domestic investment especially that from the public sector, FDI provides a source of 
high-quality investment. In Section 2.1, we have analysed the role of competition in 
China’s market creation and enterprise development. Competitive product markets were 
created in economic transition by curtailing central planning and moving towards 
market-based prices. New forces of competition were introduced into the markets, 
presenting a rivalry force towards the previously dominant SOEs. Inward FDI has 
introduced an important competitive force in domestic markets and the ‘new competition’ 
has conferred a strong impact on the development of Chinese industries. The effects of FDI 
on industrial development may be not only static or structural, but also dynamic or 
technological (see Chapter 4). However, the effectiveness of China’s ‘market for 
technology’ strategy depends in part on the balance between the positive impact of FDI, 
conferred through its structural as well as dynamic effects, and the associated costs. The 
discussion in this section principally focuses on the intro- rather than inter-industry impact 
of FDI (see Figure 4-1). Thus the direct and indirect linkage effects from FDI to the 
upstream and downstream industries are not covered. However, the backward linkages 
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should not be neglected as they help China develop competitive supply chains, which has 
in turn made the country more attractive to foreign investors. 
5.2.1 Rapid Development of the Manufacturing Sector: Strengths and Weaknesses 
China’s industrial sector has undergone a rapid development process during the reform 
period (see Subsection 1.4.1). This sector created RMB¥ 5,361.2 billion of value-added in 
2003. Measured in US$ converted by the official exchange rate, the amount of industrial 
value-added is 648.3 billion. By the measure of total employment, the size of China’s 
industrial economy overwhelms that of every other nation. According to the 1995 
industrial census, over 7 million industrial enterprises in China employed more than 140 
million workers, almost equal to the combined industrial work forces of the 28 OECD 
countries (Jefferson and Singh, 1999).  
China’s economy is producing a wide spectrum of industrial products each year more 
than any other economy in the world. According to the NBSC, China has become the 
largest producer of about 400 categories of manufacturing products. China’s steel 
production capacity has already eclipsed that of the United States and Japan combined, but 
it is still expanding rapidly.8 In 2003, China produced 50 percent of the world’s cement. 
Rapid growing production of basic commodities and raw materials has been driven by 
ravenous domestic demand. In 2003, China accounted for half of the world's consumption 
of cement, 30 percent of its coal and 36 percent of its steel. The gaps between domestic 
demand and supply remain a powerful driver of import growth for many commodities and 
materials in recent years. For instance, China’s oil imports rose by 30 percent, exceeding 
Japan’s to become second only to America’s. 9  Chinese firms have demonstrated 
convincingly that they can produce competitively priced and high-quality goods in a wide 
range of industries (see China’s production of a number of important industrial goods in 
Table 5-12). 
                                                        
8 See James Kynge, ‘The Chinese boom is bound to end in tears. But is might not end for another 10 years…with 
bumps along the way’, Financial Times, March 24, 2004. According to the NDRC, if all the recent projects 
finished, China’s steel production capacity will become at least 330 million tons. 
9 See ‘China’s material needs: the hungry dragon’, the Economist, February 19, 2004. 
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Table 5-12 Output of selected industrial products, 2001-2003 
Product Unit Production2003 
Growth
(percent)
Production
2002 
Growth
(percent)
Production 
2001 
Growth 
(percent) 
Yarn 10 thousand tons 984 15.72 850 11.7 700 6.4 
Fabric 100 million meters 375 16.21 322 11.2 291 4.8 
Chemical fibber 10 thousand tons 1,181 19.16 991 17.8 828 19.3 
Sugar 10 thousand tons 1,084 17.06 926 41.8 619 -11.5 
Cigarette 10 thousand cases 3,583 3.35 3,467 1.9 3,402 0.2 
Coal 100 million tons 16.7 15.00 13.8 18.9 11.1 10.9 
Petroleum 100 million tons 1.70 1.80 1.67 1.8 1.65 1.3 
Electricity 100 million KW-hour 19,108 15.52 16,540 11.7 14,780 9.0 
Steel 10 thousand tons 24,119 25.28 19,218 19.6 15,745 19.8 
Nonferrous metals 10 thousand tons 1,205 19.07 1,012 14.5 856 10.5 
Cement 100 million tons 8.62 18.90 7.25 9.7 6.4 7.2 
Timber 10 thousand m3 4,950 11.59 5,035 10.6 5,100 13.3 
Sulphuric acid 10 thousand tons 3,371 10.52 3,050 13.3 2,740 12.9 
Sodium carbonate 10 thousand tons 1,128 9.18 1,033 13.0 906 8.6 
Ethylene 10 thousand tons 612 12.66 543 13.0 481 2.3 
Chemical fertiliser 10 thousand tons 4,201 10.81 3,791 12.1 3,397 6.6 
Electricity generator 10 thousand KW 3,701 74.49 2,121 58.3 1,339 7.2 
Automotive 10 thousand units 444.4 36.69 325.1 38.8 233 12.8 
Colour television 10 thousand units 6,541 26.89 5,155 25.9 3,967 0.8 
Refrigerator 10 thousand units 2,243 40.26 1,599 18.3 1,349 5.5 
Air conditioner 10 thousand units 4,993 59.27 3,135 34.3 2,313 28.7 
Integrated circuit 100 million blocks 148.3 53.99 96.3 51.4 63.6 8.2 
Central office switches 10 thousand lines 7,380 25.92 5,861 -38.5 7,223 1.2 
Mobile telephone 10 thousand units 18,231 50.10 11,960 48.9 2,474 64.4 
Facsimile 10 thousand units 747 151.13 297 -6.6 318 19.8 
Personal computer 10 thousand units 3,217 119.79 1,464 50.1 758 12.7 
Optical telecom device 10 thousand units 8.7 34.11 6.5 -16.6 4.79 28.9 
Source: NBSC. 
With the rapid development of the industrial sector, the structure of this sector also 
witnessed gradual change. As noted in Subsection 1.4.1, the pre-reform industrialisation 
was largely based upon the central planning model of the former Soviet Union and priority 
was given to the establishment of strong heavy and chemical industries. Therefore China’s 
industrial structural change has been different from the South Korean and Japanese model 
(see Subsection 1.4.2), in which the process of industrial structures upgraded from light 
industries to heavy and chemical industries and then to some high-technology sectors. 
Even in the beginning of the reform period, the share of heavy and chemical industries in 
the manufacturing sector was relatively high, with regard to the level of economic 
development (see Table 5-13). The early industrialisation strategy focused on heavy 
industries led to serious economic problems. The development of the heavy industries was 
heavily dependent on capital at the expense of labour-intensive light industries that were 
China’s comparative advantages. Combined with lack of competition and poor incentives 
to improve efficiency, this strategy resulted in low economic efficiency (Lin et al., 1996). 
The rapid development of the consumer-good industries during the reform period has 
transformed China’s industrial structure to better align with its comparative advantages 
(OECD, 2002b). The interlocking set of reforms and government policies, particularly 
industrial policy, has created a highly dynamic industrial landscape in the reform era. 
Similar to the South Korean and Japanese model, the share of the high-technology 
industries has increased significantly, highlighted by the rapid increasing share of the 
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electronics industry (see Table 5-13). 
Table 5-13 Structural change in China’s manufacturing sector 
Industry 1981 1991 1997 
Light industries 36.0 32.4 32.9 
Food products 4.7 5.3 7.2 
Beverages 2.1 3.0 3.5 
Tobacco  4.9 6.3 5.2 
Textiles  16.1 10.0 7.1 
Wearing apparel and footwear  2.3 2.4 3.0 
Leather products  1.1 1.1 1.9 
Wood products, except furniture  0.9 0.6 1.1 
Furniture, except metal  0.8 0.5 0.6 
Paper and products 2.0 2.0 2.2 
Printing and publishing  1.3 1.2 1.2 
Chemical industries 26.6 26.9 26.0 
Industrial and other chemicals  11.5 12.9 11.5 
Petroleum processing and coal products 5.2 3.6 3.8 
Rubber products  2.2 1.7 1.3 
Plastic products  1.5 2.0 2.3 
Pottery, china, earthenware  0.5 0.6 0.7 
Glass and products  0.9 0.8 0.6 
Other non-metallic mineral products 4.9 5.3 5.7 
Heavy industries 37.4 40.7 41.1 
Iron and steel  6.9 7.5 6.5 
Non-ferrous metals  2.0 2.1 2.0 
Fabricated metal products 5.5 3.2 3.3 
Machinery  13.6 11.3 8.5 
Electronics 3.3 8.4 11.0 
Transport equipment  3.1 4.9 6.4 
Professional and scientific equipment  0.8 1.0 0.9 
Other manufactured products 2.2 2.4 2.4 
   Source: OECD (2002b). 
Despite the impressive rise during the reform period, China’s industrial sector still has a 
number of weaknesses, most of which are associated with the structural problems of the 
Chinese economy. First, China’s rapid industrial growth in the reform era has been largely 
concentrated in the coastal region. The gradual regional expansion of economic reform and 
openness has given costal regions considerable preferential policy support (see Subsection 
2.1.4). The pioneering costal cities and regions have obtained the opportunity to develop 
local industry by absorbing foreign investors and promoting non-state domestic enterprises. 
Despite the recent government efforts to develop the West, China’s industrial growth in the 
reform era has been largely concentrated in a number of coast provinces. Secondly, China’s 
rapid industrial growth was accompanied by widespread business failures of SOEs and 
large-scale layoff of workers in these SOEs, which led to high unemployment and imposed 
a threat to the stability of the society due to the absence of a social welfare system. 
Approximately 40 percent of the state sector’s workforce was laid off between 1997 and 
2000 (see Subsection 2.1.3). The recent strategy of the Chinese government to recuperate 
the Northeast region has been mainly aimed at tackling this problem. Once the ‘cradle of 
China’s planned economy’ and most industrial advanced region, the northeast provinces 
closed a large number of SOEs and faced severe problem of high rate of unemployment 
since the late 1990s. With 8 percent of China’s population, the tree northeast provinces 
account for 22 percent of city dwellers entitled to poverty relieve. Thirdly, China’s 
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industrial sector has long been a mixture of an emerging market system and the legacy of 
the planned economy. Many industries were strictly regulated and were shield from 
competition. Several important aspects of the industrial economy have still been subject to 
the old administrative systems, which are not suitable for a market economy. In the area of 
fixed asset investment, investment of the state sector is still subject to the system of 
investment management inhered from the central planning, a system the reform of which 
has been largely lagged behind the overall economic reform (Ba, 2003, in Chinese). Due in 
part to soft budget constraints, a large amount of state investment has been lavished on 
uneconomic projects, supported by government officials and branches of state-owned 
commercial banks. This resulted in overcapacity and inefficiency and led to the volatile 
nature of China’s industrial development, highlighted by the overheating-restriction cycles. 
On the other hand, domestic private investment was largely constrained due to entry 
restrictions, administrative screening and financing constraint. 
China’s WTO accession may be a watershed of China’s industrial development. Some 
problems caused by the legacy of central planning may be solved by the WTO-induced 
institutional changes. WTO membership has provided strong external impulses for further 
reforms and a series of reforms were planned at the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth 
Congress in 2003. The WTO entry increased the need to remove protection for inefficient 
industries, to promote market discipline for the state sector and to develop a new 
regulatory framework suitable for a market economy, which is important for further 
industrial development. The WTO accession impact varies by industry. In some industries, 
rapid and fundamental change has been already under way; in others, the changes have yet 
taken place. The WTO impact on an industry will depend on: 1) the current degree of 
protection, 2) China’s commitments under WTO10, and 3) the competitiveness of Chinese 
firms and the nature of market competition. Based on the assessments of the first two 
factors, Woetzel (2003) provides a prediction of the WTO impact on Chinese industries – 
some roughly categorised manufacturing sectors as well as some important service sectors 
and agriculture (see Figure 5-1). The third factor, the relative strength of Chinese firms 
(both domestic firms and affiliates of MNCs) in different manufacturing industries, will be 
addressed in next subsection, which will provides foundation for a general assessment of 
FDI impacts on the development of Chinese industries. 
                                                        
10 China’s commitments under WTO represent the consolidation of the 37 bilateral agreements between China 
and WTO members, also incorporate several multilateral agreements with the WTO working party (see the Annex 
I of OECD, 2002b, for a summary). 
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Figure 5-1 WTO impact on different industries (including agriculture and service sectors) 
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5.2.2 The Rise of China’s Industrial Enterprises: ‘National Team’ and Global Players 
With markets created and industries developed, China’s industrial enterprises grew up. The 
overall trends of enterprise development in China’s industrial sector during the economic 
transition have been analysed in detail in Section 2.1. The most profound structural change 
came from the expansion of the non-state sector (see Subsection 2.1.2). Meanwhile, the 
Chinese government used a wide array of industrial policies to support the growth of a 
‘national team’ of large firms that could compete with the world’s leading companies 
(Nolan, 2001). Firm-level evidence will be provided in this subsection to highlight the 
positions of different ownership categories of enterprises in China’s industrial sector and to 
demonstrate the role of inward FDI for firm development. The evidence shows that the 
Chinese market is ‘divided and ruled’ by the ‘national team’ of industrial enterprises and a 
large group of global players, mainly MNC affiliates. Large-sized SOEs still dominate the 
protected industrial sectors such as utilities, petroleum, steel and defence industry. Entry 
restrictions have by now largely sheltered these monopolistic SOEs from foreign and 
private competition. In the competitive manufacturing industries, foreign and domestic 
firms share the markets. The domestic players in these competitive markets include SOEs, 
Private-owned Enterprises (POEs), Collective-owned Enterprises (COEs), and other 
categories of firms, such as listed companies and International Joint Ventures (IJVs), which 
have mixed ownership characteristic (see Subsection 2.1.2). The significance of SOEs in 
these competitive markets has constantly decreased in the reform period. This trend has 
accelerated since the mid-1990s when the policy of ‘grasp the large and let go the small’ 
was formulated (see Subsection 2.1.3). 
Different ownership categories of enterprises have shared important complementary 
relationships that are critical to the overall dynamics of Chinese industry (Jefferson and 
Rawski, 1999). Despite their shrinking share of industrial output, SOEs has still retained a 
central position in the industrial sector. They remain the largest producers of a broad range 
of key commodities. In the evolutionary process of China’s industrial development during 
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the reform period, the state-owned industrial sector has provided essential resources for the 
development of non-state enterprises and the conversions of SOEs have been a vital source 
of IJVs and listed companies. On the other hand, SOEs served as a transitional device in 
providing social welfare to the urban labours in a destabilised environment of economic 
transition especially before the mid-1990s. The rapid growth of TVEs in the first phase of 
China’s economic transition was one of the most important achievements of China’s 
industrial development in that period. The pre-reform industrialisation strategy had left a 
large gap between supply and demand for consumer goods. Therefore TVEs rapidly 
expanded in the labour-intensive light industries such as garments, leather, beverages, 
furniture and paper products (Otsuka et al., 1998). TVEs were usually more flexible 
managed and more sensitive to market signals than SOEs. TVEs provided a transitional 
form of enterprises in an ideological environment with hostile attitudes toward private 
ownership and also served as an effective means of industrialisation in China’s dualistic 
economic structure. Prior to the early 1990s, industrial development was largely driven by 
the rapid expansion of TVEs. Since the beginning of the second phase of economic 
transition, FIEs have become a central force in the Chinese economy. Compared with 
TVEs, FIEs has been engaged in more technology-intensive industries, although a large 
part of FDI inflows were targeted at cheap labours in China. China’s manufacturing sector 
has already become a major production platform for MNCs. Inward FDI has introduced an 
important competitive force in domestic markets and helped reshaping China’s industrial 
landscape. 
Table 5-14 lists the 50 largest Chinese enterprises in 2002.11 Although we focus on 
industrial enterprises, this table also includes the largest Chinese enterprises in service 
sectors such as telecommunications, trade (whole sale or retail), construction, airlines and 
shipping, in order to provide an overall picture of the sectoral distribution of the largest 
Chinese enterprises. Due to the fact that China’s post service and railway transportation are 
monopolistic businesses, they are not included in this list. Financial institutions are also 
not included. Among the top 50 enterprises, 37 are in the industrial sector, including five 
firms in the construction sector and five firms in the energy (electricity) sector. Totally 27 
firms are in the manufacturing sector: nine in the electronics & ICT industry; five in the 
defence industry; four in the steel industry; four in the automotive industry12; three in the 
petroleum industry; one in the tobacco industry; and one diversified in textile and 
pharmaceuticals. The industries of electronics & ICT, defence, steel, automotive and 
petroleum are the main sectors that host China’s largest industrial firms. The petroleum 
industry hosts China’s two largest firms, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). 
                                                        
11 The data is from the rank of the largest 500 Chinese enterprises compiled by the China Enterprise 
Confederation & China Enterprise Directors Association. The financial institutions, railway bureaus, and the 
China State Post Bureau, which are included in this ranking, are not included in Table 5-14. 
12 Shanghai Automotive Industry (Group) Corporation takes 50 percent equity of Shanghai Volkswagen. Thus 
there is double calculation of sales here. 
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Table 5-14 Top 50 Chinese enterprises in 2002 
Rank Company 
Revenue 
(RMB¥ 
million) 
Industry Ownership 
1 China National Petroleum Corporation  379,200 Petroleum SOE 
2 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 378,004 Petroleum SOE 
3 China Mobile Communications Corporation 163,732 Telecommunications SOE 
4 China National Chemicals Import & Export Company 155,287 Trade (diversified) SOE 
5 China Telecommunications Group Company 149,077 Telecommunications SOE 
6 China FAW Group Corporation 127,242 Automotive SOE 
7 China National Cereals, Oils & Foodstuffs Imp. & Exp. Corporation  109,710 Trade (diversified) SOE 
8 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 77,728 Steel SOE 
9 Guangdong Electric Power Group Company 76,946 Electricity SOE 
10 Shanghai Automotive Industry (Group) Corporation 71,196 Automotive SOE 
11 Haier Group Company 71,053 Electronics and ICT * 
12 China Network Communications Group Corporation 66,031 Telecommunications SOE 
13 China State Construction Corporation 63,832 Construction SOE 
14 China Putian Corporation 60,228 Electronics and ICT SOE 
15 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 59,488 Shipping SOE 
16 Philips (China) Investment Co., Ltd. 58,425 Electronics and ICT FIE 
17 Dongfeng Motor Corporation 53,364 Automotive SOE 
18 China United Telecommunications Corporation 50,333 Telecommunications SOE 
19 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  47,100 Electronics and ICT FIE 
20 China Railway Engineering Corporation 46,963 Construction SOE 
21 Shanghai Electric (Group) Corporation 46,943 Electricity SOE 
22 China Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corporation 46,301 Trade (diversified) SOE 
23 China Railway Construction Corporation 45,202 Construction SOE 
24 China North Industries Group Corporation 42,615 Defence SOE 
25 China South Industries Group Corporation 39,692 Defence SOE 
26 China Huaneng Group 37,040 Electricity SOE 
27 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd.  36,265 Automotive FIE 
28 China Aviation Industry Corporation I 36,000 Aviation and defence SOE 
29 Lenovo Group (Legend Group) 35,542 Electronics and ICT * 
30 China National Offshore Oil Corporation  34,339 Petroleum SOE 
31 Yuxi Hongta Tobacco (Group) Co., Ltd. 33,596 Tobacco SOE 
32 SVA (Group) Co., Ltd. 33,146 Electronics and ICT SOE 
33 China Worldbest Group Co., Ltd. 32,002 Textile & Pharmaceuticals SOE 
34 Zhonghuan Electronics Group Corporation 28,412 Electronics and ICT SOE 
35 China Southern Airlines Limited 26,901 Airlines SOE 
36 China Aviation Industry Corporation II 26,300 Aviation and defence SOE 
37 Shenhua Group Corporation Limited 25,788 Energy (coal mining) SOE 
38 Liaoning Electric Power Corporation 25,649 Electricity SOE 
39 Shougang (Group) corporation 25,375 Steel SOE 
40 Hualian (Group) corporation 25,165 Trade (diversified) SOE 
41 China Metals Construction Group Corporation 24,766 Construction SOE 
42 Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation 24,556 Steel SOE 
43 Benxi Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation 23,423 Steel SOE 
44 Air China Co., Ltd. 23,191 Airlines SOE 
45 Shanghai Construction Group 23,003 Construction SOE 
46 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation  22,671 Aerospace & defence SOE 
47 Zhejiang Materials Company 22,648 Trade (diversified) SOE 
48 TCL Holdings Co., Ltd. 22,116 Electronics and ICT * 
49 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 22,000 Electronics and ICT POE 
50 China Shipping (Group) Company 21,600 Shipping SOE 
Source: China Enterprise Confederation & China Enterprise Directors Association. 
Note: * Mixed or ambiguous ownership. 
Among the top 50 enterprises listed in Table 5-14, there are one Private-owned 
Enterprise (POE), three FIEs, and three firms with mixed ownership characteristic. The 
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only POE is Huawei Technologies, a telecom equipment vendor. Clearly, in the sector of 
large-scale enterprises, the significance of POEs is still low, despite the fact that they have 
taken a substantial share of total industrial output (see Figure 2-2). The three firms with 
mixed ownership characteristic are Haier Group, Lenovo Group (previously named 
Legend Group) and TCL Holdings, all in the electronics & ICT industry.13 These three 
firms are representatives of the successful development and transformation of non-central 
state-owned or collectively owned enterprises. Different from the large monopolistic SOEs, 
these firms have been grown up in the competitive business environment. The three FIEs 
are Philips (China), Motorola (China) and Shanghai Volkswagen. The first two are holding 
companies established by Philips and Motorola in China and the last one is an IJV between 
Volkswagen and Shanghai Automotive Industry (Group) Corporation.  
The relatively limited number of FIEs in the top 50 enterprises has probably been 
caused by two reasons. First, several large-scale industries hosting the largest firms, 
usually monopolistic SOEs, are not open to foreign investors. The Chinese government 
will continue to have compelling political and economic reasons for maintaining control in 
many sectors and China’s business and legal environment still poses obstacles to entry of 
foreign firms into specific industries. These protected industries are dominated by SOEs 
and competition from non-state-owned firms has been limited by entry restrictions. The 
generally closed service sectors include financial services, telecommunications, trade& 
distribution and transportation (railway and airlines). The generally closed industrial 
sectors are mainly resource-based heavy industries and utility industries, such as electricity, 
gas, petroleum, steel and non-ferrous metals. Other strictly closed manufacturing industries 
include the defence industries, tobacco, and so on. Secondly, some MNCs have not 
centralised the management or common functions of different affiliates within a corporate 
group. Before the mid-1990s, the relevant laws did not permit one FIE to invest in another 
FIE or in a domestic Chinese company. Under the ‘Interim Provisions on Foreign Invested 
Investment Companies’ promulgated in 1995, foreign firms may establish holding 
companies (investment companies) to hold equities in different FIEs.14  
The large-sized SOEs listed in Table 5-14 are mostly monopolistic players in protected 
industries, in both service and industrial sectors. Many of these SOEs were converted from 
former sectoral supervisory government agencies (see Subsection 2.1.3 for a discussion of 
SOE reform). The rapid growth of the largest SOEs was associated with the strategy to 
develop large industrial groups in the 1990s (see footnote 63 in Chapter 1). Most of these 
largest SOEs have been identified as NKEs and retained a central position in China’s 
industrial sector – they have formed the backbone of China’s state sector. However, most 
of these SOEs cannot be considered as purely state-owned. As corporate groups or holding 
                                                        
13 Haier Group is legally still an urban COE. Due to the complex structure of the group, the unapparent 
institutional arrangement of ownership and the recent efforts of MBO (Management buyout), the ownership of 
Haier Group is rather ambiguous. TCL was original a SOE owned by the local government. However, based on 
the contractual arrangement which provide equity incentives for the management team according to the net-asset 
growth, the employees of TCL has hold 42 percent of the company’s equity before the recent IPO in 2004. TCL is 
now a listed joint-stock company. Legend group was originally invested by the Institute of Computing 
Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1994, the employees received 35 percent of semi-ownership 
(dividend sharing). In 1998, the 35 percent of employee ownership was legalised. In 1999, a program of 
employee share holding further clarified the individual ownership. 
14 The 1995 ‘Interim Provisions on Foreign Invested Investment Companies’ and other holding company 
regulations have been replaced by the ‘Provisions on Foreign Invested Investment Companies’ promulgated in 
2003. 
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corporations, they have a large number of subsidiaries, which are SOEs, IJVs, or listed 
companies. At the top of the corporate structure is the state ownership; while at different 
levels of the hierarchy, a large number of firms with different categories of ownership are 
affiliated.  
The entry of non-state firms injected competition into markets and introduced a rivalry 
force towards the previously dominant SOEs. The new entrants competed successfully in a 
large number of markets and captured increasing market share from the control of SOEs. 
Aggregately, the state sector, including enterprises either state-owned or state-holding, 
accounted for less than 30 percent of industrial output in the late 1990s (see Figure 2-1). 
What are the situations in different manufacturing industries? In addition to the previous 
assessment on the basis of the analysis of the largest enterprises, Table 5-15 shows the 
share of FIEs, SOEs and COEs (mainly TVEs) in 28 two-digit industries in China’s 
manufacturing sector in 1995, ranked by the significance of FIE presence in terms of FIE 
contribution to value-added. 
Table 5-15 Ownership percentage of value-added in China’s manufacturing industries in 1995 
Rank Industry FIEs (percent)SOEs (percent) TVEs (percent)
1 Electronics and telecom equipment 65.0 27.2 7.8
2 Garments and other fabric products 53.1 6.7 40.3
3 Leather, fur and eiderdown products 51.7 7.7 40.6
4 Cultural, education and sports products 48.6 14.5 36.9
5 Instruments and office machinery 43.5 42.5 14.0
6 Plastic products 40.4 13.7 45.9
7 Furniture manufacturing 36.1 10.4 53.5
8 Food manufacturing 34.8 38.0 27.3
9 Electric equipment and machinery 32.9 32.5 34.6
10 Pharmaceuticals 30.6 55.6 13.8
11 Metal products 30.5 20.0 49.5
12 Timber processing 28.1 21.0 51.0
13 Rubber products 27.7 46.5 25.8
14 Transportation equipment 26.8 59.4 13.8
15 Beverages 23.4 63.9 12.8
16 Textile industry 22.9 41.0 36.1
17 Food processing 22.1 49.6 28.3
18 Printing and record medium reproduction 21.5 59.5 19.0
19 Papermaking and paper products 19.2 45.8 35.0
20 Chemical fibber 19.1 55.0 25.9
21 Ordinary machinery  18.1 51.2 30.7
22 Raw chemical materials and chemical products 15.7 64.8 19.6
23 Non-metal mineral products 13.4 40.1 46.5
24 Special-purpose equipment 12.2 60.4 27.4
25 Non-ferrous metals 10.8 68.2 21.0
26 Ferrous metals 5.2 84.3 10.6
27 Petroleum processing 0.8 95.4 3.8
28 Tobacco 0.6 99.4 0.1
Simple average 26.9 45.5 27.6
   Source: Third National Industrial Census. 
Table 5-15 shows that FIEs already took prominent positions in many Chinese 
industries in 1995, almost the same as the non-state-owned domestic sector, measured 
approximately by the simple average of their percentage of value-added. The position of 
FIEs further strengthened since the mid-1990s (see Table 5-5), mainly driven by the rapid 
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growth of capital inflow from MNCs. Almost all MNCs in the Fortune 500 ranking have 
invested in China, except for those operating in the industries in which China restricts 
foreign entry.15 However, the aggregate data of FIE presence in standard classified 
industries cannot enable us to assess the degree of MNC participation in Chinese industries 
and the data for the largest enterprises in Table 5-14 only touches upon several largest FIEs 
in one year. To generally examine the degree of MNC presence in Chinese industries, we 
turn to the more detailed firm level evidence.16 This evidence covers the largest MNC 
subsidiaries, which have the highest potential to dominate domestic markets. Table 5-16 
lists China’s top 10 FIEs in 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2002 respectively.17 Due to the fact that 
some MNCs have not centralised the management or common functions of different 
affiliates within a corporate group, for most MNCs their China affiliates are individual 
statistical units in the MOFTEC’s statistics. For instance, Shanghai Volkswagen and 
FAW-Volkswagen are taken as individual firms in Table 5-16. If summing up, Volkswagen 
may become the largest foreign investor in terms of annual turnover in China. Similarly, if 
the three largest China affiliates of Nokia were summed up, the 2002 revenue of Nokia in 
China would become RMB¥ 41.6 billion. 
                                                        
15 According to a survey by Wang (2000). 
16 The firm-level evidence is dawn from a dataset, compiled by the author on the basis of data from the MOC 
(previously MOFTEC and SETC), which includes the largest 500 FIEs and the largest 500 National firms (mainly 
SOEs) for the 1990-present period. 
17 The data is according to ‘largest 500 foreign-invested enterprises’ list compiled by the MOFTEC. Two 
categories of companies in the MOFTEC list are not included. The first category is the listed companies in 
China’s B-share market and some international stock market. Although there is above 25 percent of foreign share 
in these companies (legal criterion of FIEs), these companies are not established by foreign investors; instead they 
are domestic companies (partly restructured from SOEs) that went public in international stock market (including 
China’s B-share market). The second category is the mobile telecommunications companies of the provinces such 
as Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian, Henan, and so on. These companies were included in the MOFTEC list after 
1999 when they were acquired by the Hong Kong-listed China Mobile. 
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Table 5-16 Top 10 FIEs, selected years 
Year Rank Company 
Revenue 
(RMB¥ million) 
Industry 
2002 1 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  45,333 Electronics and ICT 
 2 SAIC-Volkswagen Sales Co., Ltd. 44,640 Automotive (sales) 
 3 Hon Hai Precision Industry (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. 38,610 Electronics and ICT 
 4 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd.  36,265 Automotive 
 5 FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Sales Co., Ltd. 33,343 Automotive (sales) 
 6 FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Co., Ltd. 30,281 Automotive 
 7 Shanghai General Motors Co., Ltd.  18,563 Automotive 
 8 Beijing Nokia Mobile Telecommunications Co., Ltd. 17,720 Electronics and ICT 
 9 Dell Computer (China) Co., Ltd. 17,572 Electronics and ICT 
 10 Guangzhou Honda Automotive Co., Ltd. 13,632 Automotive 
2000 1 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  31,289 Electronics and ICT 
 2 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd. 28,698 Automotive 
 3 Beijing Nokia Mobile Telecommunications Co., Ltd. 15,867 Electronics and ICT 
 4 FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Co., Ltd. 15,797 Automotive 
 5 Dalian West Pacific Petrochemical Co., Ltd.  13,000 Petrochemical 
 6 Nanjing Ericsson Communication Co., Ltd. 9,873 Electronics and ICT 
 7 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 9,017 Electronics and ICT 
 8 Shanghai General Motors Co., Ltd.  8,847 Automotive 
 9 Top Victory Electronics (Fujian) Co., Ltd. 7,791 Electronics and ICT 
 10 Siemens Shanghai Mobile Communications Ltd.  7,717 Electronics and ICT 
1995 1 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd.  18,431 Automotive 
 2 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  7,364 Electronics and ICT 
 3 Beijing Jeep Corporation, Ltd. 5,746 Automotive 
 4 Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. 4,545 Electronics and ICT 
 5 Southseas Oils & Fats Industrial (Chiwan) Limited 3,775 Chemicals 
 6 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 3,610 Electronics and ICT 
 7 P&G (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd.  3,100 Personal products 
 8 Qingling Motors Company Limited 2,991 Automotive 
 9 Nanjing Jincheng Machinery Ltd. 2,811 Motorcycle 
 10 Shanghai Mitsubishi Elevator Co., Ltd. 2,786 Elevator 
1991 1 Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd.  3,575 Automotive 
 2 Beijing Jeep Corporation, Ltd. 2,406 Automotive 
 3 Guangzhou Peugeot Automobile Co., Ltd.  1,553 Automotive 
 4 Southseas Oils & Fats Industrial (Chiwan) Limited 1,140 Chemicals 
 5 Beijing Matsushita Colour CRT Co., Ltd.  1,135 Electronics and ICT 
 6 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 1,086 Electronics and ICT 
 7 Antaibao Hypaethral Coal Mine 929 Mining (Coal) 
 8 Huaqiang Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. 900 Electronics and ICT 
 9 Shenzhen Zhonghua Bicycle (Group) Co., Ltd. 840 Bicycle 
 10 Fujian Hitachi Television Co., Ltd.  740 Electronics and ICT 
Source: MOFTEC. 
SOEs still occupy leading positions in many Chinese industries in 1995 (see Table 5-15). 
Although the significance of SOEs in the industrial sector further declined since the 
mid-1990s as non-state-owned firms, particularly FIEs, rapidly expanded, SOEs has 
retained a central position in China’s industrial sector, mainly in the protected industries in 
which competition from non-state-owned firms has been largely limited by entry 
restrictions. The more detailed firm level longitudinal evidence reflects the process during 
which SOEs increasingly retreated from the competitive consumer-product sector and 
concentrated in the monopolistic basic industries. Table 5-17 lists China’s top 10 domestic 
owned manufacturing enterprises (mostly SOEs) in 1990, 1994, 2000 and 2002 
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respectively.18 The industrial distribution of the largest industrial SOEs has already been 
shown in Table 5-14. To focus on the manufacturing sector and make it more comparable 
to Table 5-16, Table 5-17 does not include the largest industrial firms in the services, 
utilities and construction sector, as well as the large diversified trading firms, which are 
included in Table 5-14. 
Table 5-17 Top 10 manufacturing SOEs, selected years 
Year Rank Company 
Revenue 
(RMB¥ million) 
Industry 
2002 1 China National Petroleum Corporation  379,200 Petroleum 
 2 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 378,004 Petroleum 
 3 China FAW Group Corporation 127,242 Automotive 
 4 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 77,728 Steel 
 5 Shanghai Automotive Industry (Group) Corporation 71,196 Automotive 
 6 Haier Group Company 71,053 Electronics and ICT 
 7 China Putian Corporation 60,228 Electronics and ICT 
 8 Dongfeng Motor Corporation 53,364 Automotive 
 9 China North Industries Group Corporation 42,615 Defence 
 10 China South Industries Group Corporation 39,692 Defence 
2000 1 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 375,390 Petroleum 
 2 China National Petroleum Corporation  345,072 Petroleum 
 3 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 70,856 Steel 
 4 Haier Group Company 40,628 Electronics and ICT 
 5 China FAW Group Corporation 39,048 Automotive 
 6 China North Industries Group Corporation 29,807 Defence 
 7 Legend Group  28,441 Electronics and ICT 
 8 China National Offshore Oil Corporation 28,354 Petroleum 
 9 Dongfeng Motor Corporation 25,803 Automotive 
 10 Shanghai Automotive Industry ( Group ) Corporation 25,801 Automotive 
1994 1 Daqing Petroleum Administration Bureau 19,908 Petroleum 
 2 Yuxi Cigarette Factory 14,670 Tobacco 
 3 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 7,941 Steel 
 4 Shougang (Group) Corporation 7,108 Steel 
 5 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 6,836 Automotive 
 6 Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation 4,908 Steel 
 7 China FAW Group Corporation 4,540 Automotive 
 8 Kunming Cigarette Factory 3,682 Tobacco 
 9 Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation  3,507 Steel 
 10 Shanghai Tobacco (Group) Corporation 2,774 Tobacco 
1990 1 Shougang (Group) Corporation 2,518 Steel 
 2 Daqing Petroleum Administration Bureau 2,209 Petroleum 
 3 Yuxi Cigarette Factory 1,884 Tobacco 
 4 Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation  1,824 Steel 
 5 Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation 1,823 Steel 
 6 Beijing Yanshan Petrochemical Co., Ltd., CNPC 1,769 Petroleum 
 7 Kunming Cigarette Factory 1,747 Tobacco 
 8 Shanghai Tobacco (Group) Corporation 1,477 Tobacco 
 9 Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd., SINOPEC 1,300 Petroleum 
 10 Qilu Petrochemical Co., Ltd., SINOPEC 1,193 Petroleum 
Source: SETC. 
The state-owned manufacturing sector has expanded greatly since the early 1990s (see 
Table 5-17). The revenue of the tenth largest manufacturing SOEs increased from RMB¥ 
                                                        
18 The data is according to ‘largest 500 industrial enterprises’ list compiled by the SETC.  
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1.2 billion in 1990 to RMB¥ 39.7 billion in 2002. Petroleum industry has always been a 
key sector that hosted the largest SOEs. Four oil companies were in the top 10 in 1990 and 
two in 2002. Due to the corporatisation reform and the government-led concentration, 
CNPC and Sinopec have become the two largest firms since the late 1990s. Steel sector 
was another important sector hosting the largest SOEs. In 1990, three out of the five largest 
manufacturing SOEs were from the steel industry. However, Shanghai Baosteel Group 
became the only steel company in the top 10 list in recent years. A striking feature of the 
structural change since the 1990s has been the rapid rise of the automotive and the 
electronics & ICT industry, which began to host the largest domestic enterprises. Before 
the mid-1990s, many largest firms in the top 10 were from the tobacco industry. The 
position of none of them has persisted since then. In 1990, most of the largest 50 industrial 
firms were steel companies, petrochemical factories and cigarette factories. There was no 
firm in the electronics industry and only one in the automotive industry – the Second Auto 
Works (later Dongfeng Motor Corporation), which ranked 31st. In 2002, three firms in the 
automotive industry and two firms in the electronics & ICT industry were in the top 10. 
The revenue of them was rapidly approaching the threshold of US$ 10 billion for the 
Fortune 500 ranking in recent years. In 2004, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 
and Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, together with other 12 Chinese firms, are 
included in the Fortune 500 list. It is the fist time when China’s manufacturing enterprises 
from competitive industries, rather than financial institutions, industrial monopolists and 
telecommunications companies, being able to enter the list. Other largest domestic players 
in the automotive and the electronics & ICT industry, such as FAW Group, Dongfeng 
Motor Corporation and Haier Group, will possibly enter the Fortune 500 list in the next 
year. 
5.2.3 Spillover Effects from Inward FDI 
FDI may have a positive impact on the development of recipient industries through direct 
as well as indirect impact, such as demonstration and diffusion effects as well as the 
competition and stimulation effects (see Subsection 4.1.2 for a detailed discussion). Studies 
on FDI spillovers separate the overall effects of FDI on industrial development and focus 
on the indirect effects on domestic firms. There have been studies that assessed the overall 
effects of FDI on the development of Chinese industries in terms of productivity growth. 
Shi (1998) argued that FDI produce beneficial effects on industrial development in terms 
of higher productivity on the basis of the case study of China’s type recorder industry. Liu 
et al. (2001) and Wei and Liu (2001) examined the impact of FDI on labour productivity in 
China’s electronics and telecom equipment industry. Liu et al. (2001) examined the impact 
of FDI on labour productivity using a dataset comprised 41 segments of China’s 
electronics industry for 1996 and 1997. The data were from the Yearbook of China’s 
Electronics Industry, 1997 and 1998. Labour productivity was modelled as determined by 
the degree of foreign presence as well as other variables, namely, capital intensity, human 
capital and firm size. This study concluded that foreign presence is associated with higher 
labour productivity. Liu and Wang (2003) studied the impact of FDI on Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) for a cross-sectional sample of China’s industrial sectors. The data were 
drawn from the Third National Industrial Census and consisted of 189 industries. An 
endogeneity test suggested that there was no evidence for a bi-directional causal relationship 
between TFP and foreign presence. Evidence indicated that foreign presence, the level of 
R&D and firm size are the most important factors enhancing TFP in Chinese industries. The 
findings of these studies have generally supported the argument that attracting FDI is an 
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effective way of introducing advanced technology to Chinese industries. However, the 
observed improvement in productivity might be largely a result of the growth of foreign 
firms and the overall assessment of the FDI impact on productivity did not distinguish this 
direct from the indirect, or spillover, effects.  
FDI spillovers in China have also been examined by several studies, which investigated 
spillovers from FDI on productivity and, more rarely, non-productivity aspects. Different 
from the typical cross-industry approach, a limited number of studies were cross-regional 
analysis. Based on a city-level FDI dataset covered 489 cities for the 1985-1995 period, 
Zhu and Tan (2000) found that the intensity of FDI inflows is positively associated with 
labour productivity in Chinese cities. A Grange causality test on a sub-dataset covered 50 
cities indicated a bi-directional causal relationship: FDI intensity has a strong positive 
effect on the labour productivity in Chinese cities and higher levels of labour productivity 
also attract more FDI inflows. The results of the analysis of the complete data set 
confirmed the contribution of inward FDI to the increase of labour productivity in China. 
To examine the feedback effects of labour productivity on the intensity of FDI inflows, the 
study followed the conventional literature on the determinants of FDI location and 
included a list of location specifics as explanatory variables. The study found that labour 
productivity did affect FDI location and this variable is especially important in inland cities. 
Using provincial data covered 30 provinces for the 1995 to 2000 period, Cheung and Lin 
(2004) found evidence for the positive FDI spillovers on domestic patent allocations in 
Chinese provinces. 
The productivity spillovers from FDI in Chinese industries have been studied on the 
basis of several different dataset, which covered different industries in China’s industrial 
sector. Using a large sample of large and medium-sized enterprises in China’s electronics 
and textile industries, Hu and Jefferson (2002) investigated the spillover effects from FDI 
on TFP and sales of domestic firms in China’s electronics and textile industries. The data 
were drawn from the ‘Survey of Large and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ that the NBSC 
conducted each year. The sample spanned the period from 1995 to 1999 and included 19 
segments within the electronics and telecom equipment industry and 33 segments in the 
textile industry. Following Aitken and Harrison (1999), this study examined the impact of 
FDI on domestic firms’ TFP by estimating an FDI-augmented production function, taking 
account of both foreign share of a firm’s equity and foreign presence in industrial segments. 
Using a polled cross-sectional estimate, this study found a tendency of FDI to reduce the 
productivity and market share of domestic firms. Comparing the difference between 1995 
and 1999, the study found that the initial productivity gaps between domestic firms and 
foreign affiliates tend to disappear. To explain the discrepancy, the authors argued that the 
short- and long-run impacts of FDI on the performance of domestic firms are quit different. 
In the short run, the superior technologies and managerial know-how of foreign affiliates 
enable them to enjoy a productivity advantages and cut into the market shares of domestic 
firms. Over time, the superior technologies and managerial know-how is diffused across 
firms in the industry and surviving firms improved their efficiency accordingly. This 
explanation was similar to the two-stage model proposed by Dunning (1975), which 
suggested that the structural effects of MNC entry will occur in two conceptually distinct 
stages: the at-entry effect and the post-entry effect. 
Perhaps the most throughout inquiry on FDI spillovers in Chinese industries is the study 
of Buckley et al. (2002). The study was based on the aggregate industry-level data, which 
included 130 three-digit industries and were drawn from the Third Industrial Census. 
Following the standard literature on productivity spillovers from FDI, the authors assumed 
that labour productivity is a function of foreign presence. Other variables considered to 
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influence labour productivity were included as controls: capital intensity (the capital labour 
ratio), R&D intensity (R&D expenditure per employee), labour quality (the percentage of 
college graduates in total employment) and firm size (the value of assets per firm). To 
examine the possible existence of the bi-directional causal relationship between 
productivity and foreign presence, the Hausman test was employed. The authors inferred 
that there was no evidence of a two-way causality between productivity and foreign 
presence, justifying the OLS method to estimate the correlation between productivity and 
independent variables. The results of regression analysis demonstrated that foreign 
presence, measured by either capital or employment, is significantly positively correlated 
with the labour productivity of domestic firms. In addition to productivity spillovers, 
Buckley et al. (2002) examined non-productivity spillovers in terms of the development of 
high-technology products and new products. The results showed that foreign presence, 
measured by capital participation, has significantly contributed to the development of 
high-technology and new products, as well as the export performance for domestic firms, 
corroborating the hypotheses about non-productivity spillovers. Based on the firm-level data 
drawn from the Third Industrial Census, Zhou et al. (2002) found that domestic firms in regions 
that attract more FDI tend to have higher productivity, while domestic firms in industries that 
have more FDI tend to have lower productivity. 
Buckley et al. (2002) investigated the difference between overseas Chinese and 
non-Chinese FDI on the performance of Chinese domestic firms. Taking overseas Chinese 
and non-Chinese capital participation as dependent variables, the regression results 
demonstrated that the overseas Chinese capital did not have a statistically significant 
positive impact on the productivity of domestic firms, while non-Chinese capital did. 
Similarly, empirical results indicated that non-Chinese FDI exerted positive effects on the 
development of high-technology products and new products for domestic firms, while the 
roles of overseas Chinese FDI was insignificantly negative. According to the authors, this 
contradicting results is consistent with the industrial distribution of FDI by overseas 
Chinese and non-Chinese foreign investors. Non-Chinese investors are usually MNCs with 
high technological capabilities and they mainly invest in technological intensive industries. 
Non-Chinese MNCs are superior to Overseas Chinese firms in product and process 
innovation and in technological development (Yeung, 1997). They are in a stronger 
position to transfer technologies and managerial skills to domestic firms than overseas 
Chinese investors, the ownership advantages of which lie in their marketing skills and 
knowledge of China (Luo, 1999). Although overseas Chinese investor cannot generate 
significant technology spillovers to domestic firms due to their relatively weak 
technological position, their market skills do enable them to exert substantial 
market-access spillovers. Buckley et al. (2002) supported this argument. Export 
performance of domestic firms was found to benefit from both overseas Chinese and 
non-Chinese capital, which implied that both overseas Chinese and non-Chinese investors 
provided a stimulus to Chinese exporters. 
Buckley et al. (2002) also compared SOEs and COEs as beneficiaries of FDI spillovers. 
The results indicated that foreign presence did not positively affect the productivity and 
export performance of SOEs. In contrast, non-Chinese capital participation improved 
productivity of COEs and total foreign capital participation enhanced the export 
performance of COEs. The authors found that the effects of foreign capital participation on 
labour productivity and exports of COEs was significantly greater than for SOEs, 
indicating a lower level of absorptive capability and learning capacity on the part of SOEs 
compared with COEs. 
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5.2.4 FDI and Competition: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Effects of MNC Presence 
The subsidiaries of MNCs, due to their possession of ownership advantages and their 
status in an international production system, have more competitive advantages and greater 
conduct options available than domestic firms. MNCs can inject competition into markets 
and contribute to improving industrial performance. But the same competitive strength 
could, under certain conditions, also create opportunities for MNCs to eliminate 
competitors, gain dominant positions within markets and even abuse their market 
dominance and engage in anticompetitive practices, hence leading to possible reduction in 
efficiency. Although evidence on FDI spillovers suggested that some Chinese domestic 
firms might benefit from competing with foreign entrants, there has been no study 
explicitly investigating the competition impact of FDI and its implications for industrial 
development. The lack of studies that examine the relationship between FDI and the 
degree of competition has been largely due to the unavailability of systematic 
industry-level data that can be used as measures of market structure and competition, such 
as concentration ratios and market shares.  
In the study on the productivity spillovers from FDI, Hu and Jefferson (2002) found that 
FDI reduced market shares of domestic firms. This study also examined whether SOEs are 
particularly vulnerable to competition from FDI than other domestic firms. The results 
demonstrated that SOEs in the electronics industry, although less efficient than other firms, 
were not more vulnerable to competition from foreign affiliates than other domestic firms. 
In the textile industry, although FDI did not exhibit an impact on firm productivity, it did 
significantly depress the SOE productivity. When comparing SOEs and COEs as 
beneficiaries of FDI spillovers, Buckley et al. (2002) found that the effect of overseas 
Chinese capital presence on the SOE productivity was negative. The finding implied that 
the overseas Chinese FDI impeded the productivity of SOEs and the expansion of the FIEs 
invested by the overseas Chinese possibly crowded out SOEs in the industries where they 
competed directly. As noted in Subsection 5.1.2 (see Table 5-6), FDI from overseas 
Chinese was mainly concentrated in low-technology industries, such as toys, food 
processing and textile. In these industries, the market share of SOEs has fallen 
considerably following the entry of FIEs invested by overseas Chinese firms. Compared 
with non-Chinese MNCs, the ownership advantage of FIEs invested by overseas Chinese 
principally lies in their knowledge about Chinese culture and society. This advantage and 
accordingly less uncertainty in market transaction make overseas Chinese investors less 
inclined to setup IJVs with local partners. According to Buckley et al. (2002), the lesser 
proclivities on the part of overseas Chinese versus non-Chinese foreign investors to form 
IJVs with SOEs reduced the learning opportunities for SOEs.  
To point out the industries raising competition policy concern is a hard task because of 
the large number of industries at different levels, the problem of market definition and the 
lack of reliable data. However, by simply checking some structural features of well-defined 
industries, we may find some potential antitrust cases for further investigation. Firm 
behaviour is associated with the structure of relevant domestic markets. In case that 
concentrated market emerged as a consequence of MNC presence, there may be more 
possible for them to indulge in anticompetitive practices in domestic markets (see 
Subsection 4.3.1). High market shares of MNCs are more likely to be associated with the 
possibility of anticompetitive practices. The concern on a number of industries, such as 
soft drinks, photo film and software, has been raised for years. All these industries have 
high degree of MNC presence, highlighted by the dominant market shares of a limited 
number of MNCs. A recent report from the State Administration for Industry and 
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Commerce (SAIC) reemphasised the competition issues of these industries, among others. 
Photo film industry 
The photo film industry in China is a typical example of industries that have been 
dominated by very limited number of MNCs. Two global leaders, Kodak and Fuji, have 
adopted different entry modes in the Chinese market: Kodak has heavily invested in China 
and served the market by locally manufactured products; Fuji exports to China. The only 
domestic player in this industry, Lucky Film, has been lucky because it is the only one in 
the previous seven domestic firms survived the harsh competition from Kodak and Fuji. In 
the mid-1980s, US$ 380 million was invested to import equipment from Kodak and Fuji 
respectively for two state-owned factories in Xiamen and Shantou (Fuda and Gongyuan) to 
serve the rapidly growing domestic market and to substitute imports. Two other 
state-owned factories in Shanghai and Baoding spent US$ 10 million respectively to 
upgrade their technology. The large amount investment did not pay off – in 1993, Fuda and 
Gongyuan only captured a share of 6.6 percent of China’s photo film market (see Table 
5-18). Facing the fierce competition from the products of Kodak and Fuji mostly smuggled 
into China, the business of most domestic players was in serious trouble by the 
mid-1990s.19 With the heavy burden of debts, Fuda and Gongyuan were on the brink of 
bankruptcy.20 In 1998, in order to ‘save’ the dying photo film industry, Chinese central 
government signed an agreement with Kodak to allow Kodak actually acquiring all 
domestic players except for Lucky, the state-owned factory in Baoding, which was in a 
relatively better situation than its domestic counterparts. According to this historical 
agreement, Kodak paid US$ 375 million to the Chinese parties and established an FIE (in 
the form of joint-stock company), Kodak China, in which Kodak took 80 percent of equity. 
Fuda and Gongyuan were incorporated into this IJV and Kodak agreed to invest additional 
US$ 673 million in the future. Another domestic player, Wuxi Aermai, was incorporated 
into Kodak Wuxi, a smaller IJV in which Kodak took 70 percent of equity. By non-equity 
arrangements, other three smaller domestic players in Shanghai, Tianjian and Liaoyuan 
received cash compensation from Kodak and agreed not to cooperate with other foreign 
firms within three years. Here joint venturing became a means of survival for domestic 
firms. The 1998 agreement explicitly granted Kodak a dominant position in China’s photo 
film industry. In addition, the Chinese government agreed not to allow other foreign firms 
enter this market through FDI prior to the end of 2001, meaning Kodak could preempt Fuji 
for three years in the Chinese market. As China’s photo film market became the second 
largest in the world in recent years, Kodak rapidly beat Fuji and developed a dominant 
position in this market (see Table 5-18). As suggested by Hay and Vickers (1987), the 
strongest foundation of market dominance comes from the government. By harnessing the 
                                                        
19 There have been many explanations for the business failures of the failures of domestic firms in the photo film 
industry (see, for example, SDPC, 1999, in Chinese). This was taken place in the environment in which the whole 
state-owned industrial sector was in trouble (see Subsection 2.1.3). The rapid changed exchange rate since 
mid-1980s was blamed to increase dramatically the debt burden of Fuda and Gongyuan. In early 1990s, domestic 
firms was facing fierce competition from low price imports (possibly dumping) – in 1994, the CIF price of Kodak 
was merely 1.3 US$. In mid-1990s, smuggled photo films were overwhelming the market, mainly through the 
agencies of Fuji and Kodak in Hong Kong. In 1997, 120 million boxes of photo film were sold in China, and the 
domestic production was 30 million. However, legal import of photo film was merely 70,000 boxes. (see Wu, 
2000, in Chinese) An anti-smuggling campaign was launched in July 1998. However, it was after the signing of 
the agreement that eliminated most domestic competitors for MNCs. 
20 Fuda had accumulated lose of RMB¥ 330 million and debt of RMB¥ 3.2 billion; Gongyuan had accumulated 
lose of RMB¥ 310 million and debt of RMB¥ 4.8 billion. 
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sovereign power of the Chinese government for its own end, Kodak was able to be in an 
impregnable position, at least in the short run. 
Table 5-18 Market share distribution in China’s photo film industry, 1993 and 2003 
Firm 1993* 2003** 
Fuji 55.0 25.0 
Lucky 15.9 15.0 
Kodak 13.7 52.0 
Konica 8.5 8.0 
Fuda 4.2 / 
Gongyuan 2.7 / 
         Note: 1) * According to a survey conducted by Kodak. 2) ** Estimated by the SAIC. 
The 1998 agreement has won Kodak a solid advantage over Fuji in China’s photo film 
market. However, more concern has been given to the future of Lucky. Lucky Film 
survived the 1998 agreement by which the Chinese government granted a whole market to 
merely one MNC, but it has to fight for survival in the shadow of Kodak and Fuji. Due to 
the existence of Lucky, which provides the most immediate competition, Kodak and Fuji 
have to sell their products much cheaper than the international prices. In 2001, a box of 
36-picture Kodak film is sold at two US$ in China, much cheaper than the prices in the 
United States and Europe. In contrast, the price of Kodak reversal film in China is much 
more expensive than in the United States, possibly because Lucky does not make the 
product. Without Lucky, Chinese consumer may not be able to enjoy the low price of photo 
film again. It has been estimated that the existence of Lucky film saves consumers around 
RMB¥ one billion per year on film and printing paper.21 As the only domestic firm in the 
photo film industry, Lucky has been strongly supported by the Chinese government. It has 
been identified as one of the 512 NKEs and received a series government support (see 
Subsection 2.1.3 for a discussion of the NKEs).  
Carbonated soft drink industry 
In 2001, the total sales of China’s soft drink industry were RMB¥ 47.2 billion and total 
profits were RMB¥ 2.7 billion. There were 799 firms in this industry. Approximately 30 
percent of all firms in this industry are FIEs, which accounted for 60 percent of sales and 
64 percent of profits. Within the soft drink industry, the largest segment was the carbonated 
soft drinks, the sales of which were RMB¥ 20.5 billion, accounting for 41 percent of the 
total soft drink industry. 
China’s carbonated soft drink industry has witnessed a ‘Cola war’ between small 
domestic firms and leading MNCs since the 1980s. A number of domestic Cola brands 
emerged in China in the 1980s and early 1990s, but almost all of them were defeated by 
the international brands – Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola.22 Domestic competitors either 
stopped business or were acquired by Coca Cola or Pepsi Cola through establishing IJVs. 
Meanwhile, in a similar segment of the soft drink industry, Jianlibao Group, a firm owned 
by a local government in Guangdong, rapidly grew up. In the mid-1990s, Jianlibao Group 
reached it high peck to become the largest domestic enterprise in China’s beverage industry, 
ranking 123 in the SETC list of the largest industrial enterprises. Partly due to the fierce 
competition from Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola, Jianlibao Group rapidly declined since the 
                                                        
21 See Dai Yan, ‘Unlucky Lucky faces price war’, Business Weekly (China Daily), February 20, 2001. 
22 The domestic Colas included Tianfu Cola, Aolin Cola, Changning Cola, Shaolin Cola, Xingfu Cola, 
Huangshan Cola, Laoshan Cola, China Cola, and so on. 
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late 1990s.23 With the shrink of Jianlibao, Wahaha Group, an urban COE, rapidly grew up 
in recent years. In 1998, based on competitive advantages established in other segments of 
the soft drink industry such as bottled water, Wahaha Group launched its own brand, 
Fortune Cola, in the carbonated segment already dominated by Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola. 
In 1998, Wahaha produced 100,000 tons of Fortune Cola, comparing with Coca Cola’s 
2,200,000 tons and Pepsi Cola’s 900,000 tons. In 2003, the production climbed to above 
600,000 tons and Fortune Cola’s market share increased from 2 percent in 1998 to 12 
percent. Wahaha became the largest enterprise in China’s beverage industry with totally 3.7 
million tons of various sorts of drinks and revenue of over RMB¥10 billion. Wahaha has 
become the fifth largest firm in the world beverage industry. With new entry of more 
domestic Colas since the late 1990s, such as Fenhuang Cola and Yanjing Cola in addition 
to Fortune Cola, the ‘Cola war’ in China has entered the second phase in which domestic 
firms began to counterattack the incumbent MNCs which has dominated the market. 
Aseptic packaging industry 
Aseptic packaging for liquid food is a small segment of the packaging industry. Tetra Pak, 
the world leader in this industry, produced 105 billion packages in 2003. In China’s aseptic 
packaging industry, Tetra Pak has become the dominant firm in the manufacture of aseptic 
cartons and the machines for filling them. In 2003, Tetra Pak China delivered 11.2 billion 
packages to Chinese customers. During 2003, China has also been Tetra Pak’s biggest 
market in terms of processing systems sales.24 Attention has been paid to the dominant 
position in this narrowly defined industry and possible abuses of dominance. Tetra Pak has 
been alleged abusing its dominant position in China’s Aseptic packaging market.25 The 
SAIC report paid special attention to Tetra Pak and asserted that Tetra Pak had an ‘absolute 
monopoly position’, controlling 95 percent of the aseptic packaging market. Tetra Pak 
responded with the argument that aseptic packaging in not a relevant market – aseptic 
packaging accounted for only 26 percent of China’s market of liquid milk packing in 
2002.26 
Tetra Pak was involved in competition policy cases in the European Union. The Tetra 
Pak case has gone through two phases: Tetra Pak I (1988) and Tetra Pak II (1991). In its 
decision on ‘Tetra Pak II’, the European Commission charged Tetra Pak with having taking 
advantage of its dominant position in the aseptic sector in cartons and machines to commit 
abuses in the related sector of non-aseptic.27 Some contracts required customers to buy 
non-aseptic machines and cartons also from Tetra Pak (tying contracts) and some required 
exclusive dealing. The Court of First Instance held that the contracts were illegal and the 
Court of Justice affirmed. Tetra Pak’s dominant position in the related aseptic market, 
according to the Court of Justice judgement, gave Tetra Pak freedom of conduct compared 
with other economic operators on the non-aseptic market to maintain undistorted 
competition in those markets. The Court of Justice has in particular ruled that, where an 
undertaking in a dominant position directly or indirectly ties its customers by an exclusive 
supply obligation, this constitutes an abuse since it deprives the customer of the ability to 
                                                        
23 In 2002, 80 percent equity hold by the local government (Sanshui, Guangdong Province) has been sold to 
private investors. The transaction only valued RMB¥ 380 million, and Jianlibao Group has been transferred from 
a SOE to a POE.  
24 According to Tetra Pak. 
25 See, for instance, Peking University (2003, in Chinese). 
26 See Ding (2004, in Chinese). 
27 See García-Gallego and Georgantzís (1999) for a detailed discussion. 
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choose his sources of supply and denies other producers access to the market. Due to these 
alleged abuses, an unprecedented €75 million was fined on Tetra Pak. This amount will 
only be surpassed by the proposed fine of €497 million on Microsoft for illegally 
squelching competitors. 
5.2.5 FDI and Competition: Effects of Foreign M&As 
Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) have substantially gained importance in 
different entry modes of FDI since the early 1990s (see Subsection 2.3.1). In China, 
however, greenfield investment is still the dominating mode of entry. Equity Joint Venture 
(EJV), Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (WFOE) 
have been the main legal forms of market entry and Foreign Invested Joint-Stock Company 
(FIJSC) provides an additional form of FIEs (see Subsection 2.3.2).28 China’s FIE regime 
is changing to further stimulate inward FDI and its WTO accession has accelerated these 
changes. In addition to investing in China through the traditional means of EJC, CJV and 
WFOE, foreign firms may now purchase operating Chinese business and may restructure 
their existing investment in China through mergers, spin-offs and holding companies that 
were impossible a few years ago.29  
China’s FDI regime has long been hostile to M&A transaction. For a long period of 
time, there had been no specific provisions on foreign M&As in China. That regime is 
changing both to accommodate the need to restructure SOEs and to further stimulate 
inward FDI. The Chinese government has been trying over the last several years to create a 
clearer roadmap for foreign M&A players looking at Chinese target firms other than the 
traditional entry modes. The Company Law provides the basic legal provisions for mergers 
and divisions between companies. The Securities Law and a series of regulations on 
China’s stock market provide legal provisions for the acquisitions of listed companies. The 
‘Provisions on Merger and Division of FIEs’ provides provisions on the mergers between 
FIEs or between an FIE and a domestic company. The ‘Interim Provisions on Domestic 
Investment by FIEs’ regulates FIEs’ domestic investment projects, including the 
establishment of new firms and the acquisition of existing firms. In addition to these, a 
series of specific regulations, which covers acquisition of different ownership categories of 
enterprises, have been promulgated by different government agencies including MOFTEC, 
SETC, SAIC, MOF, SAT, People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (see Table 
5-19).  
                                                        
28 Certain forms of international joint ventures can be considered as foreign mergers which may trigger antitrust 
review. 
29 See Norton and Chao (2001). 
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Table 5-19 Regulations on (foreign) M&As 
Regulation Effective year Issuing agency Target 
Several Provisions on Changes in Equity of 
Investors in FIEs 
1997 MOFTEC and 
SAIC 
CJV, EJV, WFOE and 
FIJSC (non-listed share) 
Provisions on Merger and Division of FIEs 1999 (revised 
effective in 2001) 
MOFTEC and 
SAIC 
CJV, EJV, WFOE and 
FIJSC 
Interim Provisions on Domestic Investment by 
FIEs 
2000 MOFTEC and 
SAIC 
CJV*, EJV*, WFOE* 
and FIJSC 
Notification on Relevant Issues Regarding the 
Transfer of State-owned Shares and Legal Person 
Shares of Listed Companies to Foreign Investors 
2002 CSRC, MOF and 
SETC 
Listed companies 
(non-listed share) 
Administrative Measures on Acquisition of Listed 
Companies 
2002 CSRC Listed companies 
Interim Provisions on the Administration of 
Domestic Securities Investment by Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) 
2002 CSRC and 
PBOC 
Listed companies 
Interim Provisions on the Utilisation of Foreign 
Investment to Restructure State-owned Enterprises 
2003 SETC, MOF, 
SAIC and SAFE 
SOEs (excluding listed 
companies and financial 
institutions) 
Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
2003 MOFTEC, SAT， 
SAIC and SAFE 
Domestic enterprises 
Source: Davies (2003). 
Note: * In the form of limited-liability company. 
The three regulations promulgated by the CSRC in 2002 provide procedural provisions 
for the acquisition of listed companies. However, the M&A regulations do not actually 
cover mergers, but are confined to acquisitions, including equity acquisition and asset 
acquisition (Tan, 2004). The ‘Interim Provisions on the Utilisation of Foreign Investment 
to Restructure State-owned Enterprises’ promulgated jointly by the SETC, the MOF, the 
SAIC and the SAFE in 2002 provided provisions for foreign M&As of SOEs (excluding 
listed companies and financial institutions). This regulation prescribes in principle that 
foreign M&As should not lead to market monopoly. The ‘Interim Provisions on Mergers 
and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors’ promulgated jointly by the 
MOFTEC, the SAT, the SAIC and the SAFE in 2003 provided more detailed provisions for 
foreign M&As of domestic firms. The Article 19-22 of this regulation provides detailed 
merger control provisions. The MOFTEC and the SAIC are identified as antitrust 
screening agencies. According to the regulation, foreign investors must report large M&As 
to these authorities before sealing a deal. According to Article 19, the notification 
thresholds are: 1) the revenue in Chinese markets of one merger party is above RMB¥ 1.5 
billion; 2) more than 10 firms in the relevant industry are acquired within one year; 3) the 
market share of one merger party is above 20 percent; or 4) the market share of one merger 
party will be above 25 percent after the merger. According to Article 20, in case that the 
MOFTEC and the SAIC believe the M&A may ‘lead to excessive concentration, hinder 
proper competition, or harm consumer interests’, they would held public hearing, which 
involves relevant government agencies, institutions, firms and others, to decide whether 
permit the M&A.  
Because of the changing policy environment, foreign M&A via equity transfer has 
begun to emerge as a practical choice to enter China for foreign firms in recent years. Prior 
to the clarification of a legal framework of foreign M&As in 2002 and 2003, a large 
number of foreign M&As have already taken place via offshore transaction, equity 
acquisition of listed companies (mainly in international stock markets or B-share markets), 
and other forms of M&As. If we use a relatively broader definition of M&A, which 
include some specific forms of joint venturing, M&As have long been utilised by foreign 
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firms to enter the Chinese market since the early 1990s. A number of foreign firms have 
used serial M&As to control a significant share of specific industries. The Kodak merger 
of China’s virtually whole photo film industry, as discussed in Subsection 5.2.4, was a 
typical case. Another typical example is Zhongce’s acquisition (via joint venturing) of 
seven SOEs in China tire industry in the early 1990s – seven out of 22 large-scaled SOEs 
in this industry has been controlled by Zhongce, accounting for 14 percent of the total 
production.30 The top priority of merger control for competition authorities is to prevent 
firms that already dominate their markets from acquiring their competitors (see Subsection 
3.2.2). However, for a long period of time, merger control had not been established in 
China and incorporated into the FDI regime. Although cannot buy equities from the 
shareholders of SOEs, foreign firms actually acquired a large mount of SOEs via asset 
acquisition or joint venturing, without notice by relevant government agencies with 
antirust concern. In the Kodak case, to the extreme, almost a whole industry has been 
granted to one MNC in 1998. Even in 2003, after the promulgation of the two regulations 
with detailed merger control provisions (see Table 5-19), a ‘milestone’ equity transfer was 
cleared, in which Kodak bought 20 percent equity of Lucky, its only domestic competitor 
in China. By this acquisition, Kodak eliminated one of its two competitors in China and 
(further) preemptied another – Lucky agreed not to establish IJVs with other foreign firms 
within 20 years. 
5.3 Methodological Considerations for Case Studies on Specific Industries 
In order to benefit adequately from FDI, as noted in Section 4.2, it is important to ensure 
the efficient functioning of the market, which depends on the contestability of the markets 
and the extent and nature of market competition. As MNCs play an increasingly important 
role in China’s industrial development and economic growth, it becomes more important to 
ensure the efficient functioning of markets. The previous two sections in this section 
document the distribution of FDI in China’s manufacturing industries and generally assess 
the FDI impact on the development of them. In particular, we preliminarily assess the FDI 
effect on competition by examining some specific industries with the most significant 
MNC participation. To extend this preliminary assessment two approaches are available: 
first, cross-sectional analysis of a large number of industries testing for a relationship 
between FDI and a measure of competition, usually market concentration; second, detailed 
case studies on specific industries.  
Models tested for a relation between FDI and market concentration have typically 
involved a cross-sectional equation with a measure of FDI as one of the determinants of 
concentration (see Subsection 4.2.2). This standard cross-sectional analysis can prove the 
association of FDI with market concentration. However, several critical problems exist 
with this approach. First, a cross-sectional study is usually based on the standard industrial 
classification, ignoring the problem of ‘relevant market’ and neglecting some prominent 
differences among industries. Shepherd (2000) has pointed out the poor fits between the 
US Census Standard Industrial Code 4-digit industries and properly defined markets.31 
This is the same for China’s industrial classification standard, the ISIC, and any other 
                                                        
30 See Wang et al. (1999, in Chinese) for a detailed discussion of FDI in China’s tire industry. 
31 See Shepherd (1970) for a detailed discussion on the serious errors in defining relevant markets for the US 
Census. 
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industrial classification standard for census. Secondly, the cross-sectional studies use 
market concentration as a measure of competition and neglect the contestability of the 
markets and other important aspects of market competition. Thirdly, the cross-sectional 
approach cannot clearly define the causality or the direction of influence between the two 
variables. Does FDI cause higher industrial concentration or is it attracted to concentrated 
market? If FDI cause industrial concentration, how does FDI do so? The case study 
approach can avoid these problems and provide insights relevant recommendations for 
policy makers. The positive correlation tested by the cross-industry studies, if carefully 
interpreted and supplemented by other information, can be used as a reasonable starting 
point for examining aspects of the relationship between inward FDI and market structure. 
However, as pointed out in Section 4.3, the actual relationship should be examined on a 
case-by-case basis by the intra-industry studies with sufficient consideration of the firm 
practices and institutional factors. In addition, as suggested in Subsection 2.2.3, to evaluate 
the effectiveness of a de facto competition policy, a reliable approach is to examine the 
degree of market competition, namely to evaluate of the effectiveness of the de facto 
competition maintenance mechanism in different industries. Thus our empirical research in 
the next two chapters relays on case studies exploring the impact of FDI on market 
competition and industrial development.  
Market delineation 
The first problem when studying market competition is the correct definition of the 
relevant industry or market. This problem will always pose questions for the policy 
implications of the cross-sectional studies on market competition based on the standard 
industrial classification. As noted in Subsection 4.2.1, the practical questions of market 
delineation focus on two dimensions: product space and geographic area. First, a relevant 
industry should include firms that sell a particular product or collection of products and a 
properly defined industry should contain all substitutes within the industry. The finer the 
industry definition (greater number of products included) is, the greater the concentration 
measure is likely to be. The problem is how to clarify the boundary of an industry in the 
complicated horizontal and vertical structure of modern economy to clearly define a 
relevant industry. Secondly, geographical consideration is important when studying 
industrial structure. The relevant market may be local, regional, national or international 
scale. The national concentration ratios tend to be small for the industry that consists of 
only local monopolists. For an internationalised industry, the national concentration ratios 
tend to be big. In our competition analysis in Part III, the geographical scope of relevant 
market is fixed to national level, leaving the only first concern relevant to market 
delineation. If markets are defined too narrowly, meaningful competition may be excluded 
from the analysis. On the other hand, if markets are too broadly defined, the degree of 
competition may be overstated.  
The definition of the relevant market is crucial when assessing market dominance, 
which is a central concept in antitrust enforcement. Theoretically, a dominant firm’s 
market power depends on the market elasticity of demand, the firm’s market share and the 
elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe. The calculation of the market share and the 
consideration of the two sorts of elasticity presume that the definition of the relevant 
market is a major premise. Market definition is of particular importance to the economic 
analysis of competition because it is the first step to determine the degree of market power 
firms may enjoy. Clearly, market shares of firms depend on market definition. A broader 
definition of the market yields lower market shares and, therefore, implies less market 
power than a narrower definition. The demarcation of market boundaries has thus a strong 
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impact on the outcome of an antitrust case, either a merger or an abuse of market 
dominance case.32 In the preceding discuss of the Tetra Pak case in China, for example, in 
case that the relevant market is defined as the aseptic packaging industry, Tetra Pak is a 
dominator with over 90 percent of market share; however, if the relevant market is 
delineated as liquid packing, then the market share of Tetra Pak is much lower. 
In antitrust practice, market definition was usually discussed in a case-by-case basis. A 
number of theoretical and empirical studies have tackled the problem of market definition, 
but a general consensus has not yet emerged. Market definition continues to cause 
problems even in the United States, which has detailed guidelines for this issue since the 
1980s (see Subsection 8.3.3). The traditional approach of defining markets is based on 
demand substitutability and emphasises the horizontal dimension of markets. As 
technological advances make markets increasingly interrelated, the boundary between up- 
and down-stream industries blurred. The increasing economic globalisation also blurred 
the geographical boundaries between markets. Facing these developments, competition 
authorities cannot use the current concept of the antitrust markets to effectively assess 
competition and market dominance in markets (Canoy and Weigand, 2002). By putting the 
idea of horizontal competition centre stage, the concept of antitrust market ignores 
business reality and overlooks how the market is perceived by those doing business in it, 
namely firms and their customers (Steiner, 2000). The proper definition of the relevant 
antitrust market can be particularly difficult if the market environment is very dynamic 
such as ICT industries and markets are interrelated.33 Facing these changes in business 
environments, the current concept of antitrust market is not suitable to evaluate 
competition in evolving and integrating markets.  
Selection of case industries 
To select a limited number of industries to study, several issues should be considered. 
Defining the relevant market carefully is the first concern in the selection of case study 
targets. As suggested earlier, a wrong definition of market leads to measurement error. Too 
broad or too narrow market definitions lead to understating or overstating market share and 
concentration measures. It is a typical mistake to take the census standard industrial code 
as the standard of industry classification. A more rational way is to conform to some 
tradition of market analysis in the business community, which usually focuses on 
classification of products.  
The analysis of FDI distribution in Chinese manufacturing industries in Subsection 
5.1.2 provides a list of two-digit industries with significant foreign present. Considering 
the scale and accordingly the relative strategic importance of the industries and concerning 
the significance of MNC presence in them, only a very limited number of industries stand 
out as ‘ideal’ targets for our case studies. In terms of the amount of FDI inflows, the 
automotive industry has been among the largest FDI recipient industries (see Table 5-4). 
The analysis of the FIE contribution to China’s two-digit manufacturing industries in 2000 
highlights a striking feature of the FIE profitability in different industries. In the sector of 
transportation equipment, the FIE profitability was more than twice of the industrial total, 
implying that the FIEs were more than three times profitable than domestic firms – the 
highest in all two-digit industries (see Table 5-20). Automotive manufacturing is the largest 
                                                        
32 See e.g. Posner (1976), Harris and Jorde (1984), Pitosky (1990), White (1993), Simons and Williams (1993), 
and Office of Fair Trading (1998) for detailed discussions. 
33 See also Pleatsikis and Teece (2001). 
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segment of the transportation equipment sector, which includes also railway equipment, 
motorcycle manufacturing, shipbuilding and aerospace & aviation. The automotive 
manufacturing segment has attracted almost all FDI in this sector, because other segments 
of railway equipment, shipbuilding and aerospace & aviation are generally closed to 
foreign entry. Therefore we can conclude that high FIE profitability has resulted from that 
in the automotive industry. FDI inflows in the automotive industry have been concentrated 
in the passenger car industry, which is a special case with extremely high level of FIE 
profitability. Although profitability alone is not sufficient evidence of market power, the 
high level of profitability in China’s passenger car industry and the persistence of it, in 
addition to high degree of concentration (see Subsection 6.2.3 for a detailed discussion) 
have provided strong evidence of the existence of market dominance in this industry. The 
question lies in how to measure the degree of market dominance and to investigate the 
sources of it.  
Table 5-20 Profitability of FIEs in different industries in 2000 
FIE percentage Profitability (percent) Industry 
Sales Profits Industry FIEs FIEs/industry 
Transportation equipment 30.85 65.64 3.72 7.92 2.13 
Printing and record medium reproduction 32.52 42.97 8.05 10.63 1.32 
Chemical fibber 35.50 45.88 5.33 6.88 1.29 
Papermaking and paper products 31.52 38.58 3.96 4.85 1.22 
Electric equipment and machinery 33.86 41.32 4.32 5.27 1.22 
Instruments and office machinery  57.48 67.18 4.50 5.26 1.17 
Plastic products 43.99 48.46 3.94 4.34 1.10 
Food manufacturing  40.81 43.88 4.05 4.35 1.08 
Metal products 39.27 41.35 3.02 3.18 1.05 
Garments and other fabric products 49.05 50.37 4.05 4.16 1.03 
Electronics and telecom equipment 72.21 70.45 6.75 6.59 0.98 
Furniture manufacturing  45.96 42.98 4.63 4.33 0.94 
Cultural, education and sports products 60.46 56.38 3.88 3.61 0.93 
Leather, fur and eiderdown products  57.26 46.39 2.82 2.28 0.81 
Total Industrial sector 26.79 29.19 5.22 5.69 1.09 
Source: Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese). 
With regard to both FDI significance and FIE profitability, Figure 5-2 positions a 
number of two-digit industries (see also Table 5-7 and Table 5-8). The electronics & ICT 
industry is the industry with the highest amount of FDI inflows (see Table 5-5) and 
therefore can be identified as another appropriate case to study. The largest FIEs have been 
concentrated in the automotive and the electronics & ICT industries (see Table 5-16). In 
addition, Table 5-17 shows that these two industries are also among those that hosted 
China’s largest manufacturing SOEs in recent years. Hosting both the largest MNC 
affiliates and the largest SOEs, these two industries present the typical arena for the ‘new 
competition’. Due to the fact that the electronics & ICT industry contains a large number 
of segments with complex horizontal and vertical structure, we choose to further study a 
specific segment – the telecom equipment industry. As a typical high-technology sector, 
this industry has been subject to proactive policy support directed at high-technology 
industries since the mid-1990s (see Subsection 5.1.3). 
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Figure 5-2 Positioning industries according to FIE percentage of sales and FIE profitability 
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         Source: Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese). 
The studies of Mckinsey Global Institute (2003) provided evidence for the generally 
positive effects of FDI on industrial development in China’s automotive and consumer 
electronics industries. Table 5-21 summarises the FIE contribution to the two two-digit 
industries to which the selected targets of our case studies belong to. Although focusing on 
the narrowly defined industries of passenger car and telecom equipment, we will explore 
the overall industrial environments of the automotive industry and the electronics & ICT 
sector. The narrowly defined segments are closely interrelated with the overall industrial 
context. For instance, China’s passenger car industry has been grew out of the industrial 
environment in which SOEs principally focused on the production of trucks and had to rely 
on MNCs in terms of large-scale production of passenger cars. The industrial policy has 
been targeted at the automotive industry at large rather than at the passenger car industry in 
specific. Both the automotive industry and the electronics & ICT sector have been 
identified as pillar industries and subjected to proactive industrial policies. Both industries 
have attracted a large amount of inward FDI and have strong MNC presence. Both 
industries have hosted the largest manufacturing domestic firms, mainly SOEs and 
semi-SOEs. However, with these similarities, the consequences of FDI on industrial 
development have been quite different. The case studies on these two industries will 
compare these differences, explore the causes of these differences, and generalise the 
(competition) policy implications of this comparison. 
Electronics and telecom equipment 
Transportation equipment 
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Table 5-21 Contribution of FIEs in 2000: comparing two selected sectors 
Percentage of FIEs vis-à-vis industrial total Item 
Transportation equipment Electronics and telecom equipment Total industrial sector 
Assets / 37.44 10.18 
Industrial output 30.29 71.57 27.39 
Sales 30.85 72.21 26.79 
Value-added 30.84 65.39 23.98 
Profits 65.64 70.45 29.19 
Value-added tax 38.74 57.49 20.05 
Source: Jiang and Li (2002, in Chinese). 
Measuring competition in industries 
It is difficult to measure the degree of competition in a give industry, let along to assess the 
impact of FDI on competition. The core concept used in practice is market structure, which 
is central to the assessment of competition (see Subsection 4.2.1). In addition to the degree 
of market concentration, the analysis of market structure may also focus on the market 
shares of large firms. By examining the determinants of market structure (in terms of 
market share distribution), we can determine whether foreign presence is associated with 
higher degree of market dominance. We can also investigate consequences of market 
structure, such as the level of prices (or the price-cost margin) and the persistence of 
profitability. Furthermore, by examining the behaviour of firms, we can explore whether 
firms are engaged in anticompetitive practices. High concentration facilitates the abuse of 
market dominance and anticompetitive practices, which are of major interest for 
competition authorities. On the other hand, certain conduct of firms can explain the 
sources of their market dominance. For example, the dominant position of Kodak in 
China’s photo film industry, as discussed in Subsection 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, has been largely 
achieved by its serial acquisition of domestic competitors. Our general assessment of the 
FDI impact on competition in several selected industries in Subsection 5.2.4 principally 
follows the third approach to analysing competition as suggested in Subsection 4.2.1, 
namely observing behaviour of firms. In case studies in the next two chapters, all the three 
approaches will be adopted to provide a comprehensive account of competitive situations 
in specific industries and to explore the impact of FDI on market competition and 
industrial development. 
Market structure is a different concept to competition, but the concept of market 
structure provides a basic theoretical structure for the measurement of the degree of 
competition in a given industry. Market structure comprises several elements (see 
Subsection 4.2.1). Our analysis will focus on the following: 1) market share distribution 
and market concentration, 2) market contestability (entry barriers), and 3) other aspects 
such as the degree of product differentiation. Entry barrier is central for our market 
structure analysis because of following reasons. First, the contestability is an important, if 
not the most important, aspect of market structure. As noted in Subsection 4.2.3, the theory 
of contestable markets suggests that an industry consisting of one or a few firms may be 
efficient because incumbent firms will maintain prices close to the competitive level due to 
the threat exerted by potential entrants. At least as early as Adam Smith, it has been 
generalised that under the condition of free entry and exit, resources will be so efficiently 
allocated that they yield the same rate of return across industries (see Section 3.1). 
Secondly, as noted in Subsection 2.1.2, rapid entry of a new private sector has been a 
defining feature of industries in a transition economy. As a variant of the more general 
process, the Chinese case shows that the key feature of the process of enterprise 
development was entry, rather than privatisation per se (Naughton, 1994). Thirdly, new 
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competitive forces have been injected into the Chinese economy in the process of 
economic transition. In the industries where a new competitive force has been introduced 
from abroad via FDI, competitive situations are more complex than the ‘closed’ industries. 
Thus exploring the effects of new entry is crucial to answering the central research 
question of this study: how the introduction of a new competitive force through FDI 
inflows influences the development of Chinese industries. 
Contextualisation is emphasised in our analysis of competition and market structure. In 
a context of transition economy, the factors influencing the degree of competition in an 
industry may be quite different from those in the standard industrial organisation literature. 
Chapter 1 has identified the ‘inherent characteristics’ in the dynamic context of economic 
change in China during the reform period. For studies at the industry level, to investigate 
the determinants of market structure (and possibly market dominance), a deep 
understanding of the specific industrial context is essential. In terms of entry barriers, for 
instance, there is no one simple, agreed system of typology of market variables that may 
provide impediments to the entry of potential firms. In some industries in China’s 
transitional economy, regulatory restrictions may probably be the most significant barriers 
to entry. 
We put our analysis of the determinants of market structure in a dynamic process of 
industrial evolution. We will analyse the evolution of an industry and seek to identify what 
shaped the structure of it and to explore which factors influenced the degree of market 
competition. Emphasis is put on the effects of the foreign entry on the evolution of market 
structure. In the transitional economy of China, government policy may be an important 
factor influencing market structure. Regulatory restrictions may be the most important 
source of structural entry barriers and industrial policy may play a central role in the 
development of some industries. We pay specific attention to the role of government policy 
in the formation of industrial structure and the evolution of it. The global context with the 
expending international production system is also important to our analysis when we study 
FDI and business activities of MNCs in China.  
A dynamic view is crucial to empirical studies. The traditional S-C-P paradigm of 
industrial organisation considers structural characteristics often change slowly and can be 
regard as fixed over time. The emphasis is therefore on the structure of industry and how it 
influence conduct and performance. However, it is possible that conduct and performance 
can have feedback effects on the structure of an industry. For instance, Philips (1976) 
pointed out that performance itself can leads to changes in conduct and structure and 
Clarke (1985) gave the example that R&D expenditure affecting costs and demand, which 
may influence industrial structure in the long run. The effects of performance and firm 
conduct on industrial structure have led to a shift away from the presumption that structure 
is the primal variable in driving the competition process. Instead, many researchers argued 
that the strategies and business practices of individual firms are important in determining 
industrial structure and thus the S-C-P process (cf. Scherer and Ross, 1990). For the ‘new 
industrial organisation’, firms were not seen as passive entities alike; instead they were 
treated as active entities that often follow different strategies.  
Both Schumpeter and the Austrian School recognised that competition is a dynamic 
process (see Section 3.1). The S-C-P approach provides us the theoretical and conceptual 
framework for market structure analysis, but the static character of it will probably limit 
the analytical power. Geroski (1990b) argued that the S-C-P approach to examining 
competition provides only a snapshot at some point in time and does little to explain the 
process of competition. Rather than the traditional approach, our empirical studies employ 
a longitudinal case study approach, which is the soundest way to determine the effects of 
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MNC entrants on competition and industrial development over time. Longitudinal analysis 
will enable us to model the dynamic process of market competition and to take into 
account the dynamics of entry strategies, government policies and the interactions between 
them. Not only market structure and its determinants, but also the strategic decisions and 
innovation activities of firms, as well as the multi-faceted progress of an industry will be 
considered.  
 6 Passenger Car Industry: FDI and the 
Determinants of Market Structure  
 
 
 
 
he automotive industry remains one of the most important industries in the modern 
economy and contributes a prominent share of total GDP and employment. Facing 
relatively saturated markets in North America, Europe and Japan, car-producing 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are looking to grow elsewhere and China becomes the 
largest emerging automotive market. In 2003, China ranked fourth in the largest 
automotive manufacturing countries. Nevertheless, China’s passenger car industry is still 
in an infant stage. The Chinese government seems to pursue a ‘third road’ of industrial 
development through which the efforts of domestic firms and MNCs are combined. Inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) helped reshape the industry during the reform period and 
this process accelerated after China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
During a relatively short period of time, the national market developed rapidly against a 
background of the fastest growing economy in the world. Most leading car-producing 
MNCs have invested in China, primarily in the form of International Joint Ventures (IJVs) 
– consequence of government policy constraints. Entry barriers and trade barriers imposed 
by the government largely hampered the function of the competition mechanism. Only in 
recent years, this pattern of industrial policy characterised by the ‘twin barriers’ was 
undergone significant revision. In this special context, the existence of market power and 
the lack of competition led to negative consequences in various dimensions of industrial 
development and the positive impact of inward FDI was largely constrained. China’s 
passenger car market has witnessed high degree of market dominance and consequently 
high level of prices and profits. It seems that State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and MNCs 
have collaborated though IJVs to share the high manufacturing profits guaranteed by 
restrictive government policy. The slow improvement of the domestic technological 
capability has highlighted the failure of the ‘market for technology’ strategy in this specific 
sector. Although the industrial policy claims to encourage exports, the aim of establishing 
international competitiveness has not been realised. The seemingly dispersed market 
structure and the apparently large number of firms concealed the problem of the lack of 
competition, as the issue of relevant market was not considered by policy makers and the 
automotive industry was taken as a whole when market structure was concerned. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 examines China’s automotive industry 
in general and passenger car industry in particular and summarises some main 
characteristics of the industrial context. FDI inflows and market competition in the 
passenger car market are depicted in Section 6.2 and evidence for the lack of competition 
and the existence of market dominance in the passenger car industry is provided. To 
explore the policy implications of the lack of competition and its consequences, Section 
6.3 analyses the determinants of market share in China’s passenger car industry and 
develops hypotheses. The determinants, such as entry order and investment scale, reflect 
T 
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the qualification of the impact of interaction between government policy and MNC 
strategy. Section 6.4 describes the empirical methodology, tests the hypotheses and 
presents the testing result. By tracking the determinants of market share achievements of 
IJVs, the econometric study in the last section investigates the source of market dominance 
in China’s passenger car industry. We investigate what are the most important determinants 
of the business performance of MNC affiliates in China’s passenger car industry and how 
market structure is affected by the interaction between MNC strategy and government 
policy, using the analytical framework developed in Subsection 4.3.3. Using market share 
as an approximate, this chapter identifies the sources of market power of IJVs. 
6.1 China’s Automotive Industry: The Industrial Context  
For studies on Chinese industries, a deep understanding of the specific industrial context is 
of crucial importance. In the case of China’s automotive industry, the rapid demand growth, 
production development, structural adjustment and policy change in a relatively short 
period provide a uniquely dynamic industrial setting for the type of studies we propose to 
undertake in Section 5.3. By examining the industrial context of China’s automotive 
industry in general and passenger car industry in particular, this section provides the 
foundation for the analysis of the relationship between FDI and industrial development as 
well as the further inquiry for the sources of market dominance. 
6.1.1 Industrial Evolution Process 
After the founding of People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government attached great 
importance to building an automotive industry. Based on the help from the former Soviet 
Union, the First Auto Works (FAW) was set up in Changchun in 1956. As a result of the 
decentralisation of central planning power in a radical industrialisation program – the 
Great Leap, many local governments actively invested in the automotive industry. In 1958, 
there were more than 200 factories trial-producing motor vehicles. Due to the fact that 
many factories were not qualified for motor vehicle manufacturing, only a small number of 
them survived. In 1960, the total output of motor vehicles exceeded 20 thousand. In the 
mid-1960s, China, relying on its own efforts, began to build the Second Auto Works, the 
later Dongfeng Motor Corporation (DMC). Local assemblers proliferated again from 1967 
to 1970, the result of local initiatives unleashed by the breakdown of the central 
government control caused by the Cultural Revolution and by the shortages of motor 
vehicles. In 1980, the production of motor vehicles increased to 222,000, principally 
medium-sized trucks.1 
In the pre-reform era, China’s automotive industry experienced slow development in a 
planned economy, leaving an extremely decentralised industrial structure. In 1979, there 
were 130 assemblers making 186,000 motor vehicles. Most assemblers produced only 
hundreds of motor vehicles. The most important firms are FAW and DMC, which mainly 
produced trucks. In 1980, over 75 percent of the motor vehicle production is commercial 
vehicles, mostly medium-sized trucks, while the share of passenger cars was less than 2 
percent. At that time, the industry was characterised by shortages of heavy trucks and light 
vehicles and by the almost non-existence of car production. Product diversification, 
                                                        
1 See Editorial Board (1996, in Chinese). 
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therefore, became a significant element in the government-led restructuring. During the 
first half of the 1980s, product diversification focused on heavy trucks and light vehicles to 
solve the problem of ‘the lack of heavy- and light-duty vehicles’. In the mid-1980s, the 
Chinese government adjusted its strategy to give a priority to passenger car, initiating the 
development of China’s passenger car industry.2 The restructuring has resulted in a rapid 
production growth of the passenger car industry, which is the focus of this chapter.  
Since the early 1980s, total automotive production has increased rapidly and the 
production of motor vehicles has gradually shifted from highly controlled under the central 
planning to market-oriented. The reform period witnessed the all-round development of 
China’s automotive industry, particularly in the passenger car segment. In 1990, the total 
production of passenger cars in China was merely 42.4 thousand. In 2002, the production 
exceeded one million. The share of the passenger car in total automotive production rose 
from 2.4 percent in 1980 to 33.5 percent in 2002 (see Figure 6-1). Another important 
structural change took place in the demand side – the private buyer took increasing share 
in the total automotive consumption. In the process of rapid industrial development in the 
reform era, other important SOEs besides FAW and DMC developed rapidly. These SOEs 
mainly include Shanghai Automotive Industry (Group) Corporation (SAIC), Beijing 
Automobile Industry Corporation (BAIC), Guangzhou Automobile Group Co., Ltd. (GAG) 
and Tianjin Automotive Industrial Corporation (TAIC).  
Figure 6-1 China’s automotive production, 1978-2003 
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2 In 1985 and 1986, China imported 150,000 passenger cars, almost nine times the domestic production over the 
same period. The sudden increase of car imports raised concerns over the drain on the country’s foreign currency 
and made the development of passenger car production imperative. 
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In addition to product diversification, another central concern of the Chinese 
government was to consolidate the highly fragmented industry. In planning to build up the 
production capacity of passenger cars, the central government aimed to limit the number of 
new entrants in order to avert the traditional over-scattered pattern in the automotive 
industry. Totally eight car production bases were founded. In 1988, based on the 
evaluation of industrial experience and technological capability as well as general regional 
balancing consideration, the government sanctioned three major car assemblers, FAW, 
DMC and Shanghai Volkswagen, and three smaller ones in Beijing, Tianjin and 
Guangzhou. This was known as the ‘Three Big and Three Small’ Strategy.3 Although the 
control on market entry was strictly implemented, two firms with defence industry 
background obtain special permission to produce compact cars in the early 1990s. This 
added ‘Two Mini’ to the ‘Three Big and Three Small’. The efforts to limit new entries and 
thus to consolidate the fragmented industry was confirmed by the later formulated 
industrial policy for the automotive industry. 
As an industry that had heavy legacies of planned economy, China’s automotive 
industry has been subjected to strong government intervention. The industrial evolution 
process has been largely led by government policy, which attempted to consolidate a 
highly fragmented industry and to promote rapid industrial development. The relevant 
trade, investment and industrial policies have undergone gradual revision, reflecting the 
dynamic interactions among the government, SOEs and MNCs. The policy changes have 
reflected the government’s changing attitude towards the role of state intervention as well 
as the problems and prospects of industrial development. The acquisition of foreign capital 
and technology has played an important role in the development of the automotive industry 
during the reform period. FDI has played an important role in the process of industrial 
evolution and structural adjustment. IJVs established by SOEs and MNCs have dominated 
the passenger car market. However, the role of FDI was limited because market 
competition was restricted mainly by government policy (see next two subsections for 
detailed discussions).  
For a long period of time, entry restriction and market fragmentation hampered 
competition in the automotive market, while high tariffs prevented international 
competition. The situation gradually changed after the WTO accession, as new 
international rules were increasingly complied with and government policies adjusted 
accordingly. As policy environment significantly changed following China’s WTO entry, a 
new phase of industrial development began and the growth of automotive production 
accelerated. The development of the automotive industry has been heated up, with the 
structure of the industry dramatically changed. In 2001, China produced 2.33 million 
motor vehicles, including 703.5 thousand passenger cars. In 2002, the two numbers 
increased respectively to 3.25 and 1.09 million. The growth in 2003 was even faster, 
principally driven by the explosive growth of passenger car production – the production of 
motor vehicles increased to 4.44 million, including 2.02 million passenger cars. In 2003, 
China produced more motor vehicles than all but three other nations. The percentage of 
passenger cars in total automotive production increased to 45 percent. Nevertheless, 
China’s passenger car market is still in the early stage of industrial development. Current 
                                                        
3 In a meeting held by the State Council in August 1987, FAW, DMC and SAIC has been identified as three car 
production bases. In 1988, the State Council declared the ‘Three Big and Three Small’ strategy in ‘Notification on 
the Strict Control of Passenger Car Production Locations’. In a later national meeting on automotive industry held 
in Shanghai in 1991, the strategy of ‘Three Big and Three Small’ was re-stressed. 
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trends predict that China may become the world’s second largest automotive market as 
early as in 2005. Automotive demand – promoted by increasing income, new distribution 
channels and the reduced regulation after the WTO entry – will further increase as the 
Chinese economy continues to grow rapidly. Rapid economic growth and a large 
population with a very low penetration of passenger cars suggest that demand is likely to 
grow significantly. As China’s ‘Tenth Five-year Plan for Automotive Industry’ predicted, 
passenger cars will gradually enter ordinary families and become the driving force for the 
growth in automotive demand.  
6.1.2 Entry Restrictions and Industrial Policy 
The combination of industrial internationalisation and government intervention is the 
driving force for the evolution of the global automotive industry. National state has long 
been considered as an important force in shaping the industry, interacting with and 
counterbalancing global forces (Dicken, 1998). For instance, under strong government 
intervention and regulation in Western Europe, the strategies of Japanese automotive 
assemblers and components suppliers behaved different from those in the United States 
(Jones and North, 1991; Sadler, 1994). Japan itself is another typical example for the role 
of government policy in the development of automotive industry. The Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry was particularly successful in sheltering the Japanese 
automotive industry from foreign competition at an infant stage (Cusumano, 1985). In 
developing countries such as Brazil, South Korea and India, strong government regulation 
is a common feature in the automotive industry (e.g. Chaudhuri, 1989; Harwit, 1995; 
Dicken, 1998; O’ Brien and Karmokolis, 1994; Tuman and Morris, 1999). 
In the early years of China’s economic transition, the central government still 
maintained a strict control over the automotive industry (Yang, 1995). In the reform era, 
the central control has gradually reduced, but a legacy of central planning still remained. 
SOEs in this industry were under municipal supervision and the IJVs had prominent state 
participation in equity. One of the most important reforms in China’s automotive industry 
is the transformation of the central administrative system (see Table 6-1). Until the 1998 
government reform, the automotive industry had been mainly under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Machinery Industry (MMI) or China National Automotive Industry 
Corporation (CNAIC), a company implementing government authority. The China 
Automotive Industry Federation was the central authority during the 1987-1990 period and 
then transferred into the China Association of Automotive Manufacturers (CAAM) in 1990. 
In the 1998 government reform, the Chinese government abandoned the function of SOE 
management and the scope of industrial management further decreased (see Subsection 
2.1.1). Accordingly, the Bureau of Automotive Industry, together with the MMI, was 
dissolved, which indicated the end of direct SOE management in this sector. However, it 
did not mean a complete disappear of government control. The State Administration of 
Machinery Industry (SAMI), a much smaller bureau under the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC), took over part of the functions of the MMI. Although no specific 
government agency established for the administration of the automotive industry, the 
SETC had the authority over several important facets of industrial development. Most 
importantly, the SETC has the authority to control market entry. A strict entry control was 
implemented by the SETC through a system of product catalogue management. As a 
means of central planning, this system also provided detailed administrative screening at 
the product level, deterring the firm decision on the development of new products. This 
system even led to the problems of rent seeking and illegal trade of product licenses. The 
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approbation of foreign investment projects must go through a screening agency either on 
central or provincial level, depending on the scale of investment. The larger the investment 
is, the more rigorous the control and the more complicate the screening process will be. In 
the new round of government reform in 2003, the regulatory function of the SETC on the 
automotive industry was transferred to the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC).  
Table 6-1 Changes in administrative authorities for the automotive industry 
Year Authority 
1950 Preparatory Group of Automotive Industry, the Ministry of Heavy Industry 
1952-1964 Bureau of Automotive Industry, the First Ministry of Machinery Industry 
1964 CNAIC established 
1966 CNAIC dissolved 
1966-1967 The First Ministry of Machinery Industry 
1976-1982 Bureau of Automotive Industry, the First Ministry of Machinery Industry 
1982 CNAIC re-established; Bureau of Automotive Industry cancelled 
1987 CNAIC dissolved again; China Automotive Industry Federation became the central 
authority 
1990 CNAIC re-established 
1993 CNAIC’s administrative function cancelled and it became a pure business 
establishment; Bureau of Automotive Industry established within the MMI 
1998 MMI (and Bureau of Automotive Industry) dissolved as a result of government 
reform and replaced by the SAMI and no department set up for the automotive 
industry; SETC began implementation of the central authority. 
2001 SAMI dissolved and China Machinery Industry Federation launched 
2003 SETC dissolved and the regulatory authority on the automotive industry was 
incorporated into the NDRC. 
Based on the argument that the Chinese automotive industry was in a scattered structure, 
entry restriction was implemented continuously by the government agencies responsible 
for the regulation of this industry. Early in 1989, one year after the establishment of the 
‘Three Big and Three Small’ strategy, automotive vehicle made by non-sanctioned firms 
was included in the list of products that need to be strictly controlled. Within the overall 
environment of strict entry control, two SOEs obtained special permission to produce 
compact cars. Although new market entries were permitted since the early 1990s, new 
entrants were all IJVs formed between MNCs and the identified six domestic firms. Only 
after 2000, new entries other than the ‘Three Big and Three Small’ were permitted.  
The automotive industry has been seen as a ‘pillar industry’ and supported by China’s 
industrial policy. This industry was first identified as a ‘pillar industry’ in the ‘Seventh 
Five-Year Plan’ (1986-1990) in 1986. The industrial policy for the automotive industry was 
inspired by the pattern of industrial development in Japan and South Korea. The history of 
automotive industrial development of these two countries has demonstrated that active 
government interventions greatly contributed to the quick expansion of the export-oriented 
automotive industry (Aoki et al., 1996). The automotive industry is the first among 
Chinese industries to be backed by a formal industrial policy. The industrial policy for this 
industry was first formulated in 1994 and modified recently in 2004. In February 1994, the 
former SPC released the ‘Automotive Industry Industrial Policy’. As a long-term plan for 
industrial development, the automotive industrial policy highlighted the determination of 
the Chinese government to develop a national automotive industry. In 2001, the ‘Tenth 
Five-Year Plan for Automotive Industry’ was promulgated by the SETC, establishing 
objective of industrial development and proposing to revise the 1994 industrial policy. In 
2004, the NDRC released the ‘Automotive Industry Development Policy’, replacing the 
1994 industrial policy (for important industrial policy changes, see Figure 6-2). 
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Figure 6-2 Development path of China’s automotive industry, 1978-2002 
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The 1994 industrial policy encouraged foreign investment in the automotive industry 
and provided detailed guidelines for prospective foreign investors. It prescribed that local 
partners in IJVs that produce motor vehicles, motorcycles and engines must take over 50 
percent of stakes, showing a clear tendency to build a ‘national automotive industry’. 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE) is a typical form of Foreign Invested 
Enterprises (FIEs) and has increasingly become a major mode of market entry, but it is not 
permitted in the automotive industry. The number of IJVs established by one foreign firm 
for one category of product was limited to no more than two. Furthermore, this industrial 
policy included very explicit requirements of local content. With regard to import, the 
industrial policy persisted that the state should adopt necessary means to manage the 
imports of motor vehicles, motorcycles and key components in the condition that China’s 
automotive industry still has no capability for international competition. The 1994 
industrial policy aimed to encourage the development of domestic producers by utilising 
foreign technology through establishing IJVs between MNCs and leading SOEs. In line 
with the 1994 ‘Outline of State Industrial Policy in the 1990s’ issued by the State Council 
(see Subsection 5.1.3), the 1994 industrial policy had explicit prescription on industrial 
organisation. The so-called ‘industrial organisation policy’ aimed to ‘avoid inefficient 
competition and improve the structure of industrial organisation’. It encouraged the 
development of large industrial groups and provided an array of supportive policy 
measures. In addition, a product license system was established, serving as an effective 
administrative measure of entry restriction. Entry restriction was proposed to be utilised as 
an effective means to limit the number of firms in the industry, to ‘avoid inefficient 
competition’, and to encourage the development of large-sized SOEs.  
Although the 1994 industrial policy emphasised the importance of passenger car 
production to industrial development, it neglected the demand side of the market and failed 
to promote passenger car purchase by ordinary families. The industrial policy stated to 
encourage private purchase of motor vehicles, but no concrete police measures followed. 
Facing limited domestic demand and without international competitiveness, China’s 
production capacity for passenger cars was much higher than the level of production. The 
market demand for passenger cars was low due in part to the high prices, which remained 
out of reach for most Chinese consumers. The prices of passenger cars in China were very 
high according to international standard; furthermore, non-price payment greatly increased 
real purchasing prices (Sun et al., 2000, in Chinese). On the supply side, the problem of 
overcapacity was a consequence of redundant investment in the automotive sector in 
response to the high capacity requirement from the government and the high profit 
anticipation caused by persistent excess profits. Taking the development of large SOEs as a 
priority, the authority did not pay much attention to market competition in the practice. 
Large-sized SOEs systematically received preferential support, while private firms were 
not allowed to enter the market. First a policy to limit the number of production bases for 
passenger cars, the ‘Three Big and Three Small’ strategy later soundly reflected the 
government support towards selected large-sized SOEs in the automotive industry (see 
Figure 6-3).  
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Figure 6-3 Important SOEs in China’s automotive industry 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In the new round of industrial concentration, the core assets of TAIC have been transferred to 
FAW and there has been a similar transaction between SAIC and Guizhou Yunque. 
The 1994 industrial policy had striking contradictions. On the one hand, it encouraged 
inward FDI and technology transfer; on the other hand, it was characterised by 
protectionism and interventionism. It generally outlined China’s plan for a self-sufficient 
automotive industry. The 1994 industrial policy was generally a continuity of the previous 
policy, which began in the mid-1980s, and many detailed prescriptions retained a strong 
flavour of central planning. This policy had a negative effect on industrial development 
and competitiveness enhancement. The automotive industry grew relatively slowly since 
the promulgation of the policy (see Figure 6-1) and the objective to promote export 
competitiveness has not been realised even until recent years. State intervention in general 
had the effect of restricting and hindering market mechanisms and the protectionism 
supported dominant firms at heavy cost to domestic consumers and industrial growth (see 
Subsection 6.2.3 for details). Another significant failure of this industrial policy was in the 
technological aspect (see Subsection 6.2.3).  
After the release of the 1994 industrial policy, one important policy change was 
reflected by the ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan for Automotive Industry’ promulgated in 2001. 
Concerning the development of the automotive industry, the ‘Outline of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan’ (2001-2005) approved by the People’s Congress in 2001 (see Subsection 
5.1.3) claimed to develop economic passenger cars and to promote the manufacturing level 
of motor vehicles and key components. On the basis of this overall outline, the ‘Tenth 
Five-Year Plan for Automotive Industry’ was formulated by the SETC. The plan 
summarised the problems faced by the automotive industry, set up the objective of 
industrial development, and provided general principles to promote industrial development 
and to realise the objective. The plan also proposed to revise the 1994 industrial policy. In 
the ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan’, the Chinese government has proposed a series of new policies 
aiming at stimulating automotive demand, particularly from private consumers. In the new 
plan, the Chinese government indicated clearly its intention of consolidating the nation’s 
automotive industry into a small number (two to three) of strong companies to meet the 
challenge of an increasingly competitive market. It provided a policy foundation for a new 
FAW DMC SAIC 
TAIC BAIC GAG 
Chang’an 
‘Three Big’ 
‘Three Small’ 
Others … … 
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round industrial concentration among leading SOEs in the form of large-scale corporate 
restructuring in recent years (see Subsection 6.2.4). In 2001, the traditional system of 
catalogue management, which had been utilised as an effective measure for entry 
restriction, was reformed to an announcement system. Although it is still an effective 
approach to entry control, the scope and the process of this system have been reduced as 
one of the efforts to gradually eliminate administrative screenings of the central 
government.  
In May 2004, the NDRC released the ‘Automotive Industry Development Policy’, the 
newest version of industrial policy, according to the ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan’ and 
considering the new situation after China’s WTO accession. The new industrial policy has 
eliminated the provisions on FDI in the previous version that were not consistent with the 
WTO obligations. The local content requirements have been eliminated 4 , but the 
restrictions on foreign equity and on the number of IJVs participated by one foreign firm 
have remained. In line with the ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan for Automotive Industry’, the new 
industrial policy emphasises the role of consumption policy for promoting industrial 
development. On the supply side, the new industrial policy further increases barriers to 
entry. Although the administrative screening has been simplified, a series of criteria for 
investment projects of automotive vehicle production have been prescribed. The threshold 
investment level of new automotive projects has been increased to RMB¥ 2 billion and it is 
prescribed that a Research and Development (R&D) centre with investment of over RMB¥ 
500 million must be established. This threshold imposes a restriction to relatively 
small-sized projects, especially for private capital. By forbidding the transfer of production 
license, the new industrial policy also blocks the new entry through the mergers of small 
incumbents. Therefore the entry of private firms has been generally blocked by the new 
industrial policy. Although the industrial policy alleges to aim at the ‘creation of the 
fair-competitive and integrated market environment’, it does not treat different firms 
equally – as ‘large-scale automotive group’, firms with over 15 percent market share can 
implement their own development strategy with the permission of the NDRC. Although no 
firms are specified, the SOEs with over 15 percent market share are only FAW, SAIC and 
possibly DMC. 
The entry restriction embodied in China’s industrial policy for the automotive industry 
has probably been based on the experience of South Korea. The experience of South Korea 
demonstrates that a strict control on new market entry is important to promote the rapid 
growth of key firms in the industry (Chaudhuri, 1989). However, the differences between 
the Chinese and South Korean models of industrial development are apparent. No foreign 
firms were allowed to enter the South Korean domestic industry. Coupled with trade 
barriers, strong export promotion measures were pursued to subject domestic firms to 
international competition to force them to become more efficient and to keep domestic 
prices low. In contrast, MNCs were allowed to enter China’s automotive industries. MNCs 
and large-sized SOEs chose to collaborate rather than to compete and they had no 
incentive to compete in international markets due to high profits in the domestic market. 
Meanwhile, it was impossible to change the scattered market structure because the high 
profitability caused by protectionism always attracted more entrants. On the basis of the 
decentralisation of government structure, local governments and state ministries often 
bargained successfully for special permission that circumvents the central government 
                                                        
4 A trade policy measure is adopted to fulfil the same purpose: the imports of motor components with the 
characteristic of integral vehicles would be treated as motor vehicles in terms of tariff rates.  
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regulation. The interventionist behaviour of local governments and corresponding market 
fragmentation further hampered competition in the national market.  
The role played by the Chinese government in industrialisation came not only from the 
central government but also from local state agencies (see Subsection 1.4.2). Local 
governments have been actively involved in the process of local economic development 
and played a significant role in industrialisation in their localities (Qi, 1992; Zheng, 1994; 
Montinola et al., 1995). For most foreign investment projects, the screening process at the 
local level is relatively simple and efficient thanks to the local efforts to attract FDI. Such 
institutional arrangements have reduced the level of the overall regulatory hurdle against 
FDI inflows through deregulation or circumvented the existing regulation when central 
supervision is lax (Huang, 1999). But the decentralisation and related inter-regional rivalry 
have also led to problems in the Chinese economy in general and the automotive industry 
in particular. In order to promote local economic development, many provinces and cities 
established its own version of ‘industrial policy’ for the automotive industry, with the aim 
to develop local firms, sometimes with the costs to non-local firms. Thus the competition 
mechanism was hindered by the ‘state aid’ provided by local governments to local firms. 
Furthermore, to protect local firms, administrative means were adopted to prevent the 
products of non-local firms from entering local markets. Many policy instruments within 
the scope of local administrative authorities can be used to support local firms and to strike 
others. Local governments could use regulations and policies to favour the purchase of 
motor vehicles produced within their jurisdiction, which has created protected local 
markets. In the begging of 1996 when the automotive industry faced weak demand, for 
instance, some cities introduced the local policy to restrict compact cars. For example, the 
Shanghai municipal government used administrative means to influence taxi companies’ 
buying decision, favouring the local Santana model from Shanghai Volkswagen. Dic (1997) 
criticised that the opportunism of the local authority leads to the fragmentation and 
miniaturisation of the Chinese automotive industry. These consequences stem from the 
rent-seeking activities of both domestic firms and local authorities.  
6.1.3 Trade Barriers and International Competitiveness 
The experience of East Asian newly industrialised economies demonstrates that trade 
policy, especially export promotion, can be utilised as an effective measure for industrial 
policy. The trade policy for China’s automotive industry has been dominated by the logic 
of import substitution. Although the industrial policy encourages exports, the objective of 
establishing international competitiveness has not been attained. Only in the truck segment, 
which has been dominated by SOEs, significant exports have been reported. In terms of the 
relative size of imports and exports, the automotive industry is one of the industries with 
the lowest international competitiveness. In 2003, the imports and exports of automotive 
products were US$ 14.4 and 4.4 billion respectively, leading to a deficit of US$ 10 billion 
in this sector.5 An international comparison highlights the low export competitiveness of 
China’s automotive industry. In 1960, Japan produced 481,600 motor vehicles and 
exported 8.1 percent of them. In 1970, Japan’s automotive production was 5,289,200 and 
the ratio of exports was 20.5 percent. It was similar in South Korea, which is a typical 
example of the independent model of industrial development generally following the 
                                                        
5 According to Xinhua News Agency. 
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approach of Japan (see Subsection 6.2.1). In 1980, South Korea produced 124,400 motor 
vehicles and exported 20.3 percent of them. In 1990, South Korea’s automotive production 
increased to 1,302,500 and the ratio of exports was 26.6 percent. In contrast, China 
produced 4,443,700 motor vehicles in 2003 and exported only 2.8 percent of them. More 
strikingly, the export of passenger cars was merely 2,849 units. 
Despite the size of the automotive market, the Chinese automotive industry still remains 
in an infant level. The share of passenger car in total automotive production was below 40 
percent in recent years, extremely low in contrast to developed countries. Rooted in the 
logic of the infant industry argument, China adopted an import substitution strategy for its 
automotive industry and imposed very high tariff rates on imported motor vehicles. By the 
early 1980s, domestic production could not meet the growing demand and the Chinese 
government had to permit large-scale vehicle imports. Imports of passenger cars surged 
accordingly. In an effort to protect domestic firms and to lessen the outflows of foreign 
exchange, the government imposed a system of import licenses, quotas and high tariff rates 
on foreign-made motor vehicles in 1986, which ranked among the highest in the world. 
High tariff rates for passenger cars deterred competition from abroad via imports. High 
tariff rates for components, coupled with strict local content requirements, prevented the 
imports of components and led to subscale assembly. The protectionist measures had 
serious consequences: they deterred international competition from imports, protected high 
prices and profits in the domestic market and led to significant market dominance and 
welfare losses (see Subsection 6.2.4). After 1992, in order to facilitate the re-entry of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China began to gradually reduce its high 
tariff rates on foreign-made motor vehicles. The later WTO agreements included an 
explicit commitment by the Chinese government to substantially reduce the restrictions it 
imposed on automotive imports and on the operations of foreign firms in China. After the 
WTO entry, high entry barriers and strict business restrictions in the automotive sector 
were further eliminated to fulfil China’s promises for its WTO entry (see Table 6-2).  
Table 6-2 Trade barriers and business restrictions in the automotive industry: before and after WTO entry 
Item Before WTO entry After WTO entry 
Tariffs 200 percent in the 1980s; 80-100 percent in the 1990s 
25 percent by 2006 (15 percent for 
components) 
Quotas 30,000 vehicles a year allowed from foreign carmaker 
Quota increased 20 percent a year, 
phased out by 2006 
Local content requirements 
 
40 percent in first year, increasing to 
60 percent, 80 percent in second and 
third years 
No local content requirements 
Foreign participation in 
sales and distribution 
Carmakers must use Chinese 
distributors to sell their vehicles 
Distribution rights for foreign firms 
phased in over three years 
Automotive financing 
Foreign, non-bank financing 
prohibited 
 
Foreign, non-bank financing permitted 
in selected cities prior to gradual 
national rollout 
Source: Mckinsey. 
Tariffs on motor vehicles, reduced on January 1, 2002 to between 40 and 50 percent, 
will gradually decrease to 25 percent by the end of 2006 (for tariff changes prior to 2002 
see Table 6-3). Tariffs on automotive components will also gradually decrease to an 
average of 10 percent. As tariff rates were lowered, other forms of trade barriers were also 
reduced. Quotas on autos will be phased out by 2005, with an initial level of US$ 6.0 
billion. Quotas will decrease 15 percent annually until eliminated. 
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Table 6-3 Motor vehicle tariff rate changes, 1994-2002 
Item Before 1994/ 1/ 1 
1994/1/1
- 
1996/4/1 
1996/4/1 
- 
1997/10/1 
1997/10/1 
- 
2001/1/1 
2001/1/1 
- 
2002/1/1 
After 
2002/ 1/ 1 
Gas Engine Car<1L 180 110 100 80 70 43.8 
1L< Gas Engine Car <1.5L 180 110 100 80 70 43.8 
1.5L< Gas Engine Car <2.5L 180 110 100 80 70 43.8 
2.5L< Gas Engine Car <3L 180 110 100 80 70 43.8 
Gas Engine Car >3L 220 150 120 100 80 50.7 
>30 Seats Bus  70 60 50   
10～29 Seats Bus  100 90 70   
Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). 
High protection yielded persistent high profitability and hence led to greater political 
bargaining power of entrants. Such bargaining power might be exploited to pursue further 
rents (He and Yang 1999). In a policy framework of import substitution, the automotive 
industry dose not built up its international competitiveness. One of the contributions 
MNCs can make to host economies is to enhance their international competitiveness. 
Protected behind trade barriers, however, China’s automotive industry simply could not 
meet global standards on price and quality.6 For almost 20 years, the potential of 
promoting competitiveness still has not been tapped. The international competitiveness of 
an industry can be simply measured by the relative size of imports and exports, as 
highlighted by the trade competition index (see Subsection 4.4.3). The export of motor 
vehicles has remained at a very low level until recent years. Government policy towards 
the automotive industry failed to attract efficiency-seeking and export-oriented MNC 
activities, which are crucial to promoting competitiveness (see Subsection 6.2.1 for a 
detailed discussion). Although protected by one of the highest trade barriers in the world, 
due to their low international competitiveness, firms in the automotive sector gave up a 
large share of the domestic market to imports for a long period of time. In fact, imports 
surged not only in the 1980s but also in the 1990s (see Figure 6-4).  
                                                        
6 See Murphy, ‘Driving ambition’, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 2004. 
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Figure 6-4 China’s imports and exports of motor vehicles, 1983-2003 
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   Source: CAAM. 
The Chinese government announced to promote exports of motor vehicles, but its 
policy focus was actually import substitution and the automotive vehicle exports remained 
low. Between 1980 and 1995, 2.13 million vehicles were imported, of which 1.05 million 
were passenger cars. The expenditure of foreign currencies was US$ 7.48 billion or 
equivalent to 65.4 percent of the total national automotive investment during the same 
period. Meanwhile, high trade barriers led to widespread smuggling. If including imports 
and smuggling of vehicles, domestic production only accounted for half of the passenger 
car market in that period (see Table 6-4). In contrast to other industries, the automotive 
sector has continuously received high protection, which may perpetuate the inefficiencies 
and low competitiveness in this sector.  
Table 6-4 Structure of the Chinese automotive market (percent), 1993-1997 
Item 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Imports 
Smuggling 
Domestic production 
Total 
57 
19 
24 
100 
60 
11 
29 
100 
44 
17 
40 
100 
28 
18 
54 
100 
16 
33 
51 
100 
              Sources: Wang (2002). 
After China’s accession to the WTO, trade barriers were reduced and greater freedom 
allowed for foreign firms to operate motor vehicle sales, financing and leasing companies. 
This market liberalisation will have a great impact on the Chinese operations of MNCs, on 
China’s imports of motor vehicles and components, and on the welfare of Chinese 
consumers. Increasing vehicle imports after WTO entry exert pressures on IJVs and may 
improve their competitiveness. The MNCs that have entered China are confronting with 
intensified competition from late entrants. Trade liberalisation speeds up technology 
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transfer, model variety and price reduction, and competition in China’s automotive market 
is intensified. Increased competition will, over time, help to develop the domestic industry 
and to improve product offerings to Chinese consumers. 
6.2 FDI and Competition in the Passenger Car Industry 
Since the beginning of China’s economic transition, a dramatic structural change has taken 
place in the automotive industry. The share of passenger cars in total automotive 
production rose from 2.4 percent in 1980 to 45 percent in 2003. Various segments of the 
automotive industry have experienced different patterns of industrial development due to 
different strategies of industrial development. In the truck industry in which China had 
already built up its competence in the era of planned economy, the Chinese government 
has adopted a self-dependence strategy. The development of this segment has been largely 
dependent on the two largest SOEs, FAW and DMC, which mainly produced 
medium-sized trucks prior to the mid-1980s. In the truck segment, foreign technologies 
were imported in the 1980s, focusing on light vehicles and heavy trucks to solve the 
problem of ‘the lack of heavy- and light-duty vehicles’ (see Figure 6-2). FAW and DMC 
have grown into the largest single-plant truck assemblers in the world. In the passenger car 
segment, a strategy characterised by the dependence on MNCs has been adopted since the 
mid-1980s when the Chinese government decided to develop China’s own passenger car 
industry. In this segment, SOEs and MNCs collaborated rather than competed via the 
institutional arrangements of IJVs. Thus market competition has been largely characterised 
by the rivalry among IJVs. Domestic partners have been the largest SOEs, including FAW 
and DMC, the traditional track makers, and SAIC, BAIC and GAG, which were previous 
much smaller assembling factories. Among the ‘Three Big and Three Small’, only TAIC 
did not engage in equity cooperation with MNCs. Rather, it produced compact cars by 
importing technology from a Japanese firm. IJVs have inherited competitive advantages 
from its foreign, as well as domestic, parents and enjoyed preferential policy treatment 
towards FIEs. They have dominated the passenger car market. Only in recent years, a very 
limited number of private-owned enterprises got the chance to enter the fast-growing 
passenger car market. Government policy is more lax with non-passenger car 
manufacturing, which is much less profitable. Local content requirements, particularly a 
start-up requirement of 40 percent, combined with the low competitiveness of the 
components industry, have also promoted foreign components suppliers subordinated to or 
affiliated with car-producing MNCs to invest in China (Sit and Liu, 2000).  
6.2.1 Industrial Development Strategies: Roles of Inward FDI 
FDI and international production is a general phenomenon in the global automotive 
industry. Prior to the 1980s, it was a common strategy for major car-producing MNCs 
except for the Japanese to set up branches in peripheral regions for both components 
manufacturing and assembly, which was well represented in the world car model (Maxcy, 
1981; Rubenstein, 1992). Since the 1980s, the continuing trend of international production 
has acted as one of the major forces in the restructuring of world automotive industry. The 
1980s also witnessed a trend of protectionism in automotive markets. Even in developed 
countries, defensive measures were used to protect the automotive sectors (Chaudhuri, 
1989). These measures forced MNCs to invest and build cars in host countries, instead of 
just exporting complete-built-up vehicles. By the early 1990s, overseas output of major 
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car-producing MNCs had accounted for more than one-third of their total automotive 
production. 
This trend of international production in the global automotive industry has provided an 
opportunity for developing countries to establish their own automotive production 
capabilities. Chaudhuri (1989) categorised two models for developing countries: 1) 
independent, domestically owned, private industry, as in South Korea, and 2) dependent, 
foreign-owned, subsidiary of MNCs, as in Latin America. FDI played a determinative role 
in the latter model. The main difference between these two models of industrial 
development lies in the choice between building a country’s own national industry and just 
being production bases of MNCs. In other words, build competitiveness of domestic firms, 
or utilise the competitiveness of MNCs to build a competitive industry. Two factors make 
the first model – the establishment of a domestic automotive industry in developing 
economies based on their own efforts – very difficult. First, the automotive industry shows 
an obvious oligopolistic feature, as a limited number of MNCs have dominated the global 
market. Second, technology evolves rapidly in safety, energy saving, pollution control, and 
other aspects. Despite these difficulties, a very limited number of developing countries, 
such as South Korea, have built up a competitive automotive industry independently. As a 
typical example of the first model, South Korea targeted export from the very beginning, 
based on its industrial policy, although it also relied on foreign MNCs for technology 
transfer (Chaudhuri, 1989). As a typical example of second model, the Latin American 
automotive industry, represented by Brazil and Mexico, has developed under the 
dominance of foreign MNCs (Jenkins, 1977; Tuman and Morris, 1999). The successful 
story of South Korea indicates that FDI is not a necessary condition for the development of 
an automotive industry, but the experience of some developing countries does show that 
attracting FDI provides an effective way of catching up.  
China seems to follow a middle approach. The Chinese government stressed to develop 
a relatively independent automotive industry and meanwhile attempted to attract 
investment from car-producing MNCs. The government strictly limited the equity share of 
foreign investors in IJVs and meanwhile imposed high local content requirements. China’s 
middle approach aimed to balance the needs of building up a ‘national automotive 
industry’ and of utilising foreign capital and technology. But there were inherent 
contradictions between these two purposes. As a result, the roles of inward FDI in 
promoting industrial development were largely limited and SOEs and MNCs collaborated 
via the organisational arrangements of IJVs to dominate the domestic market at the 
expense of consumer interests and social welfare.  
The inward FDI in China’s passenger car industry has been market- rather than 
efficient-seeking due to high trade barriers. The FDI impact on industrial development 
depends not only on increasing FDI inflows – and the technology and managerial 
know-how associated with capital – but also on global market access. China’s framework 
of industrial policy for the passenger car industry has encouraged market-seeking FDI, but 
discouraged efficiency-seeking and export-oriented FDI. High tariff rates for passenger 
cars prevented imports and protected high prices and profits in the domestic market, 
stimulating MNCs to serve local market rather than to export. High tariff rates for 
components, in combination with local content requirements, prevented IJVs from 
importing components and led to subscale plants and consequently high costs of 
production. Some China-made components were up to 40 percent costlier than world 
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prices 7 , preventing efficiency-seeking and export-oriented FDI. The organisational 
arrangements of IJVs further discouraged MNCs from exporting – it is natural that the 
foreign partners in IJVs are not willing to export thus to share its international market with 
its local partners. This may be an important reason why international competitiveness has 
not been established over a long period of time under the model of industrial policy 
pursued in China’s passenger car industry (see Subsection 6.1.3). In contrast, export 
promotion was an integral part of Japanese and South Korean industrial policies for the 
automotive industry. In China, export promotion has only been mentioned by the document 
of industrial policy, but not seriously implemented due to the inherent deficits in the 
industrial policy.  
Before the mid-1980s, China relied on importing technology to expedite the 
modernisation of its automotive industry (see Figure 6-2). The demand-led surge in motor 
vehicle imports in the mid-1980s forced China to adopt a much more open policy to 
increase passenger car production and to promote import substitution. FDI in the 
automotive sector was officially permitted and China began to encourage FDI by setting up 
IJVs with car-producing MNCs. Industrial policy provided an integrated approach to 
inward FDI in the passenger car industry, including explicit restrictions on equity share, 
local content and other operational requirements. Due to strict regulation, FDI in the 
passenger car industry has mostly taken the form of IJVs. Totally 13 IJVs had been 
established until 2002 (see Table 6-5).  
Table 6-5 IJVs in China’s passenger car industry 
IJV Foreign partner Local partner Year of establishment 
Beijing Jeep DaimlerChrysler BAIC 1984 
Shanghai Volkswagen Volkswagen Group SAIC 1984 
Guangzhou Peugeot  Peugeot GAG 1985 
FAW-Volkswagen Volkswagen Group FAW 1991 
Dongfeng-Citroën Citroën DMC 1992 
Chang’an Suzuki  Suzuki Motor Chang’an Automobile (Group) Co.  1993 
Shanghai GM  General Motors SAIC 1997 
Guangzhou Honda  Honda Motor GAG 1998 
Nanjing Fiat Fiat Yuejin Motor (Group) Corporation 1999 
Dongfeng Yueda Kia Kia Motors DMC, Jiangsu Yueda 1999 
Fengshen Nissan Motor DMC 2000 
Tianjin Toyota Toyota TAIC 2000 
Beijing Hyundai Hyundai Motor BAIC 2002 
Note: 1) Beijing Jeep was co-invested by Beijing Automotive Works (later BAIC) and American Motor 
Corporation (AMC), which was acquired by Chrysler in 1987 (Chrysler merged with Daimler Benz in 1998). 
When the joint venture agreement expired in May 2002, DaimlerChrysler signed an agreement with BAIC to 
prolong their cooperation for 30 years. 2) BAIC is corporationised from former Beijing Automotive Works. 3) In 
2002, DMC and PSA Peugeot Citroën signed an agreement to broaden the cooperation between DMC and Citroën 
to that between DMC and PSA Peugeot Citroën. 4) Nissan invested in Fengshen via Yulon Motor and DFM, an 
IJV with DMC. 5) After the restructuring between FAW Group and TAIC in 2002, FAW Group became the local 
partner of Tianjin Toyota. 
6.2.2 MNCs in the Passenger Car Industry: Pioneers and Latecomers 
The global automotive industry has been dominated a number of industrial leaders (see 
                                                        
7 See Murphy, ‘Driving ambition’, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 2004. 
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Table 6-6). As the restructuring of the global automotive industry went on, several 
corporate groups emerged (see Table 6-7) and the list of top carmakers changed 
significantly. Virtually all carmakers have entered China’s automotive market, but based on 
different entry timing strategies. Some car-producing MNCs pioneered to enter the market, 
and others followed. There are three waves of FDI in China’s automotive industries: the 
first wave took place in the mid-1980s, the second wave in the early 1990s and the third 
wave in the late 1990s and beyond (see Figure 6-2).  
Table 6-6 Leading MNCs in the global automotive industry 
Rank Company Country Global revenues rank 2001 Revenues (US$ millions) 
1 General Motors United States 3 177,260 
2 Ford Motor United States 5 162,412 
3 DaimlerChrysler Germany 7 136,897 
4 Toyota Motor Japan 10 120,814 
5 Volkswagen Germany 21 79,287 
6 Honda Motor Japan 41 58,882 
7 Fiat Italy 49 51,944 
8 Nissan Motor Japan 58 49,555 
9 Peugeot France 65 46,264 
10 BMW Germany 112 34,444 
11 Renault France 125 32,552 
12 Hyundai Motor South Korea 133 30,864 
13 Mitsubishi Motors Japan 171 25,598 
14 Volvo Sweden 267 18,301 
15 Mazda Motor Japan 296 16,754 
16 Suzuki Motor Japan 381 13,342 
17 Isuzu Motors Japan 404 12,778 
18 Fuji Heavy Industries Japan 462 10,897 
  Source: Fortune 500. 
Note: Not including companies specialised in motor components, which are also included in the motor 
vehicle and parts industry in the Fortune 500. 
 
Table 6-7 Major corporate groups in the global automotive industry 
Group Group members 
General Motors GM (Opel, Vauxhall, Saab), Fiat-Iveco, Suzuki-Maruti, Fuji and Isuzu 
DaimlerChrysler Mercedes, Chrysler and Mitsubishi 
Ford Motor Ford and Mazda 
Toyota Motor Toyota, Daihatsu and Hino 
Renault Renault, Nissan, Nissan Diesel and Samsung 
Volkswagen Volkswagen, Skoda and Seat 
PSA Peugeot and Citroën 
Volkswagen, Peugeot and American Motor Corporation (AMC) were among the 
pioneers investing in China’s automotive industry. Early in 1984, AMC, acquired by 
Chrysler (merged with Daimler Benz later in 1998) in 1987, and Beijing Automotive 
Works (BAW) established an IJV, the Beijing Jeep Corporation Ltd. (BJC), to produce 
jeeps in Beijing. BJC was one of the first and then the largest IJVs between an American 
company and a Chinese enterprise. In 1990, an engine plant is added to Beijing Jeep 
facilities.8 Although AMC was confident that BJC would be able to not only serve as an 
                                                        
8 When the joint venture agreement expired in May 2002, DaimlerChrysler signed an agreement with Beijing 
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entry into the Chinese market, but also export Cherokee Jeep from China to other countries 
in Asia, the latter object has never been attained.9 In recent years, BJC faced daunting 
challenges, with its sales and profits falling sharply. 
Although facing troubles in recent years, BJC is not the unluckiest one in the first three 
IJVs in China’s automotive industry. Guangzhou Peugeot was. It was co-invested by 
Guangzhou Automotive Works (GAW, later GAG) and Peugeot in 1985. In its relatively 
short history, Guangzhou Peugeot had experienced success but declined rapidly since 1994. 
With a relatively small amount of investment and low equity share in this IJV, Peugeot 
probably had no long-term commitment and only provided laggard models and virtually no 
technology improvement to the IJV. In the face of fierce competition from Santana and 
other brands, Peugeot rapidly lost it market share and ended up with a withdrawing from 
the IJV.10 
The only winner in the first-movers is Volkswagen, which entered China’s passenger 
car industry with two IJVs: Shanghai Volkswagen, started in 1985, and FAW-Volkswagen, 
started in 1991(see Table 6-8 for basic facts about the two IJVs). Since the start of its 
operation in China, Volkswagen has occupied the leading position in the Chinese passenger 
car market. In the first wave of FDI inflows, Volkswagen acted as a leader in terms of 
investment scale, technology improvement and localisation process, which in turn gained 
itself a leading position in the market, as well as a good relationship with the Chinese 
government. In the second wave of FDI inflows, Volkswagen fully utilised its leading 
position obtained in the first phase, beat its competitors, and got the opportunity to set up 
an IJV with FAW, an ‘ideal’ state-owned local partner among the ‘Three Big’. Therefore, 
Volkswagen built up its leading position in China by entering early and decisively, and by 
further strengthening its early dominant position through strong commitment and steadfast 
reinvestment. 
                                                                                                                                            
Automotive Industry (Group) Company (BAIC, the former BAW) to prolong their cooperation for 30 years. The 
agreement called for capital injection, a new management team and the introduction of advanced automotive 
technology. Another Agreement was signed in June 2002, between BAIC and Mitsubishi Motor, an assembler and 
engine producer which DaimlerChrysler has hold about 37 percent equity share and plan to enlarge its stick. The 
technology licensing agreement authorised BAIC to produce and sell an ameliorated version of ‘Challenger’, the 
flagship model of Mitsubishi Motor. 
9 See Mann (1997). 
10 Guangzhou Peugeot stopped operation in 1998. Honda established a joint venture in Guangzhou after PSA 
withdrew from Guangzhou Peugeot. 
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Table 6-8 Basic facts about Volkswagen’s two joint ventures in China 
Item Shanghai Volkswagen FAW-Volkswagen 
Time of establishment 1985 1991 
Location Shanghai Changchun, Jilin Province 
Total investment (RMB¥ billion) 15.05 11.13 
Shareholders at the time of 
establishment 
Volkswagen AG (50%) 
SAIC (25%) 
Bank of China (15%) 
CNAIC (10%) 
Volkswagen AG (30%) 
Audi AG (10%) 
FAW (60%) 
 
Workforce 10,300 6,000 
Production capacity 300,000 vehicles 
330,000 engines 
 
180,000 vehicles 
270,000 engines 
180,000 gearboxes 
Products Santana 
Santana 2000 
Passat 
Polo 
Jetta 
Audi 
Bora 
 
Market share (percent) 35.6 17.8 
   Source: Corporate websites of Shanghai Volkswagen and FAW-Volkswagen. 
In the second wave of FDI inflows, another European carmaker, Citroën entered, 
establishing an IJV with DMC, another state-owned local firm among the ‘Three Big’. 
Dongfeng-Citroën was launched in 1992 and began production late in 1996.11 The IJV is 
31 percent owned by DMC, 26.9 percent by Citroën, 39 percent by Chinese financial 
institutions and 3.1 percent by French banks. With a total investment of over RMB¥ 13.1 
billion, including RMB¥ 2.9 billion government and commercial loans from France, 
DCAC has a heavy burden of interest and depreciation, but a relatively low level of sales 
and production. Only after the implementation of a ‘debt for equity substitution’ project 
reducing debt of RMB¥ 2.3 billion and a corresponding capital injection from Citroën in 
2000, DCAC stopped losing money and began earning profits. FAW-Volkswagen, built just 
one year earlier with almost the same amount of investment, obviously outperformed 
DCAC. With regard to DCAC’s poor financial performance and its relative low market 
share (virtually the same as Chang’an Suzuki, which invested much less than DCAC), the 
IJV between DMC and Citroën (later PSA) is another unsuccessful story of French 
carmakers in China’s automotive market. 
In the third wave of FDI, General Motors outmanoeuvred its rivals for a role in the 
second IJV established in Shanghai. Formed in June 1997, Shanghai General Motors Co., 
Ltd. (Shanghai GM) is a US$ 1.52 billion, 50-50 IJV with SAIC. In the first year of its 
operation, Shanghai GM sold more than 20,000 luxury Buick cars and earned a profit of 
RMB¥ 500 million. In the first half of 2002, Shanghai GM’s share has climbed to number 
four in China’s passenger car market, only behind Shanghai Volkswagen, 
FAW-Volkswagen and TAIC. Although General Motors entered late in China’s 
automotive market, it came just prior to a demand boom, based on strong support from 
perhaps the most powerful domestic partner and local government.12 
                                                        
11 In 2002, DMC and PSA Peugeot Citroën signed an agreement broadening cooperation from between DMC and 
Citroën to between DMC and PSA Peugeot Citroën.  
12 In 1998, the IJV project was identified as the number one project by the Shanghai Municipal, usually given to 
an important city infrastructure project. After Shanghai GM’s production, all cars used by the city leaders changed 
to Buick, indicating strong support from the local government.  
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The even more successful story happened to Honda Motor, which entered the game in 
China’s seductive automotive market in 1998 to fill the empty left by Peugeot in 
Guangzhou. Honda entered just one year after General Motors, with a much smaller 
amount of investment. The company started the production of the luxury Accord model in 
March 1999. In 2001, Guangzhou Honda sold 51000 cars, realising RMB¥ 13.2 billion 
turnover (Shanghai Volkswagen is RMB¥ 31.7 billion) and 4.5 billion pre-tax profits. In 
2001, the market share of Honda Accord was 28.9 percent for the luxury car segment and 
7.3 percent for the passenger car market at large, almost the same as that of DCAC and 
only one percent below that of Shanghai GM. Considering the total investment of no more 
than US$ 200 million, this achievement was impressive. As car-producing MNCs 
increasingly focus on the Chinese market, the third wave of FDI did not end but heated up. 
Volkswagen, General Motors, Honda Motor and DaimlerChrysler planed to expand; Ford 
Motor, BMW and Hyundai Motor began to enter. Recent large investment projects of 
Toyota and Nissan made the nearly boiling water even hotter. As an increasing number of 
IJVs are formed after China’s WTO entry and more domestic firms begin to cooperate 
with more than one foreign partner, and vice versa, the structure of the automotive industry 
is becoming more and more complicated (see Subsection 6.2.4). 
6.2.3 Market Structure and the Lack of Competition: Consequences 
In the automotive sector, competition has been introduced since the beginning of China’s 
economic transition. In the highly regulated and protected passenger car industry, as 
discussed in Subsection 6.1.2 and Subsection 6.1.3, both entry restrictions and trade 
barriers imposed by the government determined the nature of market competition. Market 
structure is largely determined by the entry and exit of firms as well as the imports and 
exports of goods. Generally speaking, government policy, pre-entry competition among 
MNCs and after-entry market competition among IJVs have jointly determined the 
structure of China’s passenger car industry. It seems that, for a long period of time, the first 
two factors have played the most significant roles. Since the late 1980s, government policy 
on the passenger car industry has been incorporated in the sector-specific industrial policy, 
which has involved an array of restrictive policy measures, including trade barriers, 
investment project screening, foreign equity limitation and local content requirements. The 
essence of this policy system has been highlighted by systematic impediments to both 
market entry and import.  
In this circumstance of government protectionism, firms, including SOEs and MNCs, 
built up their bargaining power and used it to achieve specific objects. For car-producing 
MNCs, although stepping into China’s passenger car industry was associated with many 
uncertainties and difficulties, the potential market size and the persistent high profitability 
protected by entry restrictions and trade barriers were very attractive. The primal constraint 
facing them was the entry restriction imposed by the Chinese government. To enter the 
Chinese market, MNCs need to offer right technologies and to access to right partners. As 
a play ground for car-producing MNCs, China’s passenger car market has provided a 
special arena to compete on. Even before their investment, the competition began as 
MNCs tried to procure a very limited number of licences to set up IJVs in China, 
especially with preferred local partners – the politically powerful large-sized SOEs. The 
pre-entry competition is part of the multi-dimensional competition among MNCs in 
China’s automotive industry and, to some extent, pre-determines the position of a 
car-producing MNC in China’s automotive market. 
The large foreign investment projects usually got a more rigorous control and a more 
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complicated screening process, especially in the early years of reform. In the process of 
negotiation with domestic partners and its superior (local government or department of 
central government) and the process of screening, several interested MNCs participated 
and competed with each other. In the competition for a market entry license and a 
preferred partner, the bargaining power of MNCs and what they decided to offer 
determined the result of this pre-entry competition. Large-scale investment, advanced 
technology, fast localisation and some other specific policy preconceptions are all on the 
government’s wish list. In the early 1990s, Volkswagen utilised its leading position and 
bargaining power gained in the 1980s to get the license to form an IJV with FAW. In the 
mid-1990s, General Motors offered a lot more than its rivals and got the chance in a 
Shanghai car venture, while Ford failed. When Guangzhou Peugeot came to an end in 
1997, GAG provided a scarce opportunity for foreign car manufacturers to enter the 
Chinese market. Among several foreign automotive manufacturers that showed interests in 
taking over the venture, Honda Motor was chosen by the Chinese government to become a 
new joint venture partner of GAG. 
One of the most important issues in pre-entry competition is local partner selection, 
which is a crucial determinant of business performance of MNCs. The more ‘important’ a 
local partner is, the more likely successful the IJV will be. For the car-producing MNCs, 
however, the bargaining power in selecting a local partner is usually limited. The identified 
key SOEs get special ‘attention’ from the government. The government strategy of ‘Three 
Big and Three Small’ gives the MNCs a clear strategic evaluation for their potential joint 
venture partners. In 1987, three centrally programmed groups – FAW, DMC and China 
National Heavy-duty Truck Corporation – were ratified as independent planning units in 
the State Planning Commission. Three local corporate groups in Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Beijing soon received the same treatment. These corporation groups now dominate the 
industry (in the passenger car segment, by the IJVs they invested in) and an increasing 
number of small and medium-sized factories are taken over by these groups. Once MNCs 
entered the Chinese market, they can reinforce their bargaining power for influencing 
government policies. As He and Yang (1999) argued, many MNCs joined SOEs in 
lobbying for protection. They have the incentives to request protection in order to gain an 
advantage over their competitors outside China, or simply to seek rents from protection. 
Although there are a large number of firms in the automotive industry, production in the 
passenger car industry has long been dominated by the largest players. As a consequence 
of China’s ‘middle way’ strategy to develop it passenger car industry, it have been IJVs 
that dominate the fast-growing passenger car market. IJVs, in total, took a very large share 
of the domestic market – averaging 73.7 percent from 1986 to 2002 (see Table 6-9 for the 
combined market share of IJVs). TAIC was the only non-IJV firm that had a significant 
market share in the passenger car industry. Volkswagen has dominated China’s passenger 
car market since the mid-1980s when Shanghai Volkswagen was established. Over a period 
of 15 years, more than half of the passenger cars sold in China rolled out of Volkswagen’s 
IJVs (see Table 6-9 for Volkswagen’s market share). Other foreign IJVs accounted for most 
part of the rest. Only after 2000, as competition intensified in the passenger car industry, 
Volkswagen’s market share began to shrink significantly. Because it is the IJVs established 
jointly by the largest SOEs and the leading MNCs that dominate the passenger car market, 
the industrial structure has been largely determined by the collaboration between SOEs and 
MNCs (Figure 6-5 shows the structure of the passenger car market in 2000).  
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Table 6-9 Market share and concentration ratio in China’s passenger car industry, selected years 
Year 1986 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Shanghai Volkswagen (percent) 69 44 49 36 23 
FAW-Volkswagen (percent) 0 0 6 15 16 
Volkswagen total (percent) 69 44 55 52 39 
IJV total (percent) 83 69 70 83 77 
Concentration ratio (C3) (percent) 99 71 77 65 48 
   Source: CAAM. 
   Note: Calculate by the author according to the production data (units of passenger cars produced). 
Figure 6-5 Market share distribution in China’s passenger car industry in 2000 
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competition in the passenger car market. However, the problem was concealed by the 
seemingly dispersed market structure and the apparently large number of firms in the entire 
automotive industry. The dispersed market structure of automotive industry was formed in 
the era of planned economy and the problem has been improved during the reform period. 
However, there are still a large number of assemblers, most of which have very small 
production capacity. Some of them are taken as an automotive firm only because they have 
licenses to produce motor vehicles. In fact, they are almost extraneous when considering 
the structure of China’s automotive market. In addition, if we consider different segments 
of China’s automotive industry, the structure of these segments would be quite 
concentrated, as demonstrated by the above analysis of the passenger car segment. 
However, the government did not take the issue of relevant market into account and the 
automotive industry was taken as a whole when market structure was concerned. 
Furthermore, the number of firms rather than the ratio of concentration was used to 
measure the industrial structure. Therefore the conclusion would be that a dispersed market 
structure calls for government efforts to limit ‘unnecessary competition’ and to promote 
concentration. It seems that this argument based on misperception on market structure has 
provided the most rationale for the formulation of industrial policy. The solution proposed 
is to implement strict entry control in order to limit the number of firms in the industry. 
This policy may also be inspired by the oligopolistic nature of the current global car 
industry. However, only the status quo was emphasised and the historical development 
process was neglected – in the early 1920s, for instance, when the United States already 
produced over 200,000 passenger cars annually, there were more than 100 car assemblers 
from which Ford and GM survived and emerged as industrial leaders.13 
Behind this apparent miscalculation is the government’s determination to develop 
China’s own Ford and GM. According to the political economy of regulation, interest 
groups may lobby with the relevant government authorities for the imposition of 
government policy to their own benefit. In this process, the incumbent firm is usually the 
interest group with the strongest position (see Subsection 8.1.1 for a detailed discussion). 
In China’s automotive industry, the large-sized SOEs have the strongest influential power 
for the formulation of industrial policy. In China’s automotive industry, the seemingly 
dispersed industrial structure provided probably the strongest argument used by the 
incumbent SOEs to persuade the government to implement a strict control on market entry. 
Many dimensions should be considered for the development of an industry. As 
suggested in Section 2.3, industrial development comprises the increase of domestic 
production capacity, the progress of both static and dynamic efficiency, and the 
enhancement of international competitiveness. Associated with these facets of industrial 
development is the central concern of social welfare, which includes the interests of both 
firms and consumers. With the existence of market dominance of leading firms, as 
suggested in Subsection 3.3.1, the consumer interests may be severely harmed and welfare 
losses for the society at large may be significant. The development of domestic enterprises 
is a legitimate concern under the condition of an infant industry (see Subsection 4.1.3). In 
case that the government takes this as the only concern for industrial development, 
however, it may not be easy for it to resist the pressures from domestic firms, particularly 
large-sized SOEs. This might lead to the so-called ‘regulatory capture’ in which the 
government loses sight of the public interest and protect the privileges of established firms 
(see Subsection 8.1.1 for a detailed discussion). This may have been the case in China’s 
                                                        
13 See Geroski and Mazzucato (2001). 
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passenger car industry. From the government’s point of view, the industrial policy for the 
automotive industry has been successful in terms of the development of large-sized SOEs. 
The ‘Three Big’, FAW, DMC and SAIC, have ranked high in the top SOE list in recent 
years and SAIC even entered the Fortune 500 list in 2004 (see Subsection 5.2.2). However, 
these firms get most of their revenues from the IJVs that they invested in but cannot really 
control. The passenger cars produced in these IJVs are foreign branded and designed. The 
most profitable phase of the value chain, new product development, has been largely 
remained outside China. The core technology and associated Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) are controlled by MNCs and IJVs are only assembling bases of MNCs.  
The fundamental mechanism through which FDI promote industrial development is 
competition in the condition that foreign entries can reduce concentration and promote 
rivalry (see Subsection 4.1.2). It is not likely the case in China’s passenger car industry, as 
indicated by high concentration ratios and the particularly large market share of a dominant 
firm. Although high concentration, as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1, needs not be equated 
with a lack of competition, it facilitates abuses of market dominance and anticompetitive 
practices, which are the major interest of competition authorities. In China’s passenger car 
industry, high concentration and extremely large market share of one firm, combined with 
persistent excess profits, provide convincing evidence of the lack of competition and the 
existence of market dominance. Without effective competition, the performance of 
industrial development in China’s passenger industry has been poor. 
The rents created by protectionist measures have ballooned car prices. Due largely to 
the protection of the industry, models bear price tags much higher than those in the United 
States, Europe and Japan. This has allowed IJVs in China to enjoy persistent high 
profitability. Indicators such as the ratio of after-tax profits to book value assets revealed 
the abnormal profitability of this protected industry. This ratio was almost three times that 
of the manufacturing sector at large in 1995. In the case of Santana, the flagship brand of 
Shanghai Volkswagen, the domestic sales price in 1993 was around RMB¥ 200,000 per 
car (and the production cost around RMB¥ 85,000), which at the official exchange rate 
doubled the world price (Dic, 1997). Volkswagen has bulk of its profits coming out of its 
two China ventures in recent years. In another case, each Honda Accord made by Honda’s 
Guangzhou venture makes over US$3,000 in net profit in recent years, three times of that 
for a comparable US model. 14  The profitability of China’s passenger car industry 
remained at an extremely high level not seen anywhere else, even in recent years when 
competition was intensified. In 2002, China’s automotive industry realised revenue of 
RMB¥ 151.5 billion and profits of RMB¥ 43.1 billion. The profitability ratio of the entire 
industry was as high as 28.54 percent, despite the 5.6 percent reduction of prices. Since the 
passenger car industry has been dominated by IJVs, it is evident that MNCs have been able 
to reap high profits and to share a part of the rents behind the high protection. 
The market dominance of leading IJVs and the associated high prices and profitability 
have caused serious problems. The welfare losses caused by the market dominance of a 
very limited number of firms in the passenger car industry have been significant. 
According to an estimate by Mckinsey Global Institute (2003), the deadweight loss in 
China’s passenger car sector was approximately US$ 900 million (RMB¥ 7.4 billion) and 
the excess profits were approximately US$ 3 billion (RMB¥ 24.8 billion) in 2001. 
According to an estimation of Liang and Van Tulder (2003), the annual deadweight loss 
caused by market dominance exceeded RMB¥ 10 billion in recent years. The high 
                                                        
14 According to McKinsey. 
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profitability reduced the minimum efficient scale of production. As a result, the Chinese 
automotive industry has still remained highly fragmented, although the market was clearly 
dominated by leading firms. In 2001, there were still over 100 assemblers, despite some 
government efforts to promote consolidation. The high profitability protected small and 
inefficient indigenous assemblers, leading to a seemingly dispersed pattern of industrial 
organisation, under the pretext of which the government impose a strict control on market 
entry.  
Associated with the high level of profitability in the passenger car industry was the low 
level of product diversification, particularly before the late 1990s. Since the mid-1980s, the 
product diversification experienced a long process of slow evolution prior to the dramatic 
change took place in recent years. After Volkswagen built up its leading position in China, 
the passenger car industry was dominated by some of its models, at first Santana, a 
1970s-era model that has long been out of production elsewhere, and then Jetta and Audi. 
Other models from TAIC, Dongfeng-Citroën and Chang’an Suzuki provided more options 
for consumers. After Shanghai GM and Guangzhou Honda began production in the late 
1990s, some advanced models were introduced into the Chinese market. In recent years, 
especially after the WTO accession, an increasing number of car models were introduced 
by IJVs and some of them entered the Chinese market at the same time as they entered 
international markets. Even in recent years, some old models, especially the ‘Old Three’ 
(Santana, Jetta and Fukang) still took the largest shares of the market (see Table 6-10 for 
main models in 2000). The passenger car market witnessed an explosive process of 
product diversification in 2002, with more than 10 new models rolled out off lines. This 
development ended the reign of Santana and the ‘Old Three’.  
Table 6-10 Main passenger car models: prices and market shares 
Market share 2000 
 (percent) 
Price May 2001 
 (Beijing) Brand 
 RMB¥ US$ 
Producer 
Santana 18.2 118,500 14,300 Shanghai Volkswagen 
Santana 2000 13.5 135,000 16,300 Shanghai Volkswagen 
Jetta 2V 13.3 115,000 13,900 FAW-Volkswagen 
Alto 8.9 49,500 6,000 Chang’an Suzuki 
Charade 7100U 6.4 67,600 8,200 TAIC 
Accord 5.3 290,800 35,120 Guangzhou Honda 
Buick 5.0 350,000 42,300 Shanghai GM 
Audi A6 2.6 441,000 53,300 FAW-Volkswagen 
   Source: China Business Update Automotive Statistics, 2001. 
The lack of competition has also resulted in problems in technological progress. One of 
the most significant failures of the industrial policy for China’s passenger car industry has 
been in the technological aspect (see Peking University, 2004, in Chinese). Few SOEs have 
yet managed to establish strong R&D capabilities and to develop original brands. 
Domestic technological capability has not been established in the passenger car sector as 
expected. This highlights the failure of the ‘market for technology’ strategy (see 
Subsection 2.3.3) in this specific sector. Because the core technologies and associated IPRs 
are fully controlled by MNCs, China’s passenger car industry as a whole can be considered 
as merely a production base for MNCs. 
6.2.4 Intensified Competition after the WTO Entry 
Coupled with the reduction of trade barriers, a certain degree of deregulation toward a 
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more open industrial environment has taken place in the automotive industry since the late 
1990s. As a result, entry barriers have been reduced and more IJVs have been established. 
Many new models of passenger cars entered the Chinese market by Complete Knock 
Down (CKD) or Semi Knock Down (SKD) assembly. As the production capacity of the 
industry increased rapidly and some latecomers speeded up their presence in China, 
competition was intensified. Despite all these developments, excess profitability persisted 
even into recent years. However, greater competition has begun to squeeze margins. As 
tariffs fell, so did prices. Sales and marketing costs rose in a more competitive market and 
more frequent model upgrading meant that heavier investment would constantly be 
needed.  
Meanwhile some non-IJV assemblers entered the passenger car industry. Among them, 
Geely and Chery have been the most successful (see Table 6-11 for their production and 
market shares). Both of them did not get formal licenses from the system of product 
catalogue management when first entering the market. Geely, the only private-owned car 
assembler in China, entered the automotive industry by acquiring a small SOE in Sichuan 
to procure the license for producing small-sized passenger vehicles. In 2001, Geely finally 
got the license to produce passenger cars. In 2003, Geely accounted for about 20 percent of 
the compact-car market and began to export. In order to get the license, Chery transferred 
20 percent of its equity to SAIC and renamed SAIC-Chery in 1999. In 2003, Chery 
became one of the eight firms with the production of over 100,000 passenger cars.  
Table 6-11 Production and market shares of Chery and Geely, 1999-2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Firm Production 
(units) 
MS 
(%) 
Production 
(units) 
MS 
(%) 
Production 
(units) 
MS 
(%) 
Production 
(units) 
MS 
(%) 
Production 
(units) 
MS 
(%) 
Chery / / 2,600 0.4 30,070 4.2 49,397 4.5 101,141  5.0 
Geely 3,750  0.7 11,425 1.9 23,808 3.3 47,443 4.3 85,000  4.2 
Sources: CAAM 
The recent success of Geely and Chery in China’s passenger car industry demonstrates 
that domestic brands can establish their competitiveness in a market that has already been 
dominated by international brands. Another important implication is that an independent 
industrial development model may be a feasible approach to developing China’s passenger 
car industry. In terms of international competitiveness, China’s ‘middle way’ approach for 
the development of the passenger car industry has been failed, as firms focusing on reaping 
high profits in domestic market rather than competing in international markets. In contrast 
to IJVs, which totally focus on reaping high profits in the domestic market, these domestic 
enterprises have a natural propensity to expand internationally.15 Both Geely and Chery 
have strong ambitions to enter international markets. In 2003, Geely began to export to 
Middle East and the United States. Chery exported 1200 cars, accounting for half of 
China’s passenger car exports. In 2004, Chery’s assembler in Iran began production. The 
equity restriction, which does not allow MNCs to enter China via WFOEs or IJVs with 
majority ownership, has discouraged MNCs to conduct efficiency-seeking investment and 
to build up export base in China, which took place in some South American countries 
following a dependent model of industrial development. This explanation has been 
strengthened by a new development in China’s passenger car industry. Honda’s second car 
                                                        
15 Recently, Shanghai Volkswagen and Shanghai GM began trial shipments to foreign markets. But they still do 
not have large-scale export plans.  
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plant under construction is the first IJV with majority foreign ownership permitted by the 
Chinese government. It is also the only firm manufacturing solely for export.16 While the 
export of passenger cars is just getting started, the export of components has reached a 
considerable scale – China shipped US$ 2.4 billion car components in 2003. 
As MNCs expanded in China after its WTO entry, more IJVs were established and 
investment in China’s passenger car industry became a game of big money. The original 
industrial structure shaped by the waves of inward FDI is under dramatic change and a 
new structure has come into being (Figure 6-6 illustrates the core structure of the current 
automotive industry). With the explosive growth of passenger car sales, China has become 
a major market for many MNCs and thus a crucial battlefield for them. Almost all car 
assemblers in China are installing capacity at high speed. Volkswagen, for example, is 
investing € 5 billion over the coming years to protect its leading market position against 
increasing competition. 
Figure 6-6 Core structure of the Chinese automotive industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 See Murphy, ‘Driving ambition’, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 2004. 
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Changing policy environment after the WTO entry dramatically altered the competitive 
environment in the industry and, therefore, will greatly influence the future of China’s 
automotive industry. With the trade barriers reduced gradually after the WTO accession, a 
new round of industrial concentration (centred on the ‘Three Big’) and a new wave of FDI 
inflows accelerated simultaneously, making competitive situation in China’s passenger car 
industry more complex. The dominance of MNCs may be extended to the whole industry, 
as some late-coming MNCs and ready-positioned SOEs signed agreements to form IJVs 
producing a whole range of motor vehicles. Examples are the agreements between FAW 
and Toyota as well as between DMC and Nissan. Both agreements were signed in 2002 
and involved investing billions of US dollars (see Table 6-12 for some details of the 
agreements). Before the agreement between DMC and Nissan, all IJVs are ‘partial’ equity 
cooperation, which means that domestic firms put part of its assets or/and cash in the IJV. 
The agreement between DMC and Nissan initiated a model in which domestic firms put 
virtually all its production capacity, including the competitive and profitable truck 
production, in the IJV. Behind the deal between DMC and Nissan is Renault, which 
acquired Nissan in 1998 and formed the fifth biggest corporate group in the global 
automotive industry. The global restructuring has had its effect on competition in China, as 
demonstrated by the cases of Renault-Nissan-DMC and DaimlerChrysler-Mitsubishi 
Motor-BJC. 
Table 6-12 ‘Big Deals’ in 2002 
Project Some Details 
DMC Honda 
GAG 
z Date of agreement: July 10th, 2002 
z Production coverage: passenger cars totally for export 
z Sales target: 50,000 (2004) as beginning production capacity 
FAW Toyota z Date of agreement: August 29th, 2002 
z Equity share: 50-50 
z Investment: RMB¥ 21 billion* 
z Production coverage: medium-grade and luxury passenger cars, mini cars and 
sport-utility vehicles 
z Sales target: 300,000-400,000 (2010) 
z Makes mini cars in Tianjin starting in 2003, with annual production of 100,000 
vehicles; makes Toyota-branded luxury SUVs starting in 2003; makes large and 
medium-sized luxury sedans starting in 2005 with annual production of 50,000 at the 
facility in Tianjin. 
DMC Nissan z Date of agreement: September 19th, 2002 
z Name of the IJV: DMC 
z Equity share: 50-50 
z DMC invests by all its main assets (production bases in Shiyan and Xiangfan); Nissan 
invests by cash: RMB¥ 8.55 billion (US$ 10.3 billion) and RMB¥ 5.33 billion (US$ 
6.16 billion) in product development prior to 2006 
z Production coverage: Trucks, light commercial vehicles and passenger vehicles 
z Sales target: 550,000 (2006) including 330,000 commercial vehicles 
z Commercial vehicles use DMC’s brands; passenger vehicles use Nissan’s brands 
Source: Shanghai Securities News, September 22, 2002. 
Note: * Estimated by Fujo Cho, President of Toyota. 
In the new ‘Five-Year Plan’, the Chinese government showed its intention to 
consolidate the nation’s automotive industry into two or three strong companies. It 
provided a policy foundation for industrial concentration in the form of affirmative 
corporate restructuring, combined with all-round foreign cooperation. Domestic 
automotive firms will further seek cooperation with its foreign partners to enhance its 
competitiveness to tackle the challenges following China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organisation. Thus, this industrial concentration is a mixture of domestic production 
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restructuring and a new round of FDI inflows. This new round of industrial restructuring 
has been launched since 2001. Several smaller firms have jointed the three biggest groups 
usually through the way of state-owned equity transfer without payment. For example, 
SAIC acquired Liuzhou Wuling Automotive Company, Ltd. (Wuling Automotive), one of 
the biggest mini van and truck producers in China. This deal was propelled by the needs of 
further cooperation between SAIC and General Motors. After the deal, SAIC became the 
biggest automotive company in China in terms of both revenue and production. SAIC also 
acquired Chery, which has production capacity of 100,000 passenger cars and 300,000 
engines. Similarly, FAW acquired the core assets of TAIC and the controlling equity share 
of Sichuan Van Plant. Therefore, FAW has three production bases located in Chuangchun, 
Tianjin and Chengdu respectively. Behind this structure are the needs to comprehensively 
cooperate with Toyota, which has IJVs with TAIC and Sichuan Van Plant separately.  
6.3 Determinants of Market Structure: Hypothesis Development 
In Subsection 6.2.3, evidence has been provided to verify the lack of competition and the 
existence of market dominance in China’s passenger car industry. The evidence includes 
the high concentration, the high level of market shares of leading firms, the high level of 
prices and firm profitability. The consequences of the problem are discussed. To interpret 
the policy implications of this phenomenon, the central concern is to explain the sources of 
the existing market dominance. In addition to the qualitative analysis in Subsection 6.2.3, 
quantitative investigation will be conducted to identify the determinants of the lack of 
competition in the passenger car industry. Market share is the most direct single indicator 
of the firm’s ability to abuse its market power (see Subsection 4.3.2). Market structure is of 
interest also because of its effect on firm behaviour – high market share are likely to be 
associated with the possibility of anticompetitive practices. Thus, observing market share 
and its distribution is a logic starting point in an enquiry into possible position of market 
dominance. By investigating the determinants of market share achievements of firms, we 
can approximately identify the sources of market dominance. The determinants reflect the 
qualification of the impact of interaction between government policies and MNC strategies. 
Following the ‘new industrial organisation’, as noted in Section 5.3, firms were not seen as 
passive entities alike, instead they were treated as active entities that often follow different 
strategies. This section investigates the determinants of the market shares of IJVs in 
China’s passenger car industry. The theoretical framework constructed in Subsection 4.3.3 
to analyse the determinants of foreign market share achievements of MNCs is adopted. We 
use polled time series cross-sectional data for China’s passenger car industry to test this 
theory for the 1985-2003 period.  
For firms, market share is a key measure of business performance and is a relatively 
visible and easily monitored indicator of the success of the strategies that management has 
adopted. Many ‘market driven’ companies use share of market rather than volume of profit 
as the primary measure of business success. In the automotive industry, the historical 
success of Japanese MNCs was primarily based on their strategic targeting of maximum 
market share rather than maximisation of profit. In Central and Eastern Europe – after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall – many new entrants ‘bought’ themselves market share, by acquiring 
majority shares in local car-producing companies (Van Tulder and Ruigrok, 1998). Market 
share is the outcome of competition, the measure of firm competitiveness and the indicator 
of market power. In more restricted markets, or in markets with oligopolistic competition, 
market share can also represent the firm’s relative success in raising entry barriers to other 
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firms. Theoretical gaps remain in the literature on the determinants of foreign market share 
performance (see Subsection 4.3.3). Furthermore, most previous studies are based on 
cross-sectional analyses, which make it difficult to explore the relation between entry 
strategies and market share performance over time. Many preceding studies are 
cross-industry studies based on the standard industrial classification, ignoring the problem 
of ‘relevant market’ and neglecting some prominent differences among industries. For 
research on the determinants of foreign market share achievement, both cross-industry and 
intra-industry studies can be expected to generate relevant insights. However, to address 
the above theoretical and methodological limitations, longitudinal studies on specific 
industries are particularly needed. Facing the complexity of foreign market entry, 
intra-industry case studies are more relevant to generate insights and to expand and 
generalise theories. China’s passenger car industry since the mid-1980s provides an 
appropriate case to study thus to fill the gaps. For a dynamic intra-industry study of market 
share in this industrial context, the crucial challenge lies in identifying relevant 
determinants in a specific context, using in particular micro variables that are typically of 
greater policy implications. In the study of the specific industrial setting in China’s 
passenger car industry, all country- and industry-specific factors can be controlled so that 
we can focus on firm-specific strategic and industry-specific institutional factors. The high 
degree of complexity of entry modes can also be simplified and therefore a number of 
dimensions of entry strategy can be controlled, which facilitates a clear-cut and 
simultaneous test of the effects of relevant aspects of government policies and entry 
strategies of MNCs (cf. Liang and Van Tulder, 2004a). 
6.3.1 Entry Strategies of MNCs: Strategic Determinants 
Facing a dramatically changing industrial context, foreign car manufacturers operating in 
China face a different decision making environment as they face in matured markets in 
Europe or North America. In China’s passenger car industry, trade barriers eliminated most 
of the room for the choice between export and local production. Government policy 
restrictions made many investment modes not practicable. The industrial policy, aiming at 
building a ‘national automotive industry’, prescribed that the local partner in the IJV 
producing motor vehicles must take over 50 percent of equity. As the basic entry mode 
choice for foreign investors was thus constrained to IJV, the mode of entry can be 
generally controlled in our analysis of entry strategies, while local partner selection 
becomes crucial. Accordingly, the location decision within the host country is also 
incorporated into the process of local partner selection. A specific analysis of entry strategy 
that takes a number of theoretical deficiencies and the characteristics of China’s passenger 
car industry into account should particularly include the following four aspects: timing of 
entry, local partner selection, scale of entry and sequencing of entry in terms of entry scale. 
All these aspects reflect the outcome of interactions between MNC strategies and 
government policies. For instance, entry order is the result of interactions between MNC 
strategies of entry timing and government restrictions on market entry. A decision on 
investment scale was usually not an optimal strategic choice based on business 
performance consideration but the outcome of a negotiation process between MNCs and 
local partners as well as their superiors (see a discussion in Subsection 6.4.3). 
Order of entry 
As entry mode options were limited by policy restrictions, the timing of entry became a 
crucial strategic choice for MNCs interested in China’s passenger car market. Government 
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policy created entry barrier for firms, limited the number of firms in the industry and 
restricted the contestability of the market. When entry barriers limit the number of firms in 
a particular industry, those who have entered early often have greater monopolistic power 
(Hay and Morris, 1986; Lambkin, 1988). On the other hand, in the special context of 
post-reform China, economic and industrial circumstances were changing so rapidly that 
different timing strategies mattered considerably, even within a relatively short period. 
When several first-movers entered in the mid-1980s in the first wave of FDI, the passenger 
car industry was virtually non-existent and the market was dominated by imports. By the 
late 1990s, when a number of MNCs entered in the second wave of FDI, they faced a 
market which had been primarily developed and become dominated by the successful 
first-movers. When some late entrants came in after China WTO’ entry in 2001, the 
Chinese automotive market was experiencing a demand boom and a rapid sale takeoff. The 
entry timing strategies of MNCs shaped the order of entry in the industry, which 
accordingly influenced the market share achievements of the IJVs in which MNCs 
invested.  
Why do so many firms try to enter a new market earlier? Studies on the relation 
between entry order and firm performance demonstrate that early movers in a given 
product sector enjoy specific competitive advantages. First-mover advantages are widely 
studied in industrial organisation, strategic management and marketing. A first-mover 
advantage arises when the market pioneer develops a sustainable competitive advantage 
over late entrants. First-mover advantages stem from several sources: technological 
leadership, preemption of assets, buyer switching costs (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) 
and advantages in transition economies in particular (Luo and Peng, 1998; Van Tulder and 
Ruigrok, 1998). Besides the advantages of being a pioneer, however, there are also 
disadvantages and risks associated with the first move decision. The success of 
Volkswagen in China proves the lush rewards to a first-mover, while the failure of 
Guangzhou Peugeot also shows how risky it is to be a pioneer. 
Entry order effects exist, especially with respect to market share (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1998). Empirical studies have found enduring market share advantages for 
first-movers (Robinson and Fornell, 1985; Urban et al., 1986; Lambkin, 1988; Mitchell, 
1991; Robinson et al., 1992; Huff and Robinson, 1994; Robinson et al., 1994). Although 
the entry timing decision in a domestic industrial setting, which focuses on the 
evolutionary process of technology, product and industry, is different from that in an 
international industrial setting, the similarity to enter a new market suggests that the 
principle of first-mover advantages may apply to the international context. The 
inter-market impact of pioneering is greater than the intra-market effect and early entry 
provides an important source of competitive advantage in international setting 
(Mascarenhas 1992a, b). First-mover advantages may be amplified when host country uses 
incentives to encourage inward FDI (Brewer, 1993). Pan et al. (1999) examined the unique 
features of international markets in general and the case of China in particular, to identify 
the issues that may enlarge the first-mover advantages in international markets. Nakata and 
Sivakumar (1997) analysed how the characteristics of emerging markets were likely to 
affect first-mover advantages. The early movers into emerging economies are expected to 
have considerable preempt opportunities and benefits from market, product and 
technological leadership (Luo, 1998). Thus, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 1: The earlier an MNC enter a host market, the larger its market share will 
become. 
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Scale and sequencing of entry 
The stages model of entry (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) suggests a sequential 
pattern of entry mode decision, generally distinguishing four different modes of entry at 
different stages of entering a foreign market. However, the sequencing of foreign market 
entry in terms of entry scale still has not been investigated. Entry scale and entry 
sequencing – the two usually overlooked aspects of entry strategy – are interrelated. The 
entry sequence reflects the changing pattern of entry scale and also the change of firm size, 
which has long been identified as a determinant of performance. With regard to entry scale 
and related sequencing, there are two different strategic choices: the sequential 
(step-by-step) and the ‘decisive’ approach. The sequential approach begins with a 
relatively low production capacity and accordingly a relatively small investment scale. The 
incremental capacity buildup represents a progressive deepening of commitment to a 
foreign market. The decisive approach begins with a large-scale production capacity and 
accordingly a large investment, which represents an immediate strategic commitment to a 
foreign market. 
It is suggested that large-scale entry is of limited value in international markets 
(Mascarenhas, 1997). Large-scale entry into smaller international markets is connected 
with the risk of the inability to recover the high overhead costs with limited sales. Higher 
international resource commitment translates into higher exposure to risks. The market 
success gained by Shanghai Volkswagen and Guangzhou Honda in China suggests that a 
step-by-step entry approach is a practical strategy to restrict risk and enhance performance. 
In contrast, Dongfeng-Citroën, which entered with a very large-scale investment, suffered 
considerably from the heavy depreciation and interest burden of its massive capital 
investment and commercial loan. The changing scale of accumulated investment since the 
year of market entry reflects the scale and the related sequencing of entry. The relatively 
small initial investment scale of Shanghai Volkswagen and Guangzhou Honda allowed 
them not only to realise a quick startup of their local operations but also to make profits 
from the beginning. Nevertheless, the minimum amount of investment necessary for the 
business success in automotive industry can still be considered substantial. For a 
step-by-step strategy, continuous incremental investment is necessary as well. Thus we 
make the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The bigger the investment scale, the larger the market share will become. 
6.3.2 Government Support and Traits of IJVs: Institutional Determinants 
A variety of objectives have been suggested to explain firms’ motives to form IJVs 
(Beamish and Banks, 1987; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Hennart, 1991; 
Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Previous studies have found some support that joint ventures 
are a form of strategic behaviour to increase market power, or firm competitive advantage. 
The resource-based view on competitive advantage holds that certain firm assets with 
certain characteristics will lead to sustainable competitive advantages. This view argues 
that differential firm performance is fundamentally due to firm heterogeneity (Rumelt, 
1984, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Joint venture involves a combination of firm strategic 
resources of the partners. The competitive advantage of a joint venture is determined by 
the resources gained from the parent companies. In the case of IJVs in China’s passenger 
car industry, foreign partners and local partners contribute different sources of competitive 
advantage, as they put different kinds of resources into the joint ventures. MNCs provide 
capital, technology and management know-how; state-owned local partners contribute land, 
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skilled workers, local knowledge, and, most importantly, their close relationship with the 
government and their preferential position in the industrial policy.  
Government support 
Partner selection is a crucial factor influencing IJV performance. It influences the mixed 
skills, knowledge and resources and thus the IJV’s ability to achieve its strategic objectives 
(Killing, 1983; Harrigan, 1985). The characteristics of local partners influence the degree 
of resource complementarity and organisational and strategic fit between local and foreign 
partners (Luo, 1997). Local partner selection is especially important in transition 
economies that face the challenges of structural reform, weak market structure, poorly 
specified property rights and institutional uncertainty (Nee, 1992). Criteria for selecting 
complementary local partners for IJVs differ considerably since IJVs vary according to 
their specific national and industrial context. The relative importance of IJV partner 
selection criteria is determined by the strategic context of the proposed venture and the 
parent firms. It is also related to the critical success factors of the IJV’s competitive 
environment and the parent firm’s position vis-à-vis these factors (Geringer, 1991). In 
China’s passenger car market, one of the most critical success factors is the degree of 
government support given to a state-owned local partner. Government support will help 
IJVs increase profitability, reduce uncertainty and boost its competitive edge in the host 
market.  
In the study of the automotive industry, national states have long been considered a 
major force in shaping the industry (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995; Dicken, 1998). The 
government support towards the state-owned local partners in China’s passenger car 
industry materialises at two levels: central government support within the framework of 
industrial policy and local government support. The automotive industry has been the first 
Chinese industry to be backed by a formal state industrial policy. The influence of local 
governments should be equally considered in the process of local partner selection. Dic 
(1997) criticised the opportunism of local authorities that led to the fragmentation and 
miniaturisation of the Chinese automotive industry. Local governments used their 
regulatory and other discretionary powers to favour the purchase of motor vehicles 
produced within their jurisdiction. This has created protected local markets and 
accordingly a segmented national market. As argued by Luo (1998), firm strategic and 
organisational traits are crucial considerations in local partner selection. Government 
support is the key aspect in evaluating the qualification of a local partner in China’s 
passenger car industry. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3: The stronger the government support, the larger the IJV’s market share 
will become. 
International experience of MNCs 
The synergy between foreign and local partners is an important factor that influences the 
competitive advantage of an IJV and accordingly affects its business performance. The 
synergy between the partners decides whether the combined resources can generate (as 
intended) or ruin competitiveness. China’s automotive industry and the overall economic, 
social and cultural context have provided car-producing MNCs a different business 
environment from what they experienced previously. It can be supposed that experience in 
international operations plays an essential role in the process of the adaptation to the 
different business environment and the harmonious cooperation with state-owned local 
partners. The management of MNCs that has to coordinate more international operations is 
more efficient in dealing with the intricacies of market entry and competition and in 
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reaping the benefits in the transition economy like China. International experience is an 
important predictor for overseas expansion performance (Luo and Peng, 1999). It has been 
observed that a firm’s foreign experience enhances its performance in terms of business 
survival and market share performance (Mitchell et al., 1992; Mitchell et al., 1993; Shaver 
et al., 1997). Therefore we predict: 
Hypothesis 4: The more experienced in international operations the foreign parent is, the 
larger the IJV’s market share will become. 
Degree of foreign ownership 
As MNCs bring more strategic resources than state-owned local partners, they usually 
contribute more to the IJV than their local counterparts. A strong correlation between 
commitment and joint venture performance has been suggested (Beamish, 1988; Lee and 
Beamish, 1995). The equity share arrangements of IJVs influence the commitment of 
MNCs and accordingly their competitive advantage contribution to the joint ventures. Thus 
the degree of foreign ownership reveals the strategic commitment of the car-producing 
MNCs and influences the business performance of an IJV. Furthermore, the degree of 
foreign ownership influences the extent of control, which is associated with the 
performance of MNCs. It has been argued that, in China, having a majority stake improves 
IJV performance from a foreign parent perspective (Luo et al., 2001). Several cases of 
unsuccessful business in China’s passenger car industry are related to lower foreign equity 
share or dispersed equity structure. Accordingly we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the degree of foreign ownership, the larger the IJV’s market 
share will become. 
Figure 6-7 illustrates the analytical framework of this study and summarises the 
structure of the hypotheses. The propositions on the complex causal relationships among 
proprietary assets, entry strategies, institutional factors and competitive advantages (see 
Subsection 4.3.3) are not covered by this study. 
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Figure 6-7 Determinants of market share achievement: analytical framework and hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Test, Results and Discussion 
We used polled time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data from China’s passenger car 
industry to test the hypotheses over a period of almost 20 years (1985-2003).17 This period 
covers the entire span during which foreign entry has been facilitated. The relation 
between entry strategies and business performance is essentially dynamic, so researchers 
should be interested in what is taking place over time. However, the typical cross-section 
studies are limited in this respect. The pooling of time series (T=19 years) and 
cross-sections (N=13 firms) in this study enable us to address this concern.  
6.4.1 Data and Measures 
The first two IJVs in China’s passenger car industry began production in 1985, so we used 
this year as the starting point for our study period. Between 1985 and 2002, 13 IJVs, all 
between MNCs and local partners, were established and began production (see Table 6-5). 
                                                        
17 The data for 2003 covers the first half of the year. 
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Most leading car-producing MNCs have invested in China. Different companies chose 
different entry strategies and entered the industry at different moments. During the study 
period, in 1998, one of the IJVs, Guangzhou Peugeot, terminated its business. Accordingly, 
the years of the first and last observations for each firm time series are not always the same. 
We took account of all the units in the population of IJVs in China’s passenger car industry 
and used the unbalanced panel data to test the hypotheses. Production data of different 
IJVs and the total industry over the period 1985-1998 were from the ‘Yearbook of Chinese 
Automobile Industry 1999’ published by the CAAM. Production data of the following 
years were obtained from other publications of the CAAM. Data of IJVs were from 
sources of the CAAM or directly obtained from firms. Data about internationalisation 
strategies of relevant MNCs were from the UNCTAD/Erasmus University Database (cf. 
UNCTAD, 2002). The measures of dependent and independent variables are as follows:  
Market share achievement. To define the dependent variable for the market share analysis, 
we measured the percentage of an IJV’s production vis-à-vis the total production in 
China’s passenger car industry in each year that the firm participated in the industry.  
Timing of entry. With regard to the relationship between entry timing and market share 
achievement, two variables matter: the order of market entry and the lead-time, or the time 
between entries. To take both factors into account, we used the length of time between 
1985 and the time of entry, measured by years, to measure entry timing. The first year of 
production rather than the year of establishment of an IJV was defined as the year of 
market entry, because the year of establishment was often followed by years of 
construction before production, which varied considerably among different IJVs. 
Scale and sequencing of entry. The annual data of accumulated investment since the year 
of market entry was used as the measure of scale of entry and the sequencing of entry in 
terms of entry scale. This measurement can reflect the dynamic process of production 
enhancement, which represents the strategic decision of entry sequencing.  
Government support. Government support towards a state-owned local partner was 
measured by two criteria: 1) the position in the ‘Three Big and Three Small’ system18, 2) 
the degree of local government support, on a 5-point scale from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very 
strong). We used this method to measure the qualification of local partners for two reasons. 
First, in China’s passenger car market, the primal criteria for selecting complementary 
local partners for MNCs is the degree of government support given to a state-owned 
partner. Secondly, the strategy of ‘Three Big and Three Small’ generally reflects the 
qualification (in terms of size, technology and management) of SOEs and accordingly 
gives MNCs a clear evaluation for their potential joint venture partners. 
Degree of foreign ownership. The degree of foreign ownership was measured by total 
foreign equity share, the percentage of equity held by the foreign partner (or partners). The 
annual data of total foreign equity share took into account the changes in the equity 
structure of the IJVs. All the equity held by non-domestic entities was included in the total 
foreign equity share. Usually the foreign equity share is held by one or several specific 
                                                        
18 In a meeting held by the State Council in 1987, FAW, DMC and SAIC were identified as three major 
production bases of passenger car. In 1988, three smaller car assemblers in Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou were 
supplemented. In a meeting on automotive industry in 1991, the strategy of ‘Three Big and Three Small’ was 
stressed. 
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companies within the business group of an MNC. For example, Volkswagen AG and Audi 
AG hold 30 and 10 percent of FAW-Volkswagen’s equity respectively, making total foreign 
equity share 40 percent. In one special case of Dongfeng-Citroën, two French banks hold 
3.125 percent of equity.  
International experience. Previous studies have explored different levels of international 
experience, namely, general, regional, country and local (Li, 1994; Benito and Gripsrud, 
1995; Barkema et al., 1997; Luo and Peng, 1999). This study focused on the general level 
of international experience and operationalised it at firm level by the transnationality 
indexes (TNI) of the MNCs in the relevant years. The TNI was calculated as the share of 
foreign to total assets, reflecting both the intensity and the diversity of exposure to foreign 
investment and production activities. 
6.4.2 Analysis and Results 
Both the temporal and cross-sectional properties of TSCS data make the use of Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) problematic. There are several potential violations of the OLS 
standard assumption: 1) errors may be heteroscedastic; 2) errors may be autocorrelated; 3) 
errors may be correlated across units. The model of market share achievement can be 
estimated in several ways. The appropriate technique depends on the structure of error 
term and temporal properties of the panel data. Parks (1967) proposed a method based on 
generalised least squares (GLS), which allows for temporally and spatially corrected 
errors, as well as for heteroscedasticity. Beck and Katz (1995) pointed out that Parks 
method lead to underestimates of parameter variability in common research situation and 
showed the degree of overconfidence induced by this method. They also proposed a 
method, which combines OLS parameter with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), 
allowing for accurate estimation of variability in the presence of panel error structures 
without inducing the problems caused by the Parks method. We applied both of these 
methods to test the hypotheses. We also used lagged dependant variables and time 
dummies to tackle the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and to take 
account of the time dynamics of the panel data.  
Before conducting the tests for hypotheses, we first examined the temporal properties of 
the panel data. In order to examine the residuals for the evidence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, we used the panel data to estimate a pooled OLS model. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic (DW=0.840) was a strong indication of the presence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. To examine whether the residuals from this pooled 
regression are heteroscedastic, we tested the equality of the variances of the residuals for 
each firm. The test statistics (Table 6-13) decisively rejected the null hypothesis of equal 
variance of the residuals across firms, providing strong evidence of the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.  
Table 6-13 Tests for heteroscedasticity 
Method Df Value Probability 
Bartlett 12 66.3159 0.00000 
Levene (12, 101) 3.91568 0.00006 
Brown-Forsythe (12, 101) 3.14286 0.00079 
To correct for these maladies, we tested the hypotheses by the Parks estimator (Model 
1). Model 2 used PCSE and lagged dependant variables to deal with the problem of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity and to take account of the time dynamics. Model 3 
Passenger car industry  259 
 
further included dummy variables to check for time specific effects: if all the IJVs in 
China’s passenger car industry were subject to the common shocks in given years, which 
would be taken into account by a series of time dummies. 
Table 6-14 presents the results, which are generally consistent with our a priori 
expectations. Hypothesis 3 received strong support by model 1, 2 and 3. The results 
underlined the importance of local partner selection (in terms of government support) 
towards IJVs. Model 1, 2 and 3 also strongly supported Hypothesis 4 and 5: international 
experience of MNCs and the degree of foreign ownership played a significant role in 
determining market share achievement. Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, was rejected. 
Contrary to the hypothesis prediction, Model 1 proved that investment scale was 
significantly and negatively related to market share achievement. Model 2 (b=0.005; 
p=0.128) and Model 3 (b=0.002; p=0.214) demonstrated an insignificant negative 
relationship between investment scale and market share achievement. Hypothesis 1 was 
supported by Model 1 and 2. The inverse relationship between entry timing and market 
share indicated that the earlier the IJV was established, the greater its market share would 
become; and the longer the lead-time was, the wider the market share gap would be. 
However, Hypothesis 1 was rejected by Model 3, which took into account the effects of 
specific years. 
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Table 6-14 Results of analyses 
Variables  
(Predicted sign) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0.059*** 
(-2.721) 
-0.137* 
(-1.832) 
-0.109*** 
(-3.241) 
Entry timing 
(-) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.679) 
-0.004* 
(-1.688) 
-0.001 
(-0.511) 
Investment scale 
(+) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.970) 
-0.005 
(-1.536) 
-0.002 
(-1.253) 
Government support 
(+) 
0.055*** 
(41.64) 
0.041* 
(1.866) 
0.020** 
(2.472) 
Transnational index 
(+) 
0.068*** 
(2.837) 
0.074** 
(2.087) 
0.066** 
(2.124) 
Foreign equity share 
(+) 
0.025** 
(2.176) 
0.169* 
(1.733) 
0.106** 
(2.315) 
AR (1) 
 
0.766*** 
(23.39) 
  
MS (-1)  0.612*** 
(3.697) 
0.741*** 
(6.512) 
1986   0.269* 
(1.904) 
1987   -0.035 
(-0.437) 
1988   0.065*** 
(4.200) 
1989   0.123*** 
(4.485) 
1990   -0.018 
(-0.728) 
1991   0.044** 
(2.577) 
1992   0.023* 
(1.669) 
1993   0.020 
(1.015) 
1994   0.003 
(0.161) 
1995   0.026* 
(1.997) 
1996   0.025 
(1.643) 
1997   0.025** 
(2.084) 
1998   0.026** 
(2.038) 
1999   0.013 
(1.107) 
2000   0.015 
(1.522) 
2001   0.008 
(0.976) 
2002   -0.002 
(-0.191) 
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.853 0.910 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.030 1.986 1.950 
   Note: 1) T-statistics shown in parentheses. 2) *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *p<0.1. 
The hypothesised models fitted the data well. The hypothesised variables explained a 
significant proportion of the variation in market share. This means that most part of the 
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variation in market share achievement can be attributed to at-entry strategic and 
organisational factors. The more the variation of market share achievement can be 
explained by the at-entry factors, the more dynamic the industry is (see Subsection 4.3.3). 
Thus the results of the analysis also confirm the dynamic nature of China’s automotive 
industry. 
6.4.3 Discussion 
The empirical inquiry traces the strategic and institutional determinants of market share 
achievements (as an approximate measure of market dominance) of IJVs in the dynamic 
industrial setting in China’s passenger car industry. The result of the analysis demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the theoretical framework presented in Subsection 4.3.3 in explaining 
the determination of market share achievement in a dynamic industry setting. This analysis 
suggests that the foreign market share performance of firms can be modelled in terms of 
firm level strategic variables and institutional characteristics. We find that in the dynamic 
industrial context of China’s passenger car industry, entry order, government support 
(partner selection), the degree of foreign ownership and the international experience of 
MNCs determine their market share achievement. The causal relationship between 
government policy and the lack of competition is highlighted. Investment scale is not 
positively related to market share achievement. This finding is not consistent with common 
sense but can be easily explained for China’s passenger car industry. In a largely protected 
market with extraordinarily high prices and profits, investment scale played a relatively 
marginal role in business performance, because the lack of competition lowered the 
minimum efficient scale of production and reduced the importance of cost advantage in 
market competition. Furthermore, massive capital investment made firms more vulnerable 
to heavy depreciation and interest burden. The relatively small market size in an infant 
industry of a transition economy made it hard to fully utilise the production capacity, 
which made the problem of depreciation and interest burden even worse.  
As suggested in Subsection 4.3.3, it could be possible to measure what proportion of the 
variation in market share achievement can be attributed to at- and after-entry factors 
respectively by decomposing the sources of market share achievement variation. Thus the 
results of the analysis confirm the dynamic nature of China’s automotive industry – a large 
proportion of the variation in market share achievement can be attributed to the at-entry 
factors such as entry order, government support towards local partner, the degree of foreign 
ownership and the international experience of MNCs. As argued in Subsection 6.2.3, 
government policy, pre-entry competition among MNCs and after-entry market 
competition among IJVs have jointly determined the structure of China’s passenger car 
industry. The results of the analysis shows that the first two factors play a dominant role in 
determining the market shares of IJVs and thus the market structure of China’s passenger 
car industry. The role played by after-entry market competition in determining IJVs’ 
market share achievements is very limited. Therefore government policies and MNCs’ 
strategic reactions to these policies have to a large extent determined the market structure 
of the industry and granted dominant position(s) to specific firm(s). Clearly, the restriction 
to competition has been largely from government intervention rather than private 
behaviour, although firms’ strategic reactions did strengthen the anticompetitive effects of 
government intervention.  
The result of the analysis has significant managerial implications as well. China’s 
post-reform passenger car industry represents a typical fast-growing market environment 
and dynamic industrial setting. For both sides of the IJVs, our findings have significant 
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implications. But they are especially relevant to the MNCs, which enter in a new market 
and face a totally different environment for their strategic decision. MNCs need to be 
aware of the performance implications of foreign market entry strategies. Entry timing is 
proved to be crucial to market share achievement. Taking into account special contingency 
factors such as strong government intervention in transition economies, we also suggest 
that local partner selection is particularly important for market success. Equity structure 
arrangements are another key issue in joint venture formation besides local partner 
selection. The arrangements determine the strategic commitment of MNCs, accordingly 
their contribution to the competitive advantages of IJVs, and ultimately the IJVs’ market 
share achievement. This study also shows that the experience in international operations is 
amongst the most important determinants of foreign market share. The management of 
MNCs with experience in coordinating more international operations shows greater 
success in dealing with the intricacies of market entry and competition in a transition 
economy like China.  
The result of the analysis also implies that government intervention may lead to 
uneconomic decisions of firms. The successes of some recent IJVs such as Guangzhou 
Honda show that a light-asset strategy is an optimal choice in terms of entry scale. In 
China’s passenger car industry, investment scale plays an insignificant and even negative 
role in determining market share achievement. Relatively small investment scale allowed 
the company to realise a quick startup of the operations and make profits from the 
beginning. In the passenger car industry, a large-scale investment decision was usually not 
an optimal strategic choice based on business performance consideration but the outcome 
of a negotiation process between MNCs and local partners and their superiors (local 
governments or departments of the central government). This reflects the high cost 
involved in acquiring an entry license in the intense pre-entry competition among MNCs, 
which generally does not lead to optimal investment decisions for them. 
The pre-entry strategic characteristics, like foreign equity ownership, reflect both what 
the foreign firm wants and what it can or cannot get from the local side (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990). The pre-entry competition is a part of the multi-dimensional competition faced by 
MNCs in many Chinese industries. In the process of negotiation with a local partner and its 
superior, several interested MNCs participate and compete for the entry license. Some 
specific policy preconceptions are on the wish list of the local bargaining partner. Usually 
the entry strategy reflects not the specific efficiency considerations of an individual MNC, 
but the outcome of a complex game in which the needs from the local side are traded-off 
against the offers from a number of competing MNCs. Consequently, the pre-entry 
negotiation and competition process may lead to uneconomic entry strategic decisions for 
MNCs. Balancing between the benefits of early market entry and the costs of strategic 
concessions to get a license is crucial to appropriate entry strategy. 
Because this empirical inquiry is a study of a specific industry in a specific country, the 
problem of generalisability consists of two aspects: 1) the statistical sampling-based 
generalisability; 2) generalising from case study findings to theory. The statistical 
sampling-based generalisability is a measure of the quality of one form of level-one 
inference, which describes the process of generalising from a sample to population 
characteristics or from experimental subjects to experimental findings (Yin, 2003). Yin 
also explains that generalising from case study findings to theory is a form of level-two 
inference, which describes the process of generalising from population characteristics to 
theory or from experimental findings to theory. This study empirically tested the proposed 
theory that explains how entry strategies and organisational factors affect the market share 
achievements of foreign subsidiaries in international markets. In terms of level-one 
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inference, because we include all the units of the population in our intra-industry statistical 
analysis, the size of the population rather than the sampling might possibly limit the 
statistical power of the study. In terms of level-two inference, the problem of 
generalisability lies in the question whether we can generalise our theory from the specific 
China’s passenger car industry to other industries and other countries – in particular other 
transition economies. We stress that the results about the specific strategic and 
organisational factors obtained from the specific industrial context are only suggestive, but 
the theoretical framework is of more general implication. Nevertheless, the validity of this 
theoretical framework needs replication and extension of this study. Further analyses might 
examine different industries in different countries and with different degrees of industrial 
dynamics. In addition to focusing on at-entry strategic and organisational factors, further 
studies can also incorporate or control the (static) operational determinants of market share 
achievement, such as price, cost, advertising and efficiency. 
 7 Telecom Equipment Industry: FDI, 
Competition and Innovation 
 
 
 
 
ince the late 1990s, electronics and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
industry has surpassed some traditional industries, such as oil and steel, and become 
the single largest industry in the world. In China, electronics & ICT industry has become 
both the single largest industry and the one that has attracted the largest amount of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) inflows.1 In this widely defined industrial sector, the interaction 
among Multinational Corporations (MNCs), domestic firms and government policies 
shapes the structure of markets and the path of industrial development. With rapid buildup 
of the domestic production capacity, domestic technological capability and international 
competitiveness have been established in most segments of the electronics & ICT industry. 
The developmental dynamics of China’s electronics & ICT sector is highlighted by the 
sequential rise of different segments, which are characterised by different degrees of 
technology intensity – from low- to high-end products. The analysis of these segments can 
be considered as a ‘multiple-case’ case study, the result of which demonstrates the 
robustness of the positive performance consequences of an open and competition-friendly 
industrial policy. The effectiveness of industrial policy, which is characterised by providing 
incentives to firms thus to direct resource allocation to desired economic activities in order 
to promote industrial development, is generally supported by this ‘multiple case’ case study. 
This also presents a replication with which the structural upgrading model initiated in 
Subsection 4.4.3 can be considered robust and worthy of continued investigation and 
interpretation. In-depth study of China’s telecom equipment industry indicates that the 
entry of MNCs has increased competition and promoted innovation. The sectoral 
innovation system that emerged in this industry has integrated government efforts and 
business activities. The intensified Research and Development (R&D) activities of firms, 
both foreign and domestic, have been the driving force of the emergence of this system. 
However, government Science and Technology (S&T) efforts and other relevant policies 
have also played crucial roles in the evolving process of the system. Using firm level 
evidence, this chapter illustrates the institutional and organisational characteristics of the 
innovation system and shows how inward FDI and competition contributes to the 
emergence of the system of innovation in a dynamic industrial setting in China.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 analyses the development of China’s 
electronics & ICT sector during the reform period in general. On the basis of this, the 
                                                        
1 Here the ‘electronics & ICT’ industry refers to the ‘telecom equipment, computer and other electronic 
equipment’ (formerly ‘electronics and telecom equipment’) industry in China’s standard industrial classification. 
This industry is a two-digit industry codified 40. This Chapter slightly covers some consumer electronics 
industries, which are in the scope of ‘household electric appliances’ industry (code 395) within the ‘electric 
equipment and machinery’ industry (code 39). 
S 
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following sectors investigate in particular the impact of FDI on competition and innovation 
in China’s telecom equipment industry. Section 7.2 explores the dynamic process of 
market structural change and industrial development in China’s telecom equipment sector. 
By theoretical hypothesis development and by empirically examining the determinants of 
innovation in China’s electronics & ICT sector, Section 7.3 and Section 7.4 contribute to a 
better understanding of the factors that affect innovation and technological change at the 
system level in a dynamic context of industrial development. We particularly focus on the 
firm sector in the innovation system and investigate the relationship between foreign and 
domestic firms in terms of R&D spillovers, which is a crucial factor determining the 
domestic innovation capability of developing countries. We find that, in addition to the size 
and profitability of firms, the FDI intensity of industries influences the innovation 
expenditure of firms. Internationalisation of firms and concentration of industries do not 
have significant effects on the innovation propensity of firms. The findings provide the 
evidence of the positive R&D spillover effects from FDI. 
7.1 China’s Electronics and ICT Industry: The Industrial Context 
The electronics & ICT sector in China has developed dramatically during the reform 
period, especially since the early 1990s. In 1989, the total sales and profits were RMB¥ 
49.2 billion and 5.7 billion respectively and the total exports were US$ 2.8 billion. The 
total sales increased 27 percent annually from 1989 to 2001 and the annual growth rate of 
exports was 30 percent. The electronics & ICT sector has become the single largest 
industry in China in terms of both industrial output and export. In 2003, the total sale 
further increased to RMB¥ 1,880 billion, the total value-added climbed to RMB¥ 400 
billion and total exports increased to US$ 142.1 billion (see Table 7-1 for the development 
in recent years). The total sale has doubled since 2000 within merely three years. The total 
sales in 2003, measured in US$, were 227.1 billion, accounting for 18 percent of the world 
total. In 1996, the total sales were US$ 27.8 billion, 2.6 percent of the world total. In 1999, 
the electronics & ICT sector of China became the third largest of the world. In 2003, China 
surpassed Japan to become the second largest producer of electronics & ICT products.2  
Table 7-1 China’s electronics and ICT sector, 2001, 2002 and 2003 
Sales 
(RMB¥ billion) 
Profits 
(RMB¥ billion) 
Exports 
(US$ billion) Year 
Total  FIEs (percent) Total  FIEs (percent) Total  FIEs (percent) 
2001 1188.5 57.0 56.3 45.0 65.0 79.0 
2002 1342.3 67.6 57.6 64.1 92.0 / 
2003 1880.0 67.5 70.0 57.9* 142.1 82.7 
   Source: Ministry of Information Industry (MII). 
   Note: * The FIE percentage of pre-tax profits. 
The electronics & ICT sector has attracted the largest amount of FDI inflows in all 
Chinese industries. Until the end of 2001, according to the MII, the accumulated amount of 
FDI inflows in this sector had surpassed US$ 70 billion, which took over 15 percent of that 
of the country at large. Until the end of 2003, more than 4,000 Foreign Invested 
                                                        
2 The total sales of China’s electronics & ICT sector, measured in US$, were 227.1 billion, almost 20 percent 
higher than Japan’s US$ 227.1 billion. 
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Enterprises (FIEs) have been established and accounted for 23 percent of all firms in this 
sector. FIEs have contributed significantly to industrial development and taken account 
more than half of the total industrial output, sales and value-added.  
7.1.1 The Sequential Rise of Various Industries in China’ Electronics and ICT Sector 
There are a number of sub-sectors with different levels of the complexity and newness of 
technology within China’s electronics & ICT sector. This sector can be categorised into 
three sub-sectors: consumer products, investment products and components. The relative 
weights of these three sub-sectors have undergone fundamental shift: in 1980 the 
proportion was 17:22:61; in 1990 it was 14: 53: 33; in 1998 it was 39: 32: 29; and in 2002 
it became 29: 45: 26. The electronics & ICT sector can also be segmented according to the 
categories of products. A number of industries can be defined within the electronics & ICT 
sector according to the characteristics of final products. Among all the industries, several 
important ones include consumer electronics, computer, telecom equipment, 
semiconductors and software. Each industry can be further divided into segments which 
includes a broad and representative range of products or even further into a large number 
of specific segments that are associated with specific products. Several most important 
products in China’s electronics & ICT sector include central office switches, colour 
television, integrated circuit, mobile telephone, monitor, personal computer, tricolour tube, 
and so on. Table 7-2 shows the production, sales and exports of these products in 2003. 
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), China has become the 
world’s largest producer of a large number of electronics & ICT products, such as mobile 
handset, telephone, colour TV, monitor, central office switches, Digital Versatile Disc 
(DVD), and so on. According to the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), China’s production of mobile handset, colour TV, monitor and central office 
switches in 2003 accounted respectively for 35, 40, 55 and 30 percent of the world total. In 
2003, 40 percent of colour TVs, 50 percent of mobile handsets and PCs, 60 percent of 
monitors produced in China was exported. 
Table 7-2 Selected products in China’s electronics and ICT sector in 2003 
Product Unit Production Sales Exports (US$ billion) 
Central office switches 10 thousand lines 5,807 5,387 0.45 
Colour television 10 thousand 6,521 6,500 2.56 
Integrated circuit 100 million blocks 124.1 122.5 5.97 
Mobile telephone 10 thousand 18,644 18,321 7.38 
Monitor 10 thousand 7,326 7,373 9.57 
Personal computer 10 thousand 3,216 3,083 2.20 
Tricolour tube 10 thousand 9,051 8,906 0.75 
Source: MII. 
The developmental dynamics of China’s electronics & ICT sector is highlighted by the 
sequential rise of different industries (Figure 7-1). The rapid growth of the sector has been 
initiated by the fast expansion of the consumer electronics industry driven by strong 
market demand since the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1990s, the rise of personal computers 
(PCs) and peripherals has reshaped the landscape of China’s electronics & ICT sector. 
Furthermore, the structure of the sector has been dramatically changed as high-technology 
industries such as telecom equipment taking increasing share of the total production, sales 
and exports of the sector. As huge production capacity being built up in recent years, 
China’s semiconductor industry is in its early phase of industrial takeoff. The sequential 
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rise of different industries has followed a similar pattern. In the early phase of industrial 
development, sales grew explosively and the profit margins were high. In the later phase, 
the industries unavoidably faced the problems of slow demand growth and fierce price 
competition. However, new industries constantly emerged, driven by newly created 
demand either from income-increasing consumers or from rapidly developing downstream 
industries. Despite the relatively low growth rates, the ‘traditional’ industries kept growing 
due in part to the fact that China is still a rapidly growing developing economy. For 
instance, although China’s Personal Computer (PC) industry faces the same problems of 
slower growth and tougher competition as everywhere else in the world in recent years, it 
still has great growth potential, as the PC penetration rate in China remains much lower 
than that in North America, Europe and Japan. In 2003, the proportion of China’s computer 
industry in the total electronics & ICT sector grew from 27.3 to 33.6 percent. In the same 
year, the industries of computer, components and telecom equipment became the three 
largest segments of China’s electronics & ICT sector, accounting respectively for 33.6, 
19.5 and 22.9 percent of the sales of this sector. 
Figure 7-1 Sequential rise of industries in China’s electronics and ICT sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumer electronics 
The consumer electronics industry was the first segment within the electronics & ICT 
sector to grow up. The segmentation of this industry includes two broad and representative 
ranges of consumer electronics categories: white goods and brown goods. White goods 
include refrigerators, air conditioners, washing machines, and other household appliances. 
Brown goods include home audio and video products such as television, DVD players and 
home stereo systems, as well as portable audio products. Building on the core advantages 
of low-cost assembly and the world’s fastest-growing market, China’s consumer 
electronics manufacturers rapidly developed and built world-scale export business 
(Woetzel, 2003). FDI has played an important catalytic role in the development of China’s 
consumer electronics industry. Some International Joint Ventures (IJVs) established in the 
early 1980s, such as TCL and Konka, have been among the largest firms in the consumer 
electronics industry. The development of FIEs in this industry has been associated with the 
rapid growth of domestic enterprises, both State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
1990 2010 2000 2005 1995 
Consumer electronics 
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non-state-owned domestic firms. After 20-some years of rapid development, the market of 
consumer electronics has now reached a stage where household ownership of white and 
brown goods is very high. The market is therefore reasonably mature and highly 
competitive. Fierce price war has become a key feature of the market over recent years, 
forcing manufacturers to be more efficient in their product design, distribution, marketing 
and cost of sale. Based on its international competitiveness, China’s consumer electronics 
industry was one of the first to go global (Woetzel, 2003). Domestic firms in this industry 
have been rooted in a large and open market where their products prove themselves daily 
against the world’s best in quality and price.3 Although facing obstacles, these firms have 
capacities and great potentials to be global players.  
To grow further, many consumer electronics manufacturers have no choice but to go 
global. Most firms seeking to expand abroad have pursued a strategy of Original 
Equipment Manufacturing (OEM), supplying the established global brands and retailers’ 
private labels, but not bearing the costs of R&D and marketing. Galanz, for instance, 
makes microwave ovens on an OEM basis for almost all of the world’s leading consumer 
electronics companies and dominates over 40 percent of the global market in 2003. 
Changhong supplied Wal-Mart with televisions sold under an unrelated brand. A number of 
firms have adopted a branding strategy. Haier, for instance, is selling refrigerators under its 
own name in the United States. SVA sells its branded plasma televisions in US retail chains. 
TCL has adopted a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) strategy by purchasing an insolvent 
German television maker in an attempt to break into the European market. It is also 
pursing a wide range of branding and channelling strategies that aims at introducing the 
TCL brand to the European market.  
Computer and peripherals 
During the reform period, China’s computer industry went from being non-existent in the 
1980s to becoming the world’s fourth largest computer hardware producer in 2000 (see 
Table 7-3). In 2001, China’s computer and peripherals industry realised total sales of RMB 
181.5 billion, exporting US$ 25.0 billion. In 2002, the sales of China’s computer and 
peripherals industry increased to RMB 314.6 billion. The production of PCs reached 14.6 
million units in 2002 and China surpassed Japan to become the second largest PC producer 
in the world. In 2003, the production of PCs almost doubled, increasing to 32.2 million 
units. The computer and peripherals industry accounted for 33.6 percent of the total sales 
in the electronics & ICT sector, increasing from 27.3 percent in 2002 and becoming the 
single largest segment in this sector. This accelerated increase was largely driven by strong 
demand from international markets. A combination of players has contributed to the rapid 
growth of China’s computer industry, including domestic PC makers, MNCs and Taiwanese 
contract manufacturers. In addition, government policies promoted computer production and 
use, encouraged firms to enter the computer industry and stimulated foreign investment. 
                                                        
3  See Gao, Woetzel and Wu, ‘Can Chinese brands make it abroad?’, McKinsey Quarterly, No. 4, 2003. 
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Table 7-3 Global computer production: percentage of the top five countries 
Country 1985 1990 1995 2000 
United States 49.2 27.0 26.5 26.1 
Japan 18.9 29.2 25.2 16.3 
Singapore  1.2 3.9 7.3 7.6 
China  0 0.4 1.9 6.8 
Taiwan 1.0 3.3 5.6 6.5 
   Source: MII. 
1990, China had only 50 thousand PCs in a country with more than 1.2 billion people. 
By 2003, it has become the world’s largest producer of computer hardware and a major 
market for information technology products. FDI has contributed significantly to the 
development of this industry (see Table 7-4 for FDI in recent years). In China’ computer 
industry, the contractual value of FDI had reached US$ 4.3 billion and the realised value of 
FDI had become US$ 2.1 billion until the end of 2002. Totally 898 FIEs have been 
established in this industry. The realised amount of FDI has been US$ 586 million and 
US$ 1.51 billion in the computer segment and peripherals segment respectively.4 Some 
largest FIEs in the computer industries, such as Hon Hai, Dell (China), Seagate (Wuxi) and 
Top Victory (Fujian), have become leading producers of computer or peripherals in China. 
In the computer segment, domestic firms such as Legend, Founder and Tongfang have 
built up their competence and become China’s top manufacturers of PCs. In the peripherals 
segment, FIEs, particularly Taiwanese firms, has played the leading role on the basis of 
their global competence in this industry. Over recent years, as leading Taiwanese 
technology firms began large-scale investment in Mainland China, their contribution to the 
development of China’s computer industry has become increasingly significant. These 
Taiwanese firms include Hon Hai, Quanta, Asus, BenQ (the new name of Acer Peripherals), 
and so on. In 2003, Hon Hai, Quanta and Asus became the three largest exporters in China, 
with exporting products valued US$ 6.42, 5.29 and 3.16 billion respectively. With the help 
of its cross-strait cousin, China will be able to redraw the landscape of the world’s 
computer and peripherals industry in a couple of years. 
Table 7-4 FDI inflows in China’s computer industry (US$ million) 
Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Computer      
Number of establishments 16 26 35 43 51 
Contractual amount 46.45 125.43 352.52 393.19 134.80 
Realised amount 27.42 43.21 104.05 209.71 201.44 
Peripherals      
Number of establishments 63 97 101 193 273 
Contractual amount 501.35 361.33 438.88 968.81 979.10 
Realised amount 55.88 110.66 301.69 475.46 568.03 
   Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) (2003). 
Telecom equipment 
Since the early 1980s, China’s telecommunications market has expanded at a significantly 
high growth rate. The number of fixed telephone subscribers has shown an average annual 
growth rate of 34 percent since 1991. The growth rate of mobile telephony was more than 
115 percent for the same period (see Table 7-5). China’s telecommunications market is 
now the world’s largest in terms of both network capacity and number of subscribers. This 
                                                        
4 According to MOFTEC (2003). 
270   Chapter Seven 
 
market accounts for one fifth of world telephone subscribers. With a monthly increase of 
over 8 million subscribers, the total number of telephone users in China surpassed half a 
billion and the penetration rate climbed to 41.2 percent in 2003. 
Table 7-5 Growth of fixed and mobile telephone in China, 1991-2003 
Fixed telephone Mobile telephone 
Year Subscribers 
(thousand) 
Growth 
(percent) 
Penetration 
(percent)* 
Subscribers 
(thousand) 
Growth 
(percent) 
Penetration 
(percent)* 
1991 8,498  / 0.7 48 / 0.0 
1992 11,646  37 1.0 177 269 0.0 
1993 17,970 54 1.5 638 260 0.1 
1994 28,863 61 2.4 1,568 146 0.1 
1995 40,706 41 3.4 3,629 131 0.3 
1996 54,947 35 4.5 6,853 89 0.6 
1997 70,310 28 5.7 13,233 93 1.1 
1998 87,420 24 7.0 23,863 80 1.9 
1999 108,716  24 8.6 43,300 81 3.4 
2000 144,829 33 11.4 84,530 95 6.7 
2001 180,370 25 14.1 145,220 72 11.4 
2002 214,420 19 16.7 206,620 42 16.1 
2003 263,305 23 20.4 268,690 30 20.8 
   Source: MII. 
   Note: * Calculated by the author (population data according to the NBSC). 
Behind the impressive growth in the telecommunications market, there has been a rapid 
infrastructure build-up, which created strong demand for all equipment associated with 
fixed lines, mobile, data and optical networks. The enormous market opportunities have 
encouraged most telecom equipment manufacturing MNCs to invest and engage in local 
production in China. In this internationalised domestic market with highly intensified 
competition, local companies rose rapidly. This important segment of China’s electronics 
& ICT hosts perhaps the most successful Private-owned Enterprise (POE) in China’s 
industrial sector – Huawei Technologies. Huawei was the only POE in the list of the top 50 
industrial enterprises and was among a very limited number of large firms emerged from 
competitive manufacturing industries rather than the sectors monopolised by large-sized 
SOEs (see Table 5-14). In addition to Huawei, ZTE and Datang, listed companies 
transformed from former state-owned research institutes, are also among the important 
players in China’s telecom equipment industry. 
Integrated circuit 
The rapid development of the industries of computer and telecom equipment has boasted 
the demand for integrated circuits. In 2003, the size of China’s integrated circuit market 
reached RMB¥ 207.4 billion. Most of the market was still dominated by imports despite 
the rapid growth of the Chinese semiconductor industry since the late 1990s (Table 7-6). In 
2003, the total sales (including exports) of domestic firms in this industry climbed to 
RMB¥ 35.1 billion, but still far from meeting the increasing demand of China’s electronics 
& ICT industries. As perhaps the highest end of the entire electronics industry, the 
integrated circuit industry in China still has not built up its international competitiveness as 
in the downstream electric products, particularly consumer-products.  
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Table 7-6 Production of China’s integrated circuit industry, 1991-2003 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Production 
(billion blocks) 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.79 1.15 1.68 2.71 4.15 5.88 6.36 9.63 12.41
Source: MII. 
To boost domestic production and reduce reliance on imports, the Chinese government 
is giving the integrated circuit industry strong support by attractive industrial policy 
measures (see Subsection 7.1.2 for details) and is encouraging FDI in this industry, 
particularly in Deep Sub-Micron (DSM) integrated circuits. Consequently, a large amount 
of FDI has been attracted into China’s integrated circuit industry despite major political 
constraints such as Taiwan’s reluctant to permit its chipmakers to invest in Mainland China 
and the US laws that restrict high-technology export to China. Taiwanese investors led this 
process. First-movers have been the new startups established by previous employees in 
Taiwanese chip manufacturers. 5  Later on, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Corporation and United Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, Taiwan’s two giant 
contract chip manufacturers which have already controlled half of the world’s contract chip 
manufacturing, followed to invest in Suzhou and Shanghai respectively.6 Table 7-7 lists 
the important FIEs established after 2000, mainly by Taiwanese investors. China’s 
development towards a chip-making centre has accelerated as a large amount of FDI 
flowed in. Since 2000, totally US$ 13.9 billion has flushed in the integrated circuit industry, 
three time as the totally investment s in previous 30 years. The market demand for 
integrated circuits has kept soaring, driven by the rapid growth of the downstream 
industries of computers and telecom equipment. Meanwhile, China’s journey up the value 
chain is accelerating. China’s semiconductor industry has made significant technological 
leads in recent years. In early 2003, Shanghai-based Semiconductor Manufacturing 
International Corporation (SMIC) became the first Chinese firm to make 0.18-micron 
chips. Now the gap between the Chinese chip manufacturers and the leading foundries in 
Taiwan is future narrowing as SMIC began to make 0.13-micron chips. 
Table 7-7 Important FIEs (FDI projects) in China’s integrated circuit industry 
Company Current technology (µm) 
Investment 
(US$ billion) 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International (Shanghai) Corporation 0.13 1.48 
Motorola (China) Electronics Co., Ltd. 0.25 1.00 
Semiconductor Manufacturing International (Beijing) Corporation 0.13 1.25 
Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation 0.18 1.64 
He Jian Technology Corporation 0.18 1.50 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing (Shanghai) Corporation 0.25 0.90 
Source: MOFTEC (2003). 
                                                        
5 Both Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation and Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Corporation started up in Shanghai in 2000. The former was established by Richard Ru Gin Chang, the former 
President of Worldwide Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, a Taiwanese chip manufacturer acquired by 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation in 1999. It has been invested by a group of Chinese and 
foreign investors. The latter was established by Wenyang Wang, a Taiwanese investor, with strong support from 
Mainland China. The management team was mainly from another Taiwanese chip manufacturer acquired by 
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (see Table 7-7) 
6 He Jian Technology Corporation, located in Suzhou, was established implicitly via a Virgin Island firm by 
United Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation in 2002. One year later, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Corporation began investment in Shanghai and will begin production in 2004 (see Table 7-7). 
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7.1.2 FDI, Industrial Policy and the Development of China’s Electronics and ICT 
Sector 
Electronics and ICT sector has been the sector in which FDI played the most significant 
role in industrial development in Chinese industries (see Table 5-5 and Table 5-7). In 2003, 
according to the MII, FIEs accounted for more than half of the total sales, pre-tax profits 
and value-added, with the share of 67.5, 57.9 and 52.0 percent respectively. The 
contribution of FIEs to exports was even more significant – 82.7 percent of total exports 
were from FIEs. The significant contribution of FIEs has highlighted the crucial 
contribution of FDI to the rapid development of Chinese industries. In addition to these 
direct contributions, FDI also led to the rapid technological catch-up and innovative 
diffusion. As MNCs were establishing R&D centres in China, leading domestic firms, 
which compete head to head with MNCs, built up their core competence on the basis of 
intensive in-house R&D. Domestic firms started off using foreign technology and then 
tried to develop their own technology and products. Haier, the largest domestic firm in 
China’s electronics & ICT sector, spent 6 percent of its total sales in R&D, relatively high 
for a white-goods maker. In the telecom equipment industry, the most dynamic segment 
with high-technology characteristics, domestic firms such as Huawei, ZTE and Datang 
have become the most R&D intensive companies not only in the electronics & ICT sector 
but also in the Chinese economy at large.  
Government policies have played crucial roles in the process of industrial development. 
Like Japan and East Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), China has actively 
used industrial policy to promote the development of particular sectors and industries, 
among which the electronics & ICT sector is a priority. Starting with Japan in the 1960s 
and 1970s and continuing with South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore afterwards, the 
Asia-Pacific region became the leading global producer of electronics and IT products. 
Behind the success were government policies, which commonly involved a combination of 
export orientation to achieve international competitiveness and strong efforts to develop 
national capabilities (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998). In developing its electronics and IT 
sector, China is on a path previously trodden by Japan and the East Asian NIEs – from the 
bottom of the barrel to the mainstream, maybe to the cutting edge. China’s strategy has 
included similar elements – from the promotion of exports to heavy investment in 
information infrastructure.  
The evolution of China’s industrial policy for the electronics & ICT industry reflected 
both the changing system of industrial management in this sector and the shifting priority 
of policy objectives. In the era of planned economy, the electronics industry was under the 
direct management of the Fourth Ministry of Machinery Industry. The production of this 
industry was mainly military-products oriented. 7  In 1981, the Fourth Ministry of 
Machinery Industry was renamed the Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI). The 
production of electronics industry began to transform from military- to civil-products 
oriented. 8  Consistent to the overall trend of China’s industrial policy focusing on 
eliminating shortage in consumer products (see Subsection 1.4.2), the priority of the 
industrial policy for the electronics industry in the 1980s was to alter the industrial 
                                                        
7 In the late 1970s, the production of civil products accounted for 78 percent of total electronic products. For the 
firms directly affiliated to the Fourth Ministry of Machinery Industry, the civil production only accounted for 27 
percent. 
8 The share of civil production has increased to above 97 percent of total electronic products. 
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structure dominated by military products and to raise the production of consumer goods to 
meet market demand. Based on the experience in the ‘Sixth Five-Year Plan’, the 
development of consumer electronics was identified as the priority for the ‘Seventh 
Five-Year Plan’ in 1986. As a result of these early efforts, the percentage of the consumer 
products in the total electronics production increased from 22 percent in 1980 to 53 percent 
in 1990.  
In 1986, the State Council decided that priority should be given to four categories of 
high-technology products: 1) integrated circuses, 2) computer, 3) software, and 4) central 
office switches. A series of supportive government polices were implemented for the 
production of these four products in the ‘Seventh Five-Year Plan’. In addition, RMB¥ 100 
million was put annually into a special fund for industrial development – the Development 
Fund of the Electronic and Information Industry. 235 entities benefited from these policies 
and totally RMB¥ 800 million was granted prior to the 1990s. Within these beneficiaries 
grew out the leading computer makers such as Legend, Great Wall and Langchao. From 
1986 to 2001, totally RMB¥ 2.46 billion was granted to domestic firms for specified 
projects from this fund. In addition to this fund, which is specific for the ICT sector and is 
managed by the MII, other similar subsidy programs and funds cover more industries, 
among which ICT has been one of the most important targets (see Table 5-10). 
Since the early 1990s, the development of electronics & ICT sector has increasingly 
been established as a national strategy, which was explicitly documented in the important 
‘five-year plans’ with detailed targets and measures. The national industrial policy and 
development strategy gave particular and detailed attention to the development of the 
electronics & ICT sector and some specific segments or products of this sector. In the 1989 
‘Decision on the Gist of Current Industrial Policy’ issued by the State Council, electronics 
industry was identified as the focal point of industrial policy. The ‘Eighth Five-Year Plan’ 
(1991-1995) gave priority to the development of the electronics & ICT industry. The 
‘Ninth Five-Year Plan’ (1996-2000) further stressed the development of this sector and 
specifically emphasised the support towards integrated circuit, new-type components, 
computer and telecom equipment. The ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan’ (2001-2005) stressed the 
breakthrough and leap-forward in high-speed broadband information network and DSM 
integrated circuit as well as the commercialisation of digital electronic products, new-type 
monitors, and fabric electronic materials and devices. On the basis of the ‘Outline of the 
Tenth Five-Year Plan’, the ‘Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for Information Industry’ 
formulated by the MII provided detailed strategy to develop the industries of integrated 
circuit, new-type components & devices, telecom equipment, computer & network 
products, digital video & audio products, special electronic instruments, and so on. The 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has included integrated circuit, 
telecommunications and computer in the important projects of the ‘National S&T 
Breakthrough Plan’ for ‘Tenth Five-Year Plan’. 
As indicated by the ‘five-year plans’ and more detailed guidelines, the industrial policy 
for the electronics & ICT sector revised constantly as the product structure of the industry 
upgraded. Government support was directed at first consumer electronics, then computer 
and telecommunications, later on software and integrated circuit. Meanwhile, a national 
strategy of ‘promoting industrialisation by informatisation’ has been adopted since the 
mid-1990s. Computing and telecommunications has been strongly encouraged by the 
government. A series of central government-directed ‘Golden Projects’ have been 
implemented to promote the usage of computer in different sectors of the economy. The 
increase in computer sales between 1995 and the late 1990s was largely credited to these 
government initiatives. The government also gave priority to the development of the 
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telecommunications market. To realise this objective, the Chinese government 
implemented a deregulation program and gradually introduced competition in the 
previously monopolistic telecommunications. 
With regard to trade policy, the Chinese government has adopted generally a stance of 
free trade for the electronics & ICT sector, which has become one of the most open 
markets in China’s manufacturing sector. Since the 1990s, China has rapidly decreased its 
tariff rates to facilitate its re-entry to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
(later World Trade Organisation, WTO) (see Table 2-5). Electric product has been among 
the commodity categories that have experienced the sharpest tariff reduction. In 1997, the 
tariff of PC and most peripherals decreased from 20 to 15 percent (some of them to 12 or 9 
percent). According to China’s commitments under WTO, the tariff of electronics & ICT 
products further reduced after the WTO accession. In 2003, the tariff rate decreased from 
12.5 to 3.5 percent and the number of products with zero tariff rate has increased to 203, 
accounting for four fifth of all electronics & ICT products (see Table 7-8). Increasing 
openness to international trade exerted competitive pressures on domestic firms and also 
urged the government to reform the domestic institutions that undermine the ability of 
firms to respond to competitive pressures from abroad (see Subsection 2.2.3). 
Table 7-8 Tariff rate of electronics & ICT products after China’s WTO entry 
Item 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Average tariff rate (percent) 12.47 3.50 1.50 0 
Number of products with zero tariff rate* 123 203 232 256 
Source: MOFTEC (MOC). 
Note: * Totally 256 categories of IT products are included in the ‘Information Technology Agreement’ of WTO. 
The development of China’s integrated circuit industry has become the top priority of 
the MII in recent years. With only one out of five chips sold in China made locally, the 
priority is to meet domestic needs by promoting local production. To develop the domestic 
industry, the Chinese government is giving the integrated circuit industry strong support. 
This industry has been identified as a key industry to develop in the ‘Tenth Five Year Plan’ 
and both the MII and the MOST have crafted detailed plan for the promotion of the 
development of the industry. In June 2000, the State Council promulgated the influential 
‘Several Policies to Encourage the Development of the Industries of Software and 
Integrated Circuit’ (File NO. 18). To promote the development of the domestic production 
of DSM integrated circuits, this important policy file has provided an array of preferential 
policy measures concerning tax, equipment import, foreign currency, and so on. 
Afterwards, the MII promulgated detailed guidance for the implementation of this policy. 
In 2002, the MOF and the SAT promulgated the ‘Notification on the Tax Policies to 
Further Encourage the Development of the Industries of Software and Integrated Circuit’, 
further increasing the scope and degree of preferential VAT treatment for the integrated 
circuit industry. The supportive policy has provided strong incentives for investment in 
China’s chip manufacturing industry and led to a surge of FDI inflows in this sector (see 
Table 7-9). 
Table 7-9 FDI inflows in China’s integrated circuit industry, 1998-2002 
Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of projects 18 16 29 94 136
Contractual amount (US$ million) 141.1 38.6 965.2 892.9 1,805.1
Realised amount (US$ million) 36.3 79.1 91.1 336.3 824.4
    Source: MOC. 
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The recent start off of China’ chip manufacturing industry has led to the worry that the 
global semiconductor industry’s most production capacity needed to make the latest types 
of microprocessors, including memory chips and processors for PCs and other products, is 
rapidly moving to China. There has also been concern that too much new capacity is being 
built by the East Asian economies such as South Korea and China, suggesting that chips 
are set for another round of price wars, hurting the profitability of the entire industry.9 Due 
to the worry that the rapid growth of local production will substitute an increasingly large 
proportion of imports, most of which has been from the United States, the tax policy 
pursued by the Chinese government was complained by the United States within the WTO. 
It was argued that Chinas’ preferential VAT treatment for the integrated circuit industry put 
the US semiconductor exporters in an unfair competitive position, thus breaking the WTO 
rules. The disagreement between China and the United States reminds us the 
semiconductor trade conflicts between the United States and Japan in the 1980s. 
International conflicts associate with the rise of China’s electronics & ICT sector also 
raised when China attempted to set industrial standards for the next generations of 
electronics products. In consumer electronics, Enhanced Versatile Disc (EVD) has been 
China’s first home grown standard for the video industry, development as a successor to 
the DVD. As a voluntary standard, EVD has been developed by a 13-member consortium 
led by Shinco, China’s leading DVD maker. The State Economic and Trade Commission 
granted RMB¥ 10 million for the development of EVD. Although EVD players have been 
rolled out on across China since December 2003, achieving dominance in China, let alone 
internationally, will be difficult for the new format.10 In mobile telecommunications, 
Datang has successfully developed TD-SCDMA, one of the three 3G standards approved 
by the ITU. The most controversial industrial standard has been the WAPI (Wireless LAN 
Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure), China’s proposed proprietary national standard 
for Wireless LAN, by which the Chinese government forces foreign companies that want 
to sell certain kinds of wireless devices in China to use Chinese encryption software due to 
national-security concerns. By establishing their own industrial standards, Chinese 
electronics companies can avoid paying hefty royalties to foreign patent-holders. By doing 
so China could exceed its role as a manufacturing powerhouse and become more 
competitive in the world’s electronics & ICT industry. However, these efforts have faced 
both commercial and political hurdles as MNCs and foreign governments challenged the 
standards developed by Chinese firms or government. In April 2004, the planned 
implementation of the WAPI was postponed indefinitely by the Chinese government due to 
the US pressure from the United States.11 
7.1.3 Global Competition in Domestic Markets: The Largest Players 
The industries of electronics & ICT, defence, steel, automotive and petroleum are the main 
                                                        
9 See Christopher Whalen, ‘The Nation: High Technology Chip Production Moving to China’, Far East 
Economic Review, December 31, 2002. 
10 See Anthony Kuhn, ‘China spins a new disc’, Far East Economic Review, February 26, 2004. 
11 WAPI has been accused because details of the standard have only been shared with a number of Chinese 
equipment makers, leaving foreign firms the option of either licensing the technology though agreements with 
Chinese suppliers, or staying out of the Chinese market. After intense lobby pressure from the US government on 
behalf of WLAN chipmakers, most notably Intel, the Chinese and US Government have reached an agreement in 
April 2004 regarding WAPI and WiFi technologies in China. China agreed to suspend the implementation of the 
WAPI standard. 
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sectors that host China’s largest industrial firms (see Subsection 5.2.2). Among the top 50 
enterprises listed in Table 5-14, there are one Private-owned Enterprise (POE), three FIEs 
and three firms with mixed ownership characteristic. All others are state-owned. The only 
POE and the three firms with mixed ownership characteristic are from the electronics & 
ICT sector: Huawei Technologies is a telecom equipment vendor; Lenovo Group 
(previously Legend Group) is a computer maker; Haier Group and TCL Holdings are 
mainly producing consumer electronic products. Two out of the three FIEs in Table 5-14 
are also from the electronics & ICT sector; they are Philips (China) and Motorola (China). 
Most enterprises listed in Table 5-14 are large monopolistic SOEs and only these firms 
have been grown up in a competitive business environment.  
Due to the low impediments to both imports and market entry, most segments in 
China’s electronics & ICT industry have followed an ‘open competitive’ model of 
industrial development principally shaped by the relevant industrial policy measures. 
China’s domestic markets of electronic products has become the arena on which part of the 
global competition took place – the leading FIEs compete fiercely with each other and also 
with rapidly rising domestic players. Prior to the early 1990s, the FIEs were mainly IJVs 
between SOEs and investors from Japan and the East Asian NIEs. In the second phase of 
China’ economic transition, large MNCs from Western countries began entered China’s 
electronics & ICT industry with large scale. Table 7-10 indicates that the largest FIEs in 
this sector were mainly invested by firms from Japan and the East Asian NIEs before the 
mid-1990s. Afterwards, most of them lost their positions to leading US and European 
MNCs.12 More recently, Taiwanese manufacturers of computer peripherals entered the list 
of top FIEs in China’s electronics & ICT industry, as they decisively moved their 
production capacities to Mainland China. It can be predicted that the semiconductor 
manufacturers established by Taiwanese investors in recent years will enter the list of top 
FIEs as they realised their full production capacity.  
 
                                                        
12 As the data in Table 5-16, the data in Table 7-10 is according to ‘largest 500 foreign-invested enterprises’ list 
compiled by the MOFTEC. Two categories of companies in the MOFTEC list are not included. The first category 
is the listed companies in China’s B-share market and some international stock market. For instance, Digital 
China Holdings Limited, a Hong Kong-listed spin off from Legend Group, realised revenue of RMB¥ 10.075 
billion in 2002. But it is not included in Table 7-10. The second category is the mobile telecommunications 
companies. 
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Table 7-10 Top 10 FIEs in the electronics and ICT sector, selected years 
Year Rank Company 
Revenue 
(RMB¥ 
million) 
Industry 
2002 1 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  45,333 Telecom equipment 
 2 Hon Hai Precision Industry (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. 38,610 Computer 
 3 Beijing Nokia Mobile Telecommunications Co., Ltd. 17,720 Telecom equipment 
 4 Dell Computer (China) Co., Ltd. 17,572 Computer 
 5 Nokia (China) Investment Co., Ltd.  13,550 Telecom equipment 
 6 Seagate International Technology (Wuxi) Co., Ltd.  10,850 Computer 
 7 Siemens Shanghai Mobile Communications Ltd.  10,719 Telecom equipment 
 8 Dongguan Nokia Mobile Phones Co., Ltd. 10,295 Telecom equipment 
 9 Top Victory Electronics (Fujian) Co., Ltd. 10,251 Computer 
 10 MiTAC Shunde Ltd. 9,229 Computer 
2000 1 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  31,289 Telecom equipment 
 2 Beijing Nokia Mobile Telecommunications Co., Ltd. 15,867 Telecom equipment 
 3 Nanjing Ericsson Communication Co., Ltd. 9,873 Telecom equipment 
 4 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 9,017 Consumer electronics 
 5 Top Victory Electronics (Fujian) Co., Ltd. 7,791 Computer 
 6 Siemens Shanghai Mobile Communications Ltd.  7,717 Telecom equipment 
 7 Great Wall International Information Products (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. 7,224 Computer 
 8 TCL Electric Appliances (Hui Zhou) Co., Ltd. 6,860 Consumer electronics 
 9 Dongguan Nokia Mobile Phones Co., Ltd. 6,829 Telecom equipment 
 10 Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. 6,497 Telecom equipment 
1995 1 Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd.  7,364 Telecom equipment 
 2 Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. 4,545 Telecom equipment 
 3 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 3,610 Consumer electronics 
 4 Beijing Matsushita Colour CRT Co., Ltd.  2,673 Consumer electronics 
 5 Tianjin Mitsumi Electric Co., Ltd. 2,521 Consumer electronics 
 6 Epson Engineering (Shenzhen) Ltd. 2,500 Consumer electronics 
 7 Huaqiang Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. 2,360 Consumer electronics 
 8 Sanyo Electric (Shekou) Co., Ltd. 2,040 Consumer electronics 
 9 Qingdao Mitsumi Electric Co., Ltd. 2,014 Consumer electronics 
 10 Shanghai Novel Colour Picture Tube Co., Ltd.  1,894 Consumer electronics 
1991 1 Beijing Matsushita Colour CRT Co., Ltd.  1,135 Consumer electronics 
 2 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 1,086 Consumer electronics 
 3 Huaqiang Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. 900 Consumer electronics 
 4 Fujian Hitachi Television Co., Ltd.  740 Consumer electronics 
 5 Shenzhen Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. 718 Consumer electronics 
 6 Shanghai Novel Colour Picture Tube Co., Ltd.  700 Consumer electronics 
 7 Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. 634 Telecom equipment 
 8 Huafei Colourful Revealing System Corporation Ltd.  582 Consumer electronics 
 9 Xiamen Huaqiao Electronic Co., Ltd. 531 Consumer electronics 
 10 Shenzhen Huafa Electronics Co., Ltd. 401 Consumer electronics 
Source: MOFTEC. 
Note: There is duplication between this table and Table 7-11, because some FIEs were also included in the ‘Top 
100 Electric Firms’ Statistics of the MII. 
The changing industrial composition of FIE presence in China’s electronics & ICT 
sector clearly reflects the sequential rise of different industries (see Subsection 7.1.1). 
Manufacturers in the consumer electronics industry were the largest firms in this sector 
prior to the early 1990s. Most of them are companies making colour TVs or tricolour tubes. 
After the mid-1990s, they gradually lost their positions to the newly entered FIEs 
producing computers and base stations. In 2000, six out of the ten largest FIEs in China’s 
electronics & ICT industry were from the segment of telecom equipment, while two were 
from the computer segment and the other two from consumer electronics (see Table 7-10). 
Two years later, in 2003, all the ten largest FIEs were manufacturers of computer 
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peripherals and telecom equipment. In the top ten FIE list there were five telecom 
equipment vendors: Motorola (China), Siemens Shanghai and three China affiliates of 
Nokia. The other five computer makers were Hon Hai, Dell (China), Seagate (Wuxi), Top 
Victory (Fujian) and MiTAC (Shunde). As the newly established production bases of Hon 
Hai, Quanta and Asus in Mainland China began production in recent years, these 
Taiwanese firms will ascend rapidly in the largest FIE list. 
The entry of MNCs did crowd out some domestic firms in a number of electronics & 
ICT industries in certain period of time, particularly the early years of foreign entry. 
However, many domestic firms survived the fierce competition from the most prestigious 
competitors and rapidly grew up. Some domestic firms can be considered as ‘crowded in’ 
by the entry of MNCs as certain degree of linkage and spillover effects contributed 
significantly to their growth. The rise of domestic industrial giants in China’s electronics & 
ICT industry can be the lists of the ‘Top 100 Electronic Firms’ compiled by the MII 
(previously the MEI) since the mid-1990s. On the basis of these rankings, Table 7-11 lists 
the top ten largest domestic enterprises in China electronics & ICT industry in 1986, 1990, 
1995, 2000 and 2003. Compared with Table 7-11, it can be seen that large FIEs and 
domestic firms dominate different segments of China’s electronics & ICT industry. In the 
four segments discussed in Subsection 7.1.1, the consumer electronics industry has already 
been dominated by the leading domestic firms, such as Haier Group, TCL Holdings and 
SVA Group. To some extent, the rise of domestic companies ‘crowded out’ FIEs, which 
dominated the market prior to the early 1990s. In every key segment of consumer 
electronics, such as colour TV, refrigerator and air conditioner, domestic firms grew rapid 
and won the competition with FIEs.  
Few Chinese manufacturing companies are known outside their domestic markets, 
because most would rather supply goods to the world’s biggest brands rather than compete 
with them in global markets. But leading domestic electronic firms such as Haier Group, 
which makes refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, and totally 96 categories of 
products, began to sell its products to the rest of the world. Haier was established in 1984 
as a small urban COE, producing refrigerators. After two decades of rapid expansion, 
Haier has realised global revenue of RMB¥ 80.6 billion in 2003 and has exported its 
products to 160 countries and territories. Haier has emerged as an MNC as it actively 
engaged in international expansion. It has 22 overseas factories and production bases and 
has become the world’s fifth largest producer of white goods. ‘Haier’ has become the most 
valuable brand in China and the second most important brand of white goods in the 
world.13 In 2003, Haier has been assigned to lead the formulation of four national 
industrial standards. 
                                                        
13 According to Euromonitor. 
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Table 7-11 Top 10 domestic firms in the electronics and ICT sector, selected years 
Year Rank Company 
Revenue 
(RMB¥ 
million) 
Industry 
2003 1 Haier Group Company 80,648 Consumer electronics 
 2 Lenovo Group (Legend Group) 40,331 Computer 
 3 TCL Holdings Co., Ltd. 38,204 Consumer electronics 
 4 SVA Group 30,686 Consumer electronics 
 5 Panda Electronics Group Co., Ltd. 26,327 Consumer electronics 
 6 Hisense Company Ltd. 22,113 Consumer electronics 
 7 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 21,670 Telecom equipment 
 8 Beijing Founder Group 18,120 Computer 
 9 Guangdong Midea Holding Co., Ltd. 17,500 Consumer electronics 
 10 ZTE Corporation 17,457 Telecom equipment 
2000 1 China Putian Corporation 46,500 Diversified holding firm 
 2 Haier Group Company 40,628 Consumer electronics 
 3 Legend Group  28,441 Computer 
 4 SVA Group 23,007 Consumer electronics 
 5 TCL Holdings Co., Ltd. 17,754 Consumer electronics 
 6 Panda Electronics Group Co., Ltd. 16,839 Consumer electronics 
 7 China Greatwall Computer Group 16,228 Consumer electronics 
 8 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 15,200 Telecom equipment 
 9 Hisense Company Ltd. 13,473 Consumer electronics 
 10 Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd. 12,990 Consumer electronics 
1995 1 Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd. 6,934 Consumer electronics 
 2 Legend Group  6,708 Computer 
 3 SVA Group 6,527 Consumer electronics 
 4 IRICO Electronics Group Corporation 6,000 Consumer electronics 
 5 Stone Group 5,295 Computer 
 6 Panda Electronics Group Co., Ltd. 4,583 Consumer electronics 
 7 Shanghai Bell  4,545 Telecom equipment 
 8 Shenzhen Huaqiang Holding Limited 4,201 Consumer electronics 
 9 Konka Group Co., Ltd. 3,561 Consumer electronics 
 10 Shenzhen Seg Group Co., Ltd. 3,199 Consumer electronics 
1990 1 Shanghai No. 1 Television Factory 1,161 Consumer electronics 
 2 Changhong Machinery Factory 1,151 Consumer electronics 
 3 Shanxi Tricolour tube Factory 960 Consumer electronics 
 4 Nanjing Radio Factory 952 Consumer electronics 
 5 Tianjin Telecom and Broadcasting Co., Ltd. 918 Telecom equipment 
 6 Shenzhen Konka Electronics Co., Ltd. 842 Consumer electronics 
 7 Shenzhen Huaqiang Electronics Co., Ltd. 810 Consumer electronics 
 8 Xiamen Huaqiao Electronics Co., Ltd. 805 Consumer electronics 
 9 Huanghe Machinery Manufacturing Factory 757 Consumer electronics 
 10 Shanghai No. 4 Radio Factory 741 Consumer electronics 
1986 1 Shanghai No. 1 Television Factory 576 Consumer electronics 
 2 Shanghai No. 4 Radio Factory 455 Consumer electronics 
 3 Shanghai No. 18 Radio Factory 449 Consumer electronics 
 4 Nanjing Radio Factory 404 Consumer electronics 
 5 Beijing Television Factory 359 Consumer electronics 
 6 Shanxi Tricolour tube Factory 346 Consumer electronics 
 7 Tianjin Telecom and Broadcasting Co., Ltd. 340 Telecom equipment 
 8 Shanghai Broadcasting Equipment Factory 286 Consumer electronics 
 9 Huangzhou Television Factory 277 Consumer electronics 
 10 Changhong Machinery Factory 275 Consumer electronics 
 Source: MII. 
In addition to consumer electronics, newly emergent domestic industrial giants 
producing computers and base stations rapidly developed and entered the list of top 
electronic firms since the mid-1990s. Although the computer peripherals market has been 
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dominated by the FIEs invested by the Taiwanese industrial leaders that also dominate the 
global market, the domestic PC market has been largely controlled by domestic firms 
rather than the leading MNCs, such as Dell and Hewlett-Packard. In China’s computer 
industry, the high-end server market is still dominated by MNCs such as IBM and 
Hewlett-Packard, although domestic players such as Legend and Langchao have captured 
more market share. In the low-end PC market, domestic firms, such as Legend, Founder 
and Tongfang, have become the three largest players after their rapid rise since the 
mid-1990s (see Table 7-12). As now the industrial leader, Legend was established in 1984 
as a dealer for foreign products in China. During the 1990s, it switched strategy, built up its 
own brand and waged price wars that pushed foreign firms out of China’s PC market. In 
2003, Legend has launched Lenovo as a global corporate brand to position itself for 
overseas expansion. 
Table 7-12 Market shares of PC manufacturers in China, 1996-2003 
Company 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Legend 9.2 19.4 27.5 26.9 26.5 27.0 
Founder  0 5.6 5.3 8.8 8.4 10.0 
Tongfang 0 0 0 8.1 6.4 8.0 
Dell 1.6 1.6 3.2 4.4 6.0 7.0 
IBM 10.2 6.7 5.6 4.7 5.5 5.0 
Hewlett-Packard 8.4 5.7 4.6 3.1 3.9 3.0 
Acer 3.0 1.8 3.1 2.9 3.4 2.0 
Great Wall 3.3 5.0 5.6 4.2 3.3 1.0 
Start 0 3.7 3.7 4.8 3.0 1.0 
TCL 0 0 0 4.6 2.5 3.0 
Compaq 10.1 4.8 3.4 1.2 0 1.0 
     Source: Buckman et al. (2003), McKinsey Global Institute (2003) and iSuppli. 
7.2 FDI and Competition in the Telecom Equipment Industry 
After almost 20 years of rapid development, China has recently emerged as one of the 
most important telecom equipment markets in the world. The size of this market is 
approximately the same as that of Japan.14 China’s telecom equipment industry has high 
level of productivity. In 2002, the labour productivity of this industry was RMB¥ 217,800 
per person, in contrast to RMB¥ 59,800 of China’s industrial sector at large. The telecom 
equipment industry also has high level of international competitiveness. The trade 
competition indexes of the two main categories of telecom equipment were 0.118 and 
0.356 respectively, demonstrating high international competitiveness (Mu and Wu, 2004, 
in Chinese).15 Industrial development has been driven by rapidly growing domestic 
demand and fast upgrading technology. With over US$ 155 billion in fixed and mobile 
capital investment made over the last five years, China has become the world’s largest 
telecom infrastructure market. In the early years, MNCs invested and engaged in local 
production in China mainly aimed at supplying the local market. In recent years, however, 
MNCs increasingly see their China operations as a key for their business success not only 
in China, but also globally. The industry is increasingly integrated into international 
                                                        
14 In 2002, the sizes of the Chinese and Japanese telecom equipment markets were RMB¥ 292.57 billion and US$ 
36.34 billion respectively. 
15 See Subsection 4.4.3 for a discussion of the trade competition index. 
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production systems and China has become the crux of the world’s technology 
manufacturing supply chain. To what extent does the entry of MNCs influence market 
competition, technological progress and industrial development in China’s telecom 
equipment sector? After an overall assessment of China’s electronics & ICT sector in 
general, this section seeks to trace the impact of FDI on competition and innovation in the 
telecom equipment industry in particular. 
This section identifies the determinants of market structural change in China’s telecom 
equipment market and investigates how and to what extent competition is determined by 
the interaction between business activity and government policy. The multi-phase model 
developed in Subsection 4.4.3 can soundly describe the dynamic process of market 
structural change in China’s telecom equipment industry. Based on this theoretical 
framework, we examine the FDI effect on market structure longitudinally in different 
segments of the industry. We find that the interaction between foreign and domestic firms 
and government policy shapes the structure of the market. We also find that, in a 
competitive market, entry of MNCs increases the degree of market competition and 
promotes firm innovation. Based on the intensified R&D activities of firms competing for 
domestic and global market share, a new sectoral system of innovation emerged in China’s 
telecom equipment industry. However, government S&T efforts and relevant policies are 
crucial to the development of this system. 
7.2.1 FDI Inflows in China’s Telecom Equipment Industry 
The analysis of market structure is central to the assessment of competition (see 
Subsection 4.2.1 for a detailed discussion). Although research into the relationship between 
FDI and market structure abounds, gaps remain. First, there have been no studies that 
consider the dynamic process of market structural change with regard to competition 
between foreign and domestic firms. Second, most studies consider the FDI impact on 
domestic market concentration, but neglect the changing pattern of international trade, 
which is intrinsic to domestic market structure. Third, although the market structure impact 
of inward FDI and MNC presence has been studied, the relation between business 
practices and government policies has not been clarified in a logic framework. China’s 
telecom equipment industry in the reform era provides an appropriate case to study thus to 
fill these gaps. In a relatively short time, this industry developed significantly. This growth 
took place against a background of fast economic growth and extremely rapid 
telecommunications development. As a market was created by increasing demand and by 
updating technology, MNCs entered and domestic firms grew up. Competition between 
FIEs and domestic firms represents the basic determinant of market structure. However, in 
the environment of transition economy, government policy shapes the overall business 
environment in which MNCs and their domestic competitors operate, thus playing an 
important role in the process of industrial development. The rapid development of China’s 
telecom equipment sector is balanced between government efforts to bring in the best 
technology from outside world while fostering the growth of domestic manufacturers. 
Unlike the ‘close-door’ policy pursued in the telecommunications service, China’s 
policy for telecom equipment manufacturing is consistent with its proactive FDI policy. 
The telecom equipment industry is one of the industries in which inward FDI is highly 
encouraged by the government. The huge market for telecom equipment has stimulated 
most MNCs to invest in China through IJVs or Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
(WFOEs) since the mid-1980s. The first FIE in this industry is Shanghai Bell, set up in 
1984 when China was experiencing severe shortages of telephone exchange equipment. 
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Shanghai Bell is an IJV between the Chinese and Belgian partners.16 Many other IJVs 
have been established to produce a wide range of telecom systems and components. Entry 
obviously has to be via IJVs due to policy restrictions. In later years, WFOE became 
another important entry mode of MNCs. M&A only became an available entry mode 
choice in some specific cases (such as Alcatel’s acquisition of Shanghai Bell) very 
recently.  
Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has adopted a ‘selective promoting’ 
strategy to attract preferred FDI projects while limiting the number of IJVs in the telecom 
equipment industry, thus falling into line with the change in the country’s general FDI 
policy. The ‘Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment’ and the attached 
catalogue of industrial guidance for inward FDI provide a list of encouraged, permitted, 
restricted and prohibited FDI projects (see Subsection 5.1.3 for a detailed discussion). For 
example, in the 1995 version of the guideline, digital cellular, SDH, ATM switching 
systems, satellite communications systems and digital microwave systems are all on the 
list of desirable technologies.  
Prior to the late 1990s, virtually all important telecom equipment manufacturing MNCs 
had invested in China. However, most of them aimed to sell their products directly to the 
Chinese market and mainly engaged in Complete Knock Down (CKD) or Semi Knock 
Down (SKD) assembly. The scale of investment and production was relative small and 
total investment was approximately US$ 2 billion. Government policy played an important 
role in attracting FDI. After 1999, with newly implemented government policy to 
encourage R&D, technology transfer, product localisation and export, the pace of foreign 
investment accelerated. From 1999 to 2001, almost US$ 10 billion flushed into China’s 
telecom equipment sector. MNCs greatly increased their presence in China. Many of them 
moved production bases into China and set up local R&D centres. In 2002, the asset 
percentage of FIEs in this industry was 50.2 percent and their contribution to the total 
value-added and exports was 65.2 and 93.5 percent respectively.17 
The telecom equipment industry hosts the largest FIEs in China’s electronics & ICT 
sector (see Subsection 7.1.3). In 2002, Motorola (China) realised revenue of RMB¥ 45.3 
billion to become the largest FIE in China. If the revenues of different China affiliates 
being summed up, Nokia’s turnover in China was also above RMB¥ 40 billion, making it 
among the largest foreign investors in China. As MNCs became the largest players in the 
Chinese market, this market became the first or second most important market and profit 
source for many MNCs and the strategic importance of the Chinese market increased 
significantly.  
                                                        
16 The Chinese investor was the Post and Telecommunication Equipment Company, which was affiliated with the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunication. The foreign investors were Bell Belgium and Belgian government, 
which took 31.65 and 8.35 percent of equity respectively. In 1995, Shanghai Bell became the second largest FIE 
in China’s electronics & ICT industry, only behind Motorola (China). In 2001, Shanghai Bell was acquired by 
Alcatel after Alcatel’s acquisition of Bell Belgium. After the acquisition, Shanghai Bell has been transformed into 
a joint-stock company and renamed Alcatel Shanghai Bell. The equity taken by Alcatel has increased to 50 
percent plus one share. 
17 According to Mu and Wu (2004, in Chinese). 
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7.2.2 FDI and Market Structure in Different Segments: Climbing the Industrial 
Development Ladder 
The at-entry impact of foreign entry depends on pre-existing market structure and entry 
mode (see Subsection 4.2.2). In terms of pre-existing market structure, when some 
first-movers entered, the domestic industry of specific segments was virtually non-existent, 
with the market dominated by imports. The opening up of markets to inward FDI and the 
entry of MNCs directly increased market contestability. The other significant at-entry 
effect was the reduction of imports. Taking importers into account, the entry of MNCs 
increased the number of sellers and decreased market concentration. Telecom equipment 
manufacturing is characterised by high start-up costs and economies of scale, which make 
market entry difficult, especially in developing countries. The degree of barriers to entry 
influences the impact of FDI on market structure. In industries with high barriers to entry 
such as China’s telecom equipment sector, inward FDI can make a significant difference to 
market structure.  
Inward FDI makes a difference to concentration in the relevant market in the long run, 
that is, the post-entry effect. The actual impact of MNC participation on product market 
concentration depends on a number of factors (see Subsection 4.2.2 for a detailed 
discussion). The traditional accounts of these factors focus on the interactions between 
MNCs and domestic firms (see e.g. UNCTAD, 1997a) and the role of the policy 
environment has been largely overlooked (see Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 for theoretical 
extensions). In China’s telecom equipment industry, these firm-level factors and 
government policies work, on balance, to determine market structure. We examine the 
post-entry effect of FDI on this industry by examining the market structure of different 
segments in 2002. Table 7-13 illustrates the market share achievements of FIEs and 
domestic players, most of which compete in a broad range of product lines in the telecom 
equipment market. Table 7-13 indicates that MNCs have taken a significant share in 
various segments of mainstream telecom equipment markets, while several leading 
domestic firms have been even more successful in terms of market share performance. The 
domestic firms include SOEs, POEs and other companies wholly owned or controlled by 
domestic entities. 
Table 7-13 Market structure in mainstream telecom equipment markets in 2002 (percent) 
Company Central office switches 
Transmission 
systems 
Mobile telecom 
systems* 
WAN access 
equipment  
Domestic firms 
Huawei 
ZTE 
Fenghuo 
 
45 
15 
 
 
46 
14 
11 
 
9 
4 
 
 
35 
14 
 
FIEs 
Alcatel (Shanghai Bell) 
Siemens 
Lucent 
Nortel 
Nokia 
Ericsson 
Motorola 
 
20 
15 
 
 
 
7 
 
6 
11 
 
 
13 
 
 
19 
27 
20 
 
34 
 
 
 
3 
2 
Concentration ratios 
C3 
C5 
 
80 
97 
 
71 
89 
 
66 
88 
 
83 
91 
Source: MII and China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC). 
Note: * Data for 2000. 
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The high concentration ratios demonstrate that China’s telecom equipment industry is a 
small-number-player game, which is consistent with the nature of the telecom equipment 
industry. Domestic firms are among a limited number of dominators in most segments. 
Leading domestic firms such as Huawei, ZTE and Datang are competing head-to-head 
with MNCs in telecom systems such as SPC switching equipment, mobile systems (GSM, 
GPRS and CDMA) and every segments of the mainstream telecom equipment market. 
Firms from other sectors such as consumer electronics were also lured into the terminal 
market and have been growing aggressively in recent years. Now domestic firms are 
beating MNCs and gaining significant market share in almost every area except for several 
high-end products (see Table 7-14). 
Table 7-14 Shares of foreign and domestic firms in various markets in 2002 (percent) 
Segment Domestic firms FIEs Top three firms 
Central office switches (lines) 65 35 Huawei, Shanghai Bell and BISC 
Transmission systems 74 26 Huawei, ZTE and Fenghuo 
Mobile telecom systems  
(Base stations/switches)* 
24/32 76/68 Ericsson, Motorola and Nokia 
Mobile telecom terminal (handsets) 39 61 Motorola, Nokia and Bird 
WAN access equipment (ADSL)* (sales) 62 38 Huawei, Shanghai Bell and ZTE 
PHS systems 39 61 UT Starcom, ZTE and Lucent 
Cable (sales) 90 10 Changfei, Fenghuo and Hengtong 
Optical fibre (sales) 29 71 Changfei and Kangning 
Source: MII and CICC. 
Note: * Data for 2001. 
Although concentration ratios are high, the leading firms are undergoing constant 
changes in different segments due to intensive competition. As a result of the policy to 
limit the number of FIEs in the early years of the development of a specific segment, only 
a small number of pioneers entered the market and enjoyed the first-mover advantages. 
First-mover advantages (see Subsection 6.3.1 for a discussion) arise when pioneers 
develop a sustainable competitive advantage over late entrants. For the first-movers in 
China’s telecom equipment industry, the sources of first-mover advantages include for 
instance the preemption of assets and buyer switching costs. Based on their localisation 
advantages over importers and their technology advantages over domestic players, the 
first-movers built up strong market positions and dominated the relevant markets. However, 
the subsequent admission of new market entry introduced competition and the dominant 
first-movers faced fresh rivalry. Motorola, for example, controlled 70 percent of the mobile 
phone market in 1993. However, in 1997 Ericsson took over the number one position as 
China’s dominant supplier of mobile telephony and Nokia also seized a large part of the 
handset and transmission markets. In addition to competition among MNCs, domestic 
firms represented a key competitive force in the market. With support from industrial 
policy and based on some specific competitive advantages (for instance in distribution and 
marketing), domestic firms caught up fast and quickly obtained a leading market position. 
A pattern of structural change, described in the model with the catalytic promotion from 
inward FDI (see Figure 4-5), exists in virtually all segments in China’s telecom equipment 
industry. Various government policies played different roles in the various phases of 
structural change.  
The endogenous technological progress that took place in the era of planned economy 
reflects the model of structural enhancement without FDI and technology transfer from 
foreign firms (see Figure 4-5). With inward FDI (supposing it is market-seeking and aimed 
at supplying the domestic market), the process of structural change becomes more 
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complicated. This process can be seen in China’s telecom equipment industry since the 
mid-1980s, first in the SPC switches market (Shen, 1999; Tan, 2002), then in mobile 
telecommunications and other high-end segments (Liang, 2003). In the SPC switches 
market (see Table 7-15), Alcatel and Siemens entered in the 1980s and transformed an 
import-dominated market (Phase 1 in Figure 4-5) into an IJV-dominated industry (Phase 2 
in Figure 4-5) in the early 1990s. In 1992, domestic branded SPC switches started to 
supply the market (Phase 4 in Figure 4-5).  
Table 7-15 Shares of imports, IJVs and domestic firms in the SPC switches market (percent) 
Item 1982 1987 1992 1997 2000 2002 
Imports 100 89 54 5 0 0 
IJVs 0 11 36 63 57 35 
Domestic firms 0 0 10 32 43 65 
   Source: Tan (2002) and MII. 
Four domestic firms (Huawei, ZTE, Datang and Great Dragon) have grown up, 
competing with the two pioneering IJVs. Huawei and ZTE have become the nemesis in 
recent years. Table 7-16 shows the revenues of Huawei, ZTE and the two pioneering IJVs, 
highlighting the dynamics of China’s telecom equipment industry and the rapid rise of 
domestic firms. Within the domestic telecom equipment vendors, Huawei is by far the 
largest and best known. Huawei, a POE owned principally by its employees, was 
established in 1988. In 1992, Huawei’s revenue reached RMB¥ 100 million. After rapid 
development since the mid-1990s, Huawei’s global revenue increased to RMB¥ 31.7 
billion in 2003, including foreign sales of US$ 1.05 billion (27 percent of its totally 
turnover).18 Huawei has established more than 30 branches in the world and its products 
were sold to over 40 countries. After being successful in developing markets, Huawei 
began to get business in developed markets. In 2003, Huawei won contracts in many 
developed markets, such as France, Spain, Germany and Portugal, and began selling 
equipment in the United States under OEM arrangements with 3Com. Huawei is now the 
world’s second largest supplier of advanced digital subscriber lines.19 Huawei has built 3G 
networks in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates.  
Table 7-16 Revenues of four firms (RMB¥ million), 1995-2002 
Company 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Huawei 1,270  2,600 4,189 7,180 10,215 15,200 16,229  17,214  
ZTE 196  580* 631 1,968 2,539 4,523 10,926  12,454  
Shanghai Bell 4,545  4,575 5,006 6,046 8,647 10,820 15,101  11,138  
BISC 1,024  1,719 1,988 2,916 2,554 3,144 4,047  1,584  
Source: MII and Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
Note: * Contractual sales. 
Similar structural changes took place in mobile telecommunications later, but at an even 
faster pace (Table 7-17). As of 1999, domestic players have been entering the mobile 
telecom equipment market with strong support from the government. At the end of 2002, 
they took the place of MNCs, which had dominated the market for more than ten years. In 
                                                        
18 The revenue data of Huawei in 2003, RMB¥ 31.7 billion, published by Huawei is different from the data 
complied by the MII in the ‘Top 100 Electronics Firms’ as listed in Table 7-11. This difference may be caused by 
the different statistical scope. 
19 See Ben Dolven, ‘Making the whole world listen’, Far East Economic Review, February 26, 2004. 
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the same period from 1998 to 2002, total production in the mobile telecom equipment 
industry increased from RMB¥ 10 billion to over 200 billion. In 2002, exports of mobile 
handsets climbed to US$ 4.1 billion and the export of base stations reached US$ 470 
million. China’s mobile telecom equipment industry has become the largest in the world. 
Meanwhile, Huawei, ZTE and Datang have captured a total of 10 percent of the global 
GSM base station market.  
Table 7-17 Shares of domestic brands in mobile telecom equipment markets 
Product 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Base stations 0 2 10 24 70 
Switching equipment 0 4 12 32 50 
Handsets 0 3 11 21 39 
            Source: MII. 
Importers have been gradually crowded out. As increasing market share has been 
captured by Huawei and ZTE, with IJVs losing ground and exports increasing, the market 
structure has evolved towards the last two phases – Phase 5 and 6 in Figure 4-5. While 
Huawei’s foreign sales reached US$ 1.05 billion, 27 percent of its total revenue in 2003, 
ZTE saw its international sales jumped 90 percent to US$ 600 million. Low costs at home 
and high degrees of government support have fed the rise of Huawei and ZTE.20 Based on 
their cost advantages, Huawei and ZTE have snapped up contracts in the developing 
worlds and begun to extent their presence to the developed markets. Both Huawei and ZTE 
are known for hammering margins paper-thin. Due to the fierce competition in the Chinese 
market, Huawei and ZTE can earn bigger margins overseas although they often undercut 
their competitors by 20-30 percent.  
The structural change depicted in Figure 4-5 becomes more complicated as we consider 
the upgrading from low- to high-end products as what took place in China’s telecom 
equipment industry. The same structural change processes take place from low- to 
high-end products and sometimes simultaneously in different segments. The imports and 
affiliates of MNCs are not simply crowded out of the market and they usually turn to more 
advanced technologies and initiate another round of pioneering and catching up, based 
upon their technology advantage over domestic firms. As the structural evolution 
approaches its later phases, nor do profit-eager domestic players stand still. Instead they 
engage in the catching up process in the more technology-intensive product. At the same 
time, based on their cost advantage over MNCs, domestic firms begin to internationalise 
and go abroad to compete with MNCs in the low-end product market. As this dynamic 
process continues and the time lag between MNCs and domestic firms becomes smaller, 
the national industry successfully moves up through the technology ladder. As MNCs 
supply the market with the same technology as they supply their home market, the 
technological catch-up reaches its final phase, domestic players gain international 
competences, and the domestic market becomes part of the integrated global market. 
7.2.3 FDI, Competition and Technological Progress in the Telecom Equipment 
Industry 
FDI significantly injected international competition into the domestic telecom equipment 
                                                        
20 See Ben Dolven (2004). 
Telecom equipment industry   287 
 
market, which had a very limited number of sellers prior to the entry of foreign firms. 
MNCs, because of their possession of ownership advantages and its status in an 
international production system, have more competitive advantages and greater conduct 
options available than domestic firms (see Subsection 4.3.1). Li et al. (2000) explored the 
competitive advantages carried by MNCs in China’s telecom equipment industry. These 
characteristic features of MNCs affected the structure of the telecom equipment market 
and also had consequences for the competitive situation in this market and, hence, for the 
performance of firms and an industry as a whole. However, the same competitive strength 
could, under certain conditions, also create opportunities for MNCs to suppress 
competitors, gain dominant positions within markets and even engage in anticompetitive 
practices, thus leading to possible reduction in efficiency. The competitive market structure 
in China’s telecom equipment industry, as we examined in last subsection, largely 
eliminates this possibility. With effective competition among both international and 
domestic firms, FDI improved the performance of the industry and increased consumer 
welfare by lowering prices, improving product quality, increasing product variety and 
introducing new products. For example, as the product quality and diversification highly 
increased, the price of SPC switches has declined from US$ 300 to US$ 30 per line.  
FDI affected the industrial growth of China’s telecom equipment sector through two 
channels, that is, impacts on factor input and on Total Factor Productivity (TFP), or 
efficiency in the use of production factors. Financial resources are not the only factor 
through which FDI can affect industrial development. MNCs provided proprietary assets, 
which are usually firm-specific and costly for Chinese firms to acquire independently. The 
transfer of such assets took place not only intra-firm but also opened up to further 
dissemination to other firms in the industry and even the economy at large. The decisive 
presence of MNCs and the rapid rising of domestic firms together determine the 
technological progress and industrial development in China’s telecom equipment sector. 
The degree of technology transfer is dependent upon the technological capabilities of 
domestic firms (see Subsection 4.1.2). China’s relatively high technological capability has 
largely promoted technology spillovers in telecom equipment manufacturing, accordingly 
increasing the roles played by inward FDI in fostering industrial growth. The development 
of domestic telecom equipment vendors is the main determinant of technological learning 
capabilities.  
MNCs have been recognised as one of the principal vehicles for the international 
transfer of technology and managerial know-how (see Subsection 4.4.1). The possible 
mechanisms of technology transfer include the spillovers and other externality effects. 
Nevertheless, the basic incentive of innovation comes from competition. Competition has 
many benefits, of which the promotion and diffusion of innovations is one of the most 
important. The longitude data for the market share achievements of different firms in 
China’s telecom equipment industry demonstrates that, as a growing number of MNCs and 
domestic firms entered the market, the degree of competition increased. Moreover, the 
changing pattern of market share distribution suggests that it is an outcome of dynamic 
competition rather than static dominance by specific firms. In fact, the increasing 
competition makes it very difficult for firms to gain a strong foothold in terms of market 
share. 
In the telecom equipment industry, inward FDI and intensified competition led the 
diffusion of innovations. MNCs are efficient vehicles for the transfer of technologies. In 
resource-based and low-technology manufacturing activities, the technology transfer 
benefits may be low; in high-technology activities such as telecom equipment 
manufacturing, however, they may be considerable. In the early years, technology transfer, 
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although a stipulation of the Chinese government, was limited and mostly confined to local 
suppliers, helping them to build up managerial and functional capabilities. Because of the 
relatively low domestic technological learning capabilities, horizontal (or direct) 
technology transfer was limited. Personnel mobility was also low, with high wages acting 
as an impediment preventing skilled engineers from being lured away by domestic firms. 
The strategic consideration of MNCs prevented them from transferring core technologies 
to IJVs. R&D investment was less than MNC average and even lower than that by leading 
local firms. The R&D within local affiliates was principally for product localisation and 
less generic technologies or ingenious technologies were developed.  
Nevertheless, MNCs have set up models for local companies to closely watch and 
imitate, in the areas of production, management and marketing. Linkages are of particular 
significance to developing countries because they provide an effective means of diffusing 
valuable knowledge and skills throughout the economy. Even in the early years with much 
limited technology transfer, vertical transfer was much better and technologies for 
components localisation were transferred, as well as production technologies. In China’s 
telecom equipment industry, effective linkage means that local domestic firms are learning 
and increasing their technological capacities rapidly. With government support, EastCom, 
for example, rapidly increased its technological capability through OEM for MNCs and 
became a strong player in the terminal market with its own brand in recent years. The 
linkages also lead to various indirect effects for the host economy. For instance, more and 
more efficient local suppliers of intermediates and components highly benefits domestic 
downstream firms in the production value chain. 
Since the early 1990s, local domestic firms were learning and increasing their 
technological capacities rapidly through effective linkage. The rise of domestic firms 
highly increased domestic technological learning capabilities and promoted the degree of 
technology transfer. Leading domestic firms, which compete head to head with MNCs, 
mainly built up their core competence based on intensive in-house R&D. Competition not 
only provides incentives for firms to cut costs and eliminate inefficiencies, but also urges 
firms to innovate. In technology-intensive industries such as telecom equipment 
manufacturing, the constant introduction of new products and the R&D investment to 
achieve product innovation is critical for the success and even survival of a firm. In such 
environment, firms invest in R&D not only to gain short-term profits, but also to maintain 
their long-term survival. Highly intensified competition significantly increased the level of 
innovation for domestic firms. 
There are two approaches of measuring the innovation intensity of firms. First, from the 
input perspective, innovation can be measured by the factors that contribute to the build-up 
and maintenance of R&D facilities. These factors include R&D investment, research 
personnel and equipment. Secondly, from the output perspective, innovation can be 
measured by certain outcome of firms’ R&D activities. Based on both approaches, we find 
that leading domestic firms are intensively involved in innovation activities. Although the 
absolute level of R&D expenditure is still much lower than that of MNCs, domestic 
players have spent a large share of their revenues in R&D (Table 7-18).  
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Table 7-18 R&D expenditure* and share of revenues: leading domestic players and MNCs 
2000 2001 2002 Company 
R&D expenditure percent R&D expenditure percent R&D expenditure percent 
Domestic firms 
Huawei 
ZTE 
Datang 
2,070 
541 
344 
14 
12 
12 
3,050 
1,130 
390 
19 
10 
12 
3,056 
1,182 
165 
18 
9 
6 
MNCs 
Motorola 
Nokia 
Lucent 
4,437 
2,584 
4,018 
12 
9 
14 
4,318 
2,985 
3,520 
15 
10 
17 
3,754 
3,052 
2,310 
14 
10 
19 
Source: MII and CICC. 
Note: *RMB¥ million for domestic firms and US$ million for MNCs. 
The leading domestic firms in China’s telecom equipment industry such as Huawei and 
ZTE are among the most R&D intensive companies in China. Huawei spent 18 percent of 
its total revenue in R&D in 2002 and almost half of its employees were engaged in 
research activities. It has been one of the top patent appliers in the world telecom industry 
since the late 1990s. Table 7-19 shows the number of patents in mobile 
telecommunications in China and the world in 2001. In 2002, China’s patent applications 
in telecommunications was 1880 and 766 patents were granted.21 
Table 7-19 Numbers of patents in mobile telecommunications in China and the world in 2001 
China World Rank 
Company Patents Company Patents 
1 Huawei 53 NEC 373 
2 ZTE 40 Samsung Electronics 333 
3 Yingyeda Group (Shanghai) 13 Ericsson 245 
4 Huang Jinfu 10 Nokia 242 
5 Beijing Telecommunication University 9 Panasonic 190 
6 Yingyeda Group (Nanjing)  8 Lucent 181 
7 Telecom Transmission Research Institute, MII 8 / 140 
8 Telecom Science Research Institute, MII 8 Siemens 134 
9 Tsinghua University 7 Motorola 125 
10 Beijing Xincheng 5 Alcatel 100 
Source: China Electronics. 
7.2.4 The Emergent Sectoral System of Innovation 
A sectoral system of innovation has emerged in China’s telecom equipment industry. This 
system is a part of China’s emergent national system of innovation, which integrates 
government efforts and business activities. R&D spending in China grew rapidly over the 
past decade. In 2001 it reached almost USD 60 billion in current purchasing power parity, 
only behind the United States and Japan in the world (OECD, 2003). The transformation 
from a traditional S&T system into a system of innovation is one important aspect of 
China’s multi-dimensional economic transition. The telecom equipment industry provides 
a typical case of this process of transformation. Inward FDI and related competition, 
linkage and spillovers between foreign and local firms have significantly contributed to the 
performance of the sectoral system of innovation in this industry. The R&D investment 
and organisational learning of firms competing for domestic and global market share have 
                                                        
21 According to Mu and Wu (2004, in Chinese). 
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contributed to the emergence of the innovation system. On the other hand, government 
S&T efforts as well as relevant policies (such as FDI policy and industrial policy) are 
crucial to the development of this system.  
China had developed a considerable technological capability under the S&T system in 
the era of planned economy (Conroy, 1992). The emergent system of innovation was 
transformed from this traditional S&T system, which mainly consisted of independent 
research institutions, universities and specialised factories. In the pre-existing S&T system, 
innovation and production were two separated activities. The process of innovation was 
managed by government ministries rather than production units, through separate chains of 
command and by different channels of finance. The transformation can be seen as a shift 
from the S&T system dominated by one state sector towards a diversity of sources of 
innovation (Radosevic, 1999). In the era of planned economy, most technological 
innovations were pushed by the research institutes and supportive activities, while the 
emergent system of innovation consists of diversified entities and activities in different 
sectors, at different levels and from different origins. In the open economy of post-reform 
China, FDI and the entry of MNCs provide crucial source of innovation and technological 
progress. The impact of FDI on enhancing national technological capabilities depends on 
the dynamic process: how much does the enhancement of local capabilities takes place 
over time, how far do local linkages deepen, and how closely do foreign affiliates integrate 
themselves to the local ‘learning system’ (Lall, 2000). The extent of the dynamics process 
depends on the interactions among corporate strategies and resources, the development of 
domestic markets and government policies. Active government policies may play an 
important role in this dynamic process (see Figure 4-5).  
Inward FDI led to the diffusion of innovations and the relation between MNCs and 
domestic firms became the core factor contributing to the development the innovation 
system and determining the performance of it. MNCs presented a crucial actor in the 
newly formed sectoral system of innovation, in addition to the pre-existing research 
institutions, universities and specialised factories in the traditional S&T system. MNCs 
have taken significant share of Chinese telecom equipment market, but several leading 
domestic firms have been even more successful. The rise of domestic firms presented an 
essential part of the firm sector in the emerging sectoral innovation system. For 
export-oriented MNCs that operate in complex industries such as electronics, as noted in 
Subsection 4.4.1, efficiency requirements reduce the scope for domestic linkages in 
developing countries. As local intermediate producers grew up, however, situation in these 
industries in specific developing countries changed. Following the East Asian NIEs, China 
experienced this process in its electronics & ICT sector in general and the telecom 
equipment industry in particular. 
Enterprises are central actors in the system of innovation and they play a key role in the 
commercialisation of technologies. In the planned economic system, the factories are not 
the enterprises in the Western sense. The efficiency with which the factories use given 
technologies is often relatively low. Technical inefficiency and obsolescence lead to low 
productivity, affecting the quality of their products and handicapping their ability to meet 
market demand. In China’s post-reform telecom equipment industry, as enterprises 
developed and engaged in innovation, a system of innovation centred on firm R&D 
activities emerged. In the late 1980s, the large-scale installation of imported switches and 
the presence of IJVs in the SPC switches sector fostered technology transfer. Researchers 
and engineers, teamed with entrepreneurs, quickly grasped the opportunity to develop 
competitive local products and shared the high profits with IJVs (Shen, 1999). The 
personnel of these companies are mainly from state-owned institutes or factories, which 
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provided abundant human resources as a valuable legacy of the pre-existing S&T system.  
In the emerging sectoral system of innovation, some SOEs and listed companies with 
state control were formerly state-owned research institutes, which dominated the S&T 
system for a long period of time. As the primal institutional legacy of the S&T system, 
these research institutes provided important institutional support for the newly emerged 
system of innovation. On the one hand, they provided a plentiful supply of human capital; 
one the other hand, some successful enterprises emerged from these institutes after 
corporation orientated restructuring. Successful domestic firms emerged from the 
environment of dynamic institutional transition and rapid industrial development. They 
engaged in intensive innovation activities and became the leading force in the emerging 
system of innovation. Based on the intensive R&D activities of the corporate sector, China 
ranked high on the scale of innovation capability in telecommunications. China became the 
fourth largest innovative country in mobile telecommunications (in terms of numbers of 
patents) from 1997 to 2001, behind Japan, South Korea and the United States.  
In the system of innovation, firms play a key role, but do not operate as isolated entities. 
Their activities are shaped by national and sectoral factors. In China, government S&T 
efforts are important components of the system of innovation. The emerging system of 
innovation consists of national S&T programs and public research institutes, which interact 
actively with firms to develop technology for the market. The MII, coupled with a number 
of other government agencies such as the MOST, have extensive authority to formulate 
and implement policies in respect to ICT industries in general and the telecom equipment 
industry in particular. The ministry is actively engaged in S&T programs at a national level 
with the purpose of promoting technological development in some specific areas. From 
1999 to 2002, for example, the MII implemented the ‘Mobile Specialisation’ project to 
support the development of China’s mobile telecom equipment industry. RMB¥ one billion, 
combined with further six billion R&D fund from project undertakers and banks, was spent 
on 84 projects involving mobile telecom products and components. This government effort 
significantly contributed to the rapid growth of the mobile telecom equipment industry in 
recent years. 
A broad range of government policies supported the emergence of the sectoral system 
of innovation in the telecom equipment industry, as they shaped the general industrial 
context in which firms emerge, compete and innovate. The extent of the dynamics of 
technology transfer process depends on the interaction of the many factors that are heavily 
influenced by government policies. It has been shown that countries with relatively 
stringent restrictions on inward FDI that force MNCs into some kinds of partnership with 
local firms seem to obtain relatively little spillovers (see Subsection 4.4.3). In general, the 
more competitive and outward-oriented the government policies are, the more dynamic the 
upgrading process becomes. The impact of FDI on technology transfer and innovation 
diffusion is enhanced in an environment characterised by an open trade and investment 
regime. In such environment, FDI can play a key role in improving the capacity of the host 
country to respond to the opportunities offered by global economic integration (OECD, 
1998b). The internationalisation strategy adopted by the Chinese government has provided 
the basic policy foundation for rapid industrial development in the telecom equipment 
industry. This strategy encouraged most MNCs to invest in China and has led to intensified 
and internationalised competition in the domestic market, which in turn promotes 
innovation, efficiency and industrial development.  
The industrial policy for the telecom equipment sector has proven a key instrument for 
the birth of the sectoral system of innovation. It has helped to transform an extremely 
laggard industry into the country’s main industrial pillar and one of the most competitive 
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industries in the world. The development of domestic enterprises is one of the main 
objectives of industrial policy. Several methods have been used to support domestic 
players, such as research grants for R&D, low interest loans, tax reduction and provision of 
land in high-tech industrial parks. Sometimes, operators are also encouraged to purchase 
products from domestic vendors. Successful domestic players such as Huawei and ZTE 
benefit a lot from this supportive industrial policy. With support from government policy, 
the rise of domestic firms and brands fosters effective competition in the market. The 
rising level of local capabilities promotes the benefits of spillovers from MNCs. The 
deepening capabilities of local firms yield greater benefits than just receiving the 
technology and managerial know-how from MNCs.  
7.3 Determinants of Innovation: Hypothesis Development 
This section investigates the determinants of innovation in China’s electronics & ICT 
sector. Based on the approach that integrates FDI into the conceptual framework of the 
system of innovation, as suggested in Subsection 4.4.2, this section empirically examines 
the relation between foreign and domestic firms in terms of R&D spillovers. The lack of 
rigor and specificity prevents the system of innovation approach from becoming a ‘theory’ 
of innovation (see Subsection 4.4.2). The best way to overcome this obstacle is by actually 
using this approach in empirical research. China’s electronics & ICT sector since the 
mid-1980s provides an appropriate case to study thus to fill the theoretical and empirical 
gaps in the SI approach and the FDI spillover literature. Inward FDI contributed 
significantly to the innovative and technological advance in China. From a sectoral 
perspective, different industries realised different degrees of success in terms of industrial 
development and technological advance in the reform era. Among them, the electronics & 
ICT sector is a typical example of rapid industrial and technological development. FIEs, 
especially MNC affiliates, have contributed significantly to industrial development and 
technological progress in this sector. 
This section aims at identifying the determinants of innovation propensity of firms in 
China’s electronics & ICT sector. It investigates to what extent the performance of 
innovation systems, in terms of the R&D expenditure by large firms, has been influenced 
by inward FDI and some other firm- and industry-level factors. There has been very little 
overlap between the studies of international business and innovation system (Van Tulder et 
al., 2001). This study makes contribution by integrating FDI into the conceptual 
framework of the SI approach. Based on this theoretical framework, we identify the crucial 
factors that determine the performance of the innovation system and analyse the nature of 
the relationship between foreign and domestic firms in terms of R&D spillovers, which is a 
crucial factor determining the performance of an innovation system. 
There have rarely been studies that consider the spillover effects from FDI on R&D 
activities of domestic firms (cf. Liang and Van Tulder, 2004b). The FDI spillover literature 
is principally focusing on the relation between FDI in a host country and the productivity 
of host-country industries. In this stream of research, the determinants of productivity are 
the central concern and technological progress is usually measured as TFP (see Subsection 
4.4.1). Some recent studies on China follow this approach by examining FDI spillovers in 
Chinese industries (see Subsection 5.2.3 for a detailed survey). A number of these studies 
assessed the overall effects of FDI on productivity, taking one industry as a whole and not 
distinguishing FIEs and domestic firms (Liu et al., 2001; Wei and Liu, 2001; Liu and Wang, 
2003). Others followed the standard approach of spillover studies by investigating the 
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effect of foreign presence on productivity of domestic firms (e.g. Hu and Jefferson, 2002). 
Different from the common approach, Buckley et al. (2002) examined not only 
productivity but also non-productivity spillovers in terms of the development of 
high-technology products and new products. Similarly, Hu and Jefferson (2001) reported 
positive FDI spillover effects on introduction of new products in China’s manufacturing 
industries. There have been also studies on productivity spillovers from FDI based on 
cross-regional analysis (Zhu and Tan, 2000). Cheung and Lin (2004) used the data of 
patent applications as the measure of R&D output to examine FDI spillover effects on 
innovation in China. They used the provincial data and emphasised the geographic aspect 
of R&D spillovers from FDI. To our knowledge, there have been no studies that examined 
the spillover effects from FDI on R&D activities at the firm level in China. The positive 
correlation between FDI intensity and R&D expenditure of firms is a practical starting 
point for testing the R&D spillover effect from FDI. 
We have described the structure and dynamics of the innovation system in China’s 
electronics & ICT sector in general and the telecom equipment industry in particular. FDI 
has been identified a crucial factor that determines the performance of this system. It is 
important to move beyond mere descriptions of components of innovation systems and the 
relations between them. A practical approach is to address the activities or functions of 
innovation systems (Edquist, 1997). The basic function of an innovation system is the 
generation of innovations, which mainly reflects the performance of the system. The SI 
approach concerns the determinants of innovations, not their consequences (Edquist, 2001). 
To study the determinants of innovation at the system level is a crucial way to broaden and 
strengthen the SI approach and to address a fundamental weakness of this approach, 
namely the lack of system-level explanatory factors (Lundvall, 1992; Liu and White, 2000). 
Studying the determinants of innovation at the system level is not necessarily requiring 
system-level measures of performance. Empirical studies that examine the important 
factors (mainly causal relations) affecting the performance of the system can generate 
valuable insights. The causal relations are usually associated with the determinants of 
innovation activities (R&D expenditure or outcome) for the actors in innovation systems. 
Considerable body of literature has been directed towards a better understanding of the 
determinants of innovation. At the national level, country size, economic development 
level, economic prosperity and economic openness have been identified as the 
determinants of innovation (Teitel, 1994; Grande and Peschke, 1999; Varsakelis, 2001). 
National institutions have also crucial effects on the pace of innovation. For example, 
intellectual property right legislation, competition policy and financial system have 
different consequence on the performance of innovation systems (see surveys of empirical 
studies see, for example, Levin et al., 1987). Cultural factors also influence the pace of 
innovation (Chandler, 1990; Rosenberg, 1994; La Porta et al., 1997; Varsakelis, 2001). In 
this study of Chinese industries, we focus on industry- and firm-specific factors. 
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7.3.1 Determinants of Innovation: Firm-level Factors 
A number of firm-level factors are considered as the determinants of innovation intensity. 
Some factors are easy to measure, while others not. The former includes, for example, size 
and financial conditions of firms. The latter, for example, includes some specific resources 
and organisational features. Great disparity exists in the results of empirical studies. Take 
diversification as an example. Some empirical studies prove a negative relation between 
diversification and innovation (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson and Johnson, 
1992; Hoskisson et al., 1993) and others verify a positive influence (McEachern and 
Romeo, 1978; Link, 1982; Chen, 1996). A specific analysis of the firm-level determinants 
of innovation that takes a number of theoretical issues and the characteristics of China’s 
electronics & ICT sector into account should particularly include the following three 
aspects: firm size, profitability and internationalisation. 
Firm size 
Firm size is claimed to be a crucial firm-level determinant of innovation. Because 
information and the innovation based on it have increasing return to scale (Caves, 1996), 
the marginal benefit of R&D investment increases as scale expends and the same R&D 
expenditure is more valuable to a bigger firm. Some empirical studies support the positive 
impact of firm size (Lunn and Martin, 1986; Braga and Willmore, 1991; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996; Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Galende, 2002), while others are not able to 
verify this (Mansfield, 1964; Grabowski, 1968; Adams, 1970; Scherer, 1984; Acs and 
Audretsch, 1988; Morck and Yeung, 1991; Graves and Langowitz, 1993). There are also 
studies that emphasise the advantage of intermediate-sized firms (Scherer, 1965; Mansfield 
et al., 1971; Smith, 1974; Kumar and Saqib, 1996) or of both large and small size at the 
same time (Rothwell, 1986; Pavitt et al., 1987; Rothwell and Dodgson, 1994).  
To analyse the relation between firm size and innovation propensity, the age of firms 
must be controlled for. For example, small size is generally considered to hamper 
innovation, but newly formed firms are typically small and innovative. So we should 
separate the effect of age from the effect of size when studying the determinants of 
innovation. However, the sample of this study only covers the largest firms in China’s 
electronics & ICT sector. The age effect for the new venturing does not exist for these 
mature businesses. Thus we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: The larger a firm, the more intensive its R&D activities. 
Profitability 
Financial conditions of firms influence their intensity of innovation. Transaction cost 
theory and the positive theory of agency claim that debt financing can discourage 
innovative activities. Empirical evidence confirms this negative influence (Grabowski, 
1968; Branch, 1974; Kamien and Schwartz, 1978; Hall, 1990; Long and Ravenscraft, 1993; 
Giudici and Paleari, 2000). Schumpeter (1942) argued that large monopolistic firms are the 
best innovators because they can use their monopoly profit to fund innovation activities. 
Scherer (1992) surveyed the empirical literature and concluded that Schumpeter’s 
argumentation exaggerated the advantages of the large, monopolistic corporations as the 
engine of technological change. This debate is related to another firm-level determinant of 
innovation – profitability, which is positively related to innovation (e.g. Mansfield, 1971; 
Caves, 1996). It is also related to one of the industry-level determinants of innovation – 
market structure, which we will discuss later. In China’s electronics & ICT sector, the 
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profitability of firms generally influences their ability to finance innovation activities. Thus 
we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the profit of a firm, the more intensive its R&D activities. 
Internationalisation 
Internationalisation effects on the development of technological capacities, because it 
implies greater competitiveness and an increase in market size, which means the created 
technology can be used to a higher degree. Caves (1996) suggested a two-way 
reinforcement relationship between R&D and foreign sales. The empirical literature 
verifies the positive relationship between exports and R&D expenditures (Hirschey, 1981; 
Meisel and Lin, 1983; Lunn and Martin, 1986; Braga and Willmore, 1991; Kumar and 
Saqib, 1996; Fors and Svensson, 2002). China’s electronics & ICT sector is one of the 
most competitive and dynamic industries in terms of both export and outward FDI. Haier, 
Huawei, ZTE and some other firms in this sector are among the pioneers successfully 
expanding internationally and these firms are also among the most R&D intensive firms.  
For firms in relatively small economies, the domestic market size constrains their ability 
to increase sales. Thus internationalisation will be essential for expansion as well as for 
financing their R&D activities. However, for firms in large home countries with large 
markets such as China, this argument is weaker. Thus we make the following hypothesis 
and rely on empirical test to demonstrate the actual effect. 
Hypothesis 3: The more internationalised a firm, the more innovative it is. 
7.3.2 Determinants of Innovation: Industry-level Factors 
A number of empirical studies illustrated that the patterns of innovation activities differ 
significantly across industries, but are remarkably similar across countries for each 
industry (e.g. Carlsson, 1995; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). Factors that related to an 
industry’s technology play a major role in determining the sector’s innovation pattern 
(Carlsson, 1995). As one of the most dynamic sectors in recent decades, the ICT sector has 
experienced a rapid pace of technological progress and witnessed many radical innovations. 
Generally speaking, electronics & ICT sector is innovation intensive. However, within this 
sector, complexity and newness of the technology of different segments differ significantly 
and accordingly influence the innovation intensity of firms in the segment. FDI spillovers 
and market structure are the main concerns when we study the determinants of innovation 
in different industries in China’s electronics & ICT sector. 
R&D spillovers from FDI 
There are several channels through which inward FDI can benefit innovation activities of 
domestic firms. There is a demonstration effect on R&D activities of domestic firms, based 
on the strong knowledge and skill base of foreign firms, especially MNCs. The products 
that foreign firms bring in and the information about foreign firms’ previous and present 
R&D activities can benefit the domestic competitors by improving the efficiency of R&D 
and limiting the risk of innovation for them. FDI can also benefit domestic innovation 
through labour market turnover or movement of people. Linkages are of particular 
significance because they provide effective means of diffusing valuable knowledge and 
skill from foreign to domestic firms (UNCTAD, 2001). 
R&D spillovers from FDI are based on the effect of knowledge spillovers. The literature 
on R&D spillovers has demonstrated that the knowledge created by firms’ R&D activities 
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can spillover to other firms (e.g. Bernstein and Nadiri 1989; Jaffe et al., 1993). Knowledge 
spillover refers to the transfer of knowledge from firm to firm, which is an example of 
positive externality. Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Romer (1986) 
developed theoretical modes of the knowledge spillover process (see Griliches, 1979, and 
Bozeman, 2000, for surveys of empirical studies). In the context of developing countries, 
the direction of knowledge flow is principally from MNCs to domestic firms (Blomström 
and Persson, 1983; Haddad and Harrison, 1993). However, several of recent studies have 
shown that MNCs conduct R&D activities in foreign market to obtain access to the 
knowledge created by local firms (e.g. Anand and Kogut, 1997). 
Knowledge spillovers from MNCs to domestic firms could come in the form of direct 
technology transfer and other externality effects, such as human capital enhancement and 
linkage between foreign facilities and domestic firms. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
suggested that an organisation’s ability to evaluate and utilise external knowledge is 
related to its installed knowledge base, which is driven by prior R&D investment. For 
domestic firms in developing country, although there is knowledge spillover from MNCs, 
R&D investment is still functional, as this investment leads to enhanced ability to absorb 
knowledge. Because the absorptive capacity is path dependent, if a firm is missing the 
knowledge base derived from previous R&D investment, it may get locked out in the 
turbulent environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). One of the important channels 
through which domestic firms can expand their knowledge base is FDI spillover effect. 
The literature on the internationalisation of R&D activity has debated the extent of this 
phenomenon (Belitz and Beise, 1997; Braunerhjelm and Ekholm, 1997; Cantwell and 
Janne, 2000) and the effects of this trend on host economies (Beise et al., 1998; Blomström 
and Kokko, 1998). In resource-based and low-technology manufacturing activities, R&D 
spillover benefits may be low; in high-technology activities such as ICT manufacturing, 
however, they may be considerable. Based on the premise that R&D spillovers from FDI 
are positively related to the scale of inward FDI, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 4: The more inward FDI in an industry, the more innovative firms are. 
Market structure 
Although monopolistic position provides firms with the cash to finance innovation, it also 
hampers their incentive to innovate. Geroski (1994), for example, used innovation counts 
for UK firms from 1945 to 1983 to show that monopolistic industries are less innovative. 
Economists have long been interested in the impact of competition on innovation. 
Competition provides incentives for firms to cut costs, to eliminate organisational 
inefficiencies and to reduce slack. In addition, it also urges firms to innovate. In 
technology-intensive industries such as ICT manufacturing, the constant introduction of 
new products and the R&D investment to achieve product innovation is critical for the 
success and even survival of firms. In such environment, firms invest in R&D not only to 
gain short-term profit, but also to maintain their long-term survival.  
Analysing market structure is a practical approach to measuring competition and the 
degree of market concentration is one of the main elements of market structure (see 
Subsection 4.2.1). Concentration is widely used as a measure of market structure to 
explore the relation between competition and firm innovation. The standard industrial 
organisation literature predicts the negative correlation between competition and 
innovation because more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward entry by new 
successful innovators. However, empirical work such as Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al. 
(1999) has pointed to a positive correlation between market competition and innovative 
output. According to Reinganum (1989), in many circumstances increasing the number of 
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firms leads to faster diffusion of innovations. Blundell et al. (1993) demonstrated that 
while firms with higher market share tend to innovate more, firms in competitive industries 
tend to have a higher probability of innovation. In particular, as high market share 
generates an increase in the level of industry concentration, it may lead to a reduction in 
the aggregate level of R&D expenditures. Concentration has a negative impact on the 
probability of innovation and the competitive industries tend to generate a higher number 
of innovations. Therefore we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 5: The more concentrated a market is, the less innovative firms are. 
7.4 Test, Results and Discussion 
We use the cross-section data for the largest 100 firms in China’s electronics & ICT sector 
for 2000, 2001 and 2002 to test the hypotheses. The firm level data for the top 100 firms in 
the electronics & ICT sector are drawn from the annual survey conducted by the MII. The 
ranking is based on the sales of firms, which are identified as ‘national’ firms, including 
domestic owned firms and a limited number of FIEs that are controlled by domestic 
entities. Wholly owned foreign firms and IJVs without domestic equity control are not 
included in the survey. The 100 firms belong to eight industries within the electronics & 
ICT sector. The industry-level data are from the MII, China International Capital 
Corporation Limited (CICC) and some other sources. A multiple linear regression is used 
to estimate the effects of the hypothesised firm- and industry-level factors on the 
innovation intensity of firms for the year 2002. Before conducting the regression, we check 
the level of correlation between the independent variables to detect any harmful 
multicollinearity problems. 
7.4.1 Measures and Variables 
Innovation intensity. The empirical studies on innovation usually use two approaches of 
quantitative measures of innovative activity. First, from the input perspective, innovation 
can be measured by the factors that contribute to the build-up, maintenance and operation 
of R&D facilities. The factors include R&D investment, research personnel and equipment. 
Secondly, from the output perspective, innovation can be measured by certain outcome of 
firms’ R&D activities. The outcome can be measured by patents or innovation counts. 
Patent applications are most frequently used as an indicator of output of innovation. 
Innovation counts are comprehensive lists of innovations made by various firms. Corporate 
R&D expenditure, which reflects firm’s financial input to innovation, is widely used as a 
measure of innovation. To define the dependent variable for our analysis of innovation 
intensity, we measured the percentage of a firm’s innovation expenditure vis-à-vis its total 
sales, which is recognised as a standard measure of innovation intensity (Scherer, 1980). 
Firm size. We use firms’ total sales to measure their size. As discussed earlier, sales are a 
crucial factor related to the size of a firm concerning R&D activities. When a firm 
increases its sales, the knowledge created by its R&D activities will be utilised more 
extensively, which leads to an increased rate of return on each dollar that has been spent on 
R&D. A number of studies have found a positive relation between R&D activities and firm 
size, measured by total sales (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, for a survey). 
Profitability. We use the percentage of a firm’s annual profit to its total sales to measure 
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the firm’s profitability. The use of intensity rather that absolute volume of profit when 
measuring profitability of firms can control for the size effect and is also a way to reduce 
heteroscedasticity in the regression analysis. 
Internationalisation. Chinese firms are still in their first phase of internationalisation. 
Although firms in the electronics & ICT sector, especially the telecom equipment industry, 
are among the pioneers of international expansion, most of these firms are still choosing 
exporting as their main mode of foreign market entry. Thus we use exports to reflect the 
degree of internationalisation. Foreign sales are compared with total sales to measure the 
degree of internationalisation. 
R&D spillovers from FDI. The R&D spillover effect in one industry is determined by the 
relative level of inward FDI and some institutional factors, which are not easy to identify 
and measure. We use the relative level of FDI (foreign presence) as a proximate of R&D 
spillover effect from FDI. The share of sales of all FIEs to total sales of an industry is used 
to measure the level of FDI (foreign presence) and accordingly R&D spillovers from FDI 
in the industry. 
Market concentration. The HHI is advocated as having desirable properties as a measure 
of concentration. However, it is demanding from the collection and compiling perspective 
because it requires data of the market shares of all firms within an industry in order to be 
calculated. Consequently, empirical research frequently employs concentration ratios as the 
substitute for the HHI. The concentration ratio is measured as the sum of the market shares 
of, typically, the three, five or eight largest firms in the industry with firms being ranked by 
sales. We use five-firm concentration ratio (C5) to measure the market concentration in 
different industries. 
7.4.2 Analysis, Results and Discussion 
A correlation analysis was performed to determine the level of correlations between the 
independent variables. Table 7-20 reports the summary statistics and correlations between 
the study variables. The highest correlation exists between FDI and market concentration 
at 0.541. The correlation between FDI and market concentration is consistent with the 
argument that FDI speed up the concentration process in developing countries, which is 
widespread and under intensive empirical test (see UNCTAD, 1997a, for a survey).  
Table 7-20 Means, standard deviations and correlations of independent variables 
Variables (measures) Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 
1. Firm size (total sales) (RMB¥ billion) 5.72 10.58     
2. Profitability (profits/total sales) 0.05 0.05 -0.095    
3. Internationalisation (foreign sales/total sales) 0.25 0.29 -0.089 -0.030   
4. FDI spillovers (the share of FIE production) 0.19 0.15 -0.042 0.054 -0.355  
5. Market concentration (C5) 0.54 0.16 0.171 -0.142 -0.315 0.541 
Results of hypothesis testing are reported in Table 7-21. Hypothesis 1 was supported as 
a statistically significant parameter estimate was found (b=0.04, p<0.1) for the relation 
between firm size and innovation expenditure. Hypothesis 2 was also supported: 
profitability was positively related to innovation expenditure (b=0.08, p<0.1). The 
statistically significant parameter estimate (b=0.11, p<0.001) indicated strong support for 
Hypothesis 4: intensity of FDI in industries played a significant role in determining 
innovation propensity of firms. Hypothesis 3 and 5, on the other hand, were rejected. The 
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estimate demonstrated an insignificant positive relation between innovation and 
internationalisation (b=0.008; p=0.28). Contrary to the prediction, market concentration 
was insignificantly and positively related to innovation (b=0.008; p=0.42). Overall, the 
basic hypothesis relating R&D spillovers from FDI and innovation expenditure of firms 
was strongly supported. We obtained essentially the same results as in Table 5 when we 
tested the year 2000 and 2001, indicating the robustness of the results. 
Table 7-21 Results of regression analysis 
Hypothesis  
(Predicted sign) Variables Coefficient Prob. (t-statistic) 
1 (+) Firm size (total sales) 0.0374 0.09 (1.70)* 
2 (+) Profitability (profits/total sales) 0.0798 0.08 (1.73)* 
3 (+) Internationalisation (foreign sales/total sales) 0.0082 0.28 (1.09) 
4 (+) FDI spillovers (the share of FIE production) 0.1065 0.00 (5.58)*** 
5 (–) Market concentration (C5) 0.0082 0.42 (0.81) 
    
 Adjusted R2 = 0.45   
   Note: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.1. 
This study provides evidence of the positive FDI spillover effect on the R&D 
expenditure of firms in China. This finding is a reflection of the determinants of innovation 
propensity of Chinese firms in the electronics & ICT sector. From the SI perspective, this 
study investigates the relation between foreign and domestic firms in terms of R&D 
spillover effect, which is a crucial factor determining the domestic innovation capability of 
developing countries. The association between inward FDI and R&D expenditure is strong. 
However, any observed association between innovation and FDI needs to be carefully 
considered before concluding that there is a causal relationship. Does FDI cause higher 
innovation or is it attracted to innovation intensive industries? If FDI causes higher R&D 
activities, how does FDI do so? In this study, we did not empirically examine the causal 
relation and mechanism of the R&D spillover effect. By integrating the mechanism of 
R&D spillovers into the theoretical model, future studies can further elucidate the causality 
between inward FDI and innovation.  
Many factors can explain the innovation propensity of firms. Whether FDI is an 
independent source of innovation promotion after other factors that are commonly thought 
to determine innovation have been taken into account? FDI not only influences market 
innovation in developing countries via these factors, but also, in addition to this, has an 
independent spillover impact on innovation. Future studies should consider the following 
question: how does FDI, as an independent determinant of innovation, cause higher R&D 
expenditure not by influencing the other factors, but independently? Because this 
econometric inquiry is a study of a specific industry in a specific country, as discussed in 
Subsection 6.4.3, the problem of generalisability comprises two aspects – the size of the 
sampling and the problem of generalisability lies in the question whether we can generalise 
our findings from the specific China’s electronics & ICT sector to other sectors and other 
countries – in particular other developing economies. We suggest that the results about the 
specific determinants of innovation obtained from the specific industrial context are only 
suggestive and the validity of this theoretical framework needs replication and extension. 
On the other hand, can we extrapolate the observed patterns into the future? Longitudinal 
research could provide further investigation on the dynamic nature of R&D spillovers, 
which could lead to more sophisticated extrapolations of future developments – taking the 
environmental environment and institutional preconditions into account systematically.  
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his part generalises the conclusions of empirical findings in Part III and provides 
recommendations on China’s government policies directed at industries in general 
and competition policy in particular. Part III assesses the effects of inward Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) on the development of Chinese industries and particularly focuses 
on the impact of FDI materialised through the mechanism of competition. It demonstrates 
that the degree of market competition may to a large extent determine the FDI impact on 
industrial development. We find that competition in Chinese industries may not always be 
effectively maintained or promoted by a de facto competition maintenance mechanism. 
The FDI effects on industrial development in two important manufacturing sectors are 
analysed and compared. With regard to the potential anticompetitive effect of inward FDI, 
the traditional wisdom is that FDI may increase market concentration and lead to dominant 
positions of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) after entry by suppressing or crowding 
out domestic firms. The firm-specific advantages of MNCs may raise entry barriers for 
local firms or make competition too strong for existing local firms and thus crowd them 
out, therefore increasing concentration and limiting competition. The evidence from 
China’s passenger car industry (Chapter 6) challenges this proposition and suggests that 
MNCs and domestic firms may collaborate to dominate a market by establishing 
international joint ventures. The lack of competition may be largely caused by the 
restrictive government policy in addition to the strong presence of MNCs. The costs of the 
lack of competition are shown to be multidimensional, while consumers have to pay most 
(in terms of high prices and limited choices). Government policies largely determine these 
outcomes – entry restrictions and trade barriers are two basic policy factors determining 
the degree of competition in industries and thereby influencing the path of industrial 
development. As highlighted by the experience of China’s electronics and Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) industry (Chapter 7), FDI may play a rather positive 
role in case that the government provides a more competition-friendly policy environment.  
The rapid rise of a large number of segments in China’s electronics and ICT sector 
demonstrated the effectiveness of industrial policy in promoting industrial development. At 
the current stage of China’s economic development, therefore, industrial policy should still 
be the central element for a policy framework promoting industrial development. Although 
problems do exist in the formulation and implementation of industrial policy, to tackle 
these problems by simply substituting industrial policies with a competition policy seems 
unlikely to be an optimal solution. A more practical choice may be to complement 
industrial policies with an appropriate competition policy therefore to reduce the risks, 
rigidity and uncertainty associated with the formulation and implementation of industrial 
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policies. Competition policy may help maintain and promote effective competition by 
countering private restrictions on competition. In addition, an appropriate competition 
policy may help tackle market imperfections related to the particular institutional context 
and development level of the country. The advocacy efforts of the competition agency may 
lead to the rejection or revision of unnecessary anticompetitive regulatory measures, or for 
the adoption of policies as competition-friendly as possible. Therefore the analysis 
indicates that the Chinese government should take the option seriously of introducing a 
formal competition policy. This policy should be an integral and necessary part of a policy 
framework to ensure that inward FDI play a positive role in promoting sustained industrial 
development. A well-designed and effectively enforced competition policy is bound to be 
an essential component of the policy framework benefiting both the welfare of Chinese 
consumers and the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, thereby promoting sustainable 
industrial and economic development. 
Any policy reforms and institutional changes should not only be based upon the 
theoretical analysis that provides rationale but also on empirical studies that provide 
further prove or prediction that the reforms or changes answer for the real needs of the 
society or the country. Usually the risk lies in the misjudgement of the needs or wrong 
prediction of serving for the needs. More often the risk lies in conducting policy reforms 
and institutional changes merely according to theoretical considerations. On the basis of 
the analytical generalisation of these empirical findings, as well as the theoretical 
discussion in Chapter 3 and the contextual inquiry in Part I, recommendations on 
government policies in general and competition policy in particular are provided in this 
concluding part. For China, the interrelation between FDI, competition and industrial 
development is one of the key considerations for the establishment and implementation of 
a competition policy, Chinese version. This it not only because FDI is one of the most 
important factors determining the necessity of competition policy for developing countries, 
but also because FDI is one of the central features of China’s development model, which is 
defining the future of the Chinese economy.  
The necessity of competition policy lies in various factors. To simplify this problem by 
focusing on only one factor is often misleading. In case China would like to establish a 
formal competition policy regime on the basis of its previous transitional institutional 
arrangements, it faces particularly the challenge to build up institutions with both domestic 
and international considerations. Thus, in addition to a deep understanding of the Chinese 
context, the international policy environment should also be addressed in more detail in 
this concluding part. Competition policies vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
differences between them reflect differences in national economic and legal systems. It doe 
not seem necessary that developing countries should emulate the competition policies 
adopted by developed countries. The proliferation of competition policy regimes across the 
world also does not imply that regimes will converge and a uniformity of rules can be 
envisaged. There remain substantial variations in the structures and contents of 
competition policies of different countries. For the moment, it is particularly important for 
China to consider the design and implementation of competition policy in the light of its 
own economic, legal and cultural environment. However, fundamental asymmetries across 
different jurisdictions imply the effective enforcement of national competition policy 
would be insufficient in the world level. For China, a possible ‘soft convergence’ with 
other authorities may be necessary in addition to the emphasis on domestic conditions. 
 8 Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations  
 
 
 
 
he past experience of Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrialised Economies 
(NIEs) demonstrates that industrial policy can play a crucial role in the promotion of 
industrial development, economic growth and social welfare. The rapid rise of a large 
number of Chinese industries further proved the effectiveness of an East Asian-style 
industrial policy in promoting industrial development. At the current stage of China’s 
economic development, industrial policy should still be the central element for a policy 
framework to promote industrial development. However, industrial policy instruments are 
by no means perfect and mistakes may be made, which imply a better economic 
performance would be resulted had no policy intervention or other policy measures 
imposed. One of the essential problems of China’s present industrial policy, which is quite 
different from the Japanese and South Korean past experience, is its incapability to ensure 
a sufficient degree of competition in domestic markets. The problem is associated with the 
specific economic and industrial context of China as a transition economy, which is 
characterised by the strong presence of a state sector and the prevalence of government 
intervention and gives rise to restrictive regulation, mainly reflected by entry restrictions. 
In some cases, the problem may be exacerbated by the entry of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs). The development path of specific sectors, such as the passenger car industry, 
highlights this risk. To address these problems, simply substituting industrial policies with 
a competition policy is clearly not the optimal solution that takes into account the current 
stage of China’s economic development. A more practical choice might be to engage in a 
combination of industrial and competition policies, making full advantage of the 
effectiveness of industrial policies in directing resource allocation and promoting 
competitiveness while attempting to avert certain risks, inflexibilities and uncertainties 
associated with industrial policies through the introduction of competition policy. In 
addition to countering private restrictions on competition, at present, competition policy in 
China has a more important role to play in terms of promoting public awareness of 
competition issues and building public support for procompetitive government policies. 
The competition agency can also play a unique role in the formulation of government 
policies, essentially acting as an advocate within the government stressing the merits of 
market competition and as a representative on behalf of consumers. This boils down to the 
problems what an ‘appropriate competition policy’ for China should pursue and whether 
that could be organised on the basis of existing transitional institutions. 
An appropriate competition regime should take into account the market imperfections 
created by both the interventionist activities of the government and by the political actions 
of other countries (see Subsection 3.4.5). Both dimensions will be discussed in the first 
two sections of this chapter respectively. Section 8.1 explores the policy implications of the 
empirical findings in Part III with regard to the interrelationship between inward Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), domestic competition and industrial development. The 
T 
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importance of two basic policy factors, namely entry restrictions and trade barriers, in 
determining the degree of competition and thereby influencing the path of industrial 
development is emphasised. Two more or less generic models of industrial development 
and policy framework are drawn from the detailed analysis of two Chinese ‘pillar 
industries’: the automotive industry and the electronics and Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) industry. The performance consequences and policy 
challenges of these models are discussed in general. Section 8.2 then discusses the specific 
challenges for competition issues posed by the impact of increasing international 
businesses and economic internationalisation. This section also addresses the potential 
international conflicts that surround the implementation of competition policy in China and 
abroad. Both bilateral cooperation agreements and multilateral cooperation on competition 
policy are discussed. Based on the first two sections of this chapter, Section 8.3 discusses 
the possible design of China’s competition policy regime. Objectives, instruments and 
implementation processes of competition policy, as well as the crucial issues of policy 
harmonisation and international cooperation, are discussed in this section, providing a 
framework for the design and implementation of a competition policy, Chinese version. 
8.1 FDI, Competition and Industrial Development: Domestic Policy 
Challenges 
China’s experience of industrial development in the reform combined industrial policy and 
economic liberalisation triggered by economic transition. The economic transition led to 
progressive opening up of many Chinese industries intended at bringing the Chinese 
economy into the world economy. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) entry coincided 
with one of the most important liberalisation exercises in world since the 1990s. In parallel, 
the economic transition also triggered a wave of domestic liberalisation initiatives, which 
have facilitated the development of the non-state sector. China’s experience represents an 
interesting ‘experiment’ of policy-induced changes under relatively competitive conditions. 
Industrial policies have played a critical role in China’s industrial development. However, 
they were by no means perfect and mistakes have been made. Industrial policies, as 
demonstrated by the Chinese experience, know a number of curbs: first, unnecessary 
regulation may be imposed in the name of industrial policy; second, therefore, any type of 
competition mechanisms may be severely hindered by these regulatory policies; third, 
selective support towards a limited number of firms may lead to reverse selection and the 
sustainability of inefficient firms, leading to a policy of ‘backing losers’ or a ‘socialisation 
of loses’; fourth, the focus on the development of in particular large enterprises may lead 
to regulatory capture that in turn results in the neglect or under-presentation of consumer 
interests, hence causing welfare losses for the society as a whole; fifth, the positive effects 
of inward FDI and private entry may be hampered or even reversed by specific regulatory 
measures. Therefore competition policy may have an important role to play in China to 
tackle these problems, both in building public support for procompetitive government 
policy through competition advocacy and in promoting a competitive environment by 
countering private restraints on competition. 
8.1.1 Policy Conditions and FDI Impact: The Performance Consequences of Two 
Models of Industrial Development 
The effect of FDI on economic growth depends upon social, economic and policy 
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conditions of the host country economy (see Subsection 4.1.1 for a detailed discussion). 
The environment of a host country’s government policy is of great importance both for 
attracting inward FDI (see Subsection 2.3.1) and for guiding FDI to play a more positive 
role for economic development. It has been argued that the beneficial impact of FDI on 
growth can be enhanced in the environment characterised by an open trade and investment 
regime. However, evidence lacks at the industry level to support this argument. As noted in 
Subsection 4.1.1, the lack of empirical studies in this respect is largely due to the 
complexity of policy environment in various industries, the difficulty to identify the 
manifold dimensions of government policies (see Table 8-1) and the impossibility to 
separate the effect of one policy from another. How do government policies influence the 
FDI impact on industrial development? The impact of trade policy raises the first concern. 
Another concern relates to the FDI regime of a country, which includes incentives to attract 
FDI, guidelines to channel FDI into desired industries, and various restrictions imposed on 
business practices of foreign firms. Concerning a specific industry, business restrictions 
may be the central dimension of a FDI regime in promoting or jeopardising a positive 
impact of inward FDI. For developing countries or transition economies, the effect of 
government regulation is crucial in determining the impact of FDI on industrial 
development. Other aspects of government policies that are not included in Table 8-1 
include industrial policy, competition policy and Science and Technology (S&T) policy. 
Table 8-1 Main government policies influencing the FDI impact on industrial development 
Industrial regulation Trade policy FDI policy (Business restrictions) Price regulation Entry control 
Export promotion  Local content requirements, etc. Market price Free entry 
Import substitution No restrictions Planned price Strict entry control 
Two models of industrial policies 
The spectrum of government policies in Table 8-1 provide only a very simple 
decomposition of policy effects, without explaining through what mechanism these 
policies influence FDI and interact with each other. One of the fundamental mechanisms 
through which FDI promotes economic development, as argued in Subsection 4.1.2, can be 
competition. China’s industrial sector grew rapidly during the reform era and inward FDI 
played an important role in this process. Part III demonstrates that the degree of market 
competition may to large extent determine the impact of FDI on industrial development. 
Two basic policy factors are proved important in determining the degree of competition in 
industries – entry restrictions and trade barriers. This supports the argument in Subsection 
3.3.4 that, in developing countries, anticompetitive restrictions still come from government 
interventions in general and restrictions on market entry in particular. Figure 8-1 
preliminarily positions selected Chinese manufacturing industries within this analytical 
framework of dichotomy. 
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Figure 8-1 Degrees of entry restrictions and trade barriers in selected Chinese industries 
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The automotive industry and electronics & ICT industry in China presents two 
contrasting cases and also two basic models of industrial development and associated 
industrial policies: a more open and competitive model and a more closed and protectionist 
model (see Table 8-2). Both models do not represent the theoretical extremes that are 
normally distinguished in literature: the completely open, free trade oriented model versus 
the closed mercantilist model. The simple traditional dichotomy in development economics 
of import substitution versus export promotion does not apply to the Chinese hybrid 
models as well. The two models represent variations of both attracting inward FDI under 
very specific conditions and aiming at occupying a specific place in the international 
division of labour to facilitate national industrial development. The distinct performance 
consequences of these two models are apparent. Both industries have been identified as 
‘pillar industries’, which are subject to preferential treatment from industrial policy. Both 
have attracted a large amount of FDI and have strong MNC presence. As argued in Part III, 
discrepancy between the industrial policies for these two industries has been the primal 
factor that determined the process and pace of their development. In a framework of a 
restrictive regulatory approach, which was characterised by import substitution and entry 
restriction, the automotive industry has not yet been able to build up its international 
competitiveness. The performance in almost all dimensions of industrial development has 
been relatively poor. In electronics & ICT industries, a strong international competitiveness 
has been built up. The world’s second largest electronics & ICT industry has been 
successfully established in just over two decades. The evidence from these two industries 
seems to support a part of the argument of Bhagwati (1978) who suggested that a strategy 
of export promotion is likely to both attract higher volume of FDI and promote more 
efficient utilisation than is a strategy of import substitution (see Subsection 4.1.1). The 
evidence from these two industries demonstrates that a commitment to competitive 
markets and technological progress, rather than regulatory approaches, as the primary 
instruments of economic governance, in the specific Chinese context yields major benefits 
for efficiency, social welfare and industrial development. We should be very careful in 
generalising these results to other countries, due the rather unique conditions under which 
the Chinese transition economy has developed and probably will develop in the future (see 
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Chapter 1). 
Table 8-2 Two models of industrial development: comparing two industries 
Entry barriers Model Trade barriers (Trade policy) Foreign firms Domestic private firms 
Relatively open competitive model 
(Electronics and ICT sector) 
Low tariff and non-tariff 
barriers 
Encouraged entry Relatively free entry 
Relatively close protectionist model 
(Automotive industry) 
High tariff and non-tariff 
barriers 
Strict entry control Very strict entry control 
The different performance of these two industries can be attributed to the following 
reasons: 1) industrial differences: the technical attributes of the two sectors differ, whereas 
the electronics & ICT sector is more diversified than the automotive sector; 2) different 
initial conditions in their early stages of industrial development at the beginning of 
economic transition might influenced the development of enterprises and the orientation of 
industrial policies; 3) different global and strategic configurations in which the two 
industries have developed (ICT industry for instance developed in a much clearer 
international division of labour with relatively low import restrictions in the largest 
markets, i.e. North America and Western Europe; whereas automotive developed on the 
basis of largely domestic production with much lower degree of international labour 
division); 4) the different characteristics of the government policies and regulatory 
frameworks of these two industries in China. Researching all four factors in detail is 
beyond the scope of this study. But the preceding analysis of the interrelationship between 
FDI, government policy and industrial development in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 shows that 
the different patterns of government policies can be considered an important factor 
defining the paths of industrial development in these two sectors. Government-imposed 
entry restrictions and trade barriers largely determined the nature of market competition 
and therefore strongly influenced the path of industrial development. One of the key 
elements in the promotion of competition in China, as well as in many other developing 
countries, has been found to be the relaxation of government restrictions on market entry 
(see Subsection 3.3.4).  
In the period from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the development of China’s 
automotive industry had been guided by an industrial policy that can be characterised as a 
relatively closed and protectionist model. Rather than the commonly defined industrial 
policy that directs resource allocation toward specified areas by influencing firm decision 
through various forms of incentives, China’s industrial policy for the automotive industry 
principally consisted of a regulatory framework, which was largely consistent with the 
previous system of central planning. A traditional regulatory framework persisted in the 
name of industrial policy. Only since the late 1990s, with the gradual reduction of trade 
barriers to facilitate WTO entry and with the new entry of more enterprises, this model of 
industrial policy has undergone substantial revision. In the passenger car industry, a strict 
entry control had been implemented in order to limit the number of firms. The control on 
market entry was effective for all ownership categories of firms, among which 
non-state-owned domestic firms were in the weakest position and had long been forbidden 
from entering the industry. Entry restrictions directly limited the number of competitors in 
the industry and hampered competition. On the other hand, high trade barriers on the basis 
of the infant industry argument and an import substation strategy sheltered domestic firms 
from international competition through imports. The lack of effective competition kept the 
performance of China’s automotive industry relatively poor. Except for the explosive 
production growth in recent two years associated with the WTO entry and the revision of 
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industrial policy, the growth of this industry had been relatively slow in the 1980s and 
1990s. The welfare losses from the market dominance of a very limited number of firms 
can be considered significant. Despite strong government support and high levels of profit 
for individual firms, the industry still has not built up international competitiveness. Firms 
were reaping high profits and sharing the rents behind the high protection rather than 
competing in international markets. Neither did domestic technological capability develop 
in the passenger car sector as expected. The industry as a whole can be considered as 
merely a production base of MNCs. 
Contrary to the automotive industry, the development of China’s electronic and ICT 
industry had been led by an industrial policy that can be characterised as ‘open’ and 
‘competitive’. This approach was largely in line with the general process of deregulation in 
most Chinese industries of consumer products. The industrial policy for the electronics & 
ICT sector has been generally based on policy incentives rather than regulatory measures, 
such as entry restrictions in the automotive sector (see Subsection 7.1.2). The government 
generally adopted a hands-off approach to this sector. In terms of policies on foreign trade 
and FDI, the policy for the electronics & ICT industry has been markedly more liberal than 
that for the automotive industry. The trade policy for the electronics & ICT industry partly 
followed the model of Japan and the East Asian NIEs – outward oriented approach and 
strong export promotion – but combined with this with a much stronger commitment 
towards inward FDI. The development dynamics of China’s electronics & ICT sector is 
highlighted by the sequential rise of different segments. The similar pattern of industrial 
development in these segments demonstrates that a similar industry context, including 
industrial policy, produces more or less similar outcomes. 
Based on the contrasting evidence from the automotive industry and the electronics & 
ICT industry, the performance consequences of the two different models of industrial 
development and government policies can be summarised in Table 8-3, which takes into 
account the development of domestic production capacity, local enterprises, technology 
and international competitiveness. Both models are considered to have positive effects on 
the development of domestic enterprises. But the impact of the more close and 
protectionist model has been much lower than the more open and competitive model. 
Table 8-3 Consequences of the two models of industrial development: comparing two industries 
Model Production capacity 
Domestic enterprise 
development 
Technological 
capability 
International 
competitiveness 
Open competitive model 
(Electronics and ICT) 
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 
Close protectionist model 
(Automotive) 
↑ ↑* ↓ ↓ 
Note: *As demonstrated by the case of China’s passenger car industry, the impact on the development of domestic 
enterprises of the close protectionist model is low if concerning its poor effects on the technological progress and 
international competitiveness of domestic firms. 
Formulation of industrial policy 
Why have different models of industrial policies with totally different characteristics been 
formed, persisted for a relatively long period of time, and dominated the development of 
two strategic industries in China? The various capabilities and strategic considerations of 
government agencies and officials that were responsible for the formulation of the 
industrial policies for these two industries may provide a reason. But, concerning the 
persistence of the policy orientation, the answer may not be that simple. Industrial policies 
have officially been determined by the efforts of the central government to promote 
industrial development and economic growth. However, the Chinese political system is not 
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as centralised as it is habitually portrayed as. Different interest groups have posed and are 
posing a strong influence on the formulation of industrial policies. According to the 
political economy of regulation, interest groups may lobby with the relevant government 
authorities for the imposition of government policy to their own benefit. The interest 
groups include firms, workers, consumers and politicians. The power of an interest group 
depends on the costs of lobbing and the benefits of manipulating outcomes of 
policy-making. Firms usually have the strongest power and may successfully lobby for the 
formulation of government policy to their own benefit – even if this might be to the 
detriment of the society as a whole, particularly consumers. In addition to the possibly 
induced welfare losses, according to the Tirole (2000), the lobbing conduct may lead to a 
substantial waste of scarce resources in rent-seeking behaviour by members of the interest 
groups. The competitors or potential competitors may also be possible victims.  
In China, the final result of drafting an industrial policy was usually the result of 
balancing different interests of different groups, which were typically represented by 
different ministries of the government in the decision process. The interest group with the 
strongest position in this process was usually the incumbent firm. This is a relatively 
universal phenomenon, but particularly for the East-Asian model of business oriented 
states (cf. Van Tulder and der Zwart, forthcoming). Furthermore, as suggested in 
Subsection 6.2.3, higher protection yielded higher profits from price distortion and hence 
led to greater political bargaining power of entrants. Such bargaining power will be 
exploited to influence the formulation of industrial policy and pursue further rents. In the 
process of policy formulation, the interests of the incumbent firms are typically well 
protected due to the strong bargaining power of them, while the representatives of the 
interests of consumers and potential entrants were typically absent. Within the incumbents, 
the large State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), as members of the ‘national team’ and targets of 
strong government support, have the strongest influential power for the formulation of the 
industrial policy. In China, the government departments and SOEs can be considered as 
different parts of the same state sector. Thus it may be not easy for the government 
agencies to resist the pressures from SOEs. The newly entered MNCs, with the control of 
their proprietary assets, are also in a preferential position. In China’s passenger car 
industry, the specific arrangements of International Joint Venture (IJVs) bind the interests 
of the largest SOEs and the leading MNCs together, further strengthening the bargaining 
power of them. The persist excess profits gained by MNCs in China’s passenger car 
market on the basis of entry restrictions and trade barriers to protect incumbents can be 
largely explained by MNCs’ common interest and ‘strategic’ coalition with the leading 
SOEs, based on their partnership in IJVs. 
Special interest groups may occasionally convince public authorities of the need to 
impose regulatory restrictions even in markets where economies of scale, externalities and 
other market failures are not sufficiently strong to justify such intervention (ICN, 2002). In 
China’s automotive industry, the scattered industrial structure and the ‘overheating’ or 
overcapacity of the industry are usually the arguments used by the incumbents to persuade 
the government to implement a strict control over market entry. The alleged dispersed 
industrial structure is in fact highly concentrated considering particular segments (relevant 
markets) of the automotive sector (see Subsection 6.2.3). The existence of a large number 
of small assemblers has been largely caused by the protection from high profits and the 
strict entry control. The problem of overcapacity has been a common phenomenon in the 
global automotive sector and the overcapacity could be largely reduced if the high price 
can be reduced to a reasonable level (cf. Carillo et al., 2004). Compared with the argument 
based on the number of firms and the production capacity, the high level of prices and 
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profits has been convincing evidence of the existence of market power and the lack of 
competition in the industry. The welfare losses of the society as a whole were significant, 
but this has long been neglected and the protectionist model of regulation in the name of 
industrial policy persists. This might be caused by the special consideration of the 
government given to the strategically important and political sensitive large-sized SOEs 
with their high significance in employment. This might also be a result of the so-called 
‘regulatory capture’ in which the involved public authorities lose sight of the public 
interest and protect the privileges of established firms.1 The captured regulators use their 
regulatory powers to redistribute rents rather than to drive down costs and benefit 
consumers and the society at large. When interest groups lobbing for the imposition of 
government policy to their own benefit, if there is one dominant interest group, there will 
be regulatory capture. Clearly, in the formulation of industrial policies, large SOEs owned 
by the central government represent this dominant interest group. They might capture the 
government agency for the imposition of industrial policy to their own benefit but to the 
detriment the society as a whole, particularly the consumers. In the electronics and ICT 
sector, by contrast, a relatively weak position of large SOEs owned by the central 
government in the industries can be attributed to the avoidance of regulatory capture, 
which gave rise to a protectionist policy stance. 
Potential role of competition policy 
In the process of industrial policy formulation in China, the representatives of consumer 
interests are typically absent. The policy formulated merely concerning the interests of 
incumbent firms may be anticompetitive and may lead to negative effects on industrial 
development. Thus competition policy could have an important role to play in China in 
terms of promoting public awareness of competition issues and building public support for 
more competition-friendly government policies. Specific interest groups will always seek 
to influence the design of an industrial policy, which consists of specific measures 
applicable to specific industries and firms as well as generic measures that are applicable 
to all industries. In the traditional policy framework, it is natural to think of the 
development and competitiveness of industries exclusively in terms of firms. However, 
consumer welfare matters for industrial performance. Therefore policies protecting the 
interests of consumers are bound to become more prominent. In this sense, competition 
policy can play a formative role in the formulation of appropriate industrial policies, 
essentially acting as advocates within the government stressing the merits of market 
competition and as a representative on behalf of consumers.  
8.1.2 FDI, Government Policies and Industrial Development 
In the reform era, China’s automotive and electronics & ICT industries have attracted a 
large amount of inward FDI. In both industries, most leading MNCs have intensively 
engaged in local production. However, the effects of the presence of MNCs on industrial 
development differed substantially. In the automotive industry, MNCs have dominated the 
domestic market and allied with the largest SOEs through IJVs, reaping extremely high 
profits protected by trade barriers and entry restrictions. In addition, the MNCs have been 
largely capable of controlling their technologies and intellectual property rights, turning 
China’s passenger car industry into one of their production bases but only for serving the 
                                                        
1 Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) expounded the concept of regulatory capture.  
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domestic market rather than exporting to the world market. In the passenger car industry, 
China has failed to attract efficiency-seeking and export-oriented MNC activities, which 
are crucial to promoting international competitiveness. In many segments of the electronics 
& ICT industry, contrarily, MNCs have engaged in fierce competition, amongst 
themselves as well as with domestic players. Their presence did not crowd out but 
‘crowded in’ domestic enterprises – in China’s electronics & ICT industry grew up the 
most internationally competitive Chinese firms, either private owned or semi state-owned. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the contrasting consequences of FDI inflows 
have been strongly influenced by the different policy environments of these two sectors. 
Although both industries have been identified as ‘pillar industries’, different models of 
industrial policies have been adopted. The different policy environments largely influenced 
the nature of competition: in the automotive industry, competition has been constrained 
and the lack of competition facilitated higher prices, lower competitiveness and welfare 
losses (see Subsection 6.2.3); while the electronics & ICT industry became the arena of 
global competition in which internationally competitive enterprises compete for both 
domestic and global markets, which triggered low prices, intensive innovation and rapid 
growth. 
Regulatory approach 
There are some generally accepted basic functions of the state, including the production of 
pubic goods, the redistributive activities and macroeconomic stabilisation (see Subsection 
1.5.1 for a detailed discussion). Beyond these basic functions, economic regulation can 
encompass restrictions on a wide array of firm decisions.2 The three key decision variables 
controlled by economic regulation are price, quantity, as well as entry and exit (Viscusi et 
al., 2000). The two critical variables that regulators are controlling are price and the 
number of firms; the latter is through restrictions on entry and exit, which are the key 
determinants of economic efficiency (see Subsection 3.3.1). The theory of economic 
regulation addresses the questions who benefits from regulation, which industries are most 
likely to be regulated, and what form regulation will take (Stigler, 1971). Where 
economies of scale, externalities and market failures are so strong that competition 
mechanism cannot function well, regulation is imperative. The target of economic 
regulation in market economies has been mainly industries with natural monopolies or 
involving big (positive and/or negative) externalities.3 A review of the regulatory history 
of the United States reveals that regulation is not strongly correlated with the existence of 
market failure and potentially competitive industries have also been regulated. Empirical 
evidence supported the claim that regulation was inherently pro-producer (Jordan, 1972). 
Supporters of the theory of regulatory capture argued that most industrial regulation was 
designed to protect incumbents against competition from entrants and had the effect of 
legalising monopoly power to the detriment of consumer welfare.  
Although regulation has been imposed on both natural monopolistic industries and 
potential competitive industries, it has been generally recognised that, where competitive 
                                                        
2 The government regulation relating to the environment and safety is not covered by the concept of ‘economic 
regulation’ here. 
3 An industry is a natural monopoly when, at the socially optimal quantity, industry cost is minimised by having 
only one firm produce. An externality exists when the action of one agent affects the utility or production function 
of another agency, and the first agent doe not care how his behaviour affect the second agent’s welfare. When an 
externality is present, perfect competition doe not result in an optimal allocation of resources (Viscusi et al., 
2000). 
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markets can work well, they should not be subject to economic regulation, but only to 
competition law. Avoiding unnecessary regulation is therefore to be desired and it is 
important to limit regulation to the minimum necessity. The deregulation movement 
originated in developed economies – where a sufficient provision of public goods is 
available and the fear of ‘underinvestment’ is less tangent (cf. Mulder, 2004). The 
deregulation movement that started in the United States was intended to remove detailed 
government controls from otherwise competitive markets. Even in some network utilities, 
previously considered as natural monopolistic industries, incentive regulation and 
competition have been or are being introduced (Laffont and Tirole, 2000).  
In some developing countries and transition economies, the regulation of competitive 
industries remained relatively significant due to the legacy of the previous development 
strategies, central planning or the assessment of what was deemed appropriate in relation 
to the development level of the economy. For instance the role of a well-developed ‘civil 
society’ has been considered crucial in many countries to make deregulation a success. In 
most developing countries civil society is not that well developed. In China, the 
government intervention in manufacturing industries witnessed a transformation from a 
system of direct industrial management in line with the central planning to a system more 
or less consistent with a market economy (see Subsection 2.1.1 for a detailed discussion). 
Sequential administrative reforms has redefined the role of the government in the economy 
and substantially reduced government intervention in most manufacturing industries, 
especially those for consumer products. However, government regulation remained in 
many industries and some are implemented in the name of industrial policy. With regard to 
the two critical variables that regulators have controlled, price and the number of firms, the 
former has been largely liberalised and the latter are still under direct government control 
in some industries. As government pricing only accounts for a very small percentage in all 
consumer goods, entry restriction is the central issue of industrial regulation. Entry 
restrictions, coupled with high trade barriers, largely limited the degree of competition in 
China’s passenger car industry, thus shaping the particular path of industrial development 
in this ‘pillar industry’ (see Subsection 6.1.2). The regulatory measures have been 
implemented in the name of industrial policy.  
Industrial policy 
It is important to distinguish economic regulation from industrial policy, another form of 
economic policy that also encompasses influences on a wide array of firm decisions. With 
regard to industrial policy, market economies diversify from the generally laissez-faire, 
non-interventionist stance of the United States4 to the crucial role of government in 
economic development in Japan and the East Asian NIEs (see Subsection 1.5.1). The main 
differences between regulation and industrial policy lie in two aspects. First, the aim of 
regulation is to tackle market failures in which unrestrained competition does not work 
well, while the aim of industrial policy is to promote the development of specific industries 
that are considered to be crucial to economic development. Secondly, the means of the two 
forms of government policies are different – regulation is supported by the government 
power to coerce, or the threat of sanction, while industrial policy is implemented by 
providing incentives to firms and thus to direct resource allocation to desired economic 
                                                        
4 The United States has always had a de facto industrial policy through its defence budget. Defence orientated 
industrial policies, however, lead to other forms of regulatory capture – witnessing the plea of the then President 
of the United States Eisenhower against the growing power and influence of the Military Industrial Complex.  
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activities. Sometimes the boundary between regulation and industrial policy is not very 
clear when governments use regulatory means to realise the alleged purpose of promoting 
industrial development. Thus regulatory measures should be distinguished from the 
incentives in the implementation of industrial policies. The necessity of regulatory 
measures needs careful reconsideration, while the incentives aiming at guiding resource 
allocation towards specific strategic sectors, particularly if private decisions fail to react, is 
more competitive neutral. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these incentives depends on 
competitive conditions in markets. 
The experience of Japan and the East Asian NIEs shows that industrial policies can play 
a crucial role in promoting industrial development, economic growth and social welfare, 
especially for developing countries. Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) demonstrated that 
virtually all of the world’s 100 largest companies in their history have benefit decisively 
from various forms of government trade or industrial policies. In the late 1980s, as noted in 
Subsection 1.4.2, the theory of the developmental state emphasised that governments 
played a central role in the economic development of East Asian economies. Industrial 
policy has been asserted the central factor behind the rapid industrialisation of East Asian 
economies, among which Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are typical examples. The 
development of a large number of Chinese industries further proved the effectiveness of 
industrial policy in promoting industrial development. However, industrial policy 
instruments are by no means perfect. In particular specific industrial policy measures 
contain higher levels of risk and often feed allegations that a better economic performance 
would be resulted had no policy intervention or other policy measures imposed. The 
development path of the passenger car industry highlights some risks of industrial policy. 
First, unnecessary regulation may be imposed in the name of industrial policy. Secondly, 
industrial policy measures may hinder the effective operation of the competition 
mechanism. Thirdly, selective support towards a limited number of firms, sometimes 
inefficient ones, may lead to reverse selection. Fourthly, the focus on the development of 
large enterprises and the imminent danger of regulatory capture may lead to the neglect of 
consumer interests, hence resulting in welfare losses for the society at large. Fifthly, 
positive effects for industrial development from inward FDI and private entry may be 
hampered or even reversed by specific regulatory measures or an anticompetitive policy 
framework, whereas the possible negative effects of inward FDI cannot be addressed as 
well in a manner that does not substitute domestic regulatory capture by foreign one.5 To 
tackle these problems, simply substitute industrial policies with a competition policy is not 
the congruent solution. A more practical choice is to complement industrial policies with a 
competition policy, making full advantage of the effectiveness of industrial policies in 
directing resource allocation and promoting competitiveness, while trying to avoid the 
risks of industrial policies through the introduction of competition policy. 
The Japanese and South Korean experience has confirmed the importance of industrial 
policy while questioned the relevance of competition policy for economic growth (see 
Subsection 2.2.4). The key question here is, when implementing an industrial policy, 
whether competitive market condition can be ensured without a de facto competition 
policy. In fact, the Japanese and South Korean experience does not challenge the relevance 
of competition policy, but demonstrates that a well-designed industrial policy could 
promote the competitiveness of firms while ensuring the functioning of competitive 
                                                        
5 In the Dependencia school of development economics also referred to as the existence of a ‘comprador 
bourgeoisie’ – a domestic elite that serves the interests of foreign firms more than of local interests. 
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markets with out the introduction of a de facto competition policy. The problem for 
China’s industrial policy, as highlighted by the analysis of passenger car industry, is its 
inability to ensure competitive conditions in markets due to a specific combination of 
restrictive and regulatory policy measures, mainly reflected by entry restrictions. Although 
the leading East-Asian economies did not shy away from imposing substantial non-tariff 
impediments to foreign entry, the problem of China’s passenger car industry is associated 
with the specific economic and industrial context of China. The problem may be worsened 
by the entry of MNCs within an anticompetitive policy framework. The case of the 
passenger car industry shows that the lack of competition largely caused by the entry 
restriction may have significant negative consequences with the strong presence of MNCs. 
The Kodak case, as discussed in Subsection 5.2.4, also highlights the risk of market 
dominance granted by the government in the specific context of China’s transition 
economy in which the central government may even directly determine the basic structure 
of an industry. 
A comprehensive policy framework 
The FDI impact on China’s industrial development depends not only on increasing inward 
FDI – and the technology, managerial know-how and market access associated with capital 
inflows – but also on an effective policy framework to harness FDI and thus, in 
combination with other forces, to promote industrial development. Different policies play 
supplementary roles in the framework. In Subsection 4.4.3, the positioning of different 
policies within this framework has been preliminarily discussed. Concerning the multiple 
aims of the policy framework, Table 8-4 shows the effects of different policies in various 
aspects. The direct effects of industrial policy, S&T policy, trade policy, FDI policy and 
competition policy are depicted in this table. However, these government policies usually 
have intertwined influences in reality. For instance, competition policy may constrain the 
development of some specific firms that engaged in anticompetitive practices, while 
improving the market effectiveness and social welfare. Industrial policy and FDI policy 
intertwine with each other in terms of the industrial guidance of FDI, directing resource 
allocation towards specific sectors (see Subsection 5.1.3). Inward FDI, promoted by a 
proactive FDI policy, may both crowd out domestic firms in the short run and ‘crowd in’ 
domestic firms through spillovers and linkage in the long run. 
Table 8-4 A policy framework for the promotion of industrial development 
Enterprise development Policy Market effectiveness 
Domestic firms  Foreign firms 
Industrial policy  ↑*  
S&T policy  ↑*  
Trade policy ↑ ↑ ↑ 
FDI policy ↑ ↑ or↓ ↑ 
Competition policy ↑   
  Note: * Industrial policy and S&T policy ideally do not distinguish between foreign and domestic firms. 
But, in most countries, they are mainly directed at domestic firms. 
Promoting the development of enterprises is the key factor in driving industrial 
development in a market economy, thus it should be the central concern of an effective 
policy framework to promote industrial advancement. By attracting foreign firms on the 
basis of a proactive FDI policy, the government can fulfil the aim of enterprises 
development by introducing an important constructive force into the domestic industry. 
Innovation (or S&T) policy can help to promote the technical efficiency of firms in order 
to boost their competitiveness. The capability to export can simply be used to evaluate the 
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international competitiveness of firms and the relative size of imports and exports is an 
explicit signal of the competitiveness of the industry as a whole. However, that does not 
mean the simple solution of limiting import while promoting export is an optimal solution, 
because relevant trade policies can highly influence the degree of competition in the 
domestic industry, which in turn will influence the competitiveness of firms. Subjecting 
domestic firms to international competition is generally considered to be a crucial concern 
to promote the development of them – certainly when the economy is integrated in the 
world economy and abides the rules of the WTO. One of the principal outcomes stemming 
from the removal of trade barriers is to sharpen competitive pressure (Allen et al., 1998). 
The ‘imports-as-competitive-discipline’ hypothesis in the industrial organisation literature 
argues that international competition from import constrains the ability of domestic 
producers to engage in anticompetitive practices, which would otherwise reduce welfare 
(see Subsection 3.4.3). This is not only a theoretical argument, but also supported by strong 
empirical evidence (see Cadot et al., 2000). Reductions in trade barriers can sharply 
increase competitive pressures, which in turn have the potential to generate substantial 
welfare gains (Baldwin and Venables, 1995). As stressed by Levinsohn (1993), trade 
liberalisation, under certain circumstance, increases competitiveness on the domestic 
market. 
Industrial policy is central for the promotion of enterprise development. Related to the 
concern of enterprise development, a controversial issue is whether the development of 
domestic owned firms should be selectively encouraged. Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) 
argued that the nationality of companies continues to be a decisive factor in the supposedly 
‘borderless’ economy. A non-preferential and industry-oriented policy is optimal in an 
ideal world, because in most case the interests of foreign firms and host countries are 
consistent. However, due to the potential divergences between the private interests of 
foreign investors and the public interests of the host country, as well as some strategic 
concerns, the promotion of the development of domestic firms may be a legitimate 
consideration. In fact, in China, industrial policy and S&T policy provide incentives 
principally to domestic firms, particularly (large) SOEs. Only in terms of industrial 
guidance, foreign firms are subject to industrial policy. The general situation is that SOEs 
are supported by a wide array of industrial policy measures, while Foreign Invested 
Enterprises (FIEs) receive preferential treatment mainly through tax and other incentives to 
attract FDI. In addition to industrial policy, FDI and trade policies are instrumental in the 
promotion of the development of domestic firms that are not only sufficient to supply the 
domestic markets but also competitive to reach the global market. The role of export 
promotion is crucial. Import substitution can also play a major role in the early phase of 
industrial development, particularly important for the birth of domestic firms. Here ‘import 
substitution’ refers to the various measures to assisting domestic firms rather than the 
traditional trade regime that relies on tariffs and quotas on trade to restrict import and 
protect insufficient domestic firms.  
The precondition of firm development is that market, in which firms compete with each 
other, can operate efficiently. Ensuring that the industries and markets in which MNCs 
participate operate efficiently should be one of the central concerns of the policy 
framework. In addition to the appropriate consideration of the development of domestic 
firms, a commitment to free trade can contribute to ensure competitive markets. By 
introducing new competitive force into the markets, proactive FDI policy also contributes 
to the competitiveness of domestic market. Despite the procompetitive effects of trade and 
FDI policies, the aims of these policies focus on international trade and promoting 
domestic competition has not been an explicit objective. On the other hand, without 
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monitoring the degree of competition in domestic industries, FDI policies may neglect the 
potential negative effects of FDI when foreign firms crowd out or acquire domestic firms 
and engaged in anticompetitive practices. Similarly, without a concern on competition and 
consumer welfare, industrial policy may hinder the competition mechanism, especially 
when the selective support is firm- rather than industry-oriented. Therefore, competition 
policy should be a necessary part of an overall policy framework to ensure that inward FDI, 
combined with other forces, plays a positive role in promoting industrial, economic and 
social development. Although the promotion and protection of market competition can be 
realised without a formal competition policy as was previously the case in a large number 
of Chinese industries, introducing such a policy would help avoid risks and uncertainty as 
well as protect the functioning of competitive markets in a more efficient and 
institutionalised manner. 
Supplementing industrial policy with competition policy 
Both substitutive and supplementary relationships exist between competition and industrial 
policy. The supplementary relationship is dominant in promoting industrial development 
(see Table 8-4). These two policies have normally been put into contradiction by scholars 
or policy makers following the neoclassical tradition, which generally considers industrial 
policy as a form of government intervention that constrains market competition. In the last 
decades, in conjunction with economic liberalisation, more and more countries have come 
to recognise the value of competition as a powerful tool for spurring innovation and 
economic growth and the importance of a legal framework to safeguard market disciplines 
and to tackle market failures. Associated with this trend, the influences of industrial policy 
are far less evident than they were even a decade ago. In the preceding discussion, we 
distinguish the regulatory measures from the incentives in the implementation of industrial 
policy and argue that the necessity of regulatory measures should be carefully reconsidered. 
But the general effectiveness of industrial policy in promoting the development of specific 
strategic sectors has been supported by the past experience of Japan and several East Asian 
NIEs, as well as the more recent experience of some Chinese industries. Thus with 
necessary updates, industrial policies aiming at a selective support for specific ‘pillar 
industries’ should be further pursued in the future. However, several associated problems 
appear perhaps even sharper than in the past in China. First, regulatory measures should be 
further eliminated from the pool of policy instruments. Although entry control and 
screening should not be removed overnight, the negative consequences of strict entry 
restrictions demonstrate that entry should be permitted to ensure a certain degree of 
competition in markets. Secondly, the problem of possible regulation capture should be 
avoided by enforcing more ‘checks and balances’ in policy formulations, by considering 
the interests of consumers rather than merely those of firms and by introducing a specific 
advocate within the government on behalf of consumers and potential entrants. Thirdly, 
competition should be one of the central concerns in the redesign of an industrial policy. A 
wide range of issues that could influence the nature of competition in an industry should be 
considered. A number of policy measures, including policies directed at trade, industry and 
investment, should be integrated in policy considerations to make sure their 
implementation will not hinder effective competition. The open competitive model of 
industrial policy highlighted by the comparative analysis of the automotive and electronics 
& ICT industries provides simple principles for the policy maker – keep the market 
competitive is the precondition or an integral element of an effective industrial policy. 
Only on the basis of this, prescience on which sectors to support and effective incentives to 
direct resources allocating to them can lead to desired outcomes. 
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The degree of competition in a specific industry is influenced by a wide rang of issues, 
including firm rivalries and government policies (see Subsection 2.2.3). As a particular 
policy instrument safeguarding competition, competition policy tackles potential 
restrictions to competition, principally private restraints, and promotes economic efficiency 
and consumer welfare. In addition to competition policy, a broader set of factors may 
influence the nature of competition in industries, thus countries may have been able to 
maintain a considerable degree of market competition despite the absence of a de jure 
competition policy. If there is an effective de facto competition maintenance mechanism, 
are there needs to replace or supplement it with a competition policy? Many institutional 
changes in China’s economic transition aimed to inject competition into the economy (see 
Section 2.1). To some extent, the process of transition is a process of introducing 
competition – domestic and international – into the economic system. Competition among 
firms taken place in markets and industries has been crucial to the ‘Chinese miracle’. The 
Chinese experience demonstrates that a commitment to competitive markets, rather than 
regulatory approaches, yields major benefits for economic welfare and development. 
However, some industries remain relatively immune to the baptism of competition due – 
amongst others – to anticompetitive government policies, quite different from developed 
countries where threats toward competition are mainly private restrictions. Under this 
circumstance, if the government intends to develop, encourage or facilitate competition, 
how should it act? The consequence of the industrial policy for the automotive sector 
highlights these problems and necessitates a formal competition policy. Furthermore, the 
highly probable anticompetitive effects of MNC presence and foreign Merger and 
Acquisitions (M&As) discussed in Subsection 5.2.4 and Subsection 5.2.5 calls for a 
competition policy to ensure the positive effects of inward FDI. 
8.2 International Business and Competition Issues: International Policy 
Challenges 
When China begins to establish a formal competition policy regime on the basis of 
previous transitional institutional arrangements, it faces a challenge to build up institutions 
on the basis of both domestic and international considerations. First of all, the design of a 
national competition policy regime should take into account domestic conditions, 
particularly those at the industry level. This is the focus of the discussion in Section 8.1, 
which bases its argument on the conclusions of the empirical studies in Part III. In the 
design of a competition policy regime, in addition, international cooperation may play a 
vital role because it might support the building of domestic market-supporting institutions 
and contribute to international harmonisation and/or coordination of competition, FDI and 
trade policy regimes (see Subsection 3.4.5). The proliferation and diversification of 
competition policy, coupled with the rapid economic internationalisation, has presented a 
challenge to governments as well as firms. This is the focus of this section. The 
relationship between competition policy and the multilateral trading system has been 
subject to much debate in academic literature and international organisations (see 
Subsection 3.4.3). In recent years, increasing attention was granted to the linkages between 
economic liberalisation and competition policy. The central challenge to national 
governments stems from the disjunction between national laws and international markets. 
How to coordinate seemly ‘borderless’ business activities within the existing legal regimes 
governed by sovereign nations? In the field of trade law, the measures of each country are 
restricted by international agreements and are under the control of intergovernmental 
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organisations, in particular under the WTO regime. In the field of competition policy, such 
an international regime is lacking and the domestic laws of each state regulate private 
restraints of trade in markets.6 Expanding international businesses both in China and 
around the world give rise to competition issues for the Chinese government to address. 
Most international business activities have been associated with FDI. For China, inward 
FDI has become an integral element of its development strategy, while outward FDI has 
also increased rapidly. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), China has already become an important capital exporter. It can 
be predicted that, in the near future, international competition issues will become a 
day-to-day problem for the Chinese government as well as for Chinese firms.  
8.2.1 International Business and Competition Policy: Conflicts and Challenges 
As business activities are becoming more internationalised, they lead to increasing 
international problems with regard to the competition issue. Due to the increasing global 
character of business practices, the competition issue has become an important element of 
international politics and economic internationalisation. It appears natural that the 
competition policies need to be internationalised as well. Competition laws have been 
proliferated rapidly since the 1990s (see Subsection 2.2.4). There are now over 90 different 
competition laws installed, with more than 20 in the making, with differing procedural and 
substantive provisions. Competition policies differ from nation to nation and the 
proliferation of competition policies has not meant a uniformity of substantial rules or 
institutional approaches around the world. The proliferation and diversification of 
competition policy regimes, coupled with the rapid internationalisation of commercial 
activities, presents a serious challenge to the competition authorities as well as to the 
business community. For competition agencies, they will face a mounting number of cases 
involving foreign firms. They increasingly have to address economic decisions that are not 
confined to their national territories. A major challenge lies in the risk of inconsistent 
outcomes including discordant remedies being imposed by different competition 
authorities. For the business community, firms will face the uncertainty of 
multi-jurisdictional competition policy enforcement and the higher transaction cost that 
may arise when firm’s business practices have to be reviewed in various jurisdictions. 
There are interfaces between international business and all the three areas of competition 
policy as discussed in Subsection 3.2.2. First, there have been mounting numbers of 
cross-border mergers involving companies that had international operations and thus 
triggering merger review in multiple jurisdictions. Second, there are a large number of 
price fixing conspiracies that were international in scope. Third, competition authorities 
have become involved in investigating and prosecuting dominant position abuses where 
the target of the investigation engages in similar activities in multiple jurisdictions.  
In the field of trade law, the measures of each state are restricted by international 
agreements, in particular under the GATT/WTO regime. In the field of competition law, 
such an international regime is lacking and the domestic laws of each state regulate private 
restraints of trade in the relevant markets. Thus jurisdictional conflicts in competition 
policy enforcement have emerged in the last decades, mostly between the United States 
and other developed countries. Historically, international conflicts over the enforcement of 
                                                        
6 See ICPAC (2000). 
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competition law were caused mostly by the so-called extraterritorial enforcement of US 
antitrust laws on the basis of the effects doctrine. In response, a number of countries, such 
as Japan and the United Kingdom, insisted the territorial principle and issued diplomatic 
protests or enacted blocking legislation. The recent decade also witnessed the expanding 
scope of the extraterritorial application of competition laws in other jurisdictions, such as 
the European Union. Among the member states of the European Union, the competition 
laws of a number of countries have specific provisions incorporating the effects doctrine. 
According to the ICPAC (2000), increased interaction between trade and competition has 
brought about new dimensions in international conflicts over the extraterritorial 
enforcement of competition law. The extraterritorial enforcement of US antitrust laws for 
the purpose to protect US exporters’ interests has become another source of diplomatic 
friction. In 1992, a new policy change by the DOJ brook ground for the prosecution of 
foreign defendants for taking steps outside the United States that violated US antitrust laws 
in a way that harmed US exporters, not just importers. Pilkington, a British company, 
became the initial target of this policy change. 
Cross-border M&As 
Cross-border M&A is an important mode of FDI. The world has experienced an 
unprecedented level of merger activity, with cross-border M&As in 2000 at an all-time 
high (see Subsection 2.3.1). The number of transactions notified to the competition 
authorities has boomed likewise. For instance, the number of transactions notified to the 
European Commission more than doubled between 1991 and 1996. From 1997 to 2000, it 
grew annually by 20 to 30 percent. As the volume of cross-border M&A activities 
expanded, the number of jurisdictions around the world with merger control systems 
rapidly increased as well. Over 60 jurisdictions have hitherto adopted merger review 
regimes. Thus it is increasingly likely that cross-border mergers may be reviewed by 
multiple competition authorities. Merging firms with international business operations 
potentially should report their sales, assets, subsidiaries and market shares in more than 60 
jurisdictions to determine whether notifications to the competition authorities in those 
jurisdictions are necessary. The volume of law that firms undertaking mergers must now 
consider and the growing tendency of nations to apply their laws to offshore mergers 
present challenges for the merging firms. This also presents challenges for the competition 
authorities. These challenges come both from dealing with heightened uncertainty and 
increased transaction costs and from ensuring consistent outcomes and compatible 
remedies. Different substantive provisions will give rise to diverging evaluation on the 
nature of a transaction, incompatible remedies, and, therefore, international friction 
(ICPAC, 2000). These challenges can be addressed by facilitating, where possible, 
substantive harmonisation and convergence among merger review regimes (ICPAC, 2000). 
There are at least three concrete areas, as suggested by the International Competition 
Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) 7 , where nations can take steps to minimise 
transaction costs and conflicts: 1) facilitating greater transparency; 2) developing 
disciplines to guide the review of mergers with significant transnational or spillover effects; 
                                                        
7 ICPAC is an ad hoc advisory committee on international competition policy established by the US Attorney 
General in November 1997 ‘to address the global antitrust problems of the 21st Century’. The previous Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein endorsed the recommendation by the ICPAC that the United States seek to harmonise 
merger reporting requirements so as to facilitate the review, approval, or where necessary, opposition of 
authorities to mergers invoking the jurisdiction of multiple countries. Following the completion of its work, the 
Commission was officially disbanded in June 2000. ICPAC (2000) therefore is its final report. 
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3) and continuing to enhance bilateral cooperation. In addition, the ICPAC recommended 
the ‘most integrated approach’ – work sharing, in which the enforcement efforts of one 
agency are likely to be sufficient to remedy the antitrust concerns of other jurisdictions, to 
reduce duplication and develop more seamless merger review systems internationally. 
These challenges can also be addressed by rationalising the merger review process through 
targeted reforms by different competition agencies.  
Merger control is the area of competition policy where the international dimension is 
the strongest. About two thirds of the EU-US joint involvements in competition policy 
cases have been associated with merger control. An increasing share of the European 
Commission’s recent merger cases has been handled with the cooperation of US 
competition authorities.8 From the beginning of the European merger control policy in 
1990 until the end of February 2002, in totally 1950 notified cases, 435 transactions 
involved at least one US company.9 There were a climbing number of cross-border mega 
mergers involving companies that have international operations thus triggered antitrust 
review in multiple jurisdictions. Some important cases include Boeing and 
McDonnell-Douglas, British Telecom and MCI (and AT&T), Exxon and Mobile, and MCI 
and Worldcom. Although there has rarely been a direct conflict between competition 
authorities in terms of their final decision, there have been instances where the final 
adjudications have been different. US companies have become the primary target for the 
extraterritorial application of the competition laws of other jurisdictions, particularly the 
European Union. In 1997, for instance, the merger between Mc Donnell-Douglas and 
Boeing led to an apparent conflict between US and EU antitrust authorities. The merger 
was allowed by US authorities while European Commission expressed serious concerns. 
The conflict escalated and a trade war was avoided at the last minute when the parties 
accepted to modify their operation to satisfy the demands from the European Commission. 
In July 2001, the European Commission opposed the proposed General Electric and 
Honeywell merger – a deal cleared by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) with selected 
divestitures. The events surrounding the General Electric-Honeywell merger further 
highlighted the attention focusing on the potential for divergent outcomes when proposed 
transactions are reviewed by multiple agencies. 
International cartels 
The problem of international cartels has been increasingly recognised as an important 
global issue (WTO, 1997). Although there has been no comprehensive evidence about the 
scope and incidence of international cartels, there is no doubt that the competition 
authorities’ antitrust enforcement efforts against international cartels have been intensified. 
During the 1990s the European Commission and the DOJ together prosecuted over forty 
cartels whose effects went beyond national borders. These private international cartels 
were found in a wide range of products, including citric acid, vitamins, newsprint, fax 
paper, shipping and chemicals (Evenett et al., 2001). Hard-core cartels have been not only 
prohibited in most developed countries but also condemned in several international forums 
such as the United Nations and the OECD. For many decades, however, the United States 
stood almost alone in the world in its commitment to antitrust enforcement, especially 
                                                        
8 Schaub, A. (2000)’ Assessing International Mergers: the Commission’s Approach’, Speech at the EC Merger 
Control 10th Anniversary Conference, Brussels, September 2000. 
9 Schaub, A. (2002) ‘Cooperation in competition policy enforcement between the EU and the US and new 
concepts evolving at the WTO and the International Competition Network’, Speech at Brussels, April 2002. 
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when the defendants were located in other countries (ICPAC, 2000). Since the early 1990s, 
the number and importance of successful international cartel prosecutions brought by the 
DOJ have increased significantly. The DOJ has made international antitrust enforcement 
and cooperation a priority since 1993. It has given top priority to enforcement against 
international cartels since 1995. This change was due to a better usage of the fine spectrum 
for companies and their responsible top managers. Another important factor was the 
reform of the corporate leniency program in 1993 (see Subsection 8.3.2 for a detailed 
discussion). In the 1990s the DOJ has successful prosecuted almost 20 international cartels 
(Table 8-5), charging more than 80 corporate and 60 individual defendants. Approximately 
25 percent of the criminal antitrust cases filed by the DOJ since 1990 were international in 
scope (ICPAC, 2000). Historical level of fines has been imposed in cartel cases. In 1996, 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), a US firm, agreed to pay US$ 100 million for the impact 
that its role had on the US market in both the Lysine and Citric Acid cartels. Since 1997, 
international cartel prosecutions have accounted for over 90 percent of the fines imposed in 
criminal antitrust cases annually. US investigations into international cartels have detected 
and punished a geographically diverse group of participants located in more than 20 
different countries.  
Table 8-5 US prosecutions in international cartels, 1990-1999 
Fiscal year International cartel prosecutions 
1991 Federal Dam Repair Project 
1992 Bronze & Copper Flake 
Moving Service 
1993 Aircraft Purchase at Bankruptcy Auctions 
1994 Aluminum Phosphide 
Industrial Diamonds 
Disposable Plastic Dinnerware 
1995 Lysine (Food and Feed Additives) 
Citric Acid (Food and Feed Additives) 
Commodity Ferrosilicon Products 
Rare Banknotes Auction 
1996 Tampico Fibber 
1997 Sodium Gluconate 
1998 Graphite Electrodes 
Marine Construction 
Marine Transportation 
Sorbates 
Vitamins 
1999 Maltol 
Sodium Erythorbates 
Cable Stay Bridges 
Magazines 
                  Source: ICPAC (2000). 
The European Commission has also developed a record of anti-cartel enforcement and 
has prosecuted more than 20 cartels since the early 1990s. Although most of these cases 
are European internal rather than international, the European Union began to prosecute 
cartels with the scope beyond its borders. For example, the European Commission issued a 
decision in December 1999 in the Seamless Steel Tubes case that involved four firms from 
member states and four Japanese firms. Moreover, the European Commission has also 
investigated some of the same international cartels as prosecuted in the United States and 
Canada, including the Graphite Electrodes and Vitamins conspiracies. Other jurisdictions 
began to investigate and take actions against cartels include Australia, Canada, Israel, 
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Japan and some EU member states such as Germany and the United Kingdom.  
Abuses of dominant positions with international scope 
Both EU and US competition authorities have become involved in investigating and 
prosecuting abuses of dominant positions where the target of the investigation conducts 
business and engages in similar activities in both jurisdictions (Litan and Shapiro, 2000). A 
prominent example is the first Microsoft case in which a joint investigation was conducted 
and a joint settlement was reached. Another example is the initiation of an investigation of 
Intel by the European Commission in 2001 after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had 
closed its own investigation after a settlement was reached with Intel. The EU 
investigation was proceeding without much US involvement and cooperation. 
The Microsoft antitrust trial was a symbol of the activist stance on competition policy 
during the Clinton administration. In the second Microsoft case, according to the US 
antitrust authorities, evidence supported that Microsoft has a monopoly over desktop 
operating systems, that the monopoly is protected by the so-called ‘applications barrier to 
entry’, and that Microsoft acted to eliminate the threat to its monopoly by engaging in a 
series of practices with the intent and effect of limiting the distribution and use of 
competitors’ software. Although Microsoft challenged each of the government’s 
propositions and counters with those of its own, in May 2000 a dramatic court order 
(reversed on appeal in June 2001) prescribed that Microsoft be broken up. In the first 
Microsoft case in 1993 and 1994, Microsoft faced a joint investigation by the US and EU 
competition authorities. In this investigation, the US and EU officials cooperate in the 
negotiations with Microsoft that led to the first consent decree. Due to the company’s 
reluctant to receive potentially inconsistent rulings from both jurisdictions, a joint 
settlement was given (Litan, 2000). In March 2004, a new Microsoft case proceeded by the 
European Commission has led to a proposed fine of €497 million on Microsoft for abusing 
its Window monopoly and thwarting competition. After years of investigation and a failure 
to reach a settlement between Microsoft and the European Commission, this proposed 
ruling was given and a lengthy appeal is bound to follow.10 In China, a recent report from 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) explicitly mentioned 
Microsoft as an example of market dominance. 
8.2.2 International Competition Policy: Solutions 
As nations define and implement competition policy differently, fundamental asymmetries 
across different jurisdictions exist and imply the effective enforcement of national 
competition policy rules would be insufficient. According to the former US Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein, the advance of globalisation in the years to come will only 
enhance the scope for conflict; further integration of antitrust proceedings across 
jurisdictions will be necessary.11 Similar remarks have been put forward by the EU 
Commissioner for Competition Policy Mario Monti, admitting that the increasing 
internationalisation of the economy creates very important challenges to competition 
authorities around the world.12 Efforts are made to solve or reduce international conflicts 
                                                        
10 See Richard Waters, ‘Microsoft versus Monti: how the challenges to the long reign of Windows are growing in 
Europe and beyond’, Financial Times, March 22, 2004. 
11 Klein, J., (2000) ‘Time for a global competition initiative?’, Mimeo, DOJ, Washington, DC. 
12 Monti, M. (2000) ‘European competition policy for the 21st Century’, Speech to the Fordham Corporate Law 
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over the extraterritorial enforcement of competition law. The bilateral approach is currently 
considered the most feasible. Nevertheless, multilateral rules are required in some 
instances, which pursue at least greater convergence across competition policy regimes. To 
move towards the goal of convergence, a multilateral competition agreement, such as that 
proposed by the Havana Charter, has been advocated. But substantial and sustained 
differences in national policies, political institutions and systems of corporate governance 
suggest that a global competition policy regime can only be an ideal long-term prospect.  
Bilateral cooperation 
Where competition investigations involve multiple jurisdictions it becomes increasingly 
necessary for the national authorities to cooperate with their counterparts in other 
jurisdictions. Bilateral competition policy cooperation agreements are instruments that the 
competition authorities use to expand ties with one another and to improve cooperation 
and coordination in antitrust enforcement matters (ICPAC, 2000). The OECD went on 
proposing bilateral cooperation since the 1960s (OECD, 1995). Cooperation among 
competition authorities is meant to reduce the scope for conflict by sharing information, 
coordinating procedures, or to converge on substantive issues. The cooperation can be 
procedural by, for instance, sharing information and simplifying filing requirements. The 
second aspect of bilateral cooperation is convergence on substantive issues, which is 
perhaps the most difficult issue in international competition policy coordination. For 
merger control, for instance, there are three areas of substantive issues in the arena of 
merger control: 1) market definition, 2) assessment of competitive effects, and 3) 
appropriateness of remedies.13 
Formal and informal bilateral arrangements have helped to introduce, deepen and 
regularise the framework of the enforcement cooperation between competition authorities. 
Competition authorities have entered into a number of bilateral cooperation agreements 
with their counterparts in other jurisdictions. For example, the United States is currently a 
party to bilateral competition policy cooperation arrangements with some jurisdictions: the 
European Union, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Israel, Mexico and Japan. The 
bilateral competition policy cooperation agreements reflect two themes: enforcement 
cooperation and the avoidance or management of conflicts. The bilateral agreements 
obligates the parties to notify the other of a pending investigation, contemplates the sharing 
of information about planned actions that may affect the interests of the other party, and 
outlines efforts to cooperate in investigations (Litan and Shapiro, 2001). None of these 
agreements, however, overrides domestic laws that prohibit the sharing of confidential 
information. The United States does have one other agreement with Canada – a ‘Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty’ (MLAT) signed in 1990 – that allows the sharing of information 
obtained in criminal investigations that otherwise might be confidential. The DOJ 
successfully persuaded the Congress to authorise US antitrust agencies to enter into 
bilateral MLATs to share otherwise confidential information in civil cases. And in 1999, 
the Unites States entered into its first bilateral antitrust agreement designed specifically to 
permit the exchange of confidential information with Australia. The EU has also negotiated 
bilateral agreements with several countries, such as the United States, Canada, Israel, 
Russia, Japan and many Central and Eastern European countries.  
Given the relatively heavy volume of mergers and other investigations involving joint 
                                                                                                                                            
Institute, New York, October 20th, 2000. 
13 See the bilateral agreement between the United States and the European Union. 
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investigations between the United States and the European Union, much of the cooperative 
activity of the US and EU competition authorities were with their transatlantic counterparts 
(Litan and Shapiro, 2001). Thus a prominent example of bilateral agreement is that 
between the United States and the European Union. Both sides had already realised in the 
early 1990s that an efficient competition policy is not possible without cooperation 
between the competent authorities. Therefore they signed two far-reaching cooperation 
agreements during the 1990s. According to the antitrust authorities, the extensive and 
frequent interactions between competition agencies has led to substantial benefits since the 
agreement came into force in 1995.14 In the period 1995-1998, this agreement gave rise to 
contacts on over 200 competition policy cases.15 Under the EU-US agreement, a majority 
of these cases has been in the area of merger control (see Table 8-6). Table 8-6 also shows 
that the bilateral cooperation on competition policy between the United States and the 
European Union has become more important throughout the 1990s. The number of cases 
has been substantially increased on the EU side, while notifications from the US side have 
been stable. In terms of merger cases, EU notifications have climbed sharply from 11 cases 
in 1992 to 59 cases in 1999. The 1998 supplement to the early agreement between the 
United States and the European Union was another important milestone in international 
competition policy cooperation. Given the need for convergence in merger control, 
Directorates-General for competition (DG Competition), the FTC and the DOJ created in 
1999 the EU/US Merger Working Group whose role is to enhance transatlantic cooperation 
in ‘global mergers’. The US and the EU competition authorities cooperate to avoid 
conflicts, with perhaps the notable exception of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case in 
1997 and General Electric-Honeywell case in 2001, as discussed in Subsection 8.2.1. 
Table 8-6 Number of notifications under the EU-US agreement, 1992-1999 
US notification Merger notification Year EU notification 
FTC DOJ Total US EU US Total 
1992 26 20 20 40 11 31 42 
1993 44 22 18 40 20 20 40 
1994 29 16 19 35 18 20 38 
1995 42 14 21 35 31 18 49 
1996 48 20 18 38 35 27 62 
1997 42 12 24 36 30 20 50 
1998 52 22 24 46 43 39 82 
1999 70 26 23 49 59 39 98 
   Source: European Commission. 
Global (multilateral) solutions 
An increasing number of bilateral cooperative relationships have been established between 
competition authorities in different jurisdictions. But with more than 90 countries adopting 
competition policies, bilateral cooperation has demonstrated its limitations and the 
efficiency of the bilateral approach has been questioned. The former Assistant 
Attorney-General of the DOJ Joel Klein has stated that bilateral cooperation is an essential 
template but is insufficient to cope with present and future challenges posed by global 
mergers. 16  In addition, to build substantial cooperative relationship with all of its 
                                                        
14 See, for instance, Monti (2000) and Schaub (2000). 
15 According to European Commission (1999). 
16 EC Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 3, October 2000. 
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counterparts around the world is virtually impossible for antitrust agency in one 
jurisdiction. Therefore a multilateral agreement on competition is being called for. The 
possibility of a multilateral agreement on competition has given rise to a recent literature17 
on the possible need and implications of such an agreement.18 Some even advocate a 
multilateral competition agency that would take over mandates from national authorities. 
However, there have been diverging attitudes between jurisdictions as to the appropriate 
institutional arrangements. While the European Union has been proposing a multilateral 
framework for competition as part of the WTO, the European officials faced the resistance 
of the US competition authorities to add international competition policy to the list of 
issues to be negotiated under the auspices of the WTO.  
In the absence of a specialised global competition organisation and in view of the 
intrinsic relationship between trade and competition policy as suggested in Subsection 
3.4.3, the WTO is considered by many as the institution most suitable to house a 
multilateral framework for competition. The WTO has the advantages of a broad 
membership and a tradition of enforcing binding rules. The earliest attempt of multilateral 
harmonisation of competition rules in the multilateral trading system antedates the Havana 
Charter in the 1940s. The first effort to bring competition policy issue into the WTO was 
taken at the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996, when a Working Group on ‘The 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy’ was established. Since the 1996 
Singapore Ministerial Conference, increasing attention has been granted to the linkages 
between trade liberalisation and competition policy. The European Commission attempted 
to persuade member countries of the merits of a multilateral agreement on competition in 
the WTO.19 The US side favoured the so-called ‘Global Competition Initiative’, which has 
been proposed by the ICPAC. In particular, the final ICPAC report concluded that the 
existing multilateral organisations are not equipped to handle some competition conflicts 
between nations (ICPAC, 2000). Instead the ICPAC proposed a ‘less bureaucratic’ 
institutional structure. In 2001 a fundamental shift in the US position took place. The Bush 
administration clarified a number of important issues regarding European Union’s 
proposals for international competition policy. As a result, the United States adopted a 
positive stance on the envisaged multilateral agreement on competition in the WTO and 
supported the text drafted in Doha. The future of a multilateral framework for competition 
within the WTO was discussed during the Doha Ministerial Conference. All parties that 
signed the Doha declaration recognise for the first time that there is a valid case for the 
WTO to negotiate and conclude a ‘Multilateral Agreement on Trade and Competition’. The 
negotiation of a multilateral agreement on competition in the WTO may promote the 
adoption and enforcement of domestic competition regimes and will disseminate 
competition culture, enhance cooperation between competition authorities and facilitate the 
effective combating of anticompetitive practices.20 
Another development in multilateral cooperation in the competition policy area is the 
International Competition Network (ICN). The ICN is a project-oriented and consensus 
based organisation. Its membership is open to national and multinational competition 
                                                        
17 See e.g. Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Levinsohn (1999), Bacchetta et al. (1997), Fox and Ordover (1997), 
Bliss (1996) Mattoo and Subramanian (1997) and Richardson (1996). 
18 See Bilal and Olarreaga (1998b) for a critical review of the arguments in favour of an international approach to 
competition rules.  
19 Monti, M. (2002) ‘A global competition policy?’, Speech on the European Competition Day, Copenhagen, 
September 17, 2002. 
20 See Schaub (2002). 
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agencies responsible for the enforcement of competition laws. Representatives from the 
private sector, academia and other international organisations work with ICN members to 
produce best practice proposals to bring about a ‘soft convergence’ between the different 
authorities. The proposals are non-binding, but once adopted by the ICN jurisdictions may 
wish to consider incorporating them into their domestic legal frameworks and practices. 
Different from the WTO, which represents an initiative aimed at establishing a multilateral 
framework for competition characterised by binding rules, the ICN is a more ‘soft 
convergence’ forum. Therefore, the members of ICN are talking about the development of 
‘principles’ and ‘best practices’ designed to foster a greater degree of convergence, 
information sharing and cooperation. The concept of establishing such a new multilateral 
forum for competition policy experts and officials was advanced by the ICPAC. About 75 
competition agencies have hitherto become members, but the ICN also includes private 
sector experts and practitioners in its various working groups and meetings. The ICN has 
focused on two main areas, multi-jurisdictional merger control and the role of competition 
advocacy. 
Regional (multinational) solutions 
The recent decade has witnessed the deepening and widening of the European Union, the 
creation of the NAFTA, among other efforts of regionalisation (cf. Muller, 2004). Rising 
regionalism provides additional incentives for the adoption of a common approach to 
competition and reinforces the arguments in favour of a common competition policy. Both 
an inter-governmental approach and a supra-national approach may be adopted. There is a 
strong case for the introduction of a regional competition authority within regional 
integrating areas. A common competition policy helps to the realisation of an internal 
common market, in particular to insure the free movement of goods and services within the 
integrated market. The full benefits of internal free trade can be enjoyed only if internal 
trade barriers are not substituted by some forms of anticompetitive practices (Forrester, 
1997). Coordination of competition policies contributes to a healthy and stable regional 
trading system (Bilal and Olarreaga, 1998a). Benefits from harmonisation of other policies 
may be jeopardised by the non-harmonisation of competition policies. Krugman (1994c) 
observed that the non-implementation of competition policy in one country might give 
firms from that country an advantage in foreign markets. For example, policies that allow 
IJVs and export cartels in international markets may be rational from the viewpoint of the 
domestic country in case that they raise the returns to domestic firms from their foreign 
businesses. However, if practiced by all countries, total economic welfare from such 
behaviour would be significantly reduced. The degree of coordination and harmonisation 
between national competition policies depends on the existing degree of integration in the 
union. In the case of deep forms of regional integration such as customs unions and 
common markets, the need for a common competition policy approach is stronger.21 
However, harmonisation of competition policy may be costly. Furthermore, as suggested in 
Bacchetta et al. (1997), harmonisation of competition policies does not solve for the 
externality problem. Thus, well-designed institutional arrangements are necessary. The 
existence of a common institutional framework may facilitate the implementation of a 
common competition policy. In this institutional framework, common competition 
                                                        
21 Six forms of economic integration, ranked in increasing order of integration, according to Winters (1991), can 
be identified: Preferential Trade Areas; Free Trade Areas; Customs Unions; Common Market; Economic Union; 
and Political Union. 
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principles embodied in rules and procedures should be adopted by national governments. 
The implementation of competition policies should be left to either national authorities in 
the case of national anticompetitive practices without externality effects or to regional 
competition authorities otherwise. The ‘division of labour’ between the European 
Commission and national competition agencies in the EU competition policy regime 
provides a typical example. 
8.3 Competition Policy, Chinese Version 
Taking all the above lessons and contemporary movements into account: what would be an 
appropriate competition policy is for China? Can an appropriate formal competition policy 
be based upon previous transitional institutions or is a more radical change more sensible? 
To answer these questions, the assessment of the FDI impact on industrial development 
presents the central concern. In addition to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 and the 
contextual inquiry in Part I, therefore, Part III provides basic empirical support for our 
arguments on the design and implementation of Chinese competition policy. Law is 
national but markets can extend beyond national boundaries. The challenges presented by 
the proliferation of competition policies and the rapid internalised business activities are 
stemming from the disjunction between national laws and international markets. Therefore, 
a pertinent question associated with the design of China’s competition policy is how to 
monitor ‘borderless’ business activities within a national legal regime. In addition to a deep 
understanding of the Chinese industrial context, which is addressed in Section 8.1, and the 
wide coverage of the international policy environment, which is discussed in Section 8.2, a 
comparative inquiry into competition policies in different jurisdictions is crucial to 
providing a sound foundation for designing China’s competition policy. Competition laws 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and variations between them reflect differences in 
national economic and legal systems. It might not be necessary that developing countries 
should adopt competition policies that have been adopted by developed countries. The 
proliferation of competition policy regimes across the world also does not mean the 
uniformity of rules and institutional arrangements. There are often variations in the 
structures and contents of competition policy in different countries. It is particularly 
important for developing countries to consider the design and implementation of 
competition policy in the light of their own economic, legal and cultural environment. For 
China, learning from foreign experience and considering an appropriate soft convergence 
with other authorities may be necessary, in addition to the emphasis on the domestic 
conditions. On the other hand, the core principles of competition policy emphasised by the 
Doha Declaration, such as transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, 
should in any case be applied. 
For the design of a competition policy regime, there are three central concerns: first, 
establishing the basic objectives of the competition policy; second, identifying the 
constituents of a formal competition policy and stipulating provisions for various 
instruments of the competition policy; designing the institution of a competition policy 
regime to support effective implementation and enforcement. After identifying the 
constituents of a formal competition policy, it is important to assess the implications of 
different choices in designing a competition policy and to assess the implications of the 
country characteristics in designing competition policy. Because of the absence of a 
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comprehensive comparative study of competition policies in different jurisdictions22, there 
has been no satisfying answer as to this concern and the design of a competition policy is 
usually based on foreign experience or a model system, which generally does not adapt to 
the unique environment of a specific economy. For China, designing an appropriate 
competition policy needs careful consideration of the unique national context (see Chapter 
1) and the country’s development needs. A large number of economic issues should be 
considered and the implications of the effects of inward FDI and industrial policy on 
competition and industrial development are of particular importance. This section will 
position the design of China’s formal competition policy in a comparative perspective both 
for analytical reasons and for exploring the possibility of a soft convergence between 
competition policy regimes around the world.  
8.3.1 Objectives of China’s Competition Policy: Setting Priorities 
China needs to have a competition policy that is designed to take appropriate account of its 
level of development, its specific economic, social and political context, and the long-term 
objective of sustained economic growth. What are the implications of the analysis in the 
previous chapters for the design of an effective competition policy regime? The application 
of any policy to a set of economic problems is not costless. Competition policy is not 
different from other policies in this respect. Establishing institutions and implementing the 
policy requires the use of scarce administrative resources, including considerable human, 
financial and other inputs. Furthermore, since policy instruments are not perfect and 
mistakes may be made which imply a better economic performance would be resulted had 
no policy intervention imposed. The two dominant systems of competition policy are the 
systems of the United States and of the European Union (see Subsection 3.2.3). The 
institutional arrangements and the evolutionary processes of these two systems provide 
valuable lessons for the design of China’s competition policy regime.  
Objectives of the Chinese competition policy 
Regarding the objectives of competition policy, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, a 
spectrum of viewpoints has been expresses. At one end of the spectrum is the view that the 
sole purpose of competition policy is to maximise economic efficiency. The opposite view 
is that competition policy is based on multiple values that are not easily quantified. Some 
sociopolitical criteria such as fairness and equity are incorporated into the objectives of 
competition policy. In the United States antitrust policy is primarily designed to protect 
consumer welfare. The central concern of US enforcement agencies and courts is economic 
efficiency and the underlying assumption is that a robust competitive market is 
automatically efficient. There is a modest element of fairness and hostility to vast 
concentrations of market power. By contrast, in the European Union, a dominant objective 
of competition policy is the economic integration of the member nations. The European 
Union also considers competitive opportunities for small and medium-sized firms, 
emphasising the general notions of ‘fairness’. Compared to the US antitrust law, the EU 
competition law still is less consistent with an efficiency-based approach. Neither the 
European Commission nor the Court of Justice is sufficiently receptive to economic 
arguments and therefore decisions and judgments are often formalistic and based on 
reiteration or expansion of early case law. Furthermore, EU member countries also 
                                                        
22 There have already been notable efforts made by international organisations such as UNCTAD and OECD. 
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consider technological development, such as employment and measures that encourage 
cooperation among small and medium-sized enterprises. In some countries, such as 
Germany, freedom of individual action is viewed as the economic equivalent of a 
democratic constitutional system. In France emphasis is placed on competition policy as a 
means of securing economic freedom, that is, freedom of competition.  
The respective weights and priorities attached to the objectives of competition policy 
have remained largely ambiguous and hence are the subject of intensive debate. The 
relative importance and balance between efficiency and the various other economic, social 
and political objectives that competition policy can advance also remain to be identified by 
academic society, legislation agency and competition authority. Different views persist as 
to which objectives should receive greater emphasis and there is always pressure to 
increase the number of objectives. However, attempt to consider multiple objectives in the 
implementation of competition policy may give rise to conflicts and inconsistent results. 
For instance, protecting small business and maintaining employment could conflict with 
attaining economic efficiency. In various countries different objectives of competition 
policies are juxtaposed without any particular ranking of priorities. Despite different views 
as to the priorities of competition policy objectives, increased emphasis on efficiency is 
apparent in many jurisdictions. Since the mid-1970s, as noted in Subsection 3.2.1, the 
interests of consumers in lower prices and improved products became the central concern 
of competition policy in the United States.23 The basic static analysis of the welfare loses 
caused by monopoly, as discussed in Subsection 3.3.1, highlights the interests of consumer 
as the central concern in competition policy. This has been the thrust of the antitrust 
enforcement adopted by the US antitrust authority since then. For instance, the 1988 
‘Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations’ of the DOJ stated that the 
purpose of antitrust laws is to establish broad principles of competition that are designed to 
preserve an unrestrained interaction of competitive forces that will yield the best allocation 
of resources, the lowest prices and the highest quality products and services for consumers.  
The promotion of economic efficiency and improvement of consumer welfare should 
also be explicitly recognised as the central aim of China’s competition policy. In China, as 
argued in Subsection 8.1.1, the focus on the development of large enterprises and possible 
regulatory capture may lead to the neglect of consumer interests, hence causing welfare 
losses for the society as a whole. Firms may successfully lobby for the formulation of 
government policy to their own benefit but to the detriment the society as a whole, 
particularly the consumers. In the process of policy formulation, the interests of the 
incumbent firms are typically well protected, while the representatives of the interests of 
consumers were typically absent. Therefore ultimately the consumer interest should be 
paramount in the implementation of China’s competition policy and this can be generally 
achieved by pursuing greater efficiency.  
However, the importance of efficiency does not necessarily imply the exclusion of other 
objectives of competition policy. Because of the complex nature of the Chinese economy 
                                                        
23 Beginning in the mid-1970s, the US antitrust authority embarked upon a Chicago School revolution as Robert 
Bork, along with other antitrust scholars from Chicago University, became federal appellate judges. Over the next 
two decades, one doctrinal area after another in US antitrust was transformed, among them one key issue was to 
harmonise the new economic focus on efficiency and entry with the pre-existing legal rules that relied on 
concentration (Baker, 2002). Since the rise of the Chicago School, the presumption of harm from the increased 
concentration has declined dramatically. Accordingly, the 1982 Merger Guidelines departed from the 1968 
Guidelines by emphasising the analysis of a transaction’s competitive effects rather than merely on market 
concentration. 
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as addressed throughout this study, other policy objectives should also be considered by 
China’s competition authority. Due to the market imperfections caused by government 
interventions in a specific context of an emerging market and a transition economy, a pure 
efficiency approach to the objectives of competition policy is inappropriate for China. 
Rather, the emphasis of efficiency should be counterbalanced by other appropriate 
economic and social objectives that competition policy can advance. To avid the ambiguity 
of the objective of competition policy and to avoid the possible conflict between different 
goals, however, it is necessary to keep the object of China’s competition policy as concise 
as possible. The fairness of competition should be another core objective in addition to 
efficiency, or effectiveness of competition. In China, as noted in Subsection 2.2.1, SOEs, 
FIEs and Private-owned Enterprises (POEs) have not been equally treated. A level 
playground for firms is still lacking in China. The uneven playground is fundamentally 
reflected by different treatment to different categories of ownership regarding market entry, 
taxation and financing. Under the condition of discrimination against certain categories of 
firms and market fragmentation, the mechanism of competition may be distorted and firms 
may strive for preferential government policy and regionalised monopoly rent rather than 
true competitiveness. FIEs are in a preferential position in market competition as both the 
central government and local authorities provide various incentives to attract inward FDI. 
Super-national treatment has been given to MNCs. The supportive policies towards 
large-sized SOEs, especially the NKEs, have put them in the favourable position as well. 
In addition, they have the strongest influential power for the formulation of the industrial 
policy. It may not be easy for the government agencies to resist the pressures from SOEs 
because the government departments and SOEs can be considered as different parts of the 
same state sector (see Subsection 8.1.1). In the process of policy formulation, the interests 
of incumbent firms are typically well protected due to the strong bargaining power of them 
and potential entrants were typically in a weak position. Therefore non-state-owned 
domestic firms generally face an unfair business environment and an uneven playground. 
Entry restrictions toward POEs in specific sectors highlight this ‘unfairness’.  
As argued in Subsection 2.2.1, policy reforms should seek to build institutions without 
discrimination and providing equal opportunities to all the people. The Chinese 
government needs to be more aware of the dual effects of specific reform measures in 
affecting both efficiency and equality. The specific institutional arrangements on the 
competition issue in China need to achieve the ‘effectiveness’ for the Chinese model of 
economic development. Considering the balance between efficiency and equity, we 
propose an ‘effectiveness’ approach, which aims to ensure ‘effective and fair competition’ 
(see Table 8-7) and thus to promote long-term economic development. The targets of a 
formal competition policy are not individuals but enterprises. Achieving equal treatment 
towards different categories of firms is crucial to China’s competition policy. Eliminating 
or relaxing entry restrictions is the basic approach in China at represent to ensure ‘effective 
and fair competition’ and thus to promote industrial development. However, the 
government should have a balanced view on entry control. In the specific economic and 
industrial context in Chinese industries which are characterised by the strong presence of a 
state sector and local government interventions, there are always uncontrolled needs for 
investment due to the problem of soft budgetary constraints. In addition, as suggested in 
Section 5.2, state-led investment projects are normally based on uneconomic government 
decisions. Accordingly, immediate abandon of entry control and totally free entry in some 
previous regulated sectors may worsen the already serious problem of overinvestment. On 
the other hand, too strict entry restrictions may lead to the insufficiency of competition and 
consequently a series of problems, as demonstrated by the case of the passenger car 
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industry. For these industries, therefore, an appropriate degree of entry control is still 
necessary at present, while achieving equal treatment towards different categories of firms, 
particularly non-discriminative treatment towards POEs, is especially important. 
Table 8-7 Objectives of China’s competition policy 
Efficiency: 
Effective competition 
 
Economic Objectives 
Economic efficiency (and economic welfare) 
– Static: low prices 
– Dynamic: technological change and innovation 
Economic development 
Other economic objectives 
– Protecting small business 
– Maintaining employment 
– Market integration 
Equity: 
Fair competition 
 
Non-economic Objectives 
Equity 
Social welfare 
Fairness (fair competition) 
Freedom (of trade, choice and action) 
Pluralism (political as well as economic) 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness: 
Effective and fair competition 
 
Linking competition policy to development goals through the implementation of ‘smart governance’ measures 
(cf. Van Tulder, 1999). Performance oriented. Towards an ‘appropriate’ competition policy regime of ‘optimal 
competition’ (cf. Singh, 1999) 
The maintenance and promotion of competition was realised by countering private 
restrictions on competition. Although there is disagreement over what constitutes private 
restraints to competition, the main targets of competition policy are private restraints on 
competition and abuses of market dominance. However, probably the strongest foundation 
of market dominance comes from the government. Wherever the government uses its 
authority to exclude potential competitors it is likely to enhance market dominance (Utton, 
2003). It may be in the form of exclusive licenses, tariffs, quotas and the programs of 
nationalisation or privatisation. In some specific jurisdictions, the role of competition 
policy includes lessening the adverse effects of government intervention in the market and 
state-owned firms are subject to the rule of competition policy. For instance, in Italy, 
competition law applies to both public and private firms and firms supplying public 
services or operating a monopolistic position are exempted from competition law only 
within the limits of the mission attributed to them. The provisions in Canada’s Competition 
Act are similar. In Sweden the Competition Ombudsman may propose changes to existing 
regulations that would enhance the competitive environment. Improving access and 
opening markets by reducing barriers to entry through deregulation, privatisation, tariff 
reduction, or removal of quotas and licenses are specified as objectives of competition 
policy in some countries (see Subsection 3.2.1).  
The EU competition policy makes it possible to ensure that healthy competition is not 
hampered by anticompetitive practices on the part of companies or national authorities. 
The introduction of competition law is in the European Union is a unique case. Its 
members have collective and national antitrust legislation, with the competition regime of 
the European Union incorporated into the national laws of individual member states. One 
of the primary goals of the European Union’s competition regime – highlighted in articles 
of the Treaty of Rome and enforced by the European Commission – is economic 
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integration among the member countries. In addition to countering private restraints on 
competition, the EU competition policy also seeks to prevent the member states’ 
governments from distorting competition. By giving certain firms or products favoured 
treatment to the detriment of other firms or products, ‘state aid’ can severely disrupts 
normal competitive forces. The EC Treaty prohibits state aid that distorts competition in 
the Common Market. The Article 86 of EC Treaty states that the rules on competition also 
apply to public undertakings. Article 87 of the EC Treaty states that ‘any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the common market’. The EC Treaty, however, allows exceptions to the ban on state 
aid where the proposed aid schemes may have a beneficial impact in overall Union terms. 
The provisions in the EU competition law that seek to prevent the member states’ 
governments from distorting competition can particularly be applicable for China. The 
restrictions on competition can be from firms and they may also be from governments by 
granting public aid to businesses. The issue of public aid in the European Union is 
principally associated with the member states, while in China it is related to supportive 
measures from local governments and industrial polices formulated at the central level. 
Inter-regional rivalry has provided an impetus for infrastructure improvement and 
institutional innovation at the local level and thus contributed to local economic growth 
(see Subsection 2.1.4). However, it also leads to regional protectionism in the forms of 
preferential treatment towards local firms and restrictions on non-local firms, thus 
seriously worsening the problem of market fragmentation, which provided a severe 
challenge for China’s long-term economic development. Despite China’s rapid integration 
into international markets, some domestic markets remain fragmented due to the 
intervention of local governments (see Subsection 2.2.1). As suggested in Subsection 2.2.1, 
many product markets remain localised and segmented as many local governments used 
their regulatory and other discretionary powers to favour the purchase of products made 
within their jurisdiction. In addition to achieving a level playground for firms, concerns 
should be given to creating an integrated market. The EU competition policy can be taken 
as an example for the relevant provisions on the issue of market integration in the 
implementation of China’s competition policy.  
Competition advocacy as a priority 
Competition may not only be hindered by private restrictions but also, under certain 
circumstances, by government interventions. A major difference between competition 
issues in developed and developing countries relates to the source of anticompetitive 
restrictions. In developing countries, a dominant position often results from the direct 
action of governments (Khemani and Dutz, 1995). They may be well protected by artificial 
entry barriers and trade barriers. This is quite different to the ways in which enterprises 
have evolved in developed countries. The implication in terms of competition policy is that 
a simple transfer of the lessons of competition policy from developed countries to 
low-income developing countries may be inappropriate.  
In developed countries, the objectives of competition policies can be in principle 
achieved by the promotion of competitive process through the prevention of the abuse of 
market dominance. In developing countries such as China, however, the lack of 
competition in industries has been largely determined by restrictive government policies, 
particularly entry restrictions. Therefore competition advocacy should be a priority for the 
implementation of China’s competition policy. Competition authorities do not have a direct 
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mandate over commercial, regulatory and privatisation policies but can wield influence 
favouring market-determined solutions. In some countries, competition authorities can 
analyse whether regulatory measures from the public sector will negatively affect 
competition and strive to have any measures that unreasonably limit competition amended 
or abolished. This function of the competition policy is realised by competition advocacy 
(see Subsection 3.2.2 for a definition). Different from the three main areas of enforcement 
activity, competition advocacy is conducted mainly through competition agencies’ 
relations with other government entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits 
of competition (ICN, 2002). Based on the experience of other developing countries such as 
South Korea, the competition advocacy and legislation consultancy should be a necessary 
part of the responsibility of the future Chinese competition authority. In the early stage of 
the development of a competition policy regime, advocacy may be the central concern. 
Through twenty-some years of transition, as discussed in Section 2.1, the Chinese 
economy has been transformed from an economic system without competition to a system 
in which competition plays an essential role. This process has been largely led by 
procompetitive government policies. At the same time, however, the role of government in 
the acquisition, exercise and maintenance of market dominance of firms has remained 
considerable in the reform era. In most occasions, dominant positions were granted to a 
very limited number of large-sized SOEs. This took place primarily in the generally closed 
industrial sectors (mainly resource-based heavy industries and utility industries) such as 
electricity, gas, petroleum, steel and non-ferrous metals (see Subsection 5.2.2 for a detailed 
discussion). These sectors are also those that have been least deregulated in developed 
countries as well. Some cases took place in competitive manufacturing industries such as 
the passenger car industry. Sometimes MNCs are intensively involved, as highlighted by 
the case of the passenger car industry. As the aftermath of the 1998 agreement in China’s 
photo film industry (see Subsection 5.2.4) showed, for instance, Kodak was able to 
dominate the market and preempt its competitors by harnessing the sovereign power of the 
Chinese government for its own end. As discussed in Section 8.1, regulatory interventions, 
coupled with bureaucratic administrative practices adversely affect business decisions, the 
performance of firms and the resource allocation function of markets in some Chinese 
industries. In this respect, reform of the policies and regulations regarding the market entry 
are especially relevant.  
Effective competition advocacy is a particular priority for the successful 
implementation of China’s competition policy. In the process of industrial policy 
formulation, the interests of the incumbent SOEs are typically well protected due to the 
strong bargaining power of them, while the representatives of the interests of consumers 
were usually absent (see Subsection 8.1.1). Therefore, a central agency advocating 
competition, particularly for the interests of consumers, is a crucial factor underlying the 
effectiveness of China’s competition policy. For the Chinese competition agency, priority 
should be given to competition advocacy thus to promote a competitive environment for 
economic activities. When a large number of laws and government mandates will be newly 
introduced after the WTO entry, this function of competition advocacy is particularly 
important. The advocacy activities of the Chinese competition agency should target at both 
other government agencies that are in charge of industry-related policy-making and the 
society at large. By advocating with the relevant government agencies, the government 
agency aims at curing anticompetitive effects of regulatory intervention. The advocacy 
efforts of the competition agency may lead to the rejection or revision of unnecessary 
anticompetitive regulatory measures, or for the adoption of policies as 
competition-friendly as possible. One of the most important factors underlying the 
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effectiveness of competition laws is recognition of the importance of competition law and 
a willingness to enforce it by both the government and the society at large (World Bank, 
2002). To raise the public awareness of importance of competition, the Chinese 
competition agency should also advocate with the judicial system, economic agents and 
the public at large. 
8.3.2 Instruments of China’s Competition Policy: Stipulating Provisions 
The present regime of China’s competition policy mainly includes the Law to 
Counter-Unfair Competition, the Law of the Protecting Consumers’ Rights, the Price Law, 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulations, and regulations against unfair competition acts 
in specific industries, as well as a preliminary system of merger control (see Subsection 
2.2.3). Although the scope of China’s present competition regime is broad, a large part of 
the three widely accepted principal areas of modern competition law are still not covered 
by the present competition policy regime. An independent competition policy agency is 
still lacking in China. The government agencies currently involved includes the SAIC and 
the Ministry of Commerce. The current Chinese competition policy, therefore, remains 
relying on transitional institutions. But the attitude of the Chinese government towards the 
issue of competition policy has changed as a new legislation plan is implemented in order 
to expedite the convergence between domestic and international institutions after the WTO 
accession. A draft version of Antimonopoly Law has been circulated at the end of 2003. 
Several previous overlooked aspects of competition policy have been covered by this act 
which can be considered as the core of China’s future formal competition policy. However 
considerable problems remain as to targets, instruments and provisions of China’s 
competition policy. What can be learned from other jurisdictions? 
Provisions on agreements among firms 
The enforcement of competition policy against collusions (or cartel agreements) is one of 
the main fields of competition policies. Collusions are treated strictly in most country with 
competition policy. However, many competition authorities provide administrative or civil 
remedies rather than criminal penalties, while others criminalise this category of 
competition offences. It remains that anti-cartel enforcement levels around the world 
remain relatively low outside the United States. Several jurisdictions have established their 
own record of anti-cartel enforcement actions and others have toughened their enforcement 
programs. Jurisdictions including the European Union, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, 
South Korea, Japan, Mexico and Spain have taken significant actions against cartels. 
Several other countries, including the Netherlands, South Africa and the United Kingdom 
have enacted strong new competition laws and are putting anti-cartel enforcement in place.  
Different legal and economic standards have been adopted to attack collusions in 
different jurisdictions. Some countries treat cartel agreements with a per se approach. 
Others do not employ a per se rule and competition agency must distinguish between 
agreements that reduce competition on balance and those that promote competition on 
balance or are competitively neutral. Table 8-8 shows the standards adopted by different 
jurisdictions towards collusions. In the United States, the European Union, Germany and 
Australia, for example, price-fixing is per se illegal and subject to criminal penalties. The 
US Supreme Court has determined that cartel agreements are so universally and obviously 
destructive of competition that they are always unreasonable and that they are thus illegal 
‘per se’. If the parties can be proven entering one of these types of agreements, they are 
guilty of a Sherman Act violation and no discussion of the alleged reasonableness or 
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benefits of the agreement is necessary. In Canada, although such agreements are treated as 
criminal acts, they must affect a substantial part of the market. In Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, a rule-of-reason standard is applied to judge the legality of collusions. 
Table 8-8 Standards towards collusions 
Per se standard Substance standard Rule-of-reason standard 
Australia 
European Union 
Germany 
United States 
Canada Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
The use of straightforward per se prohibition may simplify the judicial process and can 
provide clear guidance for firms. If the per se approach applies too broadly, however, the 
implementation of competition policy may stifle business activities that could enhance 
competition and efficiency. Agreements that may enhance competition should be evaluated 
to determine whether they are, on balance, pro- or anti-competitive. Most competition laws 
take a rather liberal view of horizontal agreements other than cartels – such agreements are 
allowed unless there is a good reason to prohibit them. The agreements are prohibited only 
if they are, on balance, harmful to competition. Competition authorities balance the 
competitive benefits and costs of a particular agreement and then determine whether the 
agreement is reasonable. In a variety of cases in the implementation of competition 
policies such a ‘rule of reason’ approach is adopted. As a specific sort of horizontal 
agreements, cartel agreements are usually distinguished from other forms of agreements 
and treated with the per se approach. However, the draft version of China’s Antimonopoly 
Law seems to generally adopt a ‘rule of reason’ approach and does not distinguish cartel 
agreements.  
In the United States collusion are commonly treated with criminal sanctions, with 
potentially large fines to injured parties. The DOJ devotes substantial staff to detecting and 
challenging cartels. The European Commission staff for cartel enforcement is much 
smaller, but they cooperate with staff in competition agencies in member states. There is 
no investigative staff and cartels are normally investigated only following a complaint 
(Graham and Richardson 1997). This weaker enforcement of cartels in the European Union 
could be partly a legacy of the history. Prior to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which codified 
European competition law, cartels were customary in Europe. The differences in the 
treatment of cartels between the United States and the European Union also reflect the 
general differences in their objectives for competition policy. These differences are 
important for developing countries in general and China in particular, which may model 
their institutions after those of the United States or the European Union. 
In the design of the competition policy regime to fight cartel agreements, there are 
complex mechanisms adopted by other jurisdictions, which can be learned by China. Since 
1978, the DOJ has allowed for the possibility of avoiding criminal sanctions if specific 
conditions occurred. This program promises the first firm that reports an existing cartel 
agreement to the antitrust authorities a complete exemption from fines. In 1993 this policy 
was redesigned into the Corporate Leniency Policy, which clarified that criminal sanctions 
can be avoided in two cases: 1) if a colluding firm reveals information before an 
investigation is opened; 2) if the DOJ has not yet been able to prove collusion when a firm 
decides to cooperate. The implementation of this new leniency policy has shown a 
significant success in terms of the number of cases that the DOJ has been able to open and 
successfully conclude. The DOJ’s success under its Corporate Leniency Policy has been 
studied by other jurisdictions. Following the United States, the European Union introduced 
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in 1996 a similar leniency policy, in which more generous fine reductions can be given to 
firms which cooperate with the antitrust authority before an inquiry is opened by providing 
evidence of a collusive agreement in which they have been involved, while limited 
reductions can be granted if cooperation occurs after the opening of a case. Canada and the 
United Kingdom have also promulgated and improved their own corporate leniency 
programs. 
The US experience demonstrates that the extension of the leniency program to 
post-investigation amnesty is a crucial ingredient for a leniency policy. Motta and Polo 
(2003) analysed the effects of leniency programs on the incentives of firms to collude and 
to reveal information that helps the antitrust agency to verify illegal practices. They 
demonstrated that, by reducing the expected fines, leniency programs may induce a 
pro-collusive reaction. Thus, if the resources available to the antitrust authority are 
sufficient to prevent collusion, leniency programs should not be used. However, when the 
antitrust authority has limited resources, leniency programs might lead to more effective 
enforcement against cartel agreements. The authors showed that the optimal arrangements 
require maximum fine reduction rather than part reduction and a leniency program should 
be equally applicable to information disclosed before and after an investigation has started. 
According to the authors, allowing fine reductions only to firms which report to the 
antitrust agency before an inquiry is opened is inferior to the arrangement by which firms 
are entitled to fine discounts even if they reveal after an inquiry is opened. China’s 
competition agency should consider optimal institutional arrangements based on this 
foreign experience when designing and implementing a leniency program. 
Provisions on abuses of market dominance 
Investigating alleged abuses of a dominant position may be the most controversial and 
difficulty task for competition agencies. With regard to the treatment of this issue, 
currently there are remarkable differences between US and EU laws.24 Some competition 
laws and implementation guidelines have market share thresholds incorporated to simplify 
the inference of a dominant position. Thresholds provide clarity to the business community 
and it is important to be retained in some forms. According to the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, the US antitrust agencies divide the spectrum of market concentration as 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) into three regions that can be broadly 
characterised as not concentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately concentrated (HHI 
between 1000 and 1800) and highly concentrated (HHI above 1800).25 A survey of 
competition laws in 50 countries conducted for the World Development Report 2002 
(World Bank, 2002)26 revealed that 28 out of 50 countries have qualitative definitions of 
dominance, while the remaining 22 countries have a wide range of market shares as their 
benchmarks (see Table 8-9). Most OECD countries define dominance qualitatively. 
Several Latin American countries also define dominance qualitatively, but other 
developing countries tend to have quantitative benchmarks.  
                                                        
24 See Utton (2003) for a detailed discussion.  
25 See Subsection 4.2.1 for the discussion of HHI and other measures of concentration. As an aid to the 
interpretation of market data, according to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the US antitrust agencies use 
the HHI to measure market concentration. 
26 This report showed that different conceptions of competition reflected in two key elements of competition law 
across countries: what constitutes dominance – the ability of a firm to unilaterally control price and output in the 
market – and how countries deal with cartels, or agreement between firms. Differences are also reflected in the 
way competition laws are enforced. 
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Table 8-9 Benchmarks of market dominance in competition laws 
Country group  Market share 
Developing countries  
East Asia 50-75 percent 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 30-40 percent 
Africa 20-45 percent 
Developed countries  
United States Two thirds or more 
European Union 40-50 percent 
                   Source: World Bank (2002). 
In the draft version of China’s Antimonopoly Law, market share thresholds simplifying 
a dominant position are provided. According to the Article 16 of this draft law, a dominant 
position can be inferred as the market share of a firm or the combined market share of 
several firms reaching the following thresholds: 1) the market share of one firm is above 
1/2; 2) the combined market share of two firms is above 2/3; 3) the combined market share 
of three firms is above 3/4. Thus it seems that the draft law has adopted a concept of ‘joint 
dominance’, which was used by the European Commission. As suggested in Subsection 
3.2.3, a per se approach may well be adopted against cartel agreements, while a 
rule-of-reason approach that evaluates facts on a case-by-case basis is likely to be more 
appropriate when dealing with abuses of a dominant position. China’s competition 
authority should avoid a simplistic treatment of market dominance as a matter of market 
share. The competition agent should carefully balance the competitive benefits and costs of 
a particular behaviour. In this sense, a qualitative rather than a quantitative definition of 
market dominance may be more reasonable, considering the complexity of measuring 
market competition and economic efficiency particularly in the context of a developing 
economy. 
M&A control 
Te legal framework of China’s merger control system is embodied in a number of 
regulations on merger and acquisition targeting at different ownership categories of firms, 
promulgated and implemented by different government agencies (see Subsection 5.2.5). 
Therefore the central issue for China’s merger control system is to centralise China’s M&A 
control by integrating various regulations and concentrating administrative power to one 
government agency. In practice, a merger control policy targets not only merger and 
takeovers, but also joint ventures or other acquisitions of control, including interlocking 
directorship.27 Due to the fact that many foreign mergers have been implemented in the 
form of IJVs, it is important to include joint venture in the targets of China’s merger 
control system. This has been neglected by some regulations on (foreign) mergers 
promulgated in recent years.  
The merger control system should cover the notification, investigation and prohibition 
of M&As, no matter whether they are horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. With regard to 
the merger notification system, there are three categories of institutional arrangements (see 
Table 8-10). Mandatory pre-closing notification system has been the mainstream model in 
controlling mergers. Both the United States and the European Union have established a 
system of notification prior to the consummation of mergers (for other examples of merger 
notification systems see Table 8-10). For most jurisdictions, notification is mandatory only 
                                                        
27 See UNCTAD (2000b). 
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when the proposed M&As are above certain thresholds. Notification triggers in merger 
control differ across jurisdictions.28 Many indicators, such as total annual turnover and 
total assets, can be used as notification thresholds. China’s merger control system should 
provide detailed provisions concerning the notification, procedural issues and penalties. 
The thresholds clarified in the draft version of China’s Antimonopoly Law only simplify 
the inference of a dominant position and do not provide criteria to challenge a merger 
because in the draft law, the notification criteria is not clarified and is stated to be 
determined by the State Council. The notification trigger for foreign M&As has been 
clarified in ‘Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors’. Concerning the inconsistency between different regulations towards 
different ownership categories of enterprises, the current merger control system in China is 
far from effective. To design a ‘unified’ system of merger control without discrimination 
between different ownership categories of enterprises should be a key consideration in 
establishing a formal merger policy in China.  
Table 8-10 Classification of merger notification systems 
Mandatory pre-closing notification system Mandatory post-closing notification system 
Voluntary notification 
system 
Albania 
Argentina 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
European Union 
Estonia 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Mexico 
Republic of Moldova 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan, China 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United States 
Uzbekistan 
Yugoslavia 
Argentina 
Denmark 
Greece 
Indonesia 
Japan 
South Korea 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Spain 
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
Tunisia 
 
Australia 
Chile 
Cote d’Ivoire 
France 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Panama 
United Kingdom 
Venezuela 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2000b).  
When examining horizontal or vertical mergers, competition authorities attempt to 
prevent the creation or enhancement of market power. However, substantive evaluation 
criteria in merger control differ across jurisdictions. According to the 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines of the United States, sound merger enforcement must prevent 
anticompetitive mergers yet avoid deterring the larger universe of procompetitive or 
                                                        
28 See the Annex III of UNCTAD (2000b) for details of notification triggers. 
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competitively neutral mergers. The competition authorities should not intervene if a 
horizontal merger may have a negligible effect on market power (see Subsection 3.2.2). In 
case that a merger simultaneously enhance market power and promote technical efficiency, 
the competition authorities have to decide whether the merger should be blocked, 
principally based on the trade-off between the probable increase in market power and the 
prospective efficiency improvement. Due to the space limit of a single legislation, China’s 
Antimonopoly Law should provide some general principles on substantive review and 
prohibition criterion and detailed analytical roadmap for the evaluation of mergers should 
be elaborated in a specific enforcement guideline. 
8.3.3 Implementation Framework and Process: Designing the Institution 
In China, there has been an ‘informal’ competition policy regime, which relies on 
transitional institutional arrangements. A number of critical problems exist in China’s 
current competition policy regime. First, an antitrust law, the core of a competition policy 
system, is lacking. Secondly, an independent competition agency has not been established. 
Thirdly, there has been no centralised system of merger control that is implemented by a 
specialised competition agency, without discrimination between different ownership 
categories of firms. Furthermore, the public awareness of competition issues is weak. To 
establish a formal competition policy in China, comprehensive institutional arrangements 
should be made for the implementation of a competition policy. A competition policy 
regime comprises both substantial legal rules and an enforcement system of these rules. As 
suggested in Subsection 3.2.3, the implementation framework and process differ from 
jurisdictions, but usually addresses four basic functions: 1) initiates proceedings, 2) 
undertakes investigations, 3) adjudicates contested competition proceedings, and 4) 
judicial review of competition decisions. The design of an implementation framework with 
significant account of China’s social, economic, political and legal context as well as the 
current transitional institutions is a demanding task. 
Competition law 
A competition law, as stressed in Subsection 3.2.3, is the core of a competition policy 
regime. A competition law should specify objects of the competition policy and cover the 
three main enforcement areas of a competition policy. In developed countries that have 
introduced competition policies for decades, the current competition laws are the result of 
a long-term process of evolution and are usually embodied in different acts. For instance, 
the acts that have defined US antitrust policy include the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, 
Federal Trade Commission Act, Robinson-Patman Act, Celler-Kefauver Act and the 
Antitrust Enforcement Improvement Act (see Subsection 3.2.3). As latecomers of 
competition legislation, developing countries can centralise the antitrust provisions in one 
act that covers all necessary aspects of a competition policy regime, based on the 
experience of the precedent jurisdictions. However, developing countries can also design a 
legal framework including several separate acts covering different aspects of a competition 
policy in order to take account of the domestic legal and administrative framework. For 
China, the core of the competition policy regime, an antitrust law, is still absent. The 
present regime of competition policy is mainly centred on the Law to Counter-Unfair 
Competition, which covers a number of business anticompetitive practices such as 
predatory pricing and bid rigging. The centre theme of a competition policy, collusions or 
cartel agreements, has not been covered. Specific provisions for an effective merger policy 
are also lacking. A practical choice for China is to enact a centralised competition law (the 
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Antimonopoly Law) covering all three main aspects of competition policy enforcement 
and also defining an effective administrative framework for the implementation of 
competition policy, including the critical function of competition advocacies. The Law to 
Counter-Unfair Competition is clearly not sufficient for a formal competition policy, but 
the present enforcement of this law is well functioning. Therefore the interface between the 
newly enacted competition law and the Law to Counter-Unfair Competition should be 
carefully defined. In the short run, a separate enforcement of the two laws is practical. In 
the long run, most previous laws and regulations should be abrogated and replaced 
gradually and a centralised legal framework built around the Antimonopoly Law and 
affiliated enforcement guidelines should be formally established.  
Enforcement guidelines 
A competition law should be supplemented with enforcement guidelines, which was issued 
and followed by the competition agency. The enforcement guidelines also inform the 
business community of relevant policies. In the United States, several antitrust guidelines 
have been issued (for current effective guidelines see Table 8-11). Different guidelines deal 
with specific issues in antitrust enforcement. For instance, the ‘Guides for Advertising 
Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services’, the so-called ‘Fred Meyer 
Guidelines’, deals with advertising and promotional assistance given by suppliers to their 
reseller customers in connection with resale activities. The ‘Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy in Health Care’ explains how physician networks will be treated by the 
antitrust authorities. The ‘Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property’ 
clarifies the role of antitrust policy in high-technology industries. The ‘Antitrust 
Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors’ addresses the issues that arise when 
direct competitors seek to cooperate in the approaches such as to set standards or to 
participate in joint ventures. Probably the most influential antitrust guidelines are the 
‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’, which were issued and followed by both the DOJ and the 
FTC. The Merger Guidelines were first issued in 1968 and totally revised in 1982 under 
the first Reagan administration. In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC jointly issued Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines revising the DOJ’s 1984 Merger Guidelines and the FTC’s 1982 
Statement Concerning Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In 1997, the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines was revised to expand the explanation of how the antitrust agencies will treat 
efficiencies.  
Table 8-11 US antitrust guidelines 
Guidelines Year of promulgation 
Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services 1990 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992 (revised in 1997) 
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care 1994 (revised in 1996) 
Antitrust enforcement guidelines for international operations 1995 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 2000 
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors 2000 
Some issues that have been covered by the US antitrust guidelines may also be 
important for the implementation of China’s competition policy. Perhaps the most 
important issue is a detailed guidance on market definition. The 1982 revision of the US 
Merger Guidelines began to provide detailed guidance for market definition. By 
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introducing the concept of antitrust market29, the US competition authorities define the 
relevant market as ‘the narrowest product and geographic area in which a hypothetical 
monopolist could profitably raise and maintain prices above the competitive level 
significantly (of the order of 5 percent) for a substantial period of time’. The Merger 
Guidelines provides a paradigm for defining relevant product and geographic markets that 
is based on the likely demand response of consumers to an anticompetitive price increase. 
Market definition should take into account both the demand and supply considerations and 
include both actual and potential sellers. Considering the importance of market definition 
in the implementation of a competition policy, a guideline providing detailed guidance for 
market definition in competition investigation should be promulgated within a short-term 
period. 
In the implementation of competition policies, market definition continues to cause 
problems, even in the United States, which has detailed guidelines for this issue since the 
early 1980s. On the demand side, goods or services should be treated as being in the same 
market if they are close substitutes. The greater the range of products included as 
substitutes, the smaller will be the market share of the dominant firm, the larger will be its 
own demand elasticity, and therefore the smaller its market power. Defendants in antitrust 
cases therefore always argue strongly in favour of more products being included in the 
correct identification of the market. On the supply side, if the elasticity of supply is high, it 
will also tend to increase the firm’s own price elasticity and reduce its market power. If we 
broaden our consideration of supply elasticity this may further affect the market power of 
dominance firms. The definition of the market is crucial in EU cases, but it appears to have 
taken on a rather different significance (Utton, 2003). It has been argued, notably by 
Fairburn et al. (1986), that, rather than establishing dominance independently and as a first 
step prior to an examination of evidence of abuse, the EU authorities have tended to 
determine that an abuse has occurred and then define the relevant market in such a way 
that dominance is unquestionable. This has been changed since December 1997 when the 
European Commission adopted the Notice on Market Definition and make defining the 
relevant market a first-step necessity.  
Enforcement system 
In addition to the substantial legal rules clarified in the competition law, an enforcement 
system of the competition law should be established. The system comprises both a judicial 
and an administrative framework, the functioning of each of which should be specified by 
the competition law. A pure administrative framework of competition policy without 
judicial participation may be a more efficient choice for China. However, to incorporate 
the logic of ‘check and balance’ and to restrain the administrative power of the government, 
an independent judicial system would be crucial to the successful implementation of 
China’s formal competition policy. The independent judicial body should have the final 
adjudicative power and should be qualified to fulfil the obligation of the judicial review of 
                                                        
29 An antitrust market is ‘the minimum area and a collection of producers who could, in principle, exercise 
market power in that area if they acted collectively.’ (Geroski, 1998: 681) The market boundaries are determined 
by the hypothetical monopolist test: Firms compete in the same relevant market if a hypothetical, profit 
maximising and unregulated sole supplier can be expected now and in the future to ‘impose a small but 
significant and non-transitory' increase in price above prevailing or likely future levels.’ (DOJ, Merger Guidelines, 
1982) The basic idea is asking the following question: If a supplier increases its price to a level above the 
competitive price, would consumers still buy from that supplier (such an increase may be small, as long as it is 
significant and non-transitory)? 
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competition decisions. An independent government agency should take the responsibility 
of fulfilling the other three basic functions: 1) initiates proceedings, 2) undertakes 
investigations, and 3) adjudicates competition proceedings. Competition decisions should 
be made by the government agency and an appeal against a decision may be brought to the 
Court. Both the competition agency and the private sector should have the authority to 
lodge suits and thus to initiate proceedings. If the government is the only agent with this 
authority, the effectiveness of competition law in promoting competition can be 
undermined (World Bank, 2002). For the competition agency, the key enforcement 
decisions are whether to initiate an investigation. Another important decision is whether to 
settle or litigate. Before taking formal actions, the competition agency usually gives the 
targets of their investigations a chance to settle.  
The institutional arrangements of the competition agency differ widely across 
jurisdictions. In the European Union, Council Regulation 179 empowers the European 
Commission to enforce Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The Commission is divided 
into Directorates-General (DGs), each responsible for a different policy area. DG 
Competition is responsible for competition policy. DG competition is divided into several 
directorates. DG Competition/A is responsible for policy, legislation and coordination. DG 
Competition/B is called the merger task force and is responsible for investigating notified 
mergers. DG Competition/C to F investigate individual cases under Articles 81 and 82, 
each specialising in a particular industry. DG Competition/G handles state aid matters. 
Investigations by the DG Competition may originate from a complaint, a parliamentary 
question, as a result of notification by an undertaking or on the Commission’s own 
initiative. Many investigations, including those on most mergers, are initiated by way of 
notification. In principle, EU competition policy only applies to cases that affect trade 
between the member states. Member states expected to renounce jurisdiction over a case 
when it is taken up at the EU level. 
In the United States, the DOJ and the FTC are two federal authorities that enforce 
antitrust policy and the states can bring antitrust actions as well. In principle, US Federal 
antitrust laws only have jurisdiction in cases for which ‘interstate commerce’ is affected. In 
fact, ‘interstate commerce’ is almost always affected. The DOJ is a part of the Executive 
Branch of the United States. The Attorney General is the head of the DOJ and serves at the 
discretion of the President. The Antitrust Division of the DOJ is the competition arm of the 
DOJ. The head of the Antitrust Division reports to the Attorney General and is in charge of 
investigations and prosecutions of criminal violations, merger control, and non-merger 
violations that do not rise to the level of a criminal infraction. The FTC is an ‘independent’ 
agency, meaning that it is not a part of the Executive Branch of the US government. Five 
individuals serve as commissioners, who are appointed for staggered terms of seven years. 
The commissioners make the decisions of the FTC and they operate by majority vote. The 
DOJ and the FTC have informally divided enforcement responsibility by industry, but in 
many cases there are overlaps (Litan and Shapiro, 2001).30 Where that occurs, there may 
be tension between the DOJ and the FTC. Clearly, a relatively centralised competition 
agency as the EU model – although based on the principle of subsidiarity which implies 
that national/local competition authorities can have an important say over their ‘relevant 
market’ – is a more efficient choice for China. But the experience of the institutional 
arrangements to ensure independence of the FTC is also worthy to learn. Both the Europe 
                                                        
30 The DOJ has handled airlines and telecommunications, for example, while the FTC has specialised in the oil 
industry and pharmaceuticals. 
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Commission and the United States in the FTC have adopted a commission structure. The 
commissions in these jurisdictions are responsible for investigating conduct, bringing 
proceedings and adjudicating disputes. Judicial review is generally not available until 
decisions have been formally rendered by commissions themselves. Considering China’s 
specific political environment, a commission structure within the Executive Branch can be 
a practical choice for the institutional arrangements of China’s future competition agency. 
Unlike the US and the EU models, a centralised (in terms of central-local relationship) 
administrative structure should be adopted in order to avoid inappropriate interventions 
from local governments when competition policy actions are taken at the local levels and 
to promote the development of an integrated national market. 
Several issues should be considered to build an effective competition authority. First, it 
is important to ensure the independence of China’s competition authority.31 The future 
competition authority should be independent of a government ministry and should have its 
own budget. It is crucial to ensure that the competition agency acts independently to fulfil 
its responsibility of competition advocacy and to represent the interests of consumers in 
the formulation of government policies. To ensure the independence of the US competition 
policy implementation, as mentioned above, the FTC is designed as an ‘independent’ 
agency outside the Executive Branch of the US government. Rather than this approach, a 
possible solution for China is that the head of the authority is appointed by a committee or 
the parliament rather than by the head of the government. Independence of competition 
authorities from government ministries may be more important in developing economies 
than in developed countries, where there are more checks and balances in the political 
systems and where greater transparency protects the independence of competition 
authorities. Secondly, China’s competition agency should have the legal enforcement 
mandate, which is crucial to effectiveness of competition policy. The competition agency 
needs to have legal enforcement powers so that the agency can adjudicate the competition 
proceedings without referring the Court. The competition agency should have the statutory 
authority to force firms to provide necessary information. Thirdly, China’s competition 
agency should have adequate budgets and staff to perform its functions. The 
implementation of competition policy requires high levels of expertise in colleting relevant 
information, engaging business and industry expertise, analytical skills, and a sophisticated 
understanding of relevant theoretical frameworks (Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2002). The 
development of this expertise requires accumulated experience over a long period of time 
for a newly established agency. With the budgetary and human resource constraints, 
priorities of competition law enforcement should be decided in order to distribute a limited 
amount of resources. Currently, as argued in Subsection 8.3.1, competition advocacy 
should be a priority. Fourthly, in order to enhance the performance and public credibility of 
the implementation of competition policy, transparency is important. Decisions by 
competition authority should be publicly available. On the one hand, the public availability 
of competition decisions may have a deterrent effect on potential violations of competition 
law. On the other hand, the competition authority should publish the enforcement 
guidelines to inform the business community of their policies. 
                                                        
31 See World Bank (2002) for a general discussion. 
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8.3.4 Policy Harmonisation and International Cooperation 
When the government introduces a new policy, its implementation may have unintended 
consequences in particular economic, political and social contexts. This situation is 
somewhat analogous to the one in which a medicine tested in a laboratory has unpredicted 
side effects to a human being due to the complexity of living organic systems. This 
suggests that only institutional arrangements that are mutually consistent may be viable 
and sustainable in an economy. Otherwise, an attempted institutional design may be highly 
unstable. There are possibly inconsistence and tension between competition policies and 
other government policies. A formal competition policy should develop collaborative and 
constructive relationships with other policies and the overall political and economic setting 
in which it operates. In addition to domestic harmonisation between different policies, 
international cooperation with other competition authorities in other jurisdictions should be 
considered when implementing a competition policy. 
Policy harmonisation 
A source of tension in the implementation of competition policy is the priority attached to 
competition policy relative to that assigned to other policies. Given the extensive 
interaction the competition policy may have with other government policies in China, there 
are areas in which the respective policy objectives may be complementary such as in the 
case of initiatives directed at the deregulation of monopolistic industries and SOE reform. 
However, in other areas such as trade, industrial, employment and regional development, 
policies conflicts may often arise. The extent of consistency, or its lack, between 
competition policy and other government policies can support or thwart the achievement of 
objectives of competition policy. Thus the harmonisation with other government policies is 
crucial to the effective implementation of competition policy. China’s formal competition 
policy may interact with telecommunications policy intensively. Competition policy may 
also possibly influence the reform of other ‘natural monopolistic industries’, such as 
electricity, gas and railroad, and has an impact on the further openness of service sectors. 
In addition, defining the interface between the merger control and other relevant policies, 
such as the policy on state asset management, should be taken into account. 
At the current stage of China’s economic development, industrial policy should be the 
central concern for policy harmonisation. Industrial policy has been thought to be the 
effective way to stimulate industrial development and to create welfare by means of 
selective support. The experience of Japanese and South Korean industrial policies is 
especially relevant to developing countries, particularly for semi-industrialised countries 
like China.32  For developing countries, much more emphasis should be put to the 
long-term industrial development, because short-term efficiency associated with market 
imperfections might jeopardise long-term development. There should be recognition of the 
importance of an appropriate form of industrial policy and hence the need for a coherence 
between industrial and competition policies (Singh, 1999). Although problems do exist in 
the formulation and implementation of industrial policies, to tackle these problems by 
simply substituting industrial policies with a competition policy is not optimal. As argued 
in Subsection 8.1.2, a more practical choice is to supplement industrial policies with an 
appropriate competition policy. The role of industrial policies in directing resource 
                                                        
32 See Singh (1999). 
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allocation towards specific strategic sectors and in promoting firm competitiveness should 
be made full use of. Meanwhile, competition policy can supplement industrial policy by 
ensuring the markets to be competitive by countering private restrictions on competition 
and by rejecting unnecessary anticompetitive regulatory measures. Thus the risks and 
uncertainty of industrial policies can be avoided through the introduction of competition 
policy.  
Developments in economic theory have enriched our understanding of how competition 
and competition policy may work in the various spheres of an economy and in different 
economies (see Section 3.1 and Section 3.3). Economic development experience of many 
developing countries demonstrates that they can gain from improving competitive 
processes within their economies. Therefore, competition policy could play an important 
role in promoting industrial and economic development. In the post war period of Japan’s 
rapid economic development, however, the competition policy was subordinated to 
industrial policy. Although there has been no comprehensive account of competitive 
situations in Japanese industries during that period, there is evidence that the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) frequently imposed restrictions on market 
competition in order to maintain the private sector’s high propensity to invest (Amsden and 
Singh, 1994). MITI even encouraged a variety of cartel arrangements in a wide range of 
industries. Believing that large enterprises were required for the promotion of 
technological advance and for Japanese firms to compete effectively with their western 
counterparts, MITI also encouraged mergers between leading firms in key industries 
(Amsden and Singh, 1994). However, MITI also made sure that not one cartel developed – 
rather it often invested in creating a number of competing cartels in particular in so-called 
pre-competitive areas like technological development. This proved very effective for 
introducing competition, whilst at the same time triggering growth of domestic industries 
(cf. Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995). In its early phase of economic development, the South 
Korean government followed the Japanese strategy of economic development. South 
Korean government played an important role by its export-oriented growth strategy and 
industrial policy (Nam, 1989). But due to the smaller size of the economy, the South 
Korean government did not have equal opportunities in supporting competing 
conglomerates/cartels by domestic markets. It had to be more selective in its industrial 
policies than the Japanese government (cf. Van Tulder and der Zwart, forthcoming). Like 
in Japan, a strong industrial policy dominated competition policy in the period of rapid 
economic growth. There are many ambiguous exemptions in the competition law that 
permits dominant positions of firms (see Subsection 2.2.4). As a result of the lax 
enforcement of competition policy, South Korea has one of the highest levels of industrial 
concentration in the world. The South Korean government gave higher priority to large 
firms over small and medium-sized enterprises. The chaebols have been given strong 
government support in return for meeting specified performance targets for exports, new 
product development and technological change. In markets, the chaebols competed for 
market share, as that determined their subsequent investment allocations in a particular 
industry. Like Japanese government between 1950 and 1973, the South Korean 
government until the 1990s has purposefully coordinated industrial investment by 
competing chaebols, so as to prevent overcapacity and too much competition (Chang, 
1994). The industrial policy instruments used by Japan and South Korea during their rapid 
economic growth period included administrative guidance and tax reductions. Both 
countries also adopted a series of export promotion measures and import restrictions to 
accelerate industrial development. These governments also tried to subject the selected 
sectors to international competition that forced them to become more efficient. The lax 
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enforcement of competition policy of both countries should also be seen as a part of their 
industrial policy regimes (Singh, 1996). 
The industrial policy instruments served its purpose effectively in the early stages of 
economic development in Japan and South Korea. But as the economy developed and the 
economic environment changed, this type of government intervention began to hamper 
efficient economic performance. Regulation originally justified by market failures 
eventually gave rise to government failures (Lee, 2002). In 1988, the South Korean 
government began to deregulate industries on a vast scale. The government subsequently 
improved its competition policy in a gradual manner towards a level commensurate with 
developed countries (see Subsection 2.2.4). The economic crisis in 1997 accelerated this 
process. The Japanese competition policy also experienced a similar process of 
strengthening and maturing. In a broader perspective of the East Asian region, competition 
policy has become one of the central policy issues after the economic crisis in 1997, in 
which the structural problems of the some East Asian economies were revealed. 
At the current stage of China’s economic development, industrial policy should 
undoubtedly still play a central role in a policy framework to promote industrial 
development. Competition policy provides a necessary supplement to industrial policy. To 
harmonise competition policy and industrial policy, the government agencies in charge of 
implementing both policies should took each other into account. For the implementation of 
industrial policy, it is important to avoid using anticompetitive regulatory measures and to 
focus on providing incentives therefore to guide private investment into specific strategic 
sectors. To avoid distorting the competition mechanism, industry- rather than firm-oriented 
policy measures are more desirable. It is crucial to provide a level playing ground for firms, 
foreign and domestic, private- and state-owned, and to let them compete with each other in 
integrated markets and act in response to market signals. A non-discrimination and 
national treatment policy setting is crucial to allocating resources to efficient firms and 
capable entrepreneurs, thus being constructive for long-term industrial development. 
Selective support towards large firms may help to promote the competitiveness of these 
firms, while the risk lies in that this policy may protect the inefficient firms on the expense 
of truly efficient firms, which have greater potential to build up their competitiveness in a 
condition of ‘fair’ competition. The Japanese and South Korean experience demonstrates 
that elected support should be supplemented with measures to subject the supported firms 
to international competition that forced them to become more efficient. In addition, 
specified performance targets for exports, new product development and technological 
advance should be established for the supported firms. Without fulfilling these targets, the 
government support should be withdrawn and given to more efficient firms. An ideal 
choice for the Chinese government is that selective support should be given to specific 
firms up to some transparent standards despite the ownership categories of them. However, 
due to the political consideration of national interests, domestic firms should be the main 
targets for the government support. Within domestic firms, non-discriminative treatment 
toward POEs and other non-state-owned ownerships is crucial. Thus the policy framework 
of industrial development and competition policy should also be harmonised with policies 
on SOE reform, which may have conflicting objectives with the objective to promote 
long-term industrial development. 
International cooperation 
Expanding international businesses both in China and around the world necessitates 
international cooperation between China’s competition agency and competition authorities 
in other jurisdictions. China’s competition agency will face an increasing number of cases 
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involving foreign firms and increasingly have to address policy decisions that are not 
confined to the national territory. The major challenge may be the risk of inconsistent 
outcomes including conflicting remedies being imposed by different competition 
authorities. China’s competition agency, as its counterparts in other jurisdictions, can face 
the challenges of international competition policy by entering into bilateral cooperation 
agreements and by efforts to promote multilateral cooperation. This dual approach is meant 
to reduce the scope for conflict by sharing information, coordinating procedures, or to 
converge on substantive issues. It should be recognised that a multilateral agreement on 
competition that could improve global welfare cannot be easily negotiated. In the short 
term, the Chinese government should focus on achieving more effective enforcement of 
existing national competition policy and improving the ability of national agencies to 
regulate foreign anticompetitive practices that directly affect domestic markets. Although 
the competition authorities have been granted extraterritorial jurisdiction, a strong 
tendency to apply the Chinese laws to offshore mergers should be avoided at the current 
stage. 
Where competition investigations involve multiple jurisdictions, it is necessary for the 
Chinese competition agency to cooperate with its counterparts in other jurisdictions. To 
cope with the challenges for increased international coordination in competition policy, the 
current focus should be bilateral agreements. In December 2003, China made the first step 
towards formal international cooperation on competition policy. A Memorandum of 
Understanding on competition policy dialogue between China and the European Union has 
been signed between the Ministry of Commerce and the European Commission in Beijing. 
8.3.5 Summary 
At the current stage of China’s economic development, industrial policy should still 
occupy a central position in a policy framework to promote industrial development. 
However, industrial policy instruments are by no means perfect. Certain level of risks, 
inflexibilities and uncertainties is associated the implementation of China’s industrial 
policy. One of the essential problems of China’s present industrial policy is its incapability 
to ensure a sufficient degree of competition in domestic markets. Although free trade and 
market entry could act as a substitute to competition policy, the risks and uncertainties 
associated with industrial policies indicate that competition policy may have an important 
role to play to sustain the Chinese development model. Competition policy provides a 
necessary supplement to industrial policy. Competition policy should be integrated into a 
policy framework to ensure that inward FDI plays a positive role in promoting industrial, 
economic and social development. Although the promotion and protection of market 
competition can be realised without a formal competition policy, as was previously the 
case in a large number of Chinese industries, introducing such a policy would help protect 
the functioning of competitive markets in a more efficient and institutionalised manner. 
China needs to have a competition policy that is designed to take appropriate account of its 
level of development, its specific economic, social and political context, and the long-term 
objective of sustained economic growth. Designing an appropriate competition policy also 
needs learning from foreign experience. Based on these believes, this section provides 
recommendations on the objectives, instruments and institutions of China’s formal 
competition policy. The outlook of an appropriate competition policy for China is 
summarised in Table 8-12.  
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Table 8-12 Outlook of an appropriate competition policy for China: summary of recommendations 
Item Recommendation 
Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
Promote the ‘effective and fair competition’ 
 
– Promotion of economic efficiency and improvement of consumer welfare 
as the central aim  
– Emphasising fairness of competition: an appropriate degree of entry 
control; equal treatment towards different ownership categories of firms 
Instruments 
 
 
 
 
Agreements among firms 
 
 
Abuses of market dominance 
 
 
merger control 
 
 
Giving priority to competition advocacy: promotes public awareness of 
competition issues, builds public support for more competition-friendly 
government policies, and advocates within the government stressing the 
merits of market competition 
 
– Straightforward per se approach to cartel agreements 
– Establishing an leniency program incorporating optimal arrangements 
 
– Adopting a rule-of-reason approach on a case-by-case basis 
– Simplistic treatment of market dominance should be avoided 
 
– Centralising the merger control authority and building a ‘unified’ system 
without discrimination 
– Including (international) joint ventures in the targets of merger control 
Implementation (institution) 
 
 
Competition law 
 
 
 
Enforcement guidelines 
 
Enforcement system 
 
 
 
 
Transferring the current competition policy based on transitional institutions 
into a formal competition policy regime 
 
– Enacting a centralised competition law (the Antimonopoly Law) 
– Defining the interface between the new law and previous laws at present 
– Establishing a centralised legal framework in the long run 
 
– A detailed guidance on market definition is critical 
 
– An independent judicial body should have the final adjudicative power  
– A centralised administrative agency (a commission structure within the 
Executive Branch) with legal enforcement mandate 
– A centralised (central-local relationship) administrative structure 
– General principles: independence/authority/capability/transparency 
Policy harmonisation 
 
Industrial policy 
 
 
 
Other policies 
 
Developing collaborative and constructive relationships with other policies 
 
– Providing a necessary supplement to industrial policy 
– Representing consumer interests in industrial policy formulation 
– Advocating for competition-friendly and non-discriminative policies 
 
– Harmonising with policies such as deregulation, SOE reform, state-owned 
asset management, telecommunications policy, and so on. 
International cooperation 
 
A dual approach by entering into bilateral cooperation agreements and by 
efforts to promote multilateral cooperation 
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Appendixes 
  
SUMMARY (IN DUTCH) 
 
 
 
 
Vanaf eind jaren negentig heeft de Chinese economie een transformatie ondergaan van een 
central geleide naar een opkomende markt economie. Tijdens dit proces is de economie 
blootgesteld aan nieuwe concurrentiekrachten; via import, nieuwe toetrederes en 
verschillende institutionele maatregelen. Vooral inkomende buitenlandse directe 
investeringen (BDI) vormen een belangrijke nieuwe concurrentiekracht. Deze studie 
onderzoekt inkomende BDI als een industrieel verschijnsel – hoe beïnvloedt de introductie 
van BDI als nieuwe concurrentiekracht de ontwikkeling van lokale industrieën. Door een 
interdisciplinaire aanpak wordt een beter inzicht gegeven het effect van BDI op de 
industriële ontwikkeling in opkomende markten. Gebaseerd op een multi-dimensionaal, 
dynamisch en vergelijkende analyse, onderzoekt deze studie vooral de ontwikkeling van 
twee belangrijke industrieën in China: the auto industrie en de elektronica en ICT 
industrie. The studie illustreert de belangrijke rol van beleid in het bepalen van het effect 
van BDI. Het beleid op industrie niveau wordt vooral vormgegeven door 
toetredingsrestricties en handelsbarrières. Deze studie suggereert dat, in bepaalde gevallen, 
multinationale en lokale ondernemingen samen zullen werken met het doel een markt te 
domineren, bijvoorbeeld door het aangaan van internationale joint ventures. Dit versterkt 
the problemen van markt dominantie, het beperkende effect van regulering en welvaart 
verlies. Deze studie pleit voor een verfijnder en meer op competitie gericht 
beleidsraamwerk, met de bijbehorende nieuwe instituties en verbetering in bestaande 
beleidsinstrumenten. Dit raamwerk is van vitaal belang voor gezonde competitie, voor het 
optimaal benutten van de voordelen en het aanpakken van de nadelen van BDI; allen met 
het doel om op lange termijn duurzame industriële ontwikkeling te bevorderen. 
  
SUMMARY (IN CHINESE) 
 
 
 
 
    在中国经济改革过程中，新的竞争力量通过市场准入和各种制度安排被不断地
引入不同行业。外商直接投资是来自国外的竞争力量直接进入中国产业的首要方
式。本书研究了外商直接投资对竞争、市场结构和中国产业发展的影响，并提出了
相关的政策建议。在对中国经济中新旧各种竞争力量和新的竞争格局进行产业层面
分析的同时，本书亦结合对中国经济发展模式的总结对此进行了宏观层面的分析，
从而对所谓“中国奇迹”提供了一个独特的解读。 
理论上，本书提出了一个分析外商直接投资对产业发展影响的架构，并对传统
的静态和动态分析方法进行了必要的拓展和补充。本书探讨了包括溢出效应、关联
效应和竞争效应在内的外商直接投资影响产业发展的诸多机制，并分析了转轨经济
和新兴市场的特殊环境对外商直接投资作用机制的影响。本书强调了产业层面的政
策环境对于外商直接投资和跨国公司进入对产业发展作用的影响，并特别强调了低
贸易壁垒和松准入管制对于提高市场的可竞争性，保证一定程度的市场竞争以及促
进产业发展的作用。从某种意义上说，本书是对关于竞争性市场体制与中国经济发
展关系理论的进一步诠释以及在产业层面和利用外资领域的细化。 
在实证方面，本书在跨行业分析的基础上重点对中国汽车和电子信息产业进行
了对比分析，从而对不同政策模式对产业发展和跨国公司进入效果的影响进行了概
括。本书对外商直接投资和市场竞争对生产能力提高、技术进步、本国企业发展和
国际竞争力提升等产业发展各方面的影响进行了全面的分析。定量分析的结论表
明，即使在外资大量进入的情况下，竞争的缺乏仍可能存在并造成显著的福利损
失，而以严格和歧视性的进入管制和高关税壁垒为特征的限制性产业政策是竞争缺
乏和企业市场支配地位形成的主要原因。实证分析的结论也证明了竞争性市场结构
对于产业发展的重要作用。然而，在某些竞争性行业中，不必要的管制可能借产业
政策之名长期存在，从而限制市场竞争，影响利用外资的效果，并从多方面制约产
业的发展。特别是在大企业的发展成为产业政策唯一目标的情况下，消费者的利益
很可能被忽略，从而造成企业超额利润和社会净福利损失并存的局面。不仅国有企
业，跨国公司也可能成为此类政策的推动者和受益者。“管制俘获”(regulatory capture) 
假说提供了对这种现象的一个合理解释。 
        本书旨在通过理论和实证分析为产业层面的公共政策制定提供必要的参考。本
书特别强调了一个“竞争友好”(competition-friendly)的政策架构对于确保适度市场竞
争，提高利用外资效果和促进可持续产业发展的作用。该政策架构的建立既需要新
的政策工具(如竞争政策)的推出，又需要对既有政策工具(如产业政策)的完善。作者
希望本研究的结论及相关政策建议能够对中国产业政策和利用外资政策的完善以及
竞争政策(反垄断政策)的推出提供有益的参考。 
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New Competition: Foreign Direct Investment and
Industrial Development in China
Since the late 1970s, China has transformed itself from a centrally planned
economy into an emerging market economy. During this process, new
forces of competition have been injected into Chinese industries through
imports, market entries and various institutional arrangements. Inward
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become a crucial channel through
which a new competitive force is introduced from abroad. By exploring both
the new, as well as the ‘old’, forces of competition and the new competitive
situations emerging in Chinese industries, this study assesses the institutional
and economic characteristics of the Chinese model of development and
provides a particular interpretation of the much heralded – but less
understood – ‘Chinese miracle’. 
The primary aim of this study is to examine inward FDI as an industrial
phenomenon – how the introduction of a new competitive force through FDI
inflows influences the development of industries. It offers an interdisci-
plinary effort to advance the understanding of the FDI impact on industrial
development in emerging markets. Based on a multidimensional, dynamic
and comparative approach to analysing industrial advancement, this study
investigates in particular the development of two Chinese industries –
the automotive industry and the electronics and ICT sector. It illustrates the
critical role of the policy environment in determining the effects of inward
FDI. The policy environment at the industry level is largely defined by both
entry restrictions and trade barriers. This study suggests that, under certain
circumstances, multinational corporations and domestic firms might
collaborate to dominate a market, for instance by establishing international
joint ventures. This reinforces the problems of market dominance, regulatory
capture and welfare losses. This study also seeks to help policy makers
understand the evolution of industries and to provide a fact base for decision
making at both industry and national level. It advocates a more sophisticated
and competition-friendly framework of public policy, which requires both
the introduction of new institutions and the upgrading of existing policy
instruments. This framework is vital to ensure the contestability of markets,
to reap the benefits of FDI, to tackle the negative effects of FDI and to
promote long-term sustainable industrial development.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School
(Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus University
Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of
Management and the Rotterdam School of Economics. ERIM was founded
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts
and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the
management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and inter-firm
relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections. The
objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to
offer an advanced graduate program in Research in Management. Within
ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and Ph.D. candidates are active in
the different research programs. From a variety of academic backgrounds
and expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and
working at the forefront of creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-073-9
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